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Abstract 
This research project examines the dominant discourses of national identity and delineates the 
processes of othering in contemporary Turkey. It does this by following the various debates 
that have surfaced around women in Turkey. The data that informs this process consists of 
news coverage of selected case studies about women in mainstream Turkish newspapers. In 
doing so, the research also examines the role of women in the articulation of national 
boundaries. 
In doing this, the research builds on the arguments developed by studies of nationalism and 
postcolonial theory that focus on the close relationship between the discourses of nationalism, 
modernity and gender. 
The analysis of the case studies gives a clear, if not all comprehensive view, of the heated 
debates going on in Turkey, about what Turkishness entails, and where its identity can be 
located. While an unambiguous location does not emerge from the analysed data, the 
different proposals on the meaning of Turkishness which surface through the news stories 
point towards the opportunities, as well as the threats presented in the articulation of national 
boundaries. The research reveals that national imagination in Turkey today is still highly 
informed by the gender, ethnic and modernization discourses that have been anchored in the 
early years of the Republic. According to this, the symbolic role of women in representing 
the nation continues to form an obstacle to perceiving them as independent subjects. In 
discourses of national identity, whereas the ethnic understanding of Turkishness is largely 
clear and unquestioned, discourses about Turkey's modernity are more ambiguous and point 
to the hybrid character of the Turkish modernization project. The data also indicates an 
ambivalent relationship with Europe, which appears both as the desired locus of modernity 
and a source of threat - thus identifying with it and othering it at the same time. The analysis 
attempts to trace and interpret those ambivalences and point to where the possibilities for a 
more inclusionary understanding of national identity can emerge. 
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Two girls dressed in the colours of the Turkish Flag 
National Children's Day, 1983 
1 
Introduction 
In the very early days of this research I was given some clever advice: to write on a 
post-it note, in no more than one sentence, what I wanted to fmd out in my research 
and to stick it on the side of my computer to guide me through the coming years. 
Easy as it might sound, finding that perfect sentence that encapsulated my research 
turned out to be a truly frustrating experience. After several blocks of post-it notes 
had found their way to the waste paper bin, what ended up and stayed on the monitor 
for many years was a childhood photograph of my sister and I, dressed in the colours 
of the Turkish flag posing for our parents on National Children's Day. The picture 
was taken right after a ceremony at my primary school, where I had read a poem 
about the Turkish flag to a large crowd of parents, teachers and students gathered in 
the garden. As I read to my best acting ability, the poem about how I would readily 
shed my last drop of blood to protect my flag, my little sister was standing next to me 
trying to hold up an actual Turkish flag that was larger than her. At the end of the 
poem the crowd broke into loud applause, not a small victory for a ten year old! 
Coming down the platform, I even remember a watery eyed parent grabbing and 
hugging me and telling me how proud I made her feel. 
I grew up in the nineteen eighties, in the surreally nationalist post-military coup years 
in Turkey when every school day started with a loud reading of our pledge to the 
nation in the school garden. My parents are middle-class secularists, back then highly 
idealist, and strong believers in their nation. My mother, a blond woman with striking 
looks who could easily pass for being 'European', and my father, a dark, good 
looking and very intelligent man, are both grandchildren of settlers who were 
encouraged to migrate from the Ottoman provinces to Turkey in the early years of the 
Republic. Despite their totally different looks, with one side of my family originally 
from the Balkans and the other from the Eastern borders of the Empire, my parents 
never had any doubt as to the Turkishness of their ethnic origin - a thing that has 
always remained a mystery to me. Neither had a privileged background; my father 
had studied his way up from a rural Anatolian town to professional life in Istanbul, 
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and my mother, although from Istanbul, was no different. For this reason, they both 
felt strongly about their children's education and had high expectations from all of us. 
However, being the eldest child, and being the only one who really seemed to be into 
books, they especially had high expectations for me. They sincerely hoped that I 
would one day become an internationally applauded doctor, a surgeon if possible, 
who would work in a well-respected medical institution in Europe and make everyone 
proud back home. For me, this was the incarnation of the poem scene, only on a 
grander scale, and I must admit that as a child I found the 'applause' part quite 
appealing. I had no problems with making the whole nation proud either - in fact I 
quite enjoyed the idea. 
It was not until the early nineteen nineties that the role started to sound too restrictive, 
if not boring. For a university student, there were far more exciting routes to 
becoming internationally famous than being a heart surgeon and I no longer felt sure 
that I cared much about pleasing seventy million other people in Turkey. My parents 
resisted strongly, but in vain, to my 'liberalisation', and deep inside they still blame it 
on the Westemised education that I received. To my relief, and in time, their 
expectations faded leaving me with a curiosity about that perfect 'national daughter', 
which I once must have promised to be, and which is still longed for by many other 
people in Turkey today. 
This research is therefore a personal journey into that very picture taken more than 
twenty years ago. I started out with a series of questions, from why we were dressed 
up as Turkish flags in the first place, to why we see similar pictures on newspapers 
everyday, and what stories those pictures can tell us about national identity in 
contemporary Turkey. In this attempt, I have examined three case studies about 
debates occurring around the lives of various women in mainstream newspapers in 
Turkey. Even though none of the three cases are essentially on politics or on matters 
of government in the classic sense, the discussions formed around them are highly 
political in terms of their power for marking the boundaries of Turkish national 
identity. At the same time, the stories that have formed the data are also very much 
symptomatic of a recurring pattern in Turkey: debates raised around women, which 
are not necessarily about women, and often not by women themselves remain as a 
common motif in public discussion in Turkey. By examining those debates that 
3 
transcend the lives of women, who are the main characters in the stories, I wanted to 
delineate the practices of national othering and boundary making in Turkey. 
Following from this, the mam objective of this project can be described as an 
exploration into the articulation of national boundaries in contemporary Turkey, while 
at the same time observing how this process takes place through the bodies of women. 
The data that allows for this study is remarkably rich and diverse, with each of the 
three cases telling a different story: the first one narrates the distressing stories of 
women who committed suicide in Southeast Turkey; the second one tells an urban 
tale of a national athlete who raised herself from her rural town to competing at the 
European Championships, along with the heavy criticisms she received for her 
relationship with her married coach; and the last case which is about the weddings of 
three brides, two of whom are veiled in white wedding gowns, and all of whom have 
well-known political figures for fathers. While the particular stories might be quite 
unrelated to one another, they all converge around the ethno-nationalist, as well as 
modernist aspirations of Turkish national identity. They are united at the point in 
which these events have been turned into headline stories: all three reflect anxieties 
about the self-image, or identity, Turkey presents to itself and to the West through the 
women in the stories. Indeed, each of the three case studies introduces uncomfortable 
questions to the meanings of national identity and modernity in Turkey, and 
challenges the seeming harmony of the national unity from different grounds: the 
veiled brides can be seen as challenges to secularism and the accepted meaning of 
modernity, the national athlete's story resists the patriarchal discourses inherent in 
national identity, as well as contemporary class biases, while the suicides present the 
ultimate challenge to life in Turkey. The data analysis in chapters four, five and six, 
attempts to follow how these challenges are received, and how the journalists' try to 
reincorporate, negotiate with, or reject these alternative voices heard through the 
stories l . 
The third chapter explains the methodology chosen to deconstruct the data in these 
chapters, which is discourse analysis. This chapter also maps out the rationale 
I Because I will be giving separate introductions to the case studies in the relevant chapters I am 
avoiding detailed summaries here. 
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followed in developing the methodological framework, through a discussion of the 
concept of discourse as used in the works of Michel Foucault. As well as the issues 
encountered in applying the F oucauldian approach to empirical research, it will also 
review some of the more systematic research conducted within the school of Critical 
Discourse Analysis. Moreover, each chapter that focuses on an individual case study 
also provides a detailed description of the data and the particular methodological 
issues raised within that case study. 
While the readers might find the case studies the most engaging part of the project, 
the first two chapters are important in informing the deconstruction of data. In the 
first chapter, I try to sketch out a theoretical framework for understanding nationhood 
and national identity, drawing upon a plethora of research and theorizations in the 
field. The literature that has been used for this mainly comes from constructivist and 
discursive reviews of the nation. This literature foremost conceptualises nationalism 
as a discursive consciousness, or in Anderson's (1991) words, an 'imagination', that 
is comprised of an assemblage of manifold sub-discourses that may not always be 
consistent with each other, but nevertheless appear to be so. It also directs our 
attention to alternative versions of nationalism that circulate in society in everyday 
life, competing against the hegemonic version, turning national identity into a 
continuous process of negotiation. Such an understanding stresses the inherent 
ambivalence of the nationalist imagination, rather than seeing it as a unilinear and 
coherent ideology. Despite the need in nations to bind the community together 
around a certain and unchanging nationness, both the nation and its boundaries are 
strictly determined by their socio-cultural and historical context, requiring any 
definition to be always no more than a snapshot taken at that particular time frame. 
This is exactly what the case studies in this research offer to the readers. Secondly, it 
also sees the national process as an extension of the experience of modernity, 
resulting in relentless attempts to control that very experience through the enactment 
of boundaries, rules and national values to organize, sort and categorize the 
ambiguities that arise in that process. The deconstruction of the data in the three 
chapters attempt to interpret the debates around the news stories as part of this 
paradigm. 
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The second part of the first chapter moves away from the discussion of nations and 
nationalisms towards the rationale behind choosing the three cases about women. 
This discussion here presents a brief summary of the literature developed by feminist 
writers on the symbiotic relationship between gender and nation, and how women in 
different contexts have been seen as representatives of national boundaries. The 
symbolic role attributed to women becomes particularly poignant in national 
modernization projects, such as in the case of Turkey. 
Chapter two picks up from this discussion and contextualises the data by giving a 
background summary on Turkey's experience in nation building, and the role of 
women in this process. This chapter explains how in the early years of the Republic 
the definition of modem has taken the West as its reference point and appropriated it, 
privileging certain identities, while submerging, subordinating, marginalizing or 
devaluing certain others in this process (Kandiyoti 1999). Again, it is in these 
formative years that women were given the role of representing the newly crystallised 
national identity. While, as the chapter later discusses, the Republican formulation is 
today largely seen as inadequate and restrictive in binding the community together, 
the experience of the early years still continue to inform, and oversee the dominant 
discourses of modernity, nation and gender in Turkey. In the course of this, 
femininity turns into not the only but one of the best front seats to observe the latest 
debates on Turkishness, its defining virtues, and sins that need to be remedied. In 
short, the second chapter attempts to make the case studies more meaningful by 
immersing them within the Turkish context. 
As the readers will notice in the proceeding chapters, this research project has used 
literature form a number of fields, such as nationalism, post-colonial studies, 
feminism, and critical analysis of discourse, as well as research on Turkey, which 
have made this a strictly interdisciplinary project. However, I am hoping it will 
contribute to growing scholarship in at least a number of areas of research. Firstly, 
even though the data pertains strictly to the Turkish case, results of the analysis are 
important in showing how national boundaries, including inscriptions on ethnicity, 
culture and modernity, are constructed through, not outside gender. In this regard, the 
analysis can also contribute to the academic discussions that aim to bring gender into 
theories of nationalism and national identity. 
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N ext, the research also attempts to contribute to the burgeoning deconstructions of 
modernity and national identity in Turkey. As will be discussed in the second 
chapter, Republican discourses on modernity and nation, and the dichotomies of East 
and West along which meanings of modernness and national identity have been 
situated, have been heavily criticised in academic circles, especially over the past ten 
years. In fact, my attempt actually goes against the grain of what is now more 
fashionable in academic research about contemporary Turkey. Today, the 
contemporary presence of nationalism and discourses about modernity that take 
Europe as a reference point are taken for granted phenomenon in Turkey, which has 
resulted in a shift towards research on the hybrid experiences that are often regarded 
as more interesting, with an exceptional body of work stemming from ethnographic 
research2• While there can be no doubt about the need for examining new areas, we 
also need to bear in mind that the critical awareness of hegemonic discourses that put 
together national identity does not mean that they will disappear. Besides, without 
revisiting this now somewhat less fashionable site through analysis of contemporary 
data, we are in danger of freezing the dominant discourses within the framework of 
the early years of the Republic, and of missing out on the struggles, subtle changes, 
and possible openings for negotiation that take place in hegemonic inscriptions of 
modernity and national identity. 
In short, I am more interested in observing how the hegemonic imagination about the 
nation still continues to inform Turkish national identity today. The case studies bring 
together some of the most important fronts where hegemonic discourses of 
Turkishness are challenged and asked to negotiate - such as on religion, ethnicity, 
gender, and the meanings of Europe. In doing so it gives a clear, if not all 
comprehensive view, of the heated debates going on in Turkey, about what 
Turkishness entails, and where its identity can be located. While an unambiguous 
location does not emerge from the analysed data, the different proposals on the 
meaning of Turkishness which surface through the news stories do point towards the 
opportunities, as well as the threats presented in the articulation of national 
boundaries. Therefore, I am hoping that in my attempt to trace through these 
2 See among others Kandiyoti and Saktanber 2001; Saktanber 2002; White 2002 
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boundaries, which are constantly being broken, disrupted and rebuilt, this project will 
present its readers with valuable evidence on the discursive construction of national 
identity in Turkey, and provide a useful platform from which further questions for 
research on Turkey can be launched. 
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Chapter 1: 
Nation, boundaries and women -Sketching the frame 
In what follows I attempt to sketch out a theoretical framework for understanding nationhood 
and national identity as discursive constructs. I do this by drawing upon the plethora of theory 
and research that has emerged in the field over the last two decades. This will be followed by 
a brief summary of the literature on nation and gender, developed mainly by feminist writers. 
This section will explain the symbiotic relationship between the nation and gender, and 
examine the processes through which women are turned into prime representatives of national 
boundaries. In the final part, the discussion will focus on the role of women in national 
modernization projects in the postcolonial and Muslim world, where the role of women in the 
construction of symbolic boundaries becomes particularly complex and significant. These 
issues will be examined more in detail in the following chapter by examining the Turkish 
expenence. 
1.1 Conceptualising the nation 
"the image of the nation ( ... ) is a particular ambivalence that haunts the idea of the nation, the 
language of those who write it and the lives of those who live in it." (Bhabha 1990a: 1) 
The driving interest of this research has been to explore Turkey's national identity and the 
boundaries formed around that identity, moulding perceptions, identities, and limits of 
acceptability within the nation. All of this rests on a strong nationalist rhetoric that infiltrates 
all levels of cultural life in Turkey as evident through discussions in everyday newspapers. 
However, it would be very misleading to assume that Turkey is alone, or one of the few 
countries experiencing the current potency of nationalism. On the contrary, this is a 
Ubiquitous phenomenon peculiar neither to Turkey nor Turkish newspaper articles. The 
resurgence of nationalism, particularly in Europe following the end of the cold war, at a time 
when postmodernist perspectives had announced the end of grand narratives, has been an 
attractive area of investigation in the social sciences for some time. The year 1983 is usually 
cited as evidence of this academic outbreak with the publication of three core texts (Gellner 
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1983; Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983). What is more surprising, however, is the 
fact that debates in this area did not lose their appeal, but rather generated a continuing 
number of theorizations and textbooks on the topic. The consensus generated by these 
growing number of publications is that nationalism today, far from being passe, continues to 
remain an important and embedded force, forming "the endemic condition" in the established 
nations of the West (Billig 1995: 6). Apart from a few wishful arguments, such as 
Hobsbawm's (1990), that both nations and nationalism are a phenomenon past their peak, 
there seems to be near unanimous agreement in the mainstream literature. Moreover, in spite 
of the growth of globalisation and regional alliances like the European Union (whose power is 
once again being debated following the failure to ratify its constitution), the fundamental 
player in world-politics is still the nation state l . 
Given the scope and aims of this chapter, it is by no means possible to review all relevant 
theorizations in the mainstream literature that focus on the origins of nations in explaining 
their founding force of nationalism. Nevertheless, a necessary starting point is the work of 
modernists that attempt to expose and explain the novelty of nations, which is foremost for 
developing a discursive understanding of nationhood. 
Modernist approaches see nations and nationalism as recent historical phenomena and 
distinctive features of modem industrial society. As the forerunner of the modernist camp 
Ernest Gellner (1983) strongly argued, the nation as a natural and God-given political entity is 
nothing but a myth. For Gellner, nations as we know of today have been invented as a direct 
result of changing social conditions and the needs of the industrial society (ibid.). Of the 
other founding texts in the field, Hobsbawm & Ranger (1983), and Hobsbawm (1990) also 
criticised the naturalness and historical permanence of nations, arguing that they rest on 
invented histories. In a similar vein, Anderson (1991) explained nations as culturally created 
constructs. In doing so, the modernist perspective rejects outright the primordialist claims that 
set the base for nationalist rhetoric: that nations have always existed and therefore are natural 
entities. 
As Ozkirimli (2000: 64-5) points out, primordialism is an approach that includes a diversity of 
voices, extremists as well as less radical versions. For example, Shils advocated a less radical 
1 Many writers today, such as Mann (1996) or Ozkirimli (2005), emphasise the persistence rather than erosion of 
the power of the nation-state in the face of globalisation. 
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verSIOn of this approach in 1957, stating that nations have existed for a long time and 
therefore have their roots stretching back to ancient times. Smith (2001: 49-54) distinguishes 
this less radical version as perennialism, and includes Shils' work in this category while 
offering his ethno-symbolist approach as a third way in between modernism and perennialism. 
Smith has defended this position in his various books (see among others 1991, 1999, 2001), 
and Hutchinson (1994, 1996) also shares the ethno-symbolist approach. 
There are elaborate attempts to justify the ethno-symbolist position, including a strong 
emphasis on the various arguments it shares with the modernists, foremost on the "modernity" 
of the nation-state. However, the ethno-symbolist approach also argues for the importance of 
the longue duree and the pre-modem - pre-existing ethnies (ethnic communities) that form the 
basis of nations and determines their political success. Smith (1991: 71) describes this middle 
way as follows: 
"... if nationalism is part of the 'spirit of the age' it is equally dependent upon earlier motifs, visions 
and ideals. ( ... ) And while a new era opens with the arrival of nationalism, it is impossible to grasp its 
impact on the formation of national identity without exploring its social and cultural matrix, which 
have owed so much to the presence of pre-modem ethnies and the gradual emergence of national 
states in the West." 
In short, while this position agrees that the nation-state is a recent phenomenon, there is a 
particular emphasis on national roots that reach back into an ethnic past. Not surprisingly, the 
ethno-symbolist approach has been criticised for suggesting that the real ethnic cores of 
nations are buried in their history and origins (Ozkirimli 2003), for not paying enough 
attention to the discontinuities between modem and pre-modem understandings (Breuilly 
1996), and for supplying selective evidence to support these arguments (Laitin 2001). In 
agreeing with these criticisms, and despite parallels with the modernists on various issues, I 
find little use in embracing this approach in my analysis. 
As argued previously, modernists form the essential starting point in discursive understanding 
of nationhood. However, modernists do not form a uniform group. The range of perspectives 
in this group often complement one another while diverging in their emphasis on the 
conditions under which nation states came about, how they emerged and how they developed. 
In developing a theoretical framework for this research project, the works of Anderson 
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(1991), and Hobsbawm (1983; 1990), which emphasise the socially constructed character of 
nations, are particularly important. Their works have opened the floor to more recent studies 
that see nationalism as a discourse. They aim to deconstruct and analyse nationalism in a 
number of areas such as postcolonialism, gender and the media. Consequently these later 
studies, which are sometimes labelled as 'postmodernist debates on nationalism' for their 
deconstructivist approach (c.f. Spencer & Wollman 2002: 49; also Walker 2001), accept the 
nation-state as a central feature of modernity. At the same time, they direct their attention on 
to the nationalist discourses that have accompanied and underpinned its emergence. In return 
this has enabled further exploration and analysis of power relationships present in the 
discursive construction of the nation, particularly with regard to its boundaries, and the 
politics of inclusion and exclusion that are at play. 
In the following discussion, I attempt to map out the debates that offer a discursive 
understanding of the nation, starting with the constructivist works of Anderson and 
Hobsbawm, but also referring to other writers, such as Renan's voluntary nation ideal (1990) 
which Anderson also refers to. 
1.1.1 Explaining nation and nationalism 
Benedict Anderson's widely referenced book Imagined Communities, in which he describes 
nations and nationalism as "cultural artefacts" (1991: 4) has been profoundly influential, not 
only in studies of nationalism, but also in cultural studies. In his work, Anderson regards the 
nation as a novel phenomenon, one that emerged around the time of the Enlightenment and 
the French Revolution. His well-known argument is that a nation comes into existence when 
its members, despite never having met each other, imagine themselves as part of a 
"communion" - hence nations should be seen as "imagined communities" (1991: 6). Such a 
formulation is important not least for explaining nation-ness not as a political! ideological 
force but more as a sense of belonging which is strongly felt at an individual level by citizens. 
Nations are imagined as communities "because regardless of the actual inequality and 
exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal 
2 While this research project also shares parallel concerns, this is not to privilege all micro-scale analysis and 
deconstructions of nationhood. As Walker (2001: 615) warns, there are many different approaches to nationalism 
that favour deconstructivist interrogation, and not all of them are as convincing as the others. At its most 
extreme, postmodern readings of the nation can imply abandoning the possibility of any criticism altogether in 
favour of specifity and deconstruction. 
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comradeship" (1991: 7). It is this conception of fraternity, Anderson explains, that makes 
people ready to kill and die for their nations. 
What makes this sense of collectivity modem and different from previous religious and 
dynastic allegiances is the different apprehension of time and space. For Anderson, this is 
made possible only through material and cultural developments. Fundamental in this process 
was the spread of "print-as-commodity" (1991: 38). The printing of manuscripts, not only in 
Latin but also increasingly in the vernaculars to appeal to the masses, helped to bind the 
cognitive experience of collectivity in time and space. In particular the growth of novels and 
newspapers generated a shared simultaneity of experience and historicity. Furthermore, this 
new experience of nationhood also marked a political space with borders. Because nations 
are without exception "imagined as limited", encompassing "boundaries ( ... ) beyond which 
lie other nations", the bounded territoriality of this imagined space also needed to be 
sovereign, and represented by sovereign states (1991: 7). Therefore the national territory also 
legitimised the existence of the nation state. As Anderson discusses in detail in his book, the 
development of maps was especially significant in representing the new spatially bounded 
uni~. 
What has perhaps been the most fundamental contribution of Benedict Anderson's work is his 
formulation of nations as embedded in the cultural systems within which they "come into 
being" (1991: 12) through a collective believing in the reality of the nation, rather than as a 
result of self-consciously held political ideologies. Here, Anderson agrees that nations are 
invented, but sees this invention as a process of creation rather than simply as fabrication and 
falsity (1991: 6). All nations without a ranking of falsity-authenticity become alive through a 
socially constructed reality, which he finds equally strong: "all communities larger than face-
to-face contact . . . are imagined. Communities are to be distinguished, not by their 
falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined" (ibid.). Therefore Anderson 
not only formulates nations as imagined but also explains how they still can have such a 
profound appeal on its members, seeing nations as cultural constructs that arouse deep 
emotional attachments for their members. What makes nations such convincing, almost 
tangibly real entities is precisely the ways in which nations are imagined, and Anderson 
3 In Imagined Communities, see particularly chapter 10, "Consensus, Map, Museum" p. 163-185. 
13 
allows a good deal of discussion of the importance of the past in solidifying the imagined 
community. 
At this point, Anderson's arguments can be complemented by Hobsbawm and Ranger's edited 
book The Invention of Tradition (1983), which came out the same year as Anderson published 
Imagined Communities. In the introduction to their volume, Hobsbawm also sees nations and 
nationalism as constructs of 18th and 19th century modernity succeeding the Industrial 
Revolution. However, unlike Anderson, he does not describe this as a process subtly but 
powerfully taking place at a subconscious level among the citizens. On the contrary, 
Hobsbawm, like Gellner (1983), sees the construction of the nation as a process of social 
engineering4• This process is "often deliberate and always innovative" (ibid.: 13): it is led by 
the ruling elites who use and manipulate history and tradition to convince the populations to 
believe in the naturalness of their nations. This involves the re-interpretation, adjustment, and 
even invention of the nation's past and its traditions, so that a suitable historic continuity for 
the nation can be established. This restructuring process not only answers the present needs 
of the community, as envisioned by the elite, but also complies with future goals. However, 
Hobsbawm does not claim that this is a totally unprecedented phenomenon and notes that the 
'invention of traditions' always accompanied history. And yet he also points out that 
unsurprisingly this process became strikingly more frequent in the past 200 years. What the 
invention process does is to fill in the voids created by modernity and change: 
"we should expect it to occur more frequently when a rapid transformation of society weakens or 
destroys the social patterns for which 'old' traditions had been designed, producing new ones to which 
they were not applicable, or when such old traditions and their institutional carriers and promulgators 
no longer prove sufficiently adaptable or flexible, or are otherwise eliminated: in short, when there are 
sufficiently large and rapid changes on the demand or the supply side." (1983: 4). 
While the restructuring of history is not at central to Anderson's analysis as it is in 
Hobsbawm's, it is nevertheless a common argument in both works and described as a crucial 
process in the emergence of nations. Anderson finds the reconstruction of memory and 
history critical in the new form of national consciousness as this consciousness could only 
arise "when it was no longer possible to experience the nation as new, at the wave-top 
moment of rupture" (1991: 203). National genealogies are constructed to narrate the histories 
4 See also Hobsbawm (1990). 
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of nations, and amnesia becomes a common characteristic of this process. Renan had 
remarked a century ago that forgetting is essential in the formation of nations, the essence of 
which "is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten 
many things" (1990: 11). Following Renan, Anderson also agrees that forgetting becomes a 
need, or rather, a civic duty expected from the co-nationals5• 
To sum up, the necessary amnesia combined with the re-writing process creates for the nation 
a natural continuity in time as opposed to its cultural temporality. Yet, it also turns the nation 
into 'the modem Janus', with one face that gazes back into the primordial past and the other 
extending into an infinite future (Nairn cited in McClintock 1993: 65). For Anderson, the 
main source of the emotional appeal of nations lies precisely in this relationship with the past 
and the future. With this, nations overtook the most important function of religions: to answer 
the existential problem of fatality. Nations that "loom out of an immemorial past, and still 
more importantly, glide into a limitless future" invoke the links between "the dead and the yet 
unborn", and help to transform "fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning" (1991: 
11). Here, Anderson largely shares Hobsbawm's (1983, 1990) argument that the process of 
giving nations immortality is always shaped by the needs of the present. As Suny has also 
noted, in this process whatever actually happened becomes far less important than how it is 
remembered (2001: 864). To this, we can add that what is remembered from the past is not 
necessarily cherished wholeheartedly. For example, in the Turkish case, the past was re-
created through a careful separation of what was seen as the authentic/desirable culture and 
elimination of what was regarded as inadequate, backward or traditional in order to legitimise 
the necessary break with the unsuitable past and to transfer power to the new and modem 
nation state. That is why the national entity can only survive as long as its subjects strive to 
keep the "myths of the past" - whatever their content involves - alive (Sirman 2002: 239). 
Such a perception of the nation as a process of articulation, in which members all take part 
and receive emotional gains from it, takes us a step further and asks us to investigate how that 
construction process is undertaken, often without anyone noticing. 
Before we proceed, however, we must note that the argument on the construction of the nation 
as a cultural process has sparked intense debate in academic circles, with admiration and 
criticism of Anderson's work. His arguments are doubtless not without flaws and the 
5 For this discussion, see particularly chapter 11 in Imagined Communities, on "Memory and Forgetting", p.187-
206. 
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criticisms need to be taken into account to complement the mechanisms of control that take 
place behind the imagining. As will be discussed in the second part of this chapter, feminist 
writers have criticised his work for its masculine bias in missing the important role of gender 
in his formulation of imagined comradeship and fraternity while the postcolonial school, 
notably in the work of Chatterjee (1996), has criticised his work for its Western bias (c.f. 
Chakrabarty 2000). Breuilly (1996) raised a further criticism of Anderson for 
underestimating the power of political institutions in the wake of nationalism and instead 
giving priority to cultural transformations. For Breuilly nations will not have much power 
unless there is a political movement picking up ideas about the nation to negotiate with 
government and build support within society (ibid.). 
The discussion in this chapter attempts to take these criticisms on board, and not to regard 
Anderson's theory as 'the' theory of nationalism. In fact, there hardly exists any such theory 
that fits all cases. In particular the role of the elite in the construction of the nation, as 
emphasised by Hobsbawm (1983, 1990) and Gellner (1983) cannot be dismissed. This is 
crucial to the Turkish experience. However, with an emphasis on culture as the locus of the 
nation's articulation, what Anderson's work does is to free the focus from state institutions 
and allow us to explore the various ways in which nations are imagined in everyday life, some 
of which are state led, some of which are not. 
1.1.2 Discursive construction of the nation 
Whatever the particular relationship with the past, the crucial thing is that the members of the 
nation should have the will, "the consent to continue a common life" (Renan 1990: 19). That 
is why it becomes essential that the nation is reproduced in everyday life in a myriad of ways 
to constantly renew this consent "until it becomes as ordinary and quotidian as the water in 
which fish swim" (Suny 2001: 871). 
This reproduction of the nation takes place on two levels, which though not exclusive are 
largely overlapping processes. Firstly, the importance of political actors and the intellectual 
elite has been emphasised as a major force in fostering the reproduction process particularly at 
the formative stages of the nation. This includes the cultural institutions of the nation-state -
schools, which teach the national curriculum, museums, which uphold national heritage, or 
statues and memorials, which mark national territory are some of the examples that are led by 
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the elite6• However, the reproduction of the nation cannot only be limited to conscious efforts 
of the state and its elite. As consent needs to be continuously renewed, ordinary citizens join 
in the daily reproduction of the nation, most remarkably through mediated means, as in the 
case of Anderson's reading public. Billig (1995) calls this inconspicuous reproduction of 
nationhood ""Banal Nationalism". He argues that it is not through the obvious signs - such as 
a national flag being waved - that the nation is powerfully reproduced, remembered and 
reconfmned, but rather through the most mundane ways of thinking and talking and the 
overlooked habits of everyday life such as the national flag that hangs unnoticed in the public 
building, or number plates, or national currencies, or the daily stories in newspapers that are 
not necessarily about political events. F or Billig these paraphernalia of everyday life not only 
keep us from forgetting where we belong, but also silently form the backdrop of our everyday 
lives. 
In short, imagining the nation emerges not only as a predominantly cultural process, but also 
as a continuous one, involving numerous mechanisms that usually go unquestioned while 
allowing its subjects to identify with the nation. It becomes, ""part of a wider ideological, 
discursive consciousness", in which, ""nations, national identities and national homelands 
appear as natural" (Billig 1995: 10; also see Suny 2001). This discursive consciousness keeps 
us from questioning the main claim of sameness within the nation, in terms of its culture, 
history, aspirations, sentiments and ideas, and presents the nation as a culturally coherent 
community. In doing so, it legitimises not only the political power of the nation-state, but 
also our natural - and naturally expected - attachment to and identification with the nation. 
This discursive consciousness, or the way of thinking that naturalises the idea of the nation, 
and legitimates the operations of power within it, is what is called nationalism 7. 
Such a conceptualisation opens up many different areas for exploration. It is only when we 
start thinking about nationalism in terms of a discursive consciousness, that we can see the 
articulation of national boundaries as not only a top-down process through the state 
apparatuses, but also one that operates through the dispersed mechanisms of power weaving 
reproduced through the routines of everyday life. At the same time the discursive definition 
6 See Ozkirimli (2002) for a similar and more detailed description of the process of nation-building and everyday 
life, discussed with regard to Turkey. See Gellner (1983) for discussion of the dissemination of a standard 
national culture by the intellectual elite. 
7 Today, contemporary writers mainly refer to nationalism as a discursive formation. See, for example, Calhoun 
(1997), Wodak et. al. (1999), Ozkirimli (2000, 2003, 2005), Suny (2001) and Delanty & O'Mahony (2002). 
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points to two conclusions about nationalism. Firstly, that perceiving nationalism as a 
discourse, not as one unilinear and coherent ideology, allows us to explore the different sub-
discourses that put it together and that do not necessarily form a coherent whole. As Delanty 
& O'Mahony also argue, it should be: 
"( ... ) conceived as a semantic space, that expresses through manifold discourses the many 
kinds of projects, identities, interests and ideologies that make it up" (Delanty & O'Mahony 
2002: xv; also see Calhoun 1997: 23). 
Therefore nationalism emerges as an assemblage of many other sub discourses that are only 
loosely united, forming, in Suny's words, a "cluster of ideas and understandings that came to 
surround the signifier 'nation' in modem times (roughly post-1750)" (2001: 870). This is 
especially important when analysing different contexts, as the particular assemblage of 
nationalism will be determined by the specific culture that it is rooted in. This does not just 
entail considering the cultural particularities of the context as local details, but also requires us 
to see nationalism operating with different dynamics in each society. For instance, in 
studying English nationalism Kumar (2003) proposes a new variety, which he calls imperial 
or missionary nationalism, in order to take the imperial heritage of the English into account. 
Acknowledging the varying demands and forms of nationalism also answers one of the main 
criticisms postcolonial studies brings to the existing works on nationalism, namely that we 
should stop universalising Western categories from our Eurocentric perspective and examine 
"each nationalist movement in its own terms and its own local language" (Parekh, cited in 
Walker 2001: 626). Indeed, as Kumar (2003) has shown these categories cannot even be 
universalised for the Western world. On this, Chatterjee (1996) has argued that postcolonial 
nationalisms differ largely because of the dilemma they suffer in struggling to keep the 
postcolonial nation's cultural sovereignty and uniqueness from the West, while at the same 
time trying to define it as modem and on a par with the Western world. Similarly the case of 
Turkey, and its particular nation building experience gives Turkish nationalism very different 
dynamics when compared with other nation states, making gender, modernity and Europe the 
indispensable categories for analysis. Therefore nationalisms take different forms in their 
cultural settings, asking us to foreground different variables in their analysis. 
Second, we should also consider the possible volatility of the assemblage. Because of its 
discursive nature, nationalism can never be dominated by anyone state project but remains 
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indeterminate, recalcitrant, and codified by a whole range of social actors in various ways 
(Delanty & O'Mahoney 2002: 8). If nationalism can take a diversity of forms, not only will 
the nationalism in France be different to the nationalism in Turkey, but also within Turkey (or 
France), there can be different nationalisms envisioning the nation in different ways within 
the same time frame. Contrary to claims of the commonness of nationalism, the web of 
multiple and contradictory forces operating in everyday life allows for different, alternative 
and resistant assemblages that answer the different needs and desires about the nation. In 
other words, there will always be dominant discourses of nationalism and interpretations of 
what constitutes the nation and alternatives resisting it, all competing for hegemony within the 
borders of the nation state, but without any of them securing it forever. Therefore imagining 
the nation turns into a continuous process that cannot stop once the nation is set and is always 
in need of justification and reconfirmation. This again brings us back to Renan's stress on the 
importance of consent: whatever its particular rhetoric holds, a nationalist discourse can 
become effective only as long as it can appeal to solidarity among the co-nationals, 
demanding collective action when necessary. In return, the nation becomes a "daily 
plebiscite" (Renan 1990: 19). Through this process, the alternatives can, in time, bend and 
transform the hegemonic imagining that is sponsored by the nation state, allowing consent to 
be renewed (though only provisionally) with variations each time. 
From this, the conclusion follows that there can not be one but many nationalisms, differing 
both vertically and horizontally, all of which are only unified by the way they work through 
discourses8• This is why it is impossible to formulate clear-cut definitions for neither 
nationalisms, nor nations themselves. Nor can we find anyone discourse of nationalism - or 
following Bhabha - anyone privileged narrative of the nation that can adequately explain its 
myriad and contradictory historical forms (1990a). Here we can also refer to Katherine 
Verdery's (1996) quite relevant discussion in which she attempts to clarify the concepts of 
nations and nationalism. Verdery offers to see the concept of nation itself as "a potent symbol 
and basis of classification within an international system of nation states" (1996: 226). As a 
symbol, it links the state with the subjects, differentiates them from other subjects, while at 
the same time legitimating different social actions and movements. She argues that the nation 
works as a symbol because it is ambiguous in meaning "therefore people can mobilize 
disparate audiences (both internal and international) who think that they understand the same 
8 See Calhoun (1997: 20-23), Ozkirimli (2000a: 231), and Wodak et. al. (1999) for specific discussions on this. 
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thing by it" (1996: 227). Suny (2001) has a similar definition, if slightly different in the 
choice of concepts, where he argues that beyond the particular narratives of nations remains 
the meta-narrative: the discourse of the nation. 
While such attempts at definition might seem to strip away the general understanding of 
nation to nothing, it actually lets us see beyond the definition of nation and instead examine 
the carefully concealed varieties. Exploring the varieties within the same national context 
takes us right into the heart of the power struggles for change. In other words, defining 
nationalism as a discourse offers us a theoretical framework within which we can 
contextualise, understand and interpret change - how it occurs, how it is suppressed, and how 
it resists this suppression. It lets us analyse the mechanisms through which such struggles 
between the homogenizing forces of the nation and the resisting, alternative understandings of 
the nation take place. But above all, by exposing the process of continuous negotiation it 
allows us to examine the processes of identification. How does the nation relate to different 
identity categories, which, as Verdery (1996) notes, are also axes of social differentiation? 
How does it ask for identification from its subjects? What are the conditions under which 
alternatives are created? With these concerns in mind we can start to analyse nationalism as 
the continuous construction of boundaries, not only between its citizens and foreigners but 
also among (and for) its citizens. 
1.1.3 The nation, its subjects and its boundaries - A shared national identity 
Why do people willingly identify with the nation? If we agree with Suny that "self-
identification is not a simple, rational calculation" but one that is "deeply implicated in 
emotional attachment and subjective preferences" (2001: 868), the answer seems to lie in its 
emotional appeal. The concept of nation holds an almost concrete, tangible reality for people 
-a point that has also been briefly discussed in reviewing Anderson's (1991) work, 
particularly with regard to the seemingly eternal nature of the nation. For Calhoun 
nationalism; 
"( ... ) moves people emotionally, not least because it provides a sense of location in a large and 
complex world and an enormous reach of history. ( ... ) it is a positive source of meaning -and even 
sometimes an inspiration- and of mutual commitment among very large groups of people. If it were 
merely illusion and manipulation, it could not have the power it does." (1997: 18) 
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The symbol of nation no doubt continues to offer a powerful source of identification and a 
sense of belonging for people in an increasingly changing world. The fact that nationhood is a 
discursive construction certainly does not weaken its emotional appeal for people who believe 
in it and identify with it. It offers the comfort of categorical identities, which provides "a 
guarantee that the world isn't falling apart as rapidly as it sometimes seems to be" (Eley & 
Suny 1996: 31). In other words, the appeal of the nation, and the appeal of sharing its sense 
of nationality, lies in nationalism's ability to extend a sense of security to its citizens, offering 
them the chance to participate in the nation's cultural superiority, historicity, homogeneity 
and uniqueness. As Eley & Suny (ibid.) have argued, these claims all depend on the 
"reservoir of cultural meanings" that lie at the heart of the nation building process, and make 
the identification with the nation not only possible, but also to appear natural: 
''National identification is clearly a matter of sensibility in this sense- something transmitted from the 
past and secured as a collective belonging, something reproduced in myriad imperceptible ways, 
grounded in everydayness and mundane experience. ( ... ) A common memory of belonging, borne by 
habits, customs, dialects, song, dance, pastimes, shared geography, superstition, and so on, but also 
fears, anxieties, antipathies, hurts, resentments, is the indistinct but indispensable condition of 
possibility. Securing the existence of the nation, mobilizing the nation politically, presumes a long-
accumulating identity in this way, one that can be brought to visibility both spontaneously and by 
concerted agitation." (1996: 22) 
Nationalism presents this "long-accumulating identity" as an unchanging essence, or what 
Paul Ricoeur calls fa memete- a sameness that is built on the ideas of relations, and of 
relations of relations and that remain continuous over time9• As an embodiment of this 
essence, the nation also represents the collectivity/ its citizens, its values and norms, and its 
true character. In doing so nationalism assumes commonness among its members, with a 
shared culture, common traditions, ancestry, and goals - hence it becomes only commonsense 
to remind the citizens to identify with characteristics represented by the nation, which 
members are already expected to share. As discussed in the previous section, nationalism's 
continuous reminding and refreshing of our awareness of 'who we are' takes place in culture 
and on an everyday level. The consequence of this is that the claims of national identity and 
9 See Denis-Constant Martin (1995: 7), and Bauman (1992: 677) who borrows Ricoeur's formulation in 
explaining national identity. 
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our identification with it are embedded in the familiar and are therefore often overlooked 
details of cultural experience. 
However, this cohesive entity called the nation, like for all identity categories, can only exist 
dialectically with the other by acknowledging itself as an "other" among many others. 
Ricoeur calls this l'ipseite, selfhood, that of differentiating oneself from the identity of the 
others (Martin 1995: 7). 10 After all, as Anderson had noted, nations have boundaries beyond 
which other nations and in return nationals of those nations lie (1991 :7). Just like all 
collectivities, national identities also define their characteristics in relation to what they 
consider as existing or remaining outside the nation, with references to spatial, temporal, or 
cultural boundaries 11. That is why the content of national identity will be, "more often than 
not, a counter-image of what is seen as distinctive in the culture of other nation or nations" 
(Kumar 2003: ix). In short, the collective identity of the nation, no matter how attractive its 
invented characteristics are, needs its boundaries to be provided by others. In the relationship 
between nationalism and nation, Bauman argues that l'ipseite (difference) even "precedes and 
conditions la memete" (sameness) (1992: 677). As he underlines, the resulting national 
identity demands "unequivocal allegiance", and does not tolerate competition, let alone 
opposition - the articulated divisions carefully separate the friends of the nation, the "we-
ness" from the "outer circle" of enemies, "they-ness", through an exclusive relationship, 
which is often actively led by the state (2004: 22; also 1992: 678)12, 
10 Here, we have to note that Ricoeur was not the fIrst writer who argued about identity. Following the influence 
of Sigmund Freud's work on identification, identity has been a major area of discussion in the 20th Century 
French philosophical movement, particularly in psychoanalytical theory and especially in the works of Jacques 
Lacan. Although from a different point of approach, Lacan also argued that the self cannot exist without the 
realisation of -and always in dialectical relationship to- the existing other (See, for example Lacan, 1987). 
However, compared to Lacan's challenging writings on subjectivity, Ricoeur's hermeneutical approach, which 
describes identity as a form of narrative always constructed by its plot, offers an inspirational and more 
accessible way of thinking about social identity categories. Bauman (1992), and Constant-Martin (1995) both 
use Ricoeur's formulation in discussing national identity, as well as Wodak et aI., who refer to his work, while 
warning against a wholehearted adaptation of his arguments to national identity (See Wodak et aI. 1999: 13). 
11 Both Handler (1994: 29) and Martin (1995: 12,13) note that national identity is often defmed with reference to 
boundaries that refer to the past! historical roots, space/ geographical boundaries, and cultural traits which 
p,rovide internal homogeneity. 
2 Bauman particularly emphasises the role of the state in national identification, i.e. in confirming the 
membership to the nation through identity cards and passports, while asking other, 'smaller' identitie~ to 
conform to the dominant national identity. For Bauman, the smaller identities ''were encouraged and/or obhged 
to seek endorsement-followed-by-protection from the state authorised offices, and thereby to obliquely confrrm 
the superiority of 'national identity' relying on royal or republican charters, state diplomas and state-endorsed 
certificates." (2004: 22) 
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This makes the construction of difference a fundamental concern in studies of nationalism. 
Since the other is regarded as imminently threatening to cross the boundaries of the nation 
, 
hostility towards the others is exuberantly supported and upheld by nationalism. Seyla 
Benhabib does not exaggerate when noting the dangers: 
'Since every search for identity includes differing oneself from what one is not, identity politics is 
always and necessarily a politics of creation of difference. One is a Bosnian Serb to the degree to 
which one is not a Bosnian Moslem or a Croat. ... What is shocking about these developments is not 
the inevitable dialectic of identity/difference that they display but rather the atavistic belief that 
identities can be maintained and secured only by eliminating difference and otherness. ... The 
negotiation of identity/difference is the political problem facing democracies on a global scale.' (Cited 
in Wodak et al. 1999: 2,3) 
Wars provide the extreme case for observing not only the clear boundaries between "us" and 
"others", but also the collective identification with the nation against the enemy. Yet, 
collective identification against the other is not limited to wars. International sporting events 
are also excellent examples where communal imagination is set alight and bonds of belonging 
are strengthened (Blain et al. 1993:12; see also MacClancy 1996). Similar examples can be 
found in other international contests, such as beauty pageants, where contestants' praise for 
their countries becomes a performance to the international audience (See Wilk 1993). 
At the same time, national identity is not necessarily aroused through obvious displays of 
collective identification. In fact, it mostly remains embedded in the subtle details of culture, 
covering a wide range of activities in daily life, including customs or traditions as well as the 
most trivial details of the quotidian realm. In a quite wonderful article on dishwashing habits 
in Sweden Linde-Laursen (1993) looks at exactly this. Linde-Laursen starts his analysis with 
a personal encounter in which, as a Dane, he attempts to help with the dishes in a friend's 
house in Sweden one evening. He ends up being criticised for washing it "the Danish way" 
and is taught the right -and "Swedish" - way of washing the dishes. Arguing that there is no 
absolute cleanliness, but only a social construction of it, he finds that Swedish dishwashing 
habits had been officially advised through home economics guidelines in the nineteen forties. 
These guidelines had recommended rinsing the dishes before and after washing, and air-
drying them for reasons of hygiene, as opposed to the Danish habit of rinsing only before 
washing and afterwards hand-drying the dishes. This in time had allowed a boundary to 
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develop on the basis of cleanliness between the Swedes, who saw themselves as cleaner and 
therefore more civilized than the Danes. Linde-Laursen's case study is a good example for 
showing how a nation's habits and identity can be modelled after an understanding of 
civilizational progress. But it is also perfect for showing once again that national identity is 
not always constructed painstakingly by the state and its agencies. In this case, even though 
the Swedish state had advocated the adoption of certain housekeeping rules, the appropriation 
of these as a marker of national identity and as a marker of difference had been culturally 
articulated. 
If the trivial habits of daily life form one arena for the constant fashioning and reaffirmation 
of national identity, popular culture forms another. However, as Edensor (2002) has rightly 
criticised, mainstream writers of nationalism have not paid enough attention to popular 
culture, either ignoring the importance of culture in the formation of national identity, or 
focusing solely on folk or elite cultures 13 • In his book, Edensor argues that "national identity 
is being redistributed in a cultural matrix" and an important part of this process is popular 
culture, or "low culture" (ibid.: vii). Examining the symbolic objects of popular culture, such 
as cars in American and British contexts, he explores how these "can be reincorporated into 
national identity, can be adopted and adapted in different national contexts, both practically 
and symbolically, and drawn into particular affective relationships which cohere around ideas 
about national car cultures" (ibid.: 137). By focusing on the redistribution of national identity 
in popular culture, Edensor's work emphasises the fleeting nature of national identity and 
boundaries. Following Clifford, Edensor argues that if we are to agree that culture is not "a 
rooted body that grows, lives, and dies," but is rather "a site of displacement, interference and 
interaction", then national identity will also have to be multiple and dynamic (Clifford cited in 
ibid.: 2). Indeed, if national identity is articulated nowhere farther than the popular culture 
products we consume everyday, such as movies, exhibits, or the cars we drive, then it can be 
no more fixed or singular than culture itself. Therefore, Edensor concludes that 
acknowledging the importance of popular culture in everyday life also allows us to track the 
oppositions to national identity that culture will always harbour. 
13 "There is no doubt that historically, in the first instance, there were attempts to fonnulate a nationally codified 
body of knowledge which foregrounded 'high' culture. However, once the nation is established as a common-
sense entity, under conditions of modernity, the mass media and the means to develop and transmit popular 
culture expands dramatically, and largely escapes the grip of the state, being transmitted through commercial and 
more infonnal networks." (Edensor 2002: 4) 
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This takes us from the issue of positive identification with the nation, as officially approved 
by the state, to the creativity, tension and change that everyday life allows for in the 
conceptualisation of national identity. In fact, it takes us right back to the formulation of 
identity as a dynamic and relational process - because the Self is bound by a dialectical 
relationship with the Other, and neither can exist on its own, their interaction over the course 
of time will demand that in order for continuity to exist, transformations will be inevitable and 
necessary (Martin 1995: 7). National identity, like all social identities, involves this 
communicative process, which should not be seen as an abstract relationship between 
communities. Because national identity requires human agency, it will continuously be 
formed through identification of its subjects with the "national" on an everyday basis, at the 
same time continuously transforming it. Therefore change is not only inevitable but also 
ever-present in the construction of national identities14. 
In what follows, I intend to expand further on this discussion with a focus on subjects and 
their negative identifications, which, in producing "internal others" for the nation, become the 
major motor of change. 
1.1.4 Allowing for Change 
It would be falsely pessimistic to assume that the "trump card of nationality,,15 always wins 
over other, unapproved forms of identification in the game of identity. That would, in fact, be 
the utopia of nationalists. Based on a common ground of understanding as to what identity, as 
an analytical category means, writings on the discursive nature of national identity today 
agree that in spite of all claims of sameness and efforts to eliminate difference, in reality 
neither national identity (nor its others) can ever be uniform. It will always remain internally 
divided, always including other nationalisms and identities than the preferred or dominantly 
accepted ones for the imagined nation formed according to different audiences, settings, 
14 Stuart Hall's (1996) now well-known and much-cited formulation succinctly maps out this relationship 
between identity and identification. Basing his discussion on a discursive (and largely Foucauldian) framework, 
Hall argues that social and collective identities are dependant on an identification process that is always open to 
change and is always in process. This defmition sees identification as temporary attachments to different 
discourse positions offering different identities in culture. The openness of identification, in return, prevents 
identity from being an essence ''unfolding from beginning to end through all the vicissitudes of history without 
change; the bit of the self which remains always-already 'the same', identical to itself across time" (ibid.: 3). 
Since people will not identify with the nation in the same way, let alone forever, national identity can never be 
fixed, and will always remain as a project. 
15 Calhoun's metaphor (1997: 46) 
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topics and substantive contents (Wodak et al. 1999: 4). Dis-identification is as much a part of 
the process of national identity as are positive forms of identifying with legitimate perceptions 
of the nation. That is why nations are nothing but "hybrids of identity" where ''the idea of a 
homogenous 'pure' identity on the individual or collective level" remains "a deceptive fiction 
and illusion" (ibid: 16). Today these hybridities are said to be enhanced due to the forces of 
globalisation, which challenge the dominant nationalist discourse's singUlar and fixed 
reflection of a national culture. 
On the part of the nationalist discourse, the existing differences can either be ignored or 
suppressed in favour of the national, or isolated as "internal others". This means the 
difference threatening the order of the community is not only attributed to 'foreigners' that 
exist outside the geographical boundaries of the nation. Those who remain within the national 
borders but are culturally different from 'us' can also provide sources of threat. In fact, as 
Bhabha notes, the 'other' seldom lies outside or beyond the nation; but rather "emerges 
forcefully, within cultural discourse, when we think we speak most intimately and 
indigenously 'between ourselves'" (l990a: 4). However, the boundaries of the internal others 
are usually not as clearly marked as the external ones, and being closer than the external 
sources of threat, the repressed and internal others continuously threaten to reappear and 
challenge the conformity of the nation. What results is, in Pierson's words, "a national subject 
beset with tensions and ambiguities, exclusions and inclusions" (2000: 43). 
For Bhabha, it is these hybridities and contradictions inherent in the nation that turn it into a 
text that is ceaselessly narrated in daily life and sees this continuous negotiation of identity 
and difference as an "ambivalence that haunts the idea of the nation, the language of those 
who write it and the lives of those who live in it" (l990a: 1). In this regard, perhaps one of 
the strongest arguments Bhabha brings, and one that has a significant relevance to the Turkish 
context, is his direct linkage of modernity and the narration of the nation. He finds the claims 
of the nation, such as "progress, homogeneity, cultural organicism, the deep nation, the long 
past", as no more than ''justifications of modernity ( ... ) that rationalise the authoritarian, 
'normalising' tendencies within cultures in the name of national interest" (l990a: 4). Any 
challenge from the margins to the boundaries will be an intervention into those justifications 
of modernity and will be seen as a threat to the modernity the nation claims to represent at the 
centre. Yet, Bhabha sees this arbitrariness, the "impossibility of closure" again as a part of 
the progression of modernity, and not only an inevitable but also a desirable part of it (ibid.: 
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1). Since the nation defines itself with respect to what is inside and outside, unsettlement and 
contestation from its margins will eventually force the centre to change and re-draw its 
boundaries. Therefore, it is at the boundaries that the nation is really narrated: 
"It is from this incommensurability in the midst of the everyday that the nation speaks its disjunctive 
narrative. It begins, if that's the word, from that anterior space within the arbitrary sign, which disturbs 
the homogenizing myth of cultural anonymity. From the margins of modernity, at the insurmountable 
extremes of storytelling, we encounter the question of cultural difference as the perplexity of living, 
and writing, the nation." (1990b: 311) 
Bhabha's formulation offers a valuable insight into exploring the porous boundaries of 
national identity. This account of the nation, not only as a construction but as construction 
through negotiation helps us avoid limiting our analysis to the consequences of positive 
identification with the nation, and allows us also to explore the frictions and changes that are 
taking place at the centre as a result of its interaction with the peripheries16• At the same time, 
we should be aware that the counter-narratives produced at the margins, even as they radically 
challenge the dominant discourses of nation and nationalism "do not necessarily have to be 
progressive in their message" (Yuval-Davis 1997: 58)17. In analysing the peripheries and 
their power to transform the meanings of nation and modernity there is a need to avoid 
celebrating the margins through sheer optimism and to analyse critically the relationships of 
power inherent in the counter-narratives of national identity. This does not diminish the 
analytical importance of contestation: in analysing discursive construction of nationhood, 
exploring the openings for change inside the national framework is necessary and important 
irrespective of the particular messages involved inside the narratives. 
Before we go into the second part of the discussion in this chapter, it might be important to 
briefly summarise the main arguments posited up to now. So far, this discussion has 
attempted to sketch out a particular conceptualisation of the nation that allows us to think of 
nationalism, national identity and national boundaries as discursively constructed phenomena. 
Such a perception favours a heavy stress on the importance of the everyday as a construction 
site for nationhood, where ongoing contestations, differentiations and cultural exchanges 
16 Here, even though my discussion, and the research project as a whole focuses on the centre where dominant 
discourses of the nation are reproduced, I am not implying that change only happens at the centre, and the 
margins/peripheries are themselves immune to transformation upon meeting with the centre. 
17 Such a word of caution also accompanies the deconstructions of national identity in Turkey (c.f. Bozdogan & 
Kasaba 1997). 
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within the national space result in the continuous re-defining of the dominant meanings of 
nation, national identity and its boundaries. That is why, as Lofgren argues, 
"Instead of looking at "the national" just as a cultural category or a social identity, we might view it as 
an arena on which different interests, loyalties and strategies are acted out, an arena where the national 
is played off against, fused, contrasted or combined with other kinds of identities: class, gender, 
region, religion, generation etc. It is this chameleonic nature of the national which also may create a 
false continuity: "the national question" is always rephrased and reorganized according to the 
contemporary situation." (1993: 191) 
With these concerns, I now intend to focus on gender, which forms one of the major sites of 
boundary building for the nation, as well as a main contributor to its symbolic dimension. 
1.2 The role of gender in conceptualising the nation 
Conceptualising nationhood as a discursively constructed entity allows new grounds for 
exploration, one of which is the interaction of nationalism with gender discourses. In one of 
her articles, Enloe rightly remarks that the development of nationalism cannot be fully 
understood without looking into what goes on in the kitchen and the bedroom (2000b: 194) -
two of the most common locations of everyday life and also the iconic sites of the private 
sphere where gender relationships are firmly fixed. The point Enloe is trying to make is 
indeed acknowledged by all serious debates on nationalism today. In the past fifteen years, 
and mostly through the works of feminist writers like Enloe herself, it is now agreed that 
nations are gendered constructs and operate on embedded gender hierarchies, excluding 
women from access to resources of the state and denying them the right to power. 
Furthermore, feminist writers have also stressed that the gendering of the nation is not a 
simple process, but depends on a "symbiotic relationship" between gender, sexuality and 
nationalism: not only are the discourses on gender and sexuality shaped by forces of 
nationalism, but they are also fundamental in shaping nationalism and the construction of 
national identities 18. 
18 See Sirman (2002); also, among others, see Yuval-Davis & Anthias (eds.) (1989: 1), Walby (1996), Yuval-
Davis (1997), Ranchod-Nilsson & Tetreault (2000). 
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For feminist scholars, the driving concern behind analysing nationalism with regard to 
discourses of gender has largely been to understand women's participation in national 
projects, and their often-subordinate position in politics and as citizens. At the same time, 
feminist writing on nationalism has been quite diverse, mostly because the scholarly work is 
predominantly in the form of empirical case studies, their fragmented character reflecting the 
diversity of national contexts and particular gender experiences. Given the diversity of writing 
in the field, Ranchod-Nilsson (2000) makes a helpful distinction between the two waves of 
feminist writing on nationalism. The first of these waves includes the works produced during 
the 1970s and early 1980s, and which illuminated the role of women in terms of active or 
more hidden forms of involvement in national liberation struggles, particularly in the former 
colonial world. Analysed through case studies, these writings highlighted "the connections 
between modernization, feminism, and nationalism: and the location of politics within the 
household" (ibid.: 166-7). The common concern in this first current of works, including 
Jayawardena's (1986) well-known comparative analysis, Feminism and Nationalism in the 
Third World, was to understand the meanings of women's participation during nationalist 
movements and their aftermath, the state consolidation period, in terms of women's access to 
decision making authority and resources. Following this, in the late 1980s and under the 
influence of postmodernism, postcolonial and cultural studies, a second wave of feminist 
works on nationalism emerged (Ranchod-Nilsson 2000). Here the focus shifted from 
women's participation in nationalist movements to how the various meanings of the nation, 
the state or citizen are shaped by specific gender identities in different contexts. This, 
Ranchod-Nilsson argues, has required a re-conceptualisation of the nation as contingent, with 
shifting boundaries where the "embedded gender meanings inform not only nationalist 
movements, but also continuing struggles over just who constitutes "insiders" and "outsiders" 
and where the fluid identity boundaries of "the nation" get drawn." (ibid.: 167) 
Particularly during this phase of the feminist deconstruction of nationalism, discussions often 
build on the core argument that nationalism and the institutions of the nation state are based 
on a patriarchal order conceptualising the national community as masculine. It is this 
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inherently gendered conceptualisation that results in the subordination of female citizens. 19 
Enloe, in a well-known formulation, describes nationalism as a construct that ''typically has 
sprung from masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation and masculinized hope" 
(2000a: 44). Likewise, McClintock expands on the argument that nationalism has been from 
the very start constituted as a gendered discourse: 
"All nationalisms are gendered, all are invented and all are dangerous- dangerous ( ... ) in the sense of 
representing relations to power and to the technologies of violence. ( ... ) All nations depend on 
powerful depictions of gender. Despite nationalism' ideological investment in the idea of unity, 
nations have historically amounted to the sanctioned institutionalisation of gender difference." (1993: 
61) 
While exposing the differential treatment of men and women by the nationalist discourse, 
feminist studies also developed a strong critique of the existing mainstream analysis of 
nationalism for its plain negligence of gender (see among others McClintock 1993; Walby 
1996; Yuval-Davis 1997; Ranchod-Nilsson & Tetrault 2000io. Ironically, as McClintock also 
points out, nationalism's masculine bias is even evident in these mainstream writings, where 
nationhood is taken for granted to be a "male phenomenon" (1993: 62). The masculine bias 
particularly surfaces in Anderson's work, where he describes the nation as a homo-social 
form of male bonding, "a deep, horizontal comradeship ... a fraternity that makes it possible 
( ... ) for so many millions of people ( ... ) willingly to die for such limited imaginings" (1991: 
7). Since Anderson did not pay direct attention to gender in his work, it is only through 
writers like Sommer (1991) and Parker et. al. (1992) that the missing gender link - alongside 
sexuality - was incorporated into the discussion on Anderson's imagined community. And if 
Anderson's work ignored gender, other mainstream works on nationalism have been no less 
gender-blind continuing to reproduce gender indifference. Research on gender and 
nationalism has therefore tried to address this much-neglected area, and through critical re-
19 Carol Pateman's (1989) work, although not specifically about nationalism per se, significantly contributes to 
this debate. Pateman argued that the roots of sexual inequality can be found embedded in the very discourses that 
we use to describe and understand the origins and the development of the modem society and its political 
institutions. For the writer, modem civil society functions through a modem form of patriarchy, which is hidden 
under the discourses of civil freedom protected by the state, therefore it remains discreet in its subordination of 
women as citizens with lesser rights. Exploring the meanings of citizenship where liberty also implied sexual 
subordination of women, Pateman's conclusion was that civil freedoms were ultimately subject to patriarchal 
right. 
20 This is not to deny that there were exceptions outside mainstream theorisations. There .are works that l?oke~ at 
gender in the construction of nationhood, such as George Mosse's (1988) groundbreaking study of natIOnalIsm 
and sexuality, Balibar's (1991b) discussion on gender and family in nationalism, and Chatterjee's (1989) 
discussion on the role of gender in postcolonial nationalist rhetoric. 
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readings of existing research on nationalism, there have also been attempts to bridge the gap 
between mainstream literature and gender (c.f. Raccioppe & See 2000; Wenk 2000). 
In doing so, feminist research on nationalism has helped to deconstruct the claims of 
naturalness in nationalism and reveal the gendered relationships in the social constitution of 
nationhood (c.f. Eley & Suny 1996). Rather than looking at "the conditions under which 
and/or the ways in which collective identities of nations are formed in opposition to outside 
groups", feminist scholarship has concentrated on the "constructions and reconstructions of 
gender difference and hierarchies" within the so-called national homogeneity (Ranchod-
Nilsson 2000: 169). Following this, the main area of investigation in studies of nationalism 
and gender has been the women's role in the naturalisation and reproduction of nationhood. 
Without doubt, the key text in this area is Yuval-Davis and Anthias' (1989) contribution, 
which Yuval-Davis (1997) later extended into her book Gender and Nation. In the 
introduction to their edited book, the authors identify five major loci for the role of women in 
the reproduction of the nation. The first three of these emphasise women's reproductive role, 
both in a biological and ideological sense: firstly, women are biological reproducers of 
members of ethnic collectivities; next, and related to this, they are reproducers of the 
boundaries of ethnic/ racial groups. Thirdly, women also participate centrally in the 
ideological reproduction of the collectivity and transmission of national culture, especially in 
socialising the young. Fourthly, Yuval-Davis and Anthias point out the role of women as 
signifiers of ethnic/racial differences. In this regard, women crucially symbolise collectivity 
in the national imagination. And finally, women are active participants in national, economic, 
political and military struggles. On this, the authors argue that not only is the active 
participation of women usually overlooked, but even when women "have taken all the risks" 
they are generally seen "in a supportive and nurturing relation to men" (Yuval-Davis and 
Anthias 1989: 10). 
In examining the five major ways in which women are implicated in the social construction of 
the nation, Yuval-Davis and Anthias' categorisation largely foregrounds the importance of the 
cultural-discursive level (Walby 1996: 237). While this might be a limiting factor, especially 
for research that seeks to analyse women's active involvement in the nation-building 
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process
21
, it offers a very good starting point for research that attempts to deconstruct 
discourses of nationalism with regard to gender discourses such as this one. In particular the 
symbolic role that women occupy in nationalist discourse and collective action becomes 
important for such a discursive analysis. As Nagel also argues, this symbol "reflects a 
masculinist definition of femininity and women's proper place in the nation" and becomes a 
means through which nationalism turns into a major venue for accomplishing masculinity 
(1998: 252). For the analysis of case studies in the succeeding chapters, it is necessary to 
understand how the masculine dynamics of nationalism translate into the symbolic role 
women hold in the national imagination, and how the female symbol in return becomes 
essential for marking the national boundaries, as well as for forming the boundaries for 
women in everyday life. For this reason, women's symbolic part in the articulation of the 
nation and boundaries will now be discussed more in detail, expanding on Yuval-Davis and 
Anthias' (1989) formulation. 
1.2.1 The symbolic role of women in the discursive reproduction of the nation 
In the first part of this chapter, the discussion has highlighted how nationalist discourses 
present the nation as having a homogenous and unchanging essence, which is shared by all its 
members, and which unites the community together: all despite the fact that the nation is 
always ridden with contradictions and ambivalences, and never actually has that 
unproblematic core22• In a wide variety of national cultures national unity has been modelled 
on gender and sexual norms (Parker et al. 1992: 6), which confirm the importance of the 
family as a core institution in the nationalist discourse, and also determines the role of women 
in the social constitution of the nation. 
21 Walby (1996) in fact argues that Yuval-Davis & Anthias' work is too skewed towards the discursive domain. 
For Walby, it privileges the role of women at the ideological or cultural levels of national reproduction, without 
expanding enough on women's active involvement, such as in the economic field. Others have extended this 
criticism to existing feminist works in general, and have argued that a reconciliation should be reached between 
the discursive emphasis and women's active contribution through discussing how we can situate women's 
participation within the discursive processes and cultural representations, and how women's activism is shaped 
by the cultural context (see Ranchard-Nilsson & Tetrault 2000; Ranchard-Nilsson 2000). These criticisms are 
important and should be taken on board. However, this research project, given its objectives, particular type of 
data and method of analysis, does not examine women's political activism or subjectivity per se. 
22 Parker et al. (1992) rightly note that this founding ambivalence, not having such an essence or core at its origin 
in the essentialist sense, derives for the "nation's insatiable need for representational labour to supplement its 
founding ambivalence, the lack of self-presence at its origin or in its essence" (1992: 5). 
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As various writers have pointed out, the family has been an institution indispensable to the 
survival of the nation, not least for ensuring the continuous reproduction of the national 
community. By legitimising the heterosexual union of partners through the institution of the 
family, the nation secures its biological reproduction, and excludes all non-reproductive, 
homosexual activities from the national community (Mosse 1988; Parker et al. 1992; Peterson 
2000). But besides being the loci of biological reproduction, the family is also essential, 
alongside school, in ideologically reproducing the nation and most prominently by teaching 
the "mother tongue" (Balibar 1991 b; c.f. Anderson 1991: 154). Because of its reproduction of 
racial and linguistic ethnicities on which the nation rests its legitimacy, the family holds a key 
function in the nation-state. 
The importance of the family has significant consequences for the role of women in the 
nation. The naturalisation of the family not only reinforces sexual hierarchy, but also the 
maternal role of women as child-bearers. As biological reproducers of the new generations, 
women guarantee the nation's eternal existence, promising to endlessly fulfil the "fantasy of 
exact self-replication" (Heng & Devan 1992: 344). While this emphasises the importance of 
women's participation, the control over reproduction ultimately resides with the masculine 
collectivity. As a result, Yuval-Davis and Anthias have argued that women face "various 
forms of population control" in which they "are encouraged or discouraged from having 
children who will become members of various ethnic groups within the state" (1989: 8-9). 
They are often "called into duty" to produce more children, but only with the "right kind" 
(ibid.: 8), so as to protect the "purity" of the nation's "genetic pool" (Yuval-Davis 1997: 22) 
23. In addition to this, women are also "controlled in terms of the 'proper' ways in which to 
have children" so as to ensure that the norms and boundaries that exist within the nation are 
protected (Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989: 9). This can mean pressure to only have sexual 
relations with men from certain groups as used to be the case in South Africa, or pressure to 
follow the legitimised ways of having children (ibid.i4• These confinements on women's 
23 See Yuval-Davis (1997) and Sofos (1996) for further discussion on Eugenicist discourse and population 
control. Balibar (1991b) also mentions the importance of eugenics for the nation. Also see Tetreault & AI-
Mughni (2000) for a discussion on how women in Kuwait are discouraged from marrying 'foreign' men and 
Anthias (1989) for similar remarks about Cypriot women both on the Turkish and on the Greek side. 
24 In her own article, Yuval-Davis (1989) presents the case ofIsrael, where the mother determines the child's 
nationality. However, ifthe child is born through a forbidden relationship of incest or adultery the ch~ld will be 
an outcast and not be permitted to marry another Jew for ten generations. Yuval-Davis argues that thIS can be 
the case even if a woman chooses to remarry after she divorces from her first husband by the civil court rather 
than the religious -in which case her divorce will not be recognised by the religious court and her children from 
her second. 
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marriage and the strict controls over reproduction emerge because women not only reproduce 
their national community but also its ethnic/national boundaries. Furthermore, the biological 
function of women is accompanied by a second reproductive role of disseminating the culture 
of the community to the newly born in the families, therefore acting as "cultural carriers" 
(ibid.). 
Given the importance nationalist discourses have attributed to the family and the reproductive 
role of women for the survival of the nation, it is not surprising that the metaphor of family is 
a recurring theme in various narrations of the nation. McClintock notes that the crucial role 
accorded to the familial is very much visible in the iconography of the nations, which, 
"despite their myriad differences", are all symbolically figured as "domestic genealogies" 
(1993: 63i5• The key metaphor of family in the discursive construction of the nation also 
determines the symbolic part accorded to women in national iconography. Across different 
contexts, nations are fleshed out with female faces in the national imaginary, and sometimes 
through concrete personifications, such as the figures of Britannia, Germania, or Marianne, 
who symbolise the true essence of the national community through the female body (See 
Mosse 1988). However, this female representation always remains within the constraints of 
the familial imagery, as a mother, lover or daughter, and without exception described around 
the desires of patriarchy: modesty, chastity, purity, and dutifulness. It is important to note that 
the resulting female symbols are not fixed, but continuously re-appropriated and fine-tuned as 
they are continuously rearticulated according to national needs. George Mosse (1988) points 
to a very good example from the French national imagery, Delacroix' s painting of Marianne 
who symbolised the French Revolution, holding a tattered flag, scantily dressed, and leading 
the men into battle. After the success of the Revolution, Mosse explains, the Republic had 
opted for a more suitable representation of the nation, and properly sat Marianne down on a 
throne fully clothed, all the more respectable with her "revolutionary wings clipped" (1988: 
91i6• 
2S McClintock (1993) argues that the trope of the family serves a dual function: apart from naturalising sexual 
hierarchy within the society, it also naturalises social hierarchy. "The Family of Men", a metaphor also common 
in British national narratives of the 19th century, provides a single genesis narrative for national history. The 
genealogy of the family, in return, offers the chance to naturalize and sanction social hierarchy, between 
different groups, within a seeming organic unity of interests that form the nation. ., 
26 For a similar yet more contemporary case study, on changing iconography of women in IndonesIan natlon-
building process, see Sunindyo' s analysis (1998). 
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Then again it is not only the image that can change: the status of the female symbol can also 
be modified to adapt to the specific needs of the fraternity. Apart from the mother form, she 
can also appear as the daughter, which becomes particularly important in the context of 
national modernization projects, or as the 'lover', embodying male desire for the nation (see 
Najmabadi 1997; also see Sommer 1991). And yet, in all these figures the fertility of the 
female symbol and her rootedness within the familial remain intact: both the lover and the 
daughter promise to be 'potential' mothers. In other words, the key role nationalism attributes 
to women as the biological reproducers of the community and the nation is also replicated in 
her symbolic role. 
Case studies, which cite concretised examples of the regenerative female body are abundant 
for various national contexts, and have become especially visible in academic literature as the 
gendered nature of national histories has been brought to light. Marvin and Ingle (1999) 
present another striking example to illustrate how the idealized femininity in male political 
fantasies signifies a unified and distinct nation in the case of America. The writers discuss the 
almost mythical story of Betsy Ross, who is nationally believed to have sewn the first 
American flag - even though no written evidence to confirm the story exists. Upon the 
request of George Washington! the father of the American nation, Betsy Ross, not only sews 
but "gives birth" to the flag and to the nation, therefore becomes the mother of the "American 
holy family" and the creative centre of the nation (ibid.: 56-62). Here, her role becomes 
symptomatic of the ambivalent role of women in nationalist imagination. In spite of her 
symbolic importance, Betsy is not the real protagonist: in receiving the idea and the design for 
the flag from Washington, she does not produce but only reproduce the nation. For the 
writers, it is the "unity of male form and female substance- Washington's design and Betsy's 
bringing it to fruition that forms the creative paradigm for the nation, not Betsy herself." (See 
Marvin & Ingle 1999: 60; for further examples, see also Mosse 1988; Bloom et al. 2000; 
Caine & Sluga 2000). 
The national community and the state, both imagined as masculine, are always depicted in a 
protecting and nurturing relationship to the female nation. Projecting the national as a 
vulnerable female in need of protection of the father state and the male community/soldiers 
serves an important function: firstly, it solidifies the national borders against possible threat 
from outsiders, a vulnerability which is also extended to women citizens in real life. Yuval-
Davis argues that the linking of women with children and therefore "the collective, as well as 
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the familial future" often forms the main raison d'etre for specific national and ethnic 
projects, such as military actions (1997: 45) that are claimed to be conducted "for women and 
children" (Enloe cited in ibid.). Moreover, the female-nation also reinforces the patriarchal 
discourses that connect the female body to male honour. As "sexual and national honour 
intimately construct" each other (Najmabadi 1997: 444), protecting the territorial integrity of 
the nation-woman (which belongs exclusively to the nation-state and guarantees its existence) 
gains a crucial prominence in masculine imagination and acts as a constant reminder of the 
imminent threat to national boundaries. Studying gender in a rural Turkish community, 
Delaney (1991) has argued that because male honour is seen as essentially dependant on the 
guarantee that a child is from his own seed, the protection of women becomes a matter of 
protecting the seed27• Similarly, Peterson argues that within the imagery of "nation-as-
woman", the motherland is not only constituted as a woman's body but, as such, is "ever in 
danger of violation -by "foreign" males/sperm" (2000: 68). Not only does she needs 
relentless vigilance to defend her frontiers and her honour against "rape" by "others", but the 
patriarchal metaphor involves "a tacit agreement that men who cannot defend their 
woman/nation against rape have lost their "claim" to that body, to that land" (ibid.). As 
shown in the case of systematic rapes during the height of inter-ethnic violence in the former 
Yugoslavia, metaphor can easily become reality in ethnic conflicts, redefining rape as a 
weapon of war used to annihilate the preservation of the other nation's patriline (Sofos 1996: 
82). 
Associating national strength with virility and masculine strength, while portraying the female 
as in need of male protection not only works to cement the nation against an ever-present 
threat from outside, but can also be used to assert the fraternity's hegemony in international 
relations. Sexualisation of the other has been an important component of the colonial 
discourses of the West, which were saturated with sexual fantasies about local - and sexually 
available - women, alongside the images of "effeminate" local men (Enloe 2000a: 48-9; see 
also Young 1995). Today, military conflicts can also be seen as highly sexualised and "use 
the masculine imagery of rape, penetration and sexual conquest to depict military weaponry 
and offensives" (Nagel 1998: 258; also see Altinay 2004). While the first Gulf War supplied 
many instances of this, such as the circulating of expressions such as "Rape of Kuwait" or 
27 Wh'1 C I D I akes this comment regarding the protection of women in Muslim societies, making a 
1 e aro e aney m . ., f' I thr S l'. (1996) 
d' t' t' th t' W t ' tl'es sex I'S detached from procreatIOn, m tImes 0 natIOna eat, as 010S IS mc Ion ames ern soc Ie , ' , , 
has shown, women's symbolic association with land is equally strong IrrespectIve ofrehgIOn, 
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"Bend over, Saddam" written on USA missiles (Nagel 1998, Parker et al. 1992), the second 
Gulf War has cross-cut the symbolic oppression with reality through the revelation of 
photographs depicting naked pictures of male prisoners. Indeed, as Balibar argues, sexual 
oppression and racism are neither independent of each other nor do they exist in parallel, but 
rather they function together with racism in particular always presupposing sexism (1991 a: 
49). 
While the gendering of the nation significantly moulds its citizens' conceptualisation of it, for 
female citizens the consequences are more directly felt in everyday life. The trope of nation-
woman translates into, as Yuval Davis (1997: 45) argues, a "burden of representation" for 
women citizens in daily life as they are expected to conform to the idealized metaphor. 
Through the collaboration of gender discourses and nationalism, the female body is firmly 
linked with the collectivity's honour, and the trespassing of gender roles circumscribed by the 
collectivity's symbolic boundaries is regarded as not only shameful, but also to be punished 
for the assault on the community's honour. Therefore nationalism not only sets the 
boundaries for the woman-nation but also fixes sharp boundaries for women at the everyday 
level. On this, Yuval Davis argues that: 
"Women in their 'proper' behaviour, their 'proper' clothing, embody the line which signifies the 
collectivity's boundaries. ( ... ) cultural traditions and the (re)invention of traditions ( ... ) are often used 
as ways of legitimising the control and oppression over women. In situations in which individual men 
as well as the whole collectivities feel threatened by 'others' this phenomenon may intensify." (1997: 
46) 
Two points need further elaboration here: while nationalist discourses are pervaded by 
discourses of patriarchy and therefore work to the disadvantage of women both in terms of 
political access and in everyday life, we cannot infer that all women experience the burden of 
representation or subordination in their everyday lives in the same way. On this there seems 
to be an evident divide between the European and postcolonial contexts, and furthermore 
between different groups competing for power within national contexts. Apart from the need 
to contextualise the role of women in different discourses of nationalism that are prevalent in 
different nation-states, we also need to be aware of the differential admission of women into 
the national in their own national contexts. Since women form a heterogeneous group within 
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the national community, differentiated by economic class, race and social status, the state is 
also related to women in a heterogeneous wal8• 
Second and going back to the above quote by Yuval-Davis, the meaning of what is "proper" 
has to be analysed carefully, for it frames the fundamental question of identity not only for 
women citizens, but also given their representative role, for the national community as a 
whole. What is proper and what is not supersedes the gender question, and therefore calls for 
a defmition of national identity. At the same time, the debate on proper behaviour is also 
inextricably bound with civilizational development and invites a further debate on what 
modern life should mean in the national context. Here again we are brought back to a 
seeming divergence between discourses of European and postcolonial and other nationalisms. 
It is this divergence in the gender-nation problematic that will form the discussion in the 
remainder of this chapter. 
1.2.2 National modernities and gender discourses 
This last section aims to bring together nation, gender and modernity, homing in on the 
arguments brought by postcolonial and Middle Eastern studies. In the previous part, I have 
outlined how gender and nation are symbiotically related discourses, without necessarily 
referring to contextual differentiations. This section will make a general distinction between 
the nation building experiences of the Western and non-Western contexts in an attempt to 
show how gender has a striking urgency in the latter, and particularly in the debates about 
modernity in non-Western nations. 
Before we proceed, it is necessary to clarify the use of the concept of modernity in this 
discussion. Modernity is one of the most popular subject areas in social sciences, and a 
concept that has been defined in various ways by different writers. It is not possible here to 
go through the vast literature that has emerged around modernity, but it might be important to 
note that the discussion will remain more on a discursive level. In other words, I will not be 
focusing on the temporal experience of modernity which has been defmed by key theorists in 
the field as "a matter of movement, of flux, of change, and of predictability" by Lash and 
Friedman (1992: 1), as "ambivalence" by Bauman (1991) or as a "condition that at once 
28 This point is strongly emphasised in Anthias & Yuval-Davis (1992: 114) and becomes particularly poignant in 
the analysis of the case studies, particularly on the female suicides in South East Turkey. 
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empowers people and constrains" people, by Berman (1992: 42). Given the vagueness and 
variety of these definitions, it seems more helpful to follow the advice that rather than trying 
in vain to define and fix the meaning of modernity, we should rather track the diverse ways 
that the insistent claims to being modem are made (Rabinow quoted in Abu Lughod 1998: 7). 
Therefore, the analysis here will remain on a discursive level: what will form the main 
concern is the different trajectories proposed by different national discourses to reach 
modernity, rather than discussing the lived experience of modernity itself?9 
As emerging nation-states aspire to build their own visions of what a modem nation is , 
discourses of nationalism and modernity invariably crosscut. Often, it is tempting to analyse 
this intersection with respect to social and cultural transformations in the latecomer nations, 
mainly outside Europe, and as parts of the Third World, the postcolonial context, or the 
Muslim world. However, even within the European context, from where modernity is said to 
have originated, nationalism has always involved cultural and social projects of 
modernization. Nationalism's aspiration for modernity and to transform the national society 
has been theorised most thoroughly by Gellner (1983), who stressed the role of the elite and 
their "high culture" in this process. For Gellner, even though nationalism "usually conquers 
in the name of folk culture", in reality it is "essentially, the general imposition of high culture 
on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some 
cases of the totality, of the population" (1983: 57). Bauman (1992) explains this 
nationalism's transformation as a result of the civilising process that took off in the 17th 
century in Europe. This process, he argues, was first and foremost an attempt by the 
enlightened elites to separate themselves from the masses they were responsible for educating, 
ordering and ruling (1992: 681). Resting historically on "intellectualized doctrine" (Delanty 
& O'Mahoney 2002: 17), nationalism adopted this civilising process, and "played the role of 
the hinge fastening together" the elite/state and the masses/society (Bauman 1992: 683). The 
creation of different "policing institutions" employing modem scientific methods to discipline 
the society, such as the educational, health, or legal systems can all be read as attempts to 
regulate and modernize the peripheries of the emerging nations of Europe3o• Therefore we 
29 Of course, we need to note that there is no clear-cut boundary between the experience of modernity and 
discourses about modernity, but a circular relationship between the two. 
30 Foucault's writings (e.g. 1991) provide one of the most powerful analyses of this process in ~e emerging 
nation-states of Europe. Commenting on Discipline and Punish, De Certau (1988) eloquently pomts out that 
Foucault's writings resemble a detective story in which he follows how the Enlightenment discourse and the 
refonnist projects of the 18th century has been "colonized" or vampirized through the "'procedures' of 
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can see attempts to modernise the nation as an embedded process within the discourse of 
nationalism, which should be seen as a dynamic and ongoing process, not excluding Europe, 
and certainly not limited to the nineteenth century. This has resulted in national 
appropriations of modernity within Europe, even when they appear to emulate a seemingly 
homogeneous European model. 31 
At the same time, to argue that modernity is always subject to appropriation and re-
interpretation within the national is not to ignore the sharp divergences between different 
models of modernity in the Western and non-Western contexts. The impossibility of escaping 
the Western legacy of modernity, and reading the history of the non-Western context 
independently of the West, is strongly stressed in postcolonial studies (see among others 
Chatterjee 1989, 1996; Chakrabarty 2000, Goankar 2001). At the same time, Western 
experience of modernity and nation building cannot be adequate for understanding the non-
Western context either. Writers have pointed out that it is within the non-Western, 
postcolonial context that the projects to nationalise modernity gain a crucial significance, 
rather than in Europe where "being-modem has been the dominant self-image" since the 
Enlightenment (Abu-Lughod 1998: 7). Similarly, Gole (1998) writing on Islamic modernities 
has noted the irony of the overwhelming presence of the discourses on modernity in 
especially non-Western contexts. Precisely because of the perceived lack of modernity, she 
argues, it is omnipresent "as a source of humiliation, aspiration, rejection or simple 
reappropriation, Western modernity is a constant historical preoccupation and a point of 
mental reference and positioning for social actors in non-Western contexts" (1998: 54). 
Goankar calls this fixation with the West "a rage of modernity" where "people (not just the 
elite) everywhere, at every national or cultural site, rise to meet it, negotiate it, and 
appropriate it in their own fashion" (2001: 21). 
Chatterjee has strongly argued that these dynamics have shaped the nation building process in 
a distinctive way in the postcolonial context. For Chatterjee, what distinguishes the 
nationalist claims in the postcolonial world from Europe is very much related to a perception 
penitential, educational and medical control at the beginning of the nineteenth century." See De Certau (1988: 
45). Building on this, it is possible to argue for different "colonisations" in different contexts. 
31 A good example of this process was given previously with Linda Laursen's (1993) analysis on ''the civilised 
ways of dishwashing" that became a marker of modern Swedish identity. On the same context Lofgren (1993: 
182) has also pointed out how in the early twentieth century, under the Social Democrats, modernity became "a 
very Swedish project", while still carrying the same idea of "collective progress: a nation moving united into the 
future." Similar concerns about keeping up with the progress can be found in most national histories. 
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of difference. He rejects the universality of Anderson's theory of nation fonned through an 
imagined identification: 
"If nationalisms in the rest of the world have to choose their imagined community from certain 
'modular' forms already available to them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to 
imagine? History, it would seem, has decreed that we in the postcolonial world shall only be perpetual 
consumers of modernity." (1996: 216) 
For Chatterjee, nationalist imagination in Asia and Africa is posited not on an identity "but 
rather on difference with the 'modular' forms of the national society propagated by the 
modem West" (ibid.). Such a perception of difference, which he notes as having begun long 
before the actual political battle with the imperial power, resulted in a separation between 
inner and outside domains. The West had already proved its superiority in such areas as the 
economy, statecraft, science and technology; and therefore in what Chatterjee calls the 
"material/outside" domain that included these areas, Western superiority had to be 
acknowledged and imitated. In return, the colonial society distinguished its essential 
"spiritual/inner domain", which held the traditions and symbols of cultural identity and which 
had to be preserved. Chatterjee states that it is in this inner domain that "nationalism launches 
its most powerful, creative and historically significant project: to fashion a 'modem' national 
culture that is nevertheless not Western" (1996: 229). While the inner domain involved many 
areas, such as language and art, Chatterjee argues that the assertion of autonomy and 
difference was most dramatic in the familial world and in its representation of women (ibid.). 
Hence, women became the "inner sanctum" that holds the cultural particularity of the nation, 
and therefore needs to be protected from the West, as well as providing the ground on which 
self-independence could be declared (See Chatterjee 1989). 
Here, Enloe's (2000a) criticisms on the colonial discourses of gender - which come out in her 
work that was first published at around the same time as Chatterjee's (1989) - offer further 
discussion of the context within which the position of women became central to postcolonial 
nationalist projects. In her discussion, Enloe explains that throughout colonisation, discourses 
of gender and sexuality that were embedded in Western civilisation were used to justify the 
domination and the superiority of Western culture over indigenous cultures. British 
colonizers' depiction of local women as "uncivilised" and "lacking Victorian standards of 
feminine respectability" was very much a part of this process: 
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"Ladylike behaviour was a mainstay of imperialist civilization. Like sanitation and Christianity, 
feminine respectability was meant to convince both the colonizing and the colonized peoples that 
foreign conquest was right and necessary." (2000a: 48) 
But local women needed the colonizers' help for a more urgent matter: as well as being 
uncivilised, they were also seen as oppressed by their patriarchal societies, vulnerable and in 
need of protection from the colonisers against their own men. The local men were in return 
depicted as lacking chivalry and reverence for their women, and for this reason "they couldn't 
expect to be allowed to govern their own societies" (ibid.). As a result, these gender 
discourses helped British imperialism to "establish European male rule over the men in Asian 
and African societies" while claiming to be on a "crusade to abolish male domination of 
women" (ibid.: 49). Given this context, it is not surprising that in postcolonial nationalisms, 
women, alongside family, became a part of the inner domain that needed to be shielded from 
Western influence. 
However, the isolation of the inner from the outside domain is not an uncomplicated task. The 
inner realm of the family cannot be insulated from the changes going on in the outside world, 
and traditional forms of patriarchy that Europeans had criticised for being backward and even 
'barbaric', - and by reference to which they had justified their colonial domination - needed to 
be remedied in the modem nation. This locates women at the heart of modernization 
discourses in the postcolonial context, where the position of women and the question of how 
much Western style modernization might be allowed for women, has to be handled carefully. 
Chatterjee states that Indian nationalism resolved this through an agreement that 
" ... the crucial requirement was to retain an inner spirituality of indigenous social life. The home was 
the principal site for expressing the spiritual quality of the national culture, and women must take the 
main responsibility of protecting and nurturing this quality. No matter what the changes in the external 
conditions for women, they must not lose their essentially spiritual (i.e. feminine) virtues; they must 
not, in other words, be essentially westernized." (1989: 243) 
For Chatterjee, appropriation of modernity within the national discourses meant new forms of 
subordination for women: in the modem nation, the westernization of women had to be 
markedly different than men. An educated and relatively emancipated vision of a "new 
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woman" who would, in return for her newly achieved freedom, have the social responsibility 
of keeping essential national values intact accompanied the modernization process, subjecting 
women to a refurbished patriarchy (1989: 244)32. 
Chatterjee's arguments cannot speak for the experience of all national projects that developed 
in response to the West, and particularly in the Turkish context we see apparent divergences 
from the postcolonial model33 • However, Chatterjee's discussion of postcolonial nationalisms 
helps us understand why the question of women has a striking centrality for the national 
liberation movements in the emerging non-Western nations. The female symbol shaped by 
her familial role has always been an indispensable part of the discursive construction of 
nationalism regardless of the context. However, as Chatterjee explains, it is with the 
nationalization projects of the postcolonial world that women become potent symbols of 
national modernities, and represent the choices made to achieve the desired vision of 
modernity. Furthermore, these choices always rest on the central problematic of how one 
might "become modem when one was not, could not be, or did not want to be Western" (Abu-
LUghod 1998: 14). It is this problematic that guides the selective incorporation and 
appropriation of a modernity associated with Western progress, what Kandiyoti calls the 
"salvaging" of modernity (1998: 271). In this context, women function as a signifier "in the 
contrary dialectic of stasis and change", required not only to imagine a new and uniquely 
national modernity, but also to render it "ontologically stable" (Natarajan 1994: 79). 
This has significant consequences. Most evidently, women's burden of representation in 
everyday life is amplified through their representation of modernity that is adopted as a part of 
national identity. Here, the representation of modernity often involves its display in the 
32 Again looking at the Indian context, Natarajan (1994: 79) argues that the woman's body serves different 
symbolic roles in different moments in nationalism. She calls these 1) the movement from regional to national in 
the "modernizing" process; 2) the threat of communal or civil rupture within the body politic and 3) the rise of 
fundamentalism. For the fIrst one she sees the female body as a testing site for modernity, for the second 
moment she observes women as a site of mythic unity and in the third, as daughters of the nation, a site for 
encountering the challenge posed by Westernisation. 
33 Divergences are apparent not only in terms of the strength of 'identifIcation with difference' with Europe, but 
also at the implementation of reforms: For instance, Sirman (2002: 242) compares the Indian and Turkish 
contexts and argues that even though in Turkey women were also the representatives of the national self, they do 
not hold an inherent purity. Instead, Turkish national discourse has foregrounded the importance of women's 
ability to think and use her wisdom to contribute to her society, as well as to know her place in it. Similarly, she 
finds the family not as a location of unchanging essence, but as a part of the process of transformation with the 
new woman setting up the new family. Ahiska (2006), on the other hand argues that even though Turkey 
suffered the same divide between civilisation and culture, a different kind of society to what Chatterjee describes 
was imagined. This, she argues, is because the divide occurred not on a visible spatial/horizontal axis 
(inside/outside domains), but on a temporal/vertical one (old/new), making it possible to embody the divide 
within the same space, or even the same person. 
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international arena. As the meanings of 'Western', 'authentic', and 'backward' - therefore 
discardable - are defined, revolutionizing society and transforming women become two sides 
of the same coin (See Moghadam 1994: 12). In this process, the popular female iconography 
of 'daughters of the nation/revolution' not only represents social change but also portrays 
women as active participants in social change. Needless to say, the specific definitions do 
vary according to different nationalist projects, and so does the extent of these projects in 
reforming the positions of women and the standards of propriety that determine the rules for 
the appearance and behaviour of women. As Moghadam has pointed out, nationalist projects 
that claim to "emancipate" women, while at the same time assigning them a "national 
feminine role", regard the desired transformation as vital for the nation, as do the 
fundamentalist projects which regard women mainly as markers of "cultural rejuvenation and 
religious orthodoxy" (1994: 2). 
Such projects are prone to major problems in implementation. Firstly, we have to take into 
account that women are differentially involved in national projects, often working to support 
ethnic, racial and class hierarchies (See Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992; also Walby 1996). 
As will be further discussed in the next chapter with regard to the Turkish context, such 
projects often privilege one dominant group, in most cases the urban middle classes from the 
dominant ethnic group. Second, the ways in which women can be involved in the new nation 
is never defined clearly and therefore always suffers from ambivalences. As it has been 
argued above, in non-Western nationalist projects, modernity is perceived through the 
dichotomies of national culture versus the foreign/Western influences. This makes it 
problematic as to how much visibility women should have in real life in the public and 
political sphere, and what position they should occupy in the new modem nation. The 
common discourse of women's liberation that accompanies most modernization projects has 
therefore been much criticised for the ambiguities it carries, allowing women a newly 
acquired access to the public sphere while at the same time accompanying this new visibility 
with constant surveillance and a "persistent anxiety over their sexual morality" (Kandiyoti 
1998: 282). The admission of women to the public sphere as citizens does not necessarily 
bring equal access to decision-making processes. Even though women have been actively 
involved in most of these projects, their contribution is often decontextualised and idealised in 
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national narratives with their participation in the political and institutional realms often 
discouraged or even prevented (Gocek 2002a: 7)34. 
And lastly, we need to underline the fact that women themselves actively participate in this 
ideological terrain by reproducing or challenging the 'appropriate place and conduct' that is 
being negotiated. In this context feminism, as Abu-Lughod (1998) notes, becomes an 
inescapable term of reference for women, even though it is defined quite differently in 
different contexts. Even though this research project is more interested in analysing the 
different discourses of nation for and through women than tracing women's agency, it is 
important to note that the case studies that will be analysed in the following chapters have all 
been created through the non-confirmative discursive positions taken up by women. 
1.2.3 Conclusion and further remarks 
In a recent article Tanil Bora (2005) succinctly sums up the discussion on women, nation and 
modernity, and points to the irony in this relationship. He explains that, regardless of the 
context, reduction of women to a national symbol and the reproduction of patriarchal gender 
norms - even though they have been 'refined and reformed' - becomes a fixture in all the 
modernization projects that nationalism undertakes. For Bora, this fixture limits the 
perception of modernity, and becomes "a modem obstacle" to perceiving modernity as a 
horizon, which is freeing, open-ended, and critical of itself. Hence, not exclusively but 
mainly through women, conservatism is articulated into modernity as its indispensable 
extension, even as efforts to modernize the nation are taking place (2005: 243_4).35 Bora's 
discussion in fact rewords what Bauman (1991) had called the ambivalence of modernity - an 
attempt to fix identity and maintain it as such, and locates women at the heart of that 
ambivalence in national modernization projects. 
34 See also Sunindyo (1998) for limits to women's participation in military institutions, and Altinay (2004) for a 
similar analysis of the Turkish military context. F or a more general discussion on the unequal distribution of 
power to women citizens, see the recent article on Mexican nationalism by Craske (2005) and also Tetrault & al-
Mughni (2000) for an analysis of women and nation in Kuwait. 
35 Bora's concise discussion successfully brings together the concepts of nationalism, conservatism and 
modernity, although, it has to be added, his argument is not new. Nagel (1998), for example, has argued the 
following on nationalism's relationship with conservatism: "Lest this discussion of Muslim nationalism lead the 
reader to see masculinity and nationalism as an organizing and hegemonic relationship only for Islamic societies, 
it is important to remember that ( ... ) all nationalism, tends to be conservative, and 'conservative' often means 
'patriarchal' ( ... ) This is partly due to the tendency of nationalists to be 'retraditionalisers' ( ... ) and to embrace 
tradition as a legitimating basis for nation-building and cultural renewal. These traditions, real or invented, are 
often patriarchal and point out the ( ... ) tight connection between masculinity and nationalism" (ibid.: 254) 
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The functions fulfilled by this fixture in the discursive construction of the nation, as well as its 
consequences in terms of shaping gender identities and relationships in the nation, have been 
the focus of discussion in the second part of this chapter. Feminist scholarship in the field has 
repeatedly emphasised that between the discourses of nationalism and gender there exists a 
strong symbiotic relationship, which often works to women's disadvantage in the imagined 
community, limiting their choices of identity as citizens and as women. The discussion has 
largely focused on the symbolic realm, where discursive articulations crystallize to form the 
boundaries, both for the nation and for women citizens. This continuous process is decisive in 
moulding the everyday level of the nation for both genders, as will be demonstrated in the 
next chapters with regard to the Turkish context. 
Following from this, the discussion on modernity attempted to highlight the striking 
importance of gender in non-Western societies, both as a major site of boundary construction, 
and as a site for appropriating modernity. This discussion is particularly important in 
understanding the Turkish context where the problematics of Westernisation and 
modernisation are embedded within the very heart of national imagining. Here postcolonial 
literature can offer important insights into examining not only the tensions that arise in the 
construction of national identity in Turkey, but also how gender is positioned with respect to 
national identity. 
It is often noted that Turkey does not comfortably fit into the postcolonial model, largely 
because of the fact that it never directly experienced colonial rule, and also because the 
Ottoman Empire itself was a colonizing force (Ahiska 2003). For this reason, it might not be 
possible to explain the historical experience and modem particularities of Turkey through 
postcolonial theory alone (c.f. Stokes 2002; Kandiyoti 2002). At the same time, postcolonial 
criticism can help us understand the main concerns in the articulation of Turkish nationhood -
such as the perceived backwardness of the society as opposed to the superiority of the West, 
or the need to overcome the modernity gap while maintaining authenticity (Ahiska 2003: 359-
60). Having a predominantly Muslim population in Turkey has significantly shaped the 
debate on national identity and caused it to share many of the problems - though not the 
outcomes - of the discussed context regarding the question of women. The Turkish context 
has also provided one of the most striking examples for the contradiction Bora has pointed 
out: the otiose obsession with the female to symbolize the modernization project of 
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nationalism. Moreover, this has neither remained limited to the critical period of "nation 
fonnation" more than eighty years ago, nor to any particular elite group36. Because the 
questions about modernity and national boundaries are still tangled over the representative 
female body, the position and role of women has remained a contemporary debate for all 
groups competing to narrate their own version of the nation. This continues to turn gender 
into a major arena for further debates on the nation's identity. 
Lastly, before the Turkish context is examined, a further note needs to be made on the 
relationship between nation and modernity today. While an analysis of the national 
appropriation of modernity is crucial for understanding the central role pf women in the non-
western context, it is important to move beyond the framework of "national modernity", as 
well as the dichotomies of the "West" versus "the authentic culture" that have shaped it. As 
both Navaro-Yashin (2002) and Kandiyoti (2002) have noted, even postcolonial studies have 
inadvertently contributed to the polarisation between East and West. Navaro-Yashin argues 
that especially when the "woman question" is at stake, the discursive nature of the definitions 
of East and West give in to an enthusiasm to track down the "culturally distinct": 
"Many scholarly narratives on the relation of Middle Eastern women with the West have mapped the 
signifier "European" too easily onto a conventional story of Westernization as imposed by upper-class 
elites on the rest of the population. An Occidentalism of sorts exists in such studies that look for the 
subaltern or Middle-Eastern in signifiers and symbols that contradict the Western, as if it were 
possible to disaggregate the Middle Eastern from the European in life stories, after a long history of 
relations of power between peoples of these regions. Such studies which would like to be critical of 
Orientalism, colonialism, and Westernization, as well as of the class structure in the Middle East, often 
end up reproducing the assumptions that they set out to deconstruct." (2002: 67) 
What is ignored in reproducing "pure" categories of the East and the West are the complex 
identifications, experiences and the dynamics of hegemony and resistance that contest the 
perceived meanings of and polarizations between those categories37. But avoiding such 
pitfalls is not to deny the fact that that these dichotomies still continue to inform and shape the 
36 I agree with Walby (1996) that it is not very accurate to talk about a critical fonnative period. Walby proposes 
to talk instead about rounds of restructuring of the 'nation-state' (ibid.: 246) Seeing nation as a continuous 
articulation, it is not possible to limit the modernization process to one era only. We need to perceive this as an 
ongoing process in all nations today, even though the state might no longer hold the sole monopoly over it. 
37 Needless to say, in our attempts to transcend the dichotomies it is also equally important to avoid the trap of 
culturalism that can render critical inquiry useless 
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meanings of modernity and national identity, as the case studies in this research will show. 
What is important is to be aware that these categories are themselves discursively produced, 
not indicators of social and cultural reality, and therefore their meanings are always subject to 
change over the course of time. It is often through the negotiated meanings of these binaries 
that national boundaries are re-drawn as the centre differentiates itself from the peripheries, 
and the nation from its others. What should be explored therefore are the contested meanings 
these binaries hold in the national imagination, and how they are constantly being negotiated, 
inheriting new connotations, and how this process shapes the politics of inclusion and 
exclusion in the nation (c.f. Ahiska 2003). 
This also has important consequences for the meanings of modernity - the vision of a uniform 
"national modernity", informed through the dichotomies of East and West, seems to have 
been weakened, if not broken. Today, we can say that perceptions of nation and modernity no 
longer subscribe to the same nation-state framework, as the meanings of the modem are 
shaped by the multiple sources brought about by globalisation, not to mention the diversity of 
voices in nationalist discourse. The growing rift between the once interchangeable concepts 
of 'West' and 'Europe' is just one indicator of this shifting terrain. This brings up another 
major question: where to locate national identity and the new boundaries of the nation that 
had formed as a reaction to the binaries of East and West. Again, as will be argued, the 
answers are best discussed through women. 
This brings up another major question: where to locate national identity, and the new 
boundaries of the nation that had formed its identity with respect to the binaries of the East 
and West. The contestations emanating from this question can find their best expression 
through debates on women, who have been the symbolic representatives of national identity 
and its modernity. The following chapter presents the background from which these issues 
have been raised in Turkey. 
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Chapter 2: 
Taming modernity -Turkey, nation and women 
The aim of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, it seeks to present a brief and selective 
overview of the Kemalist nationalist project, its beginnings, and the challenges it has 
faced in particular in the last twenty five years. It is inevitably selective as in one 
chapter alone it is impossible to give a detailed account of the changes in Turkish 
social and political life over the past decade let alone over the course of the 
Republican history of Turkey itself. Instead, and without any claims to be extensive, 
this overview only attempts to highlight some of the tension points, ambiguities, and 
points of contestation that Turkishness is facing today, to draw attention to those that 
surface in the case studies, and to provide some explanation as to why these points of 
conflict have emerged. In other words it aims to place the case studies in a wider 
context, especially for readers who might not be familiar with Turkey's history or its 
contemporary problems. This discussion also attempts to make the individual 
discussions on context that accompany each case study more meaningful. 
The next goal of the chapter is to give the readers a more detailed account of how 
femininity has formed the nodal point of discourses on modernity and nationalism in 
Turkey. In hegemonic discourses of the nation-state, since the foundation of the 
Turkish Republic, women have stood for an ideal Turkey that has mastered 
modernity, positing an impeccable and singular image of the self - an image that 
despite having been heavily questioned for more than two decades, still continues to 
inform dominant discourses of national identity. The second section of the chapter 
will revisit the early years of the Republic in the light of feminist critiques and expand 
on the argument laid out in the previous chapter: i.e. the symbolic role women play in 
representing the nation and its modernity. By setting the gender debates on women 
within the larger context of debates on national identity and modernity in Turkey, this 
section aims to explain how and why the preferred narratives about women can help 
us understand the negotiations going on about what it means to be Turkish today. 
49 
In order to proceed with these discussions the necessary reference point, as in any 
study of identity politics in Turkey, is the early years of the Republic. 
2.1 The beginnings 
Every good narrative has a beginning, and the frequently told story of the Turkish 
people starts with the creation of the Republic. Already in the nineteenth century 
Ottoman Empire, discussions on Turkish nationhood and identity had started to gain 
ground through a developing nationalism, which was heavily inspired by the 
Enlightenment ideals of progress and which sought to achieve the civilisationary 
status of the West. However, it was the revolutionary movement led by Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk that materialized these aspirations with the declaration of the new 
Republic in 1923. 
From the very start, the state was the fundamental actor in shaping and protecting the 
newly emerging conceptualisation of nationhood and national identity. With the 
foundation of the Republic and the consolidation of single-party rule under Ataturk's 
Republican People's Party (CHP), a radical social engineering and top-to-bottom 
modernization project was launched. The republican elite/intelligentsia designed and 
implemented the changes deemed necessary to jettison the past and to transform the 
remnants of the empire into a modem nation-state. However, as Mardin (1973, 1997) 
stresses in his writings, this process preserved the strong state structure of the 
Ottoman Empire, where bureaucrats were regarded not only as the gatekeepers of the 
regime, but also as promoters of social change, through the projects they would plan 
and implement (See also Keyder 1997). The strong position held by the state also 
determined the extensiveness of the envisioned transformation: it included a total re-
crafting of state institutions, culture, ethnicity and citizens, in short of national self-
definition. Consequently, Turkish identity and nationalism were heavily moulded by 
the state at its initial founding stage. As Navaro-Yashin (2002) argues, Turkish 
nationalism "was not, unlike other nationalisms, imagined in the absence of state, but 
in the enduring presence of stately practices" - it had emerged mixed with statism, 
which Navaro-Yashin defines as "something beyond nationalism, as an identification 
not only or even necessarily with a nation, but with a reified state" (ibid.: 201). 
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In this social engineering project, the foremost constitutive element of the new 
Turkish identity was undeniably the adoption of a unitary ethnicity and culture. 
Turkish nationalism, notes Kieser, was radical in not only its attempt to force future 
national cohesion but in replacing the universalist worldview of the Ottoman Empire, 
and the Islamist culture that it rested on (2006b: viii). One has only to compare this to 
the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious cosmopolitan system that the 
Ottoman Empire had been built upon to consider the extent of the attempted 
transformation. The constitution of the new nation was re-constructed, eradicating _ 
or subjugating - the ethnic and cultural diversity of the Muslim populations under the 
hegemonic identity of "Turkish"l. For Keyder (1997), this required the silencing of 
the masses and a redefinition of the "popular" through the use of folklore and history. 
The defining vector of this reconstitution, he argues, "was an unsullied ethnic heritage 
endowed with all the positive virtues of might, unity, state-building acumen, and self-
confidence" (1997: 45). 
At the same time, the nation-building process did not only rest upon an ethnic 
conception, but also incorporated modernism as the fundamental ingredient of 
national identity. To put it more precisely, the two discourses, of modernization and 
nationalism supported and worked through each other. The commitment to catch up 
with the modem West, prompted by the modernization discourse, legitimised the 
elite-led nation-building project, strengthened the state and its institutions, while the 
West signified the final destination in the national imagination. Secularisation formed 
the cornerstone of this all-encompassing national project, as well as the first necessary 
step towards civilisationary progress. A series of radical institutional reforms were 
enacted under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk, including the abolishment of the two 
fundamental institutions of the empire, the sultanate and the Islamic caliphate, 
resulting in the removal of Islam from the constitution and the adoption of secularism 
as state ideology. As Yesim Arat rightly points out, during this process the state not 
only separated itself from religion but also attempted to control religion, confining it 
to the private realm and to keep "its public expression under state supervision" (2001: 
I While there was a conflation of being Muslim and a Turk, non-Muslim citizens were accepted as a 
part of the Turkish nation on the condition that they adopted Turkish language as mother tongue, 
Turkish culture, and the ideal of Turkism. See Bali (2006) - and other related articles in the edited 
book of Kieser (2006a) - for a good selection of articles on the politics of Turkification during the 
single party era. 
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35).2 The foundation of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, Diyanet,3 which reports 
directly to the office of the Prime Minister and is responsible for all religious issues, 
from the setting up of mosques to the approval of religious clerics, is the best 
evidence of this attempt (ibid.; cf. Davison 2003).4 The secularisation process was 
also supported by extensive cultural reforms that covered almost all areas of daily life, 
private as well as social realms, and changed the entire socio-cultural landscape of 
Turkey, re-modelling it along European standards. 
Here the Turkish modernization project intersects with the experiences of other non-
Western nation-states, where, as has been highlighted in the previous chapter, the 
perceived lack of modernity has been deriving force in national modernization 
projects. Chakrabarty (2000) discusses in detail how anticolonial nationalisms were 
predicated on the urgency of catching up with Western modernity, attempting to 
complete the transformation without delay, despite the absence of an industrialised 
society to mobilize for this purpose. This also summarizes the Turkish experience. 
Gole (1997) again argues that the political will to Westernise is common in the 
Middle Eastern context, resulting in a set of civilisationary choices. However, as 
Gole points out, the Turkish experience is exceptional not only in the extensiveness of 
the civilising project, attempting to penetrate into all areas of everyday life, but also in 
the "epistemological break" it has made in its self-definition, from inhabitants of the 
Ottoman Empire to citizens of the Turkish Republic (ibid.). 
It is at the conceptualisation of this break that the transformation of women's status in 
society becomes pivotal. In other words, the epistemological break between the past 
and present found its expression through women's identity in the newly found 
Republic. A direct association was formulated between the status of women and the 
new national identity. In his public speeches Kemal Ataturk himself strongly 
2 Similarly, Davison (2003: 336) argues that "by 'secular state' one understands a 'religion-free' state", 
but in the case of Turkey, the state's desire to control religion has never allowed it to be religion-free. I 
will be expanding on this debate in the analysis of the weddings case study in chapter six. 
3 Today, Diyanet still functions as a state institution that administers religious education, mosques, 
religious foundations and charities in line with the principles of Sunni Islam. 
4 The banning of major religious educational institutions in 1924, (Tevhid-i Tedrisat kanunu), and sma!l 
religious institutions and orders in 1925 (Tekke ve Zaviyelerin kaldirilmasi) also form a part of thiS 
process. 
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advocated the equality of both genders in order to achieve the desired civilisationary 
status: 
"A civilisation where one sex is supreme can be condemned, there and there, as crippled. A 
people which has decided to go forward and progress must realise this as quickly as possible. 
The failures in our past are due to the fact that we remained passive to the fate of women." 
(Cited in Jayawardena 1986: 36, and also in Yegenoglu 1998: 132) 
The rhetoric of women's emancipation and inclusion in the public sphere was 
supported by an extensive dismantling of the existing customs and social institutions 
that regulated women's life in the Ottoman regime and their replacement in 
accordance with the needs of becoming a civilised nation. The legal changes included 
the introduction of compulsory primary education for both sexes in 1924, adoption of 
the Civil Code in 1926, modelled after the Swiss Civil Code which secularised family 
law, and the right to vote at a local level in 1930 and national level in 1934 (Kandiyoti 
1989: 126). These changes also abolished polygamy, restricted the marriage age over 
a minimum, and permitted women a set of equalities on legal matters (such as 
inheritance and divorce) with men. The unveiling of women, backed with vigorous 
campaigning for Western dress, especially by Kemal Ataturk himself5, has a 
particularly symbolic importance in this reform process and in Turkey's 
secularisation. While the new state neither prohibited the wearing of the veil nor 
required women to wear Western clothes, the Hat Reform, which in 1926 abolished 
the fez for male citizens, marked a preference for Western style dressing. Saktanber 
(2002a: 140-1) explains that by abolishing the symbolic head attire of the Ottoman 
Empire, the Hat Reform encouraged women to uncover their heads: once men donned 
the Western look, and replaced their Oriental fez with the bowler hat, this could 
constitute a legitimate example for women to follow. As a result, the reform had 
worked to convince men to give consent to women's new and 'open' way of dressing 
(ibid.). 
5 "In some places I have seen women who put a piece of cloth or a towel or something like it over their 
faces and who turn their backs or huddle themselves on the ground when a man passes by. What is the 
meaning and sense of this behaviour? Gentlemen, can the mothers and daughters of a civilised nation 
adopt this strange manner, this barbarous posture? It is an object of ridicule. It must be remedied at 
once." Kemal Ataturk, quoted in Yegenoglu (1998: 133). 
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All in all, what was at stake in this process was not just the remaking of women but 
the wholesale refashioning of gender and gender relations (Kandiyoti 1997b, 1998). 
Women were emancipated but men also had to be reformed into attentive spouses and 
engaged parents who were emotionally close to and directly involved with their 
children, and particularly with their much-valued daughters (Kandiyoti 1998: 281; 
also 1997b). Kandiyoti (1997b: 125) notes that Ataturk's choice of daughters instead 
of sons as his adopted children, in a society where male child preference was the 
uncontested norm, is particularly heavy with symbolic significance. How the early 
reforms initiated by the modernising elite changed the status of women has remained 
a central narrative in the almost mythical story of the transformation of Ottoman 
remnants into a modem and independent Turkey. And because the new female 
symbolised the new nation, the central iconography of the regime from the early years 
of the Republic was formed by visual images, which depicted women unveiled, 
dressed in shorts and bearing the flag in athletic competitions, in school or military 
uniform, as pilots, as professionals or in evening dress in ballroom dancing scenes6. 
What essentially gave the Turkish Republic its new character and ideological identity 
based on secularism was the transformation of the role of women in society through 
Kemalist reforms (Saktanber 2002b: 323). 
When the extent and impact of these reforms on societal life are considered, Turkey 
was not only the first Muslim country to undertake such a radical project to rewrite 
gender roles to include women in the public sphere and give them equal rights as men, 
but was remarkably early in doing so, even when compared to its Western 
counterparts. As a result, for a long time both women's emancipation and the 
modernization project it symbolised remained unchallenged. In international accounts 
too, Turkish modernization was heralded as a success story, and the reforms caused in 
Jaywerdena's (1986) words, "an international sensation", proof that the Western 
model of modernity could be implemented into a Muslim society.7 
6 Highlighted by Kandiyoti (1997b: 125) Oole (1998: 59), these photographs are today remembered by 
many secularists with a nostalgic longing and especially on national days printed in newspapers. 
7 Also, for classic examples of the praise of Turkey's civilizational shift from East to secular and 
modern Europe, see the well-known works of Bernard Lewis (1961), The Emergence of Modern 
Turkey and Daniel Lerner (1958), The Passing of Traditional Society. For comments on how these 
early works on Turkish modernization overlooked the embedded ambiguities in the project, see Kasaba 
(1997). 
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However, in practice such a comprehensive top-to-bottom project was destined to 
suffer major problems from the very early stages. The reforms did mark "a new 
positioning of the state vis-a.-vis the woman question", but at the same time they could 
not penetrate into the rural hinterlands and remained for a long time within the social 
circle of the urban bourgeoisie (Kandiyoti 1989: 126). This disjuncture was also 
apparent in other areas since the re-constructed nationhood and national identity were 
implemented in an instrumentalist fashion without much space for negotiation 
between the masses and the elite (c.f. Keyder 1997). In his seminal work Mardin 
(1973) discusses this lack of interconnectedness between the masses and the elite 
through the key concepts of the centre and the periphery. For Mardin the architects of 
the new nation had inherited a deep fissure between the centre, where the state's 
ruling class, the military and the bureaucrats are located, and its peripheries, located 
primarily in the provinces, but also including "the lower classes who had difficulty in 
joining the stream of modernization" (ibid.: 179). The ties that had loosely connected 
the two during the height of the Empire, such as the judicial system, or the charitable 
foundations had been weakened in its decline, leaving mainly the religious institutions 
which Mardin sees as forming the "real hinge" (ibid.: 174) between the centre and the 
peripheries. With the modernization project in the nineteenth century, the peripheries 
were estranged from the centre; they further aligned with religion and united in their 
opposition to the attempts for national modernization and integration into the new 
cultural framework. The strictly secularist and more uncompromising Kemalist 
modernization project only widened the gap between the two groups. The Kemalists 
associated the provinces with rurality and backwardness, and identified them as a 
potential source of treason against the national and secularist aims of the Republic 
(ibid.: 182). The Kurdish and religious uprisings of the early years of the Republic 
sharpened the centre's distrust of the peripheries. As a result, the strengthening of the 
state "partly against the periphery" became a priority before anything else, which 
Mardin sees as "profoundly unrevolutionary, despite the populist themes which the 
Republic developed" (ibid.: 183). 
This had major consequences. Not being able to identify with or reach out to the 
peripheries, the Kemalist centre aimed for a linear top-down regulation that would 
eventually bring advancement. Yet, in doing so, they "missed the revolutionary-
mobilizational aspect" that could mobilize masses for the attempted restructuring of 
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the society (ibid.: 184). Mardin argues that what Ataturk could not "achieve through 
political mobilization or through a commitment to radical changes in social structure", 
he tried to do with ideology, national symbols and historical myths, all of which was 
too much of a burden for ideology to carry (ibid.). Following from this, it is not 
surprising that a significant portion of this ideological burden was placed on female 
gender identity. 
While the centre-periphery duality offers some explanation to the problems of the 
early years of the Republic, there were also paradoxes inherent in the very discourse 
of the national identity that the centre was trying to sculpt, which suggests the 
heterogeneity of the centre itself. Caglar Keyder (1999a) argues that even though the 
Republican state was nationalist, it was ambiguous in defining the constituent 
coordinates of nationhood. For Keyder, Turkish nationhood "mostly veered toward 
an ethnic definition rather than a constitutional one, and when ideological propping 
was required, religion was brought in as a defining element despite the state's avowed 
secularism" (ibid.: 11). The existing ambiguities, particularly the role of religion in 
Turkishness was to create many paradoxes for Turkish identity in general and for 
women in particular who were given the task of representing it. Finally, as a top-
down project, it was evidently unlikely that the Kemalist project could sustain itself in 
the long term. The experience of modernity brought different definitions of what it 
meant to be modem and different identifications with the nation, which the Kemalist 
discourse could no longer contain. As Scott argues, "one of the great paradoxes of 
social engineering is that it seems at odds with the experience of modernity generally. 
Trying to jell a social world, the most striking characteristic of which appears to be 
flux, seems rather like trying to manage a whirlwind" (Scott, cited in Bozdogan 2001: 
8). It is in the aftermath of the eighties that the growing tension between the 
experience and the demands of modernity - most importantly regarding the questions 
of identity and belonging - and the Turkish modernization project led to a questioning 
of the Kemalist discourse both in everyday life and in academic discussions. 
2.2 The re-transformation 
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The aftermath of the 1980s once again marks a new era of transformation in Turkish 
culture and politics8. After years of ideological divisions and resulting violence that 
had severely ruptured the social and political structure, Turkey entered the new 
decade with a military coup in 1980, with the army taking over to re-establish the 
power of the state authorities and the rule of law. During the military regime that 
lasted until 1983, all left and right wing parties were banned, and political 
associations, particularly leftist organizations, which were regarded as a communist 
threat, and their networks, labour unions and intellectuals, or simply anyone or any 
institution involved with socialism, heavily suppressed or persecuted (Kalaycioglu 
2005). A new constitution, which largely reified the role of the state, was adopted in 
1982, and in 1983 general 'multiparty' elections were held under the strict supervision 
of the military with only three parties permitted to take part (ibid.). The discourse of 
the Kemalist military during this time was similar to the early Republican one. 
Kasaba notes that before the elections, military officials had warned the public against 
voting for politicians they labelled as "the remnants of the old order" responsible for 
driving the country to the edge of the precipice prior to the coup, and encouraged 
people to open up a new, brighter future for themselves (1997: 15). In doing so, 
Kasaba argues, the military reiterated the Kemalist argument that Turkey had to get 
rid of the burden of the past and start a new future in order to catch up with the 
modem world (ibid.). 
Turkey did embark on a new phase in the post-1980s, but not exactly in the way 
desired by the Kemalist military. The dynamics of this change were external as much 
as internal. With the Cold War rhetoric dissolving and the Soviet Union finally 
disintegrating in 1991, Turkey found itself in a changing international context and 
was faced with new issues and challenges in terms of its foreign policy, particularly 
with regard to its relationship with the European Community, as well as the Balkans, 
8This is, of course, not to say that there were no major political or social changes until the 1980s. The 
ending of the single-party era of 1923-50 is often discussed as a significant turning point in Turkish 
social and political life. With the multi-party democracy of the 1950s, the defeat of the Kemalist party 
and the rise of the more populist Democrat Party, and its eventual termination through the military 
coup of 1960 had important repercussions on the social scene. It is again around this time that the 
perceived axis of - and admiration for- modernity shifted from Europe to the USA. However, the 
impact of the 80s was radically extensive and influential. For a detailed overview of the dynamics that 
have shaped political, social and economic life in Turkey in different periods, see Ersin Kalaycioglu's 
(2005) account of Turkish Republican history. For further discussion on the emergence of the USA as a 
new point of reference in the 1950s, see Bora (2002). 
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the Caucasus' and the Middle East. Domestically, following the 1983 elections, the 
Motherland Party (ANAP) lead by Turgut Ozal came to power and changed Turkish 
economic policy from a protectionist model to a market oriented one. The neoliberal 
market agenda adopted by the ANAP government allowed for increased privatisation 
and liberalisation of the economy resulting in the gradual break-up of the self-
containment policies. This in tum facilitated exposure to the forces of globalisation 
and an erosion of state authority. 
The resulting context, combined with the ideological vacuum left by the purge of 
political life under the military regime, mobilised alternative identities and political 
demands, particularly those coming from two of the most influential contestants, the 
Kurdish and Islamist groups (Kalaycioglu 2005). As Kurdish nationalists challenged 
"Turkish identity", arguing that it represented not just a civic but an ethnic identity, 
the questioning of "Turkishness" and the debates on "who are the Turks?" took over 
the country (ibid.: 147-8). This challenge evoked two different responses from 
Turkish nationalism, with one group arguing for a definition of Turkishness as a "se1f-
adopted" identity which does not belong to anyone specific ethnic community, and 
another group, mainly the Turkish ethnic nationalists, responding by reaching out to 
their roots in Central Asia, just as Kurdish ethnic nationalists were reaching out to 
their own ethnic origins (ibid.). As the armed struggle between the terrorist wing of 
Kurdish nationalism, the PKK, and the Turkish armed forces intensified in the South 
East of Turkey in the mid eighties, ethnic nationalism escalated on both sides. Today, 
the heavy human cost of the armed conflict, which resulted in the death of 30,000 
people between 1991 and 1999 alone, continues to fuel ethnic Turkish nationalism 
(ibid.: 144). 
It was not, however, just the ethnic dimension of Turkishness that was heavily 
challenged, but also the state-inscribed modernization project it was to represent. The 
neo-liberal economic policies of the ANAP regime provided opportunities for a new 
class of entrepreneurs, many of them private businessmen rising through the networks 
they established with the public authorities (Bugra 2003: 462), creating a new 
prosperous class that could enjoy the rapidly developing consumer culture. At the 
same time a class of service sector professionals, who could demand high incomes 
and could afford the expanding range of consumer goods, came into being in urban 
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areas. However, with the changes brought about by globalization, both economic 
development and integration remained uneven resulting in marked differences in 
income distribution. As Bugra notes, the neoliberal agenda for market reform had 
little room for social security provisions and "neither was there much concern for a 
restructuring of the redistributive system in conformity with social and economic 
objectives" (2003: 458). In addition, in urban centres, the influx of migrants from 
Anatolia, mainly driven by the military conflict in eastern and southeast regions, 
accentuated the disparity in terms of income and life styles, while deteriorating social 
services and benefits further amplified the feeling of social inequality (Keyder 
1999b). As a result of all these changes, a kaleidoscope of lifestyles became apparent 
particularly in the city centres, which were no longer distinguishable on the basis of 
previous class distinctions but instead on the basis of consumption patters (Keyder 
1999b, c.f. Kandiyoti 2002)9. In this transformation, the middle classes of earlier 
years, as well as the "decent" jobs of the previous era were left behind, creating an 
"additional awareness that the promises of assimilation that once held sway in the 
modernist era, were not to be reproduced in the postmodern one" (Keyder 1999b: 24). 
The rise of Islamist politics in the eighties and nineties attempted to offer a solution to 
these new polarisations in society through religious unity, as well as offering 
protection from the moral degeneration/over-Westernization that global culture 
seemed to entail. At the same time, Isiamists10 posed an open challenge to the secular 
"look" of modem life that the Republic had identified with. In the early eighties a 
new kind of headscarf, the veil, tied in a particular style to cover the neck and 
sometimes the shoulders and often accompanied by a long loose coat or jacket to 
disguise the body form, became the self-expression of Islamist women in the public 
sphere gaining a political meaning11 • The rising number of women wearing the veil 
9 Articles in Caglar Keyder's edited book Istanbul (1999a), as well as his articulate discussion (1999b) 
in the same book explore these irregularities within the context of Istanbul. 
10 Jenny White (2002: 6) defines the Islamist movement as "a general mobilization of people around 
cultural, political and social issues that are presented through an Islamic idiom" while also stressing 
that Islamism is not coherent in organization, ideological interpretation, goal or method. The term 
'Islamists' are used in this research in a similar sense, to refer to supporters bonded through the 
Islamist movement within the chosen time span of the study. It is important to note that even in the 
related case study of white weddings spanning only a two-year period, different meanings of the term 
and contradictions among the Islamists themselves clearly surface. 
II The 'veil' or in Turkish, 'turban' refers to a contemporary style and should not be confused with the , . 
pre-Republican veil. In the analysis of case studies, 'veiled' will refer to the contemporary Islamlst 
headscarf. Far from being a uniform dress code, the veiled dress today can be seen in many styles, 
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was met with a strong reaction from secularist groups, resulting in the ban of the veil 
from state premises, including universities and for employees working in the public 
sector. To this day the confrontation between the Islamists and the state has focused 
on this garment 12. The landslide victory won by the Islamist-based Justice and 
Development party (AKP) in November 2002 has not resolved the conflict either. 
What the veil stands for, whether it is compatible with the secular principles of the 
Republic and what place it should hold in modem Turkey are still thorny issues that 
wait to be confronted. 
Strikingly as the nineties unfolded, while the polarization between Kemalist 
secularism and Islamist politics continued on a discursive level, the "open" and 
"closed" identities started converging on the marketplace. As various writers point 
out, today the heterogeneities of both groups also find their expression through the 
choice of commodities, as observable in the growing market for Islamist fashion and 
the commodification of Islamist identities (See particularly Navaro-Yashin 2002; 
White 2002). The participation of Islamists in consumer culture and their 
reinterpretation of its uses and meanings to make its products compatible with 
Islamist lifestyles have challenged the secularist monopoly over the meaning of being 
modem. Consequently, and as my study of white weddings in Islamist circles will 
also show, Islamists' use of consumer culture has been sharply criticised by most 
secularists, with only a few regarding this as a positive move and a convergence of 
identities in Turkey. 
Finally, and related to this last issue, Kemalist inscription of women's gender identity, 
which had been the major symbol of the modernisation project, was challenged, not 
only by the Islamists who openly rejected Kemalist discourses on gender, but also by 
feminists from the secular classes as well. The post-coup context increased the 
audibility of feminist voices and witnessed the growing questioning of the social role 
and status of women, including whether the Kemalist project itself actually had any 
from the most conservative loose grey coats to the most colourful and fashion-aware styles, combined 
with jeans and trousers. The headscarf is today still banned in universities, as well as for women who 
work in government institutions, such as doctors, teachers, MP's etc. . 
12 See Elizabeth Ozdalga (1998) for a detailed discussion of the background of the debate on veil. 
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feminist intentions 13. This has led to a fragmentation of the meaning of feminism 
which had until then been regarded as synonymous with the Kemalist modernization 
project. I will discuss the feminist deconstructions of Kemalism in the second part of 
this chapter. 
To summarize, the post eighties context witnessed the erosion of state power, the 
questioning of the linear modernization project, and as a result, serious challenges to 
the official account of Turkish identity. What is more, these changes blurred the 
boundaries between the centre and the periphery, and led to as Acikel (2006: 66) 
argues, new class, religious, ethnic and regional dynamics, which allowed the 
peripheries to be articulated onto state and bureaucratic mechanisms, breaking the 
seemingly indivisible unity of the centre, state and bureaucracy. However, Acikel 
notes, although the centre-periphery paradigm, as Mardin had explained, has been 
punctured and fragmented, the opposition between the metaphors of centre and 
periphery has not disappeared. Similarly, Ahiska (2006) argues that the concepts and 
representations that have been mapped onto the centre and periphery has shifted and 
changed over time, given the changing power dynamics in society: whereas in the 
aftermath of coups in Turkey the military has been the organising force of the centre, 
today it is the media and non-governmental organizations that are associated with the 
centre as its integral elements (ibid.: 17). However, like Acikel (2006), she also 
stresses that the duality between the centre and the periphery, and through them, 
between what is seen as modem and non-yet-modem, continues to inform Turkish 
politics and prevents the centre from imagining the society as one inseparable whole. 
Alongside this disjuncture, what also continues to shape Turkish politics and everyday 
life is the hegemony of the nationalist discourse. Opinion polls today show that about 
68 percent of the Turkish population describes itself as nationalist, while 32.3 percent 
declares itself as 'fully' nationalist (Tempo 2006). At the same time, writers note that 
nationalism in Turkey today should not be seen as a homogenous discourse of 
Kemalist nationalism, but one that includes, alongside the official Kemalist version 
which forms the "root-language" of Turkish nationalism, many other sub-discourses 
I3 For further discussion on 1980s and the feminist movement, see Tekeli 1990b: 33-6. For a 
comparative discussion on ftrst (Republican) and second (post 1980s) wave feminist movements in 
Turkey, again see Tekeli 1998. See Also Ozturkmen (2000) and Yesim Arat (2000) for further 
discussion on post-80s feminism. 
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that account for its supremacy (Bora 2003: 436; Yumul and Ozkirimli 2000. 
, 
Ozkirimli 2006). Among these, radical nationalism offers one version with its ethno-
essentialist/racist rhetoric, and Islamist nationalism offers another, stressesing the 
ethnic value of Turkishness while suppressing the modernist aspirations inherent in 
Kemalism (ibid.). Another version is what Bora (2003) calls the liberal 
neonationalism. This strand, Bora argues matured by the end of the 1980's, and since 
then, it has been partiCUlarly - and most influentially - advocated by the media (ibid.: 
441). 
I find a brief discussion on this discourse useful for further demonstrating the 
changing nature of the centre periphery relationship in Turkey, and to elaborate on the 
dynamics of this change. But such a discussion is also relevant due to the strong 
support it receives from the media, which sees itself as firmly located at the centre. 
The analysis in this research reveals this discourse, along with its preferred point of 
identification, the EuroTurk (or its popularly used synonym the "White-Turk") to be 
strongly evident in the reporting of the case studies. Therefore, I will shortly expand 
on this discourse of nationalism building on Bora's (2003) definition. 
Bora defines liberal nationalism as an offspring of the modernist-Westernizing vein in 
official nationalism, one that adapts to market fetishism the Ataturkist ideal of 
"attaining the rank of modem civilisation" and "defines cultural identity in terms of 
its ability to "achieve" and "catch up" with the modem lifestyle" (2003: 443). While 
the liberal nationalist discourse, with its emphasis on economics and economic 
performance achieved in the international markets has always accompanied the 
official Kemalist nationalism, it gained a more prominent position in the eighties with 
the integration of the Turkish economy with the global markets under what Bora calls 
the "dazzling aura of globalisation discourse" (2003: 441). By the nineties, it had 
transformed into a more radicalised and chauvinistic neo-nationalist version. With 
this version, Europeanised urban upper middle classes distinguished themselves from 
the impoverished lower classes, which they saw as a hindrance to national progress, 
partiCUlarly to Turkey's membership of the EU (ibid.: 442). 
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The term "Euro-Turlf,14, a phrase first coined and taken up by columnists in the early 
nineties, refers to this Europeanised class and forms the preferred national identity of 
the liberal neo-nationalist discourse. These urban Turks are described as urbanites 
that have ""caught up" with the ED norms, educationally, professionally, and in terms 
of consumption, as well as with their good manners, cultural interests, and even 
biological standards" (Bora 2003: 442). Yumul (2000) points out that the 
civilisationary progress achieved by the new urban populations are expected to be 
reflected in their physical outlook - handsome, young, well groomed, clean-shaven _ 
certainly no moustaches - fair complexion, and tastefully dressed. Furthermore, with 
their civilised manners and Western looks, these new Turks also sported a new and 
"narcissistic" nationalism, which presented itself as "the nationalism of the twenty-
first century" (Bora 2003: 444). Bali quotes the praise for the clean-shaven, 
handsome Turkish soldiers in the column of Hurriyet newspaper's editor in chief as a 
good example of this new, almost fashionable nationalism: 
"All three are young. All three are Western looking. All three are dressed in comfortable 
clothes, as an American youth would. All three have modern haircuts. ( ... ) In short, all three 
are universal. All three are universal, but at the same time all three are also national, even 
more 'national' than we would have guessed. From the Turkish flag waving on the long pole 
in the entrance, the picture of Ataturk in the inside, and the way they perceive Turkey's most 
important problems emerges the new national identity of the new citizen. Turkey crafts a new 
citizen that many have not yet discovered, and will never discover. With his life style, 
cultural values, cultural consumption, this new citizen is totally Western." (2002: 316, my 
emphasis.) 
Bali rightly notes that this outright elitist division of society between those who are 
privileged and those who are not is quite similar to the American WASP figure (ibid.: 
324). At the same time, this discourse carries more than a just blatant declaration of 
elite chauvinism. As Irzik and Guzeldere (2003) argue, the emergence of the Euro-
Turk identity is largely due to the urban middle class' disappointment at the economic 
14 Bora argues that the tenn "White-Turk" is more often used by those who critically oppos~ th.is 
discourse (2003: 443). However, as Bali shows, the tenn itself has been coined by a columnIst m 
Hurriyet newspaper in the mid-90s, and was taken up by journalists themselves for some time. To 
avoid confusion, and to be consistent, I will use the tenn Euro-Turk in this discussion here. However, 
what I am more interested in here is not the tenns themselves, or whether they are literally taken up, 
but the ways in which they help us understand how and why certain segments of the society see 
themselves as belonging to the centre, and different from and superior to the peripheries. 
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and social consequences of Turkey's insertion into the global market (c.f. Demiroz & 
Dncu 2005). The lack of state regulation on the economy, the disturbing inequalities 
caused by the spreading commodification and increasing migration from rural areas, 
the mobilization of new networks between aspiring businessmen and public 
authorities for private gain leading to "downright corruption" (Bugra 2003: 462) have 
all changed the social and economic dynamics in the urban centres and accentuated 
the feeling of frustration in the liberal segments of the population (See Demiroz & 
Dncu 2005). 
The liberal neo-nationalist discourse sharpened in response to these changes and the 
emerging others in the urban centres, and in time grew and developed to involve new 
mearungs. According to the urban elite, the new rich who had originated from 
Anatolian towns would have the money but lack the desired upbringing and refined 
taste to accompany their wealth. The migrants, recently having arrived from their 
villages, simply did not have the means to adapt to civilised urban life15• In contrast, 
the Europeanised Turks would have the taste and refinement to take part in global 
consumer culture, and their lives would easily blend into the modem life styles of the 
West. With the inclusion of the Islamists in the list of unwanted others, this ideal 
identity also acquired a political edge (Bali 2002). The urban elite strongly rejected 
the Islamists, showed full support for Kemalism and the secular principles of the 
Republic and fully anchored its identity in secularism. In the more recent years, with 
the continued ascent of the Islamists, mounting tension resulting from income 
differences, and the realisation that the segments of population that were rejected 
would not disappear, the urban elite's attitude to the lower classes started to change 
from contempt towards philanthropy (Bali 2002). Urban liberals began discussing the 
problems of what they saw as the peripheries of Turkey under the rhetoric of 'other 
Turkey'. This' other Turkey' often refers to the outskirts of the cities or the Southeast 
region of Turkey and also comes up quite frequently in the data in this research. 
However, this discourse, despite its seeming philanthropy, still maintains the sharp 
distance between the Europeanised Turks and others, as well as confirming the 
15 The maganda stereotype of the machismo male was widely used in public discourse in the late 
eighties to represents these new dwellers of the cities. As Bali (2002) reminds us, this stereotype was 
highly important in triggering the formation of the White-Turk identity. The maganda stands for an 
undesirable hybrid of traditional immigrant culture with urban culture, resulting in vulgar and tasteless 
over-consumption and loss of the moral and cultural values of the urban middle classes. See Oneu 
(1999) for a detailed discussion of this stereotype. 
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superior position of the urban elite vis-a-vis the 'other Turkey' and as the hegemonic 
group that defines and excludes the nation's internal others (c.f. Yumu12000: 46). 
In their discussion on the attraction of the new nationalist discourse, Demiroz and 
Oncu (2005) argue that it offers the disillusioned urban elite the promise of progress _ 
even a revolutionary hope. Being a Europeanised Turk implies belonging to a 
segment of population who has the necessary skills to further the progress and 
democratisation of Turkey once started by the Kemalists (ibid.). In other words, the 
liberal neo-nationalist discourse repeats what Ahiska (2003) calls 'the frustrating and 
endless efforts' to catch up with the 'train of Western civilisation' and to overcome 
the 'time lag', this time with the help of the new urban elite. Following Yumul 
(2000), we can also add that this unilinear vision of progress largely results in the 
desire to reinstate the boundaries of the centre and the periphery, the West and the 
East, and along this axis to relocate the meaning of modernity with the urban elite. 
Such an attempt can only result in further tension, argues Yumul, because Turkish 
modernity is essentially a hybrid, and it continues to hybridise further as its 
peripheries are constantly carried into the centre, changing the meaning of the centre 
in the process (ibid.: 47). In rejecting that hybridity, the centre once again denies that 
the peripheries are an autonomous dynamic realm with the potential to offer 
alternative meanings of modernity and nation, and instead imagines them as a non-
entity (Ahiska 2006). 
2.3 The academic resonance 
The growing visibility and political appeal of divergences from the official definitions 
of modernity and national identity have also been apparent in the burgeoning list of 
academic publications, particularly since the nineties, that aimed to deconstruct the 
Kemalist project together with its modernist and nationalist aspirations. Bozdogan 
and Kasaba's edited work, Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey 
(1997a), reflects a powerful collection of such critical engagement. In their very first 
sentence in their introduction, the authors firmly state that both in Turkey and around 
the world today what is being witnessed is "the eclipse of the progressive and 
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emancipatory discourse of modernity"(1997b: 3)16. For the authors what Turkey is 
experiencing is closely linked to the demise of nationalist developmentalism and the 
rise of global ising trends in the world: 
"As these global trends ensnarl the country with all their energy and unruliness, official 
modernization, with its singularity, austerity, and paternalism appears woefully inadequate 
both as a source of inspiration and as a mechanism of control in economics, politics, and 
cultural production."(1997b: 5) 
While some of the recent publications have concentrated specifically on the 
nationalist discourses of the Kemalist project (e.g. Altinay 2004, Kieser 2006a), 
others have invited the readers to see beyond the polarities of East versus West, Islam 
versus secularism, state versus public, or tradition versus modernity that were 
embedded at the heart of Kemalist discourse, and instead examine the hybrid patterns 
which either do not fit into these dichotomies or offer alternative meanings and 
experiences of modernity and identity outside the official nationalist discourse (e.g. 
Keyder 1999a; Kandiyoti 2002; Navaro-Yashin 2002). With a similar concern, Irzik 
and Guzeldere (2003) in the introduction to their edited work, ask us to explore what 
is taking place at the fault lines of Turkish identity. For the writers, Turkey is: 
"neither caught between nor a successful synthesis of an "East" and "West" ... rather a 
country in which many of the fundamental social divisions have been experienced, 
articulated, concealed, or displaced in a culturaVideological vocabulary mobilising the "West" 
in different power and justification strategies." (2003: 285) 
16 Recently, this work has also been criticised. Ahiska (2003: 358) criticises it for seeing Turkish 
modernization as a failed imitation of the West, a copy, therefore replicating modernization discourse 
as the reference point. Similarly Alev Cinar's (2005: 3) argues that the work retains a Eurocentric 
perspective, and missing out that Turkish modernity was not an imitation (a copy) implemented top 
down. While some of the arguments in the book, such as those in Keyder's article (1997), fall into the 
danger of reinscribing the essentialist categories of model versus copy, this criticism cannot be 
generalised to all the contributions in the book. Many of the articles in the book point towards the 
inherently hybrid character of Kemalist modernization, and highlight its deliberat~ attemp~ ~t 
negotiating with Westernization rather than copying it wholeheartedly. Articles by Mardm, Kandlyott, 
or Bozdogan invite readers to look at the hybrid forms, ambiguities or appropriations that did not. fit 
into the Western model even in the very early years of the Republic. Bozdogan's book (2001), which 
examines, as in her article in her edited book, Turkish architectural culture in the early Republic, is also 
a good example of this effort. 
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In terms of scholarship on Turkey, feminist criticism, which has been challenging 
Kemalism heavily on the gender front since the eighties, can be considered both as a 
pioneer of and a main contributor to the attempts to deconstruct national identity 
among academics. The literature in this field has not only highlighted the intricate 
relationship between gender, state and national imagining, particularly the integral 
role of the female signifier for Kemalist nationalism, but also re-examined the links 
between gender, national modernity and identity in the light of contemporary 
experiences. As Gole argued, women were integral to both the modernist and the 
nationalist discourses of the Kemalist project: 
"The way Kemalism approaches the woman question can shed I ight to the dilemma of 
civilisation and nationalism. Women have been the main ingredient of the Kemalist 
movement both in its civilisationary project and nationalist ideology. We can, in a way, say 
that women have carried the flag of the Kemalist reforms." (Gole 1991: 90) 
In the following section of this chapter, I will try to summarize briefly those main 
arguments emerging from this rich volume of feminist scholarshipl7. This will not 
only provide the background from which the more contemporary debates on women 
in Turkey have emerged, but will also help us explore the gaps and contradictions that 
had been embedded in national identity from the very early years of its inception and 
have multiplied ever since. 
2.4 Kemalist reforms, nationalism and women 
In the previous chapter, we have discussed how, by the mid-80s, heated academic 
debates had emerged on the problematic relationship between nation and gender as 
feminists started to eye nationalism with suspicion and no longer saw it as compatible 
with and complementary to feminism. The feminist literature on women and nation in 
Turkey is one of the early contributors to the academic debate on gender and 
nationalism. 
17 Most writers on women in Turkey, whose works I will be heavily referring to in the following 
discussion, can be regarded as being within the feminist canon, such as Sirin Tekeli, Deniz Kandiyoti, 
Zebra Arat, Yesim Arat, Ayse Saktanber, Nukhet Sirman, Meltem Ahiska, and Ayse Durak~asa. 
Nilufer Gole strictly refuses to align herself with any political stance even though she has wntten 
heavily on the women question in Turkey, therefore I hesitate to call her a feminist writer. See 
interviews with Gole, Ozcan (2002: 18). 
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Given the key symbolic role which the "modem female" image had (and still has) in 
representing national identity in Turkey, feminist critiques of the content and 
intentions of Kemalist reforms, as well as the liberating power of state feminism 18 in 
terms of women's rights in Turkey, mark a steep tum in conceptualising the national 
project. For a long time, not only did women's rights remain tantamount to Kemalism 
and Turkish modernity in official discourses, but also among the early generation of 
women who had benefited from the opportunities offered by the new nation, there was 
a strong feeling that they "figuratively, owed their existence to Ataturk" (Arat 1997: 
96). At a symbolic level, a very strong and uncontested paternal relationship was 
formed between Ataturk and his new, emancipated daughters l9• In sharp contrast, the 
main starting point for feminist critiques in the post-1980s has been an agreement that 
the reform process was done for a Kemalist-nationalist cause rather for women 
themselves. Sirin Tekeli's writings (1981, 1990b and 1998) are among the earliest to 
raise this criticism. Tekeli argued that the republican reforms concerning women, 
such as the granting of suffrage rights to female citizens, served more than one goal: 
they were mainly strategic moves to sever the ties with the Ottoman past and 
showcase the evidence of the new democratic nature of the new nation to the West, 
but they also helped Ataturk offset any accusations of becoming a dictator (1981: 
298). Similarly, Kandiyoti argued that there was "no doubt that the woman question 
became one of the pawns in the Kemalist struggle to dismantle the theocratic 
remnants of the Ottoman state" (1989: 139). Along the same lines, Yegenoglu (1998) 
has emphasised how the unveiling of women has held a strategic value in the 
construction of nationalist ideology and in distancing the new Republic from its 
Ottoman past. And argued that woman's status in the new nation formed "one of the 
main reference points of the ideological debates and arguments that characterised this 
complex process of transformation of a feudal world empire into a nation-state" 
(1997: 126). 
In these arguments, the nationalist cause emerges as an obstacle to women's full 
liberation. For Zehra Arat, Kemalism fell short of bringing about full liberation to 
18 This concept has been coined in Tekeli's writings (and has been used largely by ~ost-198? femin.ists. 
19 For further discussion on this, see Carol Delaney's article (1995) where she dIscusses m detaIl the 
fatherly figure of Ataturk for the Turkish nation in general but for women in particular. 
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women particularly because its refonns "were not aimed at liberating women or at 
promoting the development of female consciousness and feminine identity" (1994: 
58). Arat is even cynical of the tenn "state feminism" or any associations between the 
early republican era and feminism: 
"With a goal of socioeconomic development, these reforms are hardly feminist, and their 
perception of the role of women and definition of womanhood would not qualify them to be 
taken as "state-sponsored feminism," as done by some analysts." (Ibid.io 
While highlighting the instrumentalism of the refonns, these studies also revealed 
continuity, rather than a radical break with the past in tenns of the Republican elite's 
interest in women's rights. Writers have argued that the direct relationship between 
the emancipation of women and building a modem nation had started to emerge 
alongside the developing Turkish nationalism in the nineteenth century, particularly 
through the attempts to modernize the Ottoman state during the Tanzimat era21 . 
Questions about the role and status of women entered political discussions as the 
intellectuals of the time, inspired by Enlightenment ideals, started to problematise 
modernity and criticise the Empire's weak position vis-a-vis the West, seeking for 
ways to reconcile modernization with the Islamic culture without imitating Western 
ways of life. With the rising power of the more political, constitutionalist Young 
Turks in the political scene at the end of the century and the start of the second 
constitutional period in 1908, both nationalism and women's emancipation began to 
be regarded as indispensable to the civilisationary process. Yegenoglu (1998) points 
out that the essential features of this debate were fundamentally shaped by the 
nationalist discourse. In primarily attempting to transfonn and save the empire, 
demands for modernization focused on issues like family, responsible motherhood, 
and the education of citizens, which, as Yegenoglu notes, were all regarded as part of 
the "woman's question" (ibid.: 127). 
20 Zebra Arat (1994: 74) strongly rejected the term arguing that for any movement to be called feminist, 
it has to recognize gender inequality and male domination and take measures against it. Given the early 
Republican women's sincere belief in, and adoption of Kemalism as a guarantor of rights, and 
emancipation from the old system of patriarchal domination, the term clearly points at a different 
discourse about feminism and women's rights than used by the post-80s feminist researchers. 
21 There is an abundance of literature on how the woman's question first appeared in political 
discussions during the Tanzimat era (1839-76) in the Ottoman Empire. See particularly the discussions 
in Kandiyoti (1989, 1997b, 2000), and also Gole (1991), Yegenoglu (1998) Sirman (2002). Also see 
Jayawardena (1986). 
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Analysis of novels published after the Tanzimat period reveals the evident desire that 
urban male intellectuals had felt for a new woman, liberated but still modest, and for 
the new nuclear family bond that would be formed between them (See Kandiyoti 
1997a; Sirman 2002). Sirman (2002) particularly emphasises how the transformation 
in the conceptualisation of the family had also transformed the expectations from 
women. In the new social order, envisioned by the post-Tanzimat novelists, women 
would be educated, unselfish and wise partners who would raise patriotic children for 
the nation22• At the same time, these novels also pointed to the dangers of excessive 
Westernization through the portrayal of "loose" female characters, reflecting the 
desire to achieve Western progress while maintaining the spiritual essence of the 
Islamic-Ottoman heritage. The problematization of womanhood in this period marks 
the selective and inconsistent appropriation of European and Islamic concepts for a 
political project, which would eventually lead to a republicanism which the writers of 
the time "could neither have anticipated, nor, indeed, approved" (Kandiyoti 1998: 
274). 
In short, the conceptualisation of Turkishness from the very start had problematised 
gender: in pre-Republican discourses, women's transformation was foremost 
necessary for a more civilised national self-definition, provided that men themselves 
would take measures towards betterment. But women also played an important part 
in fostering the image of the nation as an ethnically coherent entity with roots 
reaching back into history. This ethno-nationalist discourse was advocated largely 
through the works of Ziya Gokalp (1876-1924), a major theoretician of Turkish 
nationalism, foremost ideologue of Turkism and a strong advocate of women's rights. 
Furthermore, he also had a very significant influence on the development of 
Kemalism, with Mustafa Kemal Ataturk claiming Gokalp to be his "intellectual 
mentor and father" (Fleming 2000: 127). Consequently, feminist scholarship has 
devoted considerable attention to the writings of Gokalp, who is arguably the founder 
of Turkish nationalism, to demonstrate how discourses around female gender are 
tightly embedded in Turkish nationalist thought. 
22 In Sirman's words in these novels "men are still the head of the household, but the pashas of 
Tanzimat are no long~r around. The new regime will be set by the new man. These young men, mainly 
from the middle class, mostly in governmental jobs, are modest men who are affectionate towards the 
women, the freed slaves, that they have power over" (2002: 237). 
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In Kandiyoti's (1989: 141) words, Gokalp marks "a major departure from earlier 
approaches to the women question", from those that had a modernist yet still Islamic 
stance, towards one that is anchored strictly in Turkish nationalism23. While Gokalp, 
like most other intellectuals of his time, found it necessary to differentiate between 
Western civilisation and Western culture, his work was different in attempting to 
bring together Western civilisation with a national Turkish culture and a secular form 
of religion. Gokalp summarized this ideal synthesis in his well-known self-definition: 
"I am from Turkish nationality, Islamic community, and Western civilisation." (Parla, 
quoted in Gocek 2002b: 73). For Gokalp, while Western civilisation was seen as 
desirable, a cultural submission to the West had to be avoided, and civilisation had to 
be achieved while protecting national culture. More importantly, Gokalp argued that 
this was possible because Turkish culture, in its pre-Islamic pure form rooted in 
central Asia, was inherently compatible with Western civilisation. Therefore, it 
needed to be freed from 'foreign' effects that had destroyed its original form. It is 
significant that by foreign Gokalp particularly meant the Islamic and Arabic 
influences on Turkish culture, and attempted to detach the meaning of "Turkishness" 
away from the East and bring it closer towards the West. These oppressive, non-
Turkish practices that had disrupted the 'essence' of Turkish culture and moral values 
were also responsible for women's poor status in society. For the author, Turkish 
society was inherently egalitarian, and a return to its cultural roots also required a re-
establishment of the original gender roles in society: 
"The reason why Turkists are both populist and feminist is not simply because these ideals 
are valued in this century; the fact that democracy and feminism were the two main principles 
of ancient Turkish life is a major factor in this respect." (Gokalp, quoted in Kandiyoti, 
1989: 141) 
Fleming (2000: 128) argues that Gokalp's interest in women was based on the idea 
that they were repositories and guarantors of the past. By locating women's ideal 
status in the past, Gokalp did not just provide evidence that pure and authentic 
23 Similar discussion of the development of Turkism and concerns about women's rights can be found 
in Gole's analysis of the ideal Turkish woman (1991) and also Jaywardena (1986). A detaped an~lys!s 
of Gokalp's nationalism and his arguments on women's emancipation can also be found m Flemmg s 
article (2000). My discussion here on Gokalp builds from these works. 
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Turkish culture already holds all the necessary potential for progress. He also urged 
the community to recover its original culture in order to restore women's proper 
position in society, and reinstate the nation's civilisationary potential (see also Gole 
1991: 67). Women, as in other nationalisms, had a significant representative role in 
Gokalp's version, but this time stood for the inherent progressiveness of the 
collectivity. As a result, not only was the question of women's emancipation central 
in Gokalp's utopian "New Nation", but also his conceptualisation of nationalism itself 
was to a large extent "predicated on the proper positioning of women" (Fleming, 
2000: 128). As research on gender and nationalism in Turkey has repeatedly 
underlined, Kemalism's moulding of nationalism and the modernization project was 
significantly influenced by this vision. 
The importance Kemalists accorded to history as the pnme mover of national 
consciousness and citizenship is a good case in point. The foundation of the Society 
for the Study of Turkish Historl4, which was set up by Ataturk to study and rewrite 
Turkish and Ottoman history, paid particular attention to carefully studying Turkish 
women before Islam (Kandiyoti 1989: 142). The 'Turkish History Thesis' was a 
product of this extensive rewriting, arguing that the Turks had contributed to 
civilisation long before they had become a part of the Islamic World and the Ottoman 
Empire, and had maintained their cultural identity, rooted in their Central Asian 
origins throughout their historl5• Ataturk's adoptive daughter, Afet Inan, educated as 
a historian, took an active part in these studies and in the dissemination of the Turkish 
History Thesis, also writing in detail about women in pre-Islamic Turkish culture (see 
Kandiyoti 1989: 142; Durakbasa 2000b: 141-148). In these writings, the essential 
Turkish cultural identity was the authentic source of women's redeemed status in the 
new nation. 
Given this rhetoric, it is no coincidence that an almost mythological ' Anatolian 
woman' decorates narratives of the War of Independence that had founded the nation. 
Gole argues that: 
24 Turk Tarih Tetkik Cemiyeti, later renamed as Turk Tarih Kurumu, Turkish Historical Society. 
25 Altinay (2004) offers a critical discussion on the ideological purpose and fmdings of the Turkish 
History Thesis. 
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"( ... ) the Anatolian woman displays the formation of national consciousness with respect to 
Western civilisation: Instead of "a coquettish Ottoman woman who is alien to her own 
nation" or the "Muslim woman who is fanatical and alien to civilisation", Kemalism had put 
forward the "Anatolian woman" ( ... ) as both the saved one and the saviour of Turkish nation: 
Anatolian woman would save Republican reforms from degeneration, and the reforms would 
save her from the fanaticism of Islam." (Gole 1991: 91; c.fToska 1998) 
It is evident that women were assigned the significant symbolic role of not only 
representing the nation, but by already rooting the potential for progress in the 
nation's cultural essence, they also helped to legitimise and, in Kandiyoti's words, 
"salvage" the modernization project that was undertaken (1998: 271). It is within this 
discursive framework that the first generation Kemalist feminists had started 
discussing the woman question. However, as Sirman (2002: 274) underlines, it is 
important to regard national gender roles not as imposed from outside, but as adopted 
willingly by individuals who would like to benefit from the opportunities these roles 
can offer. Certainly the early generation of women in the Turkish republic felt they 
benefited from the new gender roles assigned them by the new Republic, and even 
when asked about it decades later in the 1990s, they strongly supported and defended 
Kemalism (Zehra Arat 2000b; Yesim Arat 1997). In contrast, the feminist wave of 
academic literature that developed in the eighties and nineties attempted to 
deconstruct and criticise the ways in which the nationalist framework had moulded 
and limited gender discourses for women in Turkey. 
In this respect, two major consequences of Kemalist discourse on women have 
received particular emphasis. Firstly Kemalism was, like in most other national 
projects, also hostile to individualism and required the submission of all identities 
under the national one. Consequently, all independent or alternative identities outside 
the Kemalist project were suppressed, including feminist organizations and 
movements. Therefore the equation of women's rights solely with the national 
project has been strongly criticised by writers like Tekeli, who rightly argued, "the 
thesis that argues women's rights have been granted from above, by Ataturk, is not 
fair, and is wrong" (Tekeli 1998: 345). Feminist research has shown that the official 
version of national history omitted the activities of feminist organisations of the late 
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Ottoman Empire, which were especially visible between 1910 till the end of 1920s 
(Cakir 1993; Demirdilek 2000). In the newly found Republic, the attempts of these 
organizations to influence the modernization process were cancelled out by the 
Kemalist regime, and women's independent and active participation in politics was 
curbed. Saktanber (2002b) notes one good example as the case of the Women's 
People Party, which was founded in 1921 but was prevented from taking part in the 
elections as it would be competing against Ataturk's Republican People's Party. 
After turning into the Turkish Women's Union in 1924, the organization was 
eventually closed down completely in 1935 for not conforming to the national 
interest. Halide Edip Adivar's well-documented biography also shows how, as one of 
the strongest figures of Turkish feminism and nationalism, and a leading symbol of 
the War of Independence, she was forced into retiring into exile abroad when she 
opposed the Republican regime (Durakbasa 2000a). With the suppression of existing 
feminism, the claim that Ataturk granted women their rights almost without any 
demands became the widely accepted argument of the Kemalist discourse on 
women's rights (Saktanber 2002b: 325). This discourse, in return, has formed one of 
the main obstacles that prevented women from developing new conceptual 
frameworks that question patriarchy and from becoming politically active individuals 
(ibid.). 
A second common argument emerging from feminist criticisms was that, despite its 
modernist character, and claims of gender equality, Kemalism had an inherent 
patriarchal conservatism, and had not altered "the traditional norms of morality that 
guaranteed a biologically defined and socially constraining femininity for women" 
(Durakbasa 2000b: 148). Writers have focused on two areas where conservatism is 
particularly apparent: the role of women in the social and public sphere, and women's 
sexuality. On the first issue, the argument is that, while the social responsibilities of 
women were given a new prominence with Kemalism, this had not cancelled out their 
domestic duties. In fact, Kemalism continued to see the reproductive responsibility of 
women as simply their most important function, and regarded their enlightenment as 
simply necessary in order for them to better perform their domestic duty (Durakbasa 
2000b; Arat 1994). Often, Kemal Ataturk's own words, defining motherhood as 
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women's most important duty have provided writers with the main proof of this 
bias26. 
Added to this are the almost unanimous criticisms about the resilience of a patriarchal 
morality in Kemalism that saw women's sexual purity strictly as representative of 
male - and national - honour, which posed a striking contradiction to the 
emancipatory rhetoric of Kemalist reforms. The images that propagated the idea of 
the new woman in ballrooms, doing sports, or even wearing bathing suits at the beach 
were inevitably inconsistent with the sexual Puritanism and patriarchal conservatism 
of Kemalism. Kandiyoti (1998) has noted that because of this inherent contradiction , 
the inclusion of unveiled women in the public sphere resulted in a perpetual anxiety 
over the sexual morality of new modem woman who "incurred the constant risk of 
overstepping dangerous boundaries", and therefore "required diffuse, but persistent 
monitoring" (ibid.: 282; cf. Berktay 2002). 
Altinay's (2004) case study on the memoirs of Sabiha Gokcen, Turkey's first female 
combat pilot and Ataturk's adoptive daughter, provides an excellent illustration of this 
patriarchal anxiety operating alongside the encouragement for women to take a more 
active part in the public sphere even including national defence. As Altinay explains, 
Gokcen's training as a pilot and the support she got from Ataturk throughout shows 
that motherhood was not the only option offered to women who were invited into the 
nationalist project through the military. Nevertheless, her essential femininity, and 
concerns about protection of her honour/sexual purity, still remain a key obstacle she 
has to face. Altinay points to the striking incident where Gokcen asks Ataturk his 
permission to take part in the military operation against the Kurdish insurgency - the 
Dersim operation in Southeast Turkey. Ataturk not only grants her his permission but 
also gives her his pistol, reminding her of the sacrifice she has to make in the worst 
26 See for example, "The most important duty of woman is motherhood. The importance of this duty is 
better understood, if one considers that the earliest education takes place on one mother's lap. Our 
nation had decided to be a strong nation. Circumstances today require the advancement of our women 
in all respects. Therefore, our women, too, will be enlightened and learned and, like men, will go 
through all educational stages. Then, women and men, walking side by side, will be each other's help 
and support in social life." Ataturk, quoted in Arat (1994: 60). 
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case scenano (Le. falling into the hands of the enemy) that may await a female 
soldier27• Altinay acutely notes that: 
"In Ataturk's view, the threat to her honour (through rape, an unspoken, unnamed act in this 
narrative) was the ultimate danger, not death. Her pennission to go was based on her 
readiness to kill herself in order to protect her honour, and her nation's." (Altinay, 2004: 39) 
For Altinay, in a nation that defined itself as a "nation of soldiers", Gokcen's military 
participation is symbolic of the acceptance of women as a part of this soldier-nation, 
alongside the male citizens. However, for all her participation in military operations, 
the compliments from both the military and the media and her ambition, Gokcen's 
success as a military operations pilot did not further open up the military ranks or 
service to her or other women. 
Altinay's discussion also highlights a paradoxical situation for women: the difficulty 
in building their self-identity from male role models. On this, Saktanber (2002b) 
argues that even though men also have to go through a problematic reconstruction 
process, they have Kemal Ataturk as their clear role model, the leader of the nation 
whom they can identify with in formulating their public identity. Women also had 
their role models, their fathers, husbands and Ataturk. However, while they were 
declared as equal to men as citizens, they were also asked to preserve the division of 
labour based on sexual differences. The need to balance the two has, for Saktanber 
and other writers (See among others Kandiyoti 1997b; Kadioglu 1998, Durakbasa 
2000b ), resulted in a particular female type. She is patriotic and loyal to the 
nationalist cause, modem, but most importantly, all the while avoiding promiscuity 
and remaining fully virtuous. Hence, the new woman is marked by her de-eroticised 
image; she is an asexual woman, a sister figure in the public sphere, and dressed in the 
classic Kemalist attire, the suit. Even as she mixes with men in her social or work 
life, she remains, as Kandiyoti (l997b: 127) puts it, "as pure as the driven snow". 
This 'good, new woman' of Kemalism is also identified by her undemanding nature -
she is someone who has willingly accepted all her familial, social and national 
27 "Gokcen, then, I will give you my own pistoL... I hope that you will not face any risk. But if 
anything that will put your honour to risk should happen, do not hesitate to use this pistol against others 
or to kill yourself." Gokcen's memoirs, as quoted in Altinay (2004: 39) 
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responsibilities and who lives for others. In this pragmatic/modernist discourse 
, 
women are described as self-sacrificing, complementing others and existing for 
others, and most importantly, for the nation28• It is at this point that the "burden of 
representation" discussed in the previous chapter becomes an acute problem for 
women, for the highly paradoxical Republican discourses of gender do not offer clear 
blueprints to follow. 
A major conclusion emerging from feminist criticisms has been that the contradictory 
demands on women's identity embody the paradoxes inherent in the Kemalist 
modernization project, particularly regarding the location of Turkishness along the 
axis of East-West /change-stability/ modernity-tradition. Chatterjee (1989) forms a 
favoured reference in these arguments, and writers have pointed out that what lay at 
the heart of these ambivalent attitudes can also be found in Chatterjee's contention 
that women in postcolonial nation-states are asked to acquire the cultural refinements 
of the West but without jeopardizing the spirit of the nation by 'over-Westemising' 
(Yegenoglu 1998: 134; Berktay 2002; Sirman, 2002; c.f. Kadioglu 1996). Therefore 
the healthy balance that women are asked to sustain between two perceived 
dichotomies becomes a reflection of the healthy balance that the nation needs to strike 
for its own national identity. As argued previously, while Chatterjee's argument is 
not fully applicable to the Turkish case, it also makes us aware of the impossibility of 
ever arriving at such a national balance in everyday life. 
All in all, the conservatism In Kemalism' s approach to women has been better 
explained not as resilience of patriarchal discourses, but as of a consequence of 
modernity. Berktay (2002) argues that the exasperation, frustration and paranoia that 
surface as the nation tries to sever its ties with the past has been symbolically 
projected on to gender, particularly women's gender identity in Turkey. For Berktay, 
the insecurity male nationalists feel in the course of transformation results in attempts 
to reproduce the patriarchal ideology and adapt it to the current context as a proof that 
some things remain unchanged (ibid. 275). Similarly Bora (2005) has remarked that 
what is important is to follow how the attempts to limit and regulate modernity allow 
conservatism to be articulated with Kemalist-modernist discourse through the woman 
28 See Sirman (2002) for a discussion on this, through an examination of pre and post Republican 
national novels. 
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problem. As Bora succinctly argues, Kemalist modernization discourse joins 
conservatism, not exclusively, but mainly through the women question. As a result, 
change becomes the source of further conservatism, rather than an old form of 
patriarchy that remains unchanged throughout the modernization process. 
Finally, and following from this, as the forces of modernity and nationalism are 
locked in a permanent struggle to define and redefine each other, the possibility of 
closure in national identity becomes only a very temporary discursive stop, if not a 
mere fantasy. As Kandiyoti notes, the very contradictions inherent in the modem, yet 
chaste, ideal open it up to further challenges: 
"( ... ) the replacement of the physical veil by its metaphoric counterpart, chastity was, at best, 
an unstable solution and one that failed to effectively dissociate modernity from potential 
sexual transgression. The modem woman's presumably disciplined and de-eroticised body 
could constantly reinvent and refashion itself by selecting from the many images offered by 
global consumerism and invite renewed changes of both immorality and "inauthenticity". 
(1998: 283) 
Today, it is undisputable that the hegemonic discourses of Kemalism on gender and 
national identity have been weakened. The ideal - and paradoxical - Turkish woman 
has also been criticised and deconstructed heavily by academics. However, it is far 
too early to declare her death. As the analysis in the following chapters will show, 
Kemalist perceptions of women, with all its contradictions, is still highly popular 
among journalists and those that see themselves as a part of the centre. Perhaps we 
can argue that the paradoxes inherent in national gender and national identity do not 
only expose them to further challenges as Kandiyoti has argued: they also contribute 
to their survival. In other words, it is the contradictory nature of the Kemalist 
discourses that has allowed them to adapt and articulate into different situations, and 
that can largely explain its pervasiveness. 
2.5 Conclusion and further remarks 
This chapter attempted to present a brief overview of the historical context necessary 
for understanding the articulation of national identity in contemporary Turkey. At the 
same time, it also tried to highlight the ways in which discourses of national identity 
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have been tightly intertwined with gender discourses in Turkey. Here, the discussion 
followed up on the theoretical framework mapped out in the previous chapter. It 
explained the discourses of nationalism as both a product of modernity while at the 
same time trying to control modernity through a unilinear vision of progress and the 
clear categorisation of the roles and places of different social groups in the name of 
national unity. I have also tried to explain that women, through the various missions 
they fulfil in the discursive construction of the Turkish nation, offer the best chance to 
explore the paradoxes that surface in this process. Historically, women have always 
been at the heart of debates on where and how to strategically best locate national 
identity between the dualities of East and West, still the core question of national 
identity in Turkey. The position, look and status of women in society still act as a 
significant barometer of whether Turkey has caught up with the West, and if so, 
whether this has happened without surrendering to Western culture. In other words, 
through women it is quite easy to observe the daily negotiations with the West, which 
can usually mean the simultaneous identification and othering of Western identity. At 
the same time, as the carriers of national culture and representatives of ethnicity, 
through women it is also possible to follow through the ethnic foundations of 
Turkishness. As discussed before, the modernist and ethno-nationalist discourses are 
inextricable constituents of Turkish national identity, and work through each other, 
with women offering the prime case of observing how this takes place. 
This framework fonns the reasoning behind the selection of the case studies that will 
be analysed in the following chapters. My attempt to demonstrate the paradoxes in 
Turkishness today through the debates on women is part of a rich and ever growing 
literature. Today, beyond the feminist deconstructions of the early Kemalist 
discourse, there is a thick volume of research that focuses on the contemporary 
situation and tries to understand debates about Turkey through examining women. 
However, in these more contemporary researches, Islamist women have been the most 
popular area of investigation for feminist researchers in the 90s (c.f. N avaro-Yashin 
2002: 67). Today the 'woman question' seems to be brought up largely within 
analyses of the state/secularism, Islam and modernity triangle, and with attempts to 
observe how everyday experiences transcend the fault lines set by the Republican era 
(See Saktanber 2002a; White 2002; Arat 2005; Cinar 2005). While the ethnographic 
research accompanying such a focus has contributed extensively to the important 
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debates on the different meanings of modernity in Turkey, certain areas have been 
neglected. How the discourses of women and ethno-nationalism are interlinked in 
Turkey today is one of those rather neglected areas that the case studies will highlight, 
by analysing the gendered discourses of ethnic difference and ethnic puriti9• 
Another area that seems surprisingly unpopular in most contemporary studies is the 
centre, and its secular urban women (Navaro-Yashin 2002: 67). Again through the 
analysis of the data in the next chapters, secular women will appear in various forms, 
as the subjects of the news stories, as an ideal, and also through the self-representation 
of female journalists. 
Unlike the more restricted focus of most studies on gender and national identity, my 
goal here is to provide a broad, though certainly not all-encompassing overview to 
follow how discourses on nationalism and modernity intersect and interact over the 
representative body of the female. This will be done through the analysis of the 
debates occurring through a variety of subject positions, often more than one 
appearing over the same body: the 'national daughter', 'urban journalists', 'Kurdish 
women', 'Anatolian woman', the 'adulteress', the 'manipulated woman', the 
'Republican woman', the 'well educated young woman living abroad', as well as 
various versions of the 'Islamist' women. However, before we can explore the 
interweaving discourses of nation, modernity and gender in contemporary Turkey, the 
next chapter will briefly introduce the methodology for the analysis. 
29 A recent contribution that breaks the pattern is Altinay's (2004) book on gender, militarism and 
national identity in Turkey. While the book is not exclusively about women, it offers contemporary 
data on the links between nation, ethnicity, militarism and gender, as well as rich and fresh data from 
the early years of the Republic. Another interesting article is offered by Lale Yalcin-I:Ieckma~ and 
Pauline van Gelder'S article (2000), which looks at images of Kurdish women in KurdIsh medIa, and 
compares them with images of Turkish women in mainstream media in Turkey. 
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Chapter 3: 
Methodology -Constructing the Rationale for Analysis 
The theoretical framework as well as the analytical structure of this research is woven around 
the definition of discourse as based on the works of Michel Foucault -which proved to be an 
inspiring, challenging and at times problematic task. This chapter will explain how his 
arguments can offer answers to methodological concerns, while also presenting new problems 
at the same time. The discussion will also introduce the framework for analysis, which was 
developed to deconstruct the texts. 
3.1 Power, society and discourse 
Discourse over the last couple of decades has received high popularity among researchers 
working across a wide range of academic disciplines in the social sciences. As a result, many 
different uses and interpretations of the term exist today, bringing with them different 
traditions of how to conduct discourse analysis. Some of these are useful for analysing media 
discourse, such as critical discourse analysis as developed by Fairclough (1995), himself a 
linguist, or the narrative analysis developed by Alan Bell (1991). Others such as the 
ethnographic or psychological approaches are less so 1• Given the daunting range of voices in 
the field, it is necessary to underline that in this research, discourse is definable, in its simplest 
form, as the social construction of reality through language. This definition stems from the 
critical writings of Michel Foucault, who uses discourse to explain individual acts of 
language, or rather 'language in action' and is very much related to his explorations of power 
with which he became especially concerned in his later works2. To expand on this definition 
then, we can briefly discuss the two "radically novel" propositions made by Foucault on 
power, namely on the relationship between knowledge, truth and power, and the way power 
I See Jaworski & Coupland (1999) for a comprehensive overview of the various approaches to discourse 
analysis. 
2 I.e. Discipline and Punish (1991), The History of Sexuality: Volume 1; The Will to Knowledge (1998), Volume 
2: The Use of Pleasure (1992) particularly deal with how power operates through discourses. 
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functions {Hall 1997i. These propositions also inform the argumentative framework of 
methodology developed for the analysis. 
Foucault conceived a very important linkage between knowledge and power, and argued 
strongly that truth and knowledge, rather than being opposed to the workings of power, are 
closely involved with it. Not only is knowledge, assuming the authority of truth, always a 
form of power, but also power itself produces further knowledge through its institutions of 
discipline (such as the prison or the hospital in his earlier works), which is why he rejects the 
temptation to think of power as operating in a direct and brutally repressive fashion. In the 
fIrst volume of The History of Sexuality (1998), he calls this 'the repressive hypothesis' of 
power - power is regarded as dominating people, while knowledge, the truth, is seen to set 
people free. Foucault radically disagrees with this proposition and argues that it is different 
conceptions of knowledge and power that actually bind people into certain roles, such as how 
sexuality should be conceived. Foucault's now well-accepted warning about the links 
between the production of knowledge and power is nowhere more relevant than in the 
analysis of news stories. 
Second, and following this, Foucault does not perceive power as radiating from one single 
direction, from an institution, a structure, or a general system of domination exerted by one 
group over another. He tells us not to seek sources of power in certain people or state 
apparatuses, but rather in the "manifold relationships of force that take shape and come into 
play in the machinery of production, in families and in institutions" as "the basis of wide-
ranging effects of cleavage that run through the social body as a whole" (1998: 94). For 
Foucault, 
"( ... ) "Power", insofar as it is permanent, repetitious, inert, and self-reproducing, is simply the over-all 
effect that emerges from all these mobilities, the concatenation that rests on each of them and seeks in 
return to arrest their movement. ( ... ) it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategically 
situation in a particular society."{ibid.: 92) 
What Foucault finds especially striking in the modem period is that there is an unremitting 
and unstoppable expansion of power dispersed in society and its institutions. "Power is 
3 In his discussion on Foucault, Hall focuses on these propositions and gives a similar (although much more 
detailed) summary to the one I am giving here. 
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everywhere," he says, "not because it embraces everything, but it comes from everywhere" 
(ibid.). Foucault's insight becomes especially valuable for this research in exploring the 
operation of power in nations in general, and in understanding the experience of Turkey in 
particular. Even in analysing the early years of the Republic, rather than power residing 
simply with an elite engulfed in a project of modernization from above, his approach directs 
us towards exploring the specific historical conditions that enabled the elite to justify their 
radical project, namely their new perception of reality about nation and modernization. 
Similarly, trying to understand the growing appeal of Islamism simply as a consequence of 
the political visibility of Islamist parties would be just as meaningless. In his outlining of the 
questions to be asked in analysing the discourses of sexuality, Foucault already laid down 
what should be the necessary concerns of a social researcher: 
"In a specific type of discourse, in a specific fonn of extortion of truth, appearing historically ( ... ), 
what are the most immediate, the most local power relations at work? How did they make possible 
these kinds of discourses, and conversely, how were these discourses used to support power relations? 
How was the action of these kinds of discourses modified by their very exercise, entailing a 
strengthening of some tenns and a weakening of others, with effects of resistance and counter 
investments, so that there has never existed one type of stable subjugation, which in retrospect takes 
on a aspect of a unitary and voluntaristic politics of sex?" (1998: 97) 
What Foucault advises, therefore, is to consider the expanding production of discourses in the 
field of multiple and mobile power relations. In fact, a co-existence of competing discourses 
trying to fix the meaning, in our case, of the nation, is only possible because the power to 
define it does not emanate from one single specific source. As power circulates through 
myriad patterns, different social groups can have the chance to put forward their definitions 
and claims on what the concept of nationhood, or nationality implies. Therefore Foucault's 
formulation sets the basis for discussing the various ways of imagining the nation today, or its 
desired version of modernity, or why the dominant discourses of nation are continuously 
prone to change over time. 
Lastly, Foucault's views on modem society are again helpful in understanding how power can 
mould identities in society. In Discipline and Punish (1991), Foucault shows how power 
relations in modem societies can go 'right to the depth of society' through a range of social, 
cultural and economic institutions, such as the hospital or the school where everyday practices 
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of normalization and disciplining are developed to monitor, shape and govern the behaviour 
of individuals. It is through this microphysics of power that discourses of nation and 
modernization can empower or constrain people, and shape the construction of cultural 
identities. In fact, Foucault strongly emphasises that the subject is produced as an effect 
through and within discourse and has no meaningful identity outside discourse. This again 
helps to question the normalization of identities that surface through the analysis of case 
studies - just as the madman, or the hysterical woman could not exist outside the clinic and 
the clinical discourses of the time, just as the 'homosexual' as we know of today is known 
only to the modem era and had not existed before, the stereotyped identities of the veiled 
Islamist girls, the poverty stricken Kurdish women, or the national daughter figure that we 
meet through news stories are discursive constructs from contemporary Turkey. Such a 
formulation, while inspiring, does cause problems when analysing news texts, which I will 
discuss below. 
3.2 Who writes the stories? Journalists and the problem of authorship 
The above framework for perceiving social realities as constructed through discourses is 
invaluable in the analysis of media texts for at least two reasons. Firstly, by dispersing power 
and the articulation of discourses through social layers, it raises doubts as to how much power 
the media really has in what it communicates to the public. As Macdonald argues, the concept 
of discourse 
"( ... ) acknowledges more readily than other analytical concepts that the media are at best partial 
originators of ideas and values. ( ... ) Discourse reminds us that the media's forms of talking and 
thinking interact with those of the wider society- sometimes setting an agenda, but frequently reacting 
to perceived public desires or concerns." (2003: 2) 
Second, and related to this, seeing the media not as a sole producer but more accurately, a 
reproducer of already existing discourses urges us to explore the relationship between the 
texts themselves and the operation of power in the society. In other words, it extends the 
focus from the texts themselves, per se, to the social construction of the texts, in which media 
plays only a part. Macdonald points out that such an approach helps to avoid "the pitfalls of 
an ontological/epistemological split between an objective 'reality' out there in the 'real world' 
(ontological state of being) and interpretative form of being (epistemology) achieved through 
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media" (2003: 3). Instead, she argues, "it acknowledges the role of media in constituting the 
very realities that are referenced in media texts" (ibid.). Following this, we can add that 
media texts form the conceptional crossroads in society, where dominant discourses meet, 
react to, and even negotiate with the resisting ones. 
The constructivist model of media, rather than a representational one is informed by 
Foucault's rejection of reality as existing outside discourses, and has also shaped the analysis 
of news stories in this project. This has in fact been one of the main concerns in directing the 
analysis onto how the identities of the main characters in news stories are constructed through 
the media texts, rather than examining how these characters interpret and react to dominant 
discourses. To expand on this further we can take the example of the national athlete Sureyya 
Ayhan's case study. The analysis here is not interested in who the main character Sureyya 
Ayhan is, but primarily with how she appears in the news4• At what points does she form a 
subject position that the Turkish readers can identify with? How does her identity stir up 
awareness about national identity among Turkish readers? Where does she set up the 
boundaries of "others" for the nation? How does she build up a vision for the nation? How 
does she reorganize the nation's past for specific purposes? In short, how is she constructed 
through discourse to set the boundaries of the nation? 
These concerns in tum have determined my decisions on which parts of the text to analyse. 
Initially, the texts contain, in terms of their narration, a number of elements: the story that 
explains how events unfold as well as a more personalized account of the story by the 
journalist, which takes the form of comments, subjective remarks and so on. Interwoven into 
the story are also a number of quotes from eyewitness accounts, or first hand comments by the 
main protagonists in the story. Because the research is interested in exploring journalists' 
narrations (such as how the media reacts to events, rather than the events themselves; how 
they talk about women's identities rather than how women talk about their own experiences) 
the analytical focus was only directed to journalistic accounts of the stories, with information 
given in the form of quotes disregarded. This means that it is not the quotes themselves - say, 
the content of remarks made by Sureyya or Sureyya's family members etc.- but how those 
remarks were foregrounded, emphasised and selected that would be analysed. This decision 
was taken because the analysis seeks to reveal the linguistic strategies employed by journalists 
4 The analysis here is not interested in following the characters' (e.g Sureyya Ayhan's) version of reality, which 
is not possible without ethnographic analysis. 
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in the coverage of the stories, that express who is to be included in or excluded from the 
national boundaries of Turkishness, and under what conditions this inclusion/exclusion takes 
place. The decision to focus the analysis on the journalists' interpretation of events was then 
applied to all three case studies. 
While such a focus helped to clear up practical and theoretical questions that could have been 
raised about narration, it also raises further issues about authorship. By directing the focus on 
to journalists, are we not falling into exactly the same epistemological split Macdonald was 
mentioning? Moreover, while the particular authors of the news stories are usually irrelevant, 
with the columns and feature stories -particularly in the Batman suicides where features were 
mainly written by women as a "women's story" - it is not possible to completely disregard the 
particular names attached to the stories. If this is taken as attribution of authorship to 
journalists, then we cannot convincingly dismiss the power of the press in producing realities. 
This problem can only be avoided by resorting once again to Foucault, particularly his 
discussion on the relationship between texts and authors, and "the manner in which a text 
apparently points to this figure who is outside and precedes the text" (1980: 115). 
In his article "What is an Author?" Foucault (1980) radically questions the notion of 
authorship; the way authors are seen as privileged creators of their texts, and the way meaning 
is seen as inscribed by them. For Foucault, the idea of authors as having the sole authority 
over their texts is, like many other concepts, which he challenges in his works, a 
sociohistorical construct, a conceptual framework that we might better abandon. However, 
once having declared the death of the author, he is careful not to transfer his creative power to 
the texts themselves, and expect the real meaning to reside in texts. Foucault argues that 
writing creates an opening for meaning/discourse, which is continuously constructed and in 
which the author as the individual, as the writing subject "endlessly disappears" (1980: 116). 
Therefore he rejects the futile discussions about where "real" meaning resides, or who creates 
it and embeds meaning within its specific culture: 
"Discourse that possesses an author's name is not to be immediately consumed and forgotten; neither 
is it accorded to the momentary attention given to ordinary, fleeting words. Rather, its status and 
manner of reception are regulated by the culture in which it circulates." (ibid.: 123) 
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In doing so, Foucault directs his attention away from the individuality of the author and 
towards his role or function in society. Foucault points at a complex and circular relationship 
here: the author, as a concept, is no more than an extension of discourse itself and at the same 
time, his role is to "characterize the existence, circulation, and operation of certain discourses 
within a society" (ibid.: 124). In other words, the author is "a function" of discourse and 
functions to circulate discourse (ibid.: 123). 
In short, Foucault asks us to direct our attention away from the 'absolute nature and creative 
role of the subject' and towards the discourses he disseminates. Such a conceptualisation has 
radical consequences for perceiving subjectivity since it seems to completely disregard it. 
However, what it does is to look at a process that is much more exciting: how the subject 
appears through discourse, how it negotiates with it, how it works its way through it. Indeed 
Foucault seems to be much more sympathetic to the subject than he is usually given credit for: 
"But the subject should not be entirely abandoned. It should be reconsidered, not to restore the theme 
of an originating subject, but to seize its functions, its intervention in discourse, and its system of 
dependencies ... we should ask: under what conditions and through what forms can an entity like the 
subject appear in the order of discourse; what position does it occupy, what functions does it exhibit; 
and what rules does it follow in each type of discourse? In short, the subject (and its substitutes) must 
be stripped of its creative role and analysed as a complex and variable function of discourse." 
(ibid.: 137) 
While Foucault's discussion pertains to literary texts, his arguments help us see the identity of 
the journalists, even when named, as no more important than the discourses they help to 
reproduce. By focusing on these issues we will also be following Foucault's advice that we 
should leave aside questions about who the real author is and instead ask ourselves more 
pertinent questions, such as what the modes of existence of the discourses are, where they 
come from, how they are circulated, and how they determine possible subject positions in 
society5. To an extent then, Foucault's echoing of Beckett's words can also inform this 
research: 
"What matter who is speaking, someone said, what matter who is speaking?" (ibid.: 115) 
5 In the analysis of the case studies, this concern includes the dominant position that journalists themselves, not 
individually but as a group, hold in the society, as well as the different subject positions characters occupy in the 
stories. It is through the comparison of the two that the analysis gains its critical edge. 
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3.3 Discourse Analysis as a Method 
However inspiring the concept of discourses is discourse analysis, having become one of the 
most popular approaches to studying texts, is full of ambiguities for the researcher. As 
mentioned above discourse analysis is used in diverse ways and in various disciplines in the 
relevant literature and as a result, the term far from implies a homogeneous method for 
analysis. In fact, Fairclough (1999) has noted that if discourse analysis is to establish itself as 
a method in social sciences, the aim cannot be uniformity of practice but a common agenda, 
an establishment of at least some consensus over what the main theoretical and 
methodological issues in the field are. Nevertheless, in this plurality of approaches, we can 
observe two broad patterns that have informed the research (See Fairclough 1995). The first 
is to see discourse as a social construction of reality, a form of knowledge as we have already 
discussed with respect to Foucault's works. The second is the predominant usage of the term 
as in language studies, defining discourse as social action and interaction in certain social 
situations. Both of these approaches, with their own sub-divisions, are useful for the analysis 
of the chosen case studies. 
As helpful as Foucault is for understanding and forming the overarching theoretical 
framework for the research, he is also a great inspiration for analysing the case studies. Both 
his archaeologies and genealogies point us towards studying the power relationships that are 
embedded in the signs and linguistic details of the texts, but are irreducible to language and 
speech. However, his work provides no comfort in terms of how exactly we should track and 
analyse those power relationships from the texts, and how to find the actual methodology for 
systematic analysis of news articles. 
This difficulty exists because Foucault's work changes and shifts over time, offering 
fragmented thoughts but without solid theories that remain constant. For Gutting (1994) each 
of Foucault's books "is determined by concerns and approaches specific to it and should not 
be understood as developing a theory or a method that is a general instrument of intellectual 
progress" (ibid.: 2). Therefore Gutting describes Foucault, in Isaiah Berlin's adaptation of 
Archilochus's metaphor, "not as a hedgehog but a fox" (ibid.) We can say that what he offers 
is more of an approach to understanding and exploring society, rather than theories on society. 
Ignoring the fragmented nature of his work and trying to extract broad theories often leads to 
misreading, "muffling and distorting" his works as we try to harmonize them (ibid.: 3), while 
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producing a scientific methodology from his work seems almost impossible (c.f. Sawyer 
2002). In fact, in The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault himself denies any scientific 
pretensions in his analysis: 
"I have never presented archaeology as a science, or even as the beginning of a future science ... the 
word archaeology is not supposed to carry any suggestion of anticipation; it simply indicates a 
possible line of attack for the analysis of verbal performances." (Cited in Gutting 1994: 5) 
As for the linguistic approaches to discourse, these offer systematic and detailed 
methodologies to analyse texts, which is more promising when studying actual news articles. 
However, they usually have the disadvantage of treating the texts in isolation from socio-
cultural practices and discourse, foregrounding the text and its linguistic aspects but without 
focusing on the context. What writers in the school of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
have proposed instead, is to examine the dialectical relationship between semiosis (where 
meaning is produced, such as language, visual images, or body language) and social practices 
(Fairclough 2001: 122-123). In this project, the theoretical and analytical insights of CDA 
have been informative in analysing the data, particularly its linguistic structure. 
3.3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis & analysis of the language 
CDA sees discourse -language use in speech and writing- as a form of social practice (See 
Fairclough 1995: 54; Wodak et al. 1999). This approach studies language and its linguistic 
aspects, not in isolation but within its context, in order to create an awareness of the reciprocal 
influences language and social structure have on each other. In doing so, CDA closely 
examines the relationships of power and dominance. Wodak summarises the aim of CDA as 
follows: 
"The aim of Critical Discourse Analysis is to unmask ideologically permeated and often obscured 
structures of power, political control, and dominance, as well as strategies of discriminatory inclusion 
and exclusion in language use." (Wodak et al. 1999: 8) 
In this research, the aims of conducting the analysis, as well as the effort to link texts with 
their socio-cultural context, sit within the theoretical positioning of CDA. Still, beyond its 
main goals and objectives in analysing the texts, even in CDA there appears to be no unifying 
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methodology. This is mainly because the analytical methods in discourse analysis are 
employed depending on the type and size of the data set that is being investigated, as well as 
the specific research questions that are being asked (Fairclough, 1995; Wodak et al. 1999). In 
an analysis of parliamentary debates on immigration, Van Dijk (2000) also acknowledges that 
CDA should be considered as offering a shared perspective rather than a unitary method. He 
comments upon how he chose the structural categories for his research: 
"How to avoid getting lost in the jungle of a multitude of discursive structures and strategies, and how 
to make a reasoned choice of relevant, or at least interesting, discourse properties to be studied in 
detail? Relevance is a contextual, and hence a relative notion. In our case, this means that the choice of 
categories for analysis depends on, for instance, the research questions, problems or aims of our 
research project. For the same reason, in discourse analysis there is not one method to analyze a text. It 
depends on what one wants to know, and why, and what theoretical instruments one has to relate text 
structures with the contextual aims one has." (2000: 86) 
In other words, while there is a unifying perspective in CDA, the methodology is data driven, 
requiring that a combination of strategies are used in building the methodological framework, 
which in return has resulted in different ways of conducting CDA (See also Meyer et. al. 
2000; Wodak & Meyer 2001). 
Amongst the variety of approaches within CDA, two methodological approaches were found 
to be particularly helpful in designing the analytical framework for this research. The first of 
these is the basic scheme Norman Fairclough developed in full detail in his 1995 book Media 
Discourse. As a linguist, Fairclough uses the word discourse mainly "to refer to spoken and 
written language" (1995: 54) and argues that media language should be analysed as a 
discourse. However the linguistic analysis of media should only form a part of the critical 
discourse analysis of media. For Fairclough, the whole analysis should extend beyond that: 
"Linguistic analysis focuses on texts, in a broad sense: a newspaper article is a text, but so too is a 
transcription of a radio or television programme. But discourse analysis is concerned with practices as 
well as texts, and with both discourse practices and sociocultural practices." (1995: 16) 
Fairclough's aim is to "show the systematic links between texts, discourse practices, and 
socio-cultural practices" (ibid.) as he argues that discourse analysis of media texts should 
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weave between these three levels. He is firstly concerned with the linguistic analysis of texts, 
how meanings and forms, representations, identities and relations are created via linguistic 
means. Next is the level of discursive practice, by which he refers to the processes of text 
production and consumption. This includes "the ways in which the texts are produced by 
media workers in media institutions" (ibid.), or more specifically, "institutional routines such 
as editorial procedures involved in producing media texts" (1995: 59). The level of discursive 
practice also includes "the ways in which they [texts] are received by audiences", such as the 
consumption patterns that might shape the interpretation process, as well as "how media texts 
are socially distributed" (1995: 16). Fairclough underlines the fact that the discursive level 
mediates between the text and sociocultural practice. Finally, there is the analysis of 
sociocultural practices within which the text and the discourse practice are placed. At this 
level, questions of power in society become the central interest of the analysis. 
While such clear-cut distinctions between different levels hardly exist when it comes to the 
analysis of data, Fairclough's attempt to relate the text and grammar to different levels of 
media production, consumption and society is informative in developing an analysis on 
newspaper texts. In particular his emphasis on the institutional routines and genres can be 
helpful in understanding the possible variations in the narration of the same story depending 
on the choice of paper or genre of the news item. In all three case studies examined for this 
research, I also found that some differences existed among the papers. These depended upon 
the choice of particular news genres within which the story was covered, particular editorial 
policies, and the influence of columnists in the newspaper. It is indeed interesting to observe 
how these differences in journalistic practices shape the language and content of the news 
articles and they have been closely observed and noted in the description of the data in each 
case study. However, in application, the differences are often not meaningful enough to 
subvert attention from the emerging common themes. This can be attributed to two factors. 
Firstly, in attempting to observe patterns of discourse in large amounts of data, variations fade 
away unless they are significant. Second, choosing three newspapers from the mainstream 
media with similar, if not the same, ideological standpoints has largely eliminated some of the 
differences that we could have otherwise observed in the coverage of the story (Le. a left wing 
newspaper, or one from the religious right might have covered the stories differently). In other 
words, the common sociocultural practice shared by these newspapers erases any meaningful 
variations that could have arisen at the institutional and textual levels. 
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Following this, we can also add that Fairclough's framework would work best with a small 
number of texts, which would allow for a detailed micro-level analysis between the three 
dimensions he outlines. Given the large bulk of data chosen for this research, his framework 
could not be applied to the developed methodology for analysis, but has been informative in 
developing the linguistic analysis. His emphasis on the representations, particular 
constructions of writer and reader identities, as well as particular construction of the 
relationship between the reader and the writer have also been the focal points in the analysis 
of case studies. Such an analysis, Fairclough underlines, would be "sensitive to absences as 
well as presences in texts" (1995: 58), to things that haven't been said by journalists when 
they could have. Where significant, such absences have been discussed in the research. 
However, more common than the absences were the presuppositions that surfaced in all three 
case studies. Rather than focusing upon what is present in and what is absent from the texts, 
Fairclough asks researchers to look at a scale of presence, "running from 'absent' to 
'foregrounded': absent - presupposed - backgrounded - foregrounded" (1995: 106) The 
implicit meanings that are left unsaid but presupposed in the texts are important particularly in 
the way in which journalists position their readers (1995: 1 07) and have been further 
discussed in analysis of the case studies. 
In building the general analytical framework for this research, the methodological approach as 
laid out by Ruth Wodak and her colleagues (1999) on the discursive construction of Austrian 
national identity was more useful. The Viennese School of CDA, to which these authors 
belong, diverges from other analysis of discourse in its shift of focus: their concern is not to 
"study the linguistic system and its functional and semantic potential in all its dimensions per 
se but rather to establish the linguistic relations between specific linguistic subsystems and 
social structures" (ibid.: 9). The focus here is to explore interconnectedness through the 
principle of triangulation - which the authors define as approaching the discursive phenomena 
"from a variety of methodological and theoretical perspectives taken from various 
disciplines"(ibid.). Using historical, socio-political and linguistic perspectives in their study 
of national identity, the authors distinguish between three dimensions of analysis: contents, 
strategies and means andforms of realisation (1999: 30). 
Hence in contrast to Fairclough's emphasis on texts as the focus of analysis, Wodak et al. start 
out by examining the general content before moving toward linguistic analysis, arguing that 
the interpretation process is shaped by the preset discursive frames. On the level of content 
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major thematic areas are outlined. On the strategy level, the discursive strategies employed in 
the discursive formation of national identity are analysed at macro and micro levels. And 
finally the linguistic means, the lexical units and syntactic devices that serve the discursive 
strategies are closely examined. It is neither possible nor useful to impose their detailed 
methodological framework for analysis to the case studies. However, in analysing the large 
collection of data here, it was possible to use and adapt their approach of moving from themes 
to strategies and then following how those strategies are realised in the linguistic details of the 
texts. 
3.3.2 The role of the interpreter 
One other important discussion that has informed the methodological framework is the 
hermeneutic impetus in analysis. The notion of hermeneutics can be basically described as a 
process in which "all understanding is conditioned by the prior knowledge of the interpreter 
and that it is extended through interpretation and thereby creates new conditions for 
understanding" (Meyer et al. 2000: 198-199). Meyer points out that in terms of the methods 
and procedures used for the analysis of discourse, CDA generally sees its procedure as a 
hermeneutic process (2001: 16). Similarly, in their research on discourses in late modernity, 
Chouliaraki and Fairclough also attempt to combine structuralist and interpretivist 
approaches, arguing for "a way of seeing and researching social life as both constrained by 
social structures, and an active process of production which transforms social structures" 
(1999: 1-2). Seeing analysis as implicated within the hermeneutic process also conforms to 
the Foucauldian conception of power as outlined above: while the researcher might take an 
alternative position, he or she will always be positioned with respect to, not outside the 
already existing power relationships. 
However, arguing that understanding is conditioned by the prior knowledge of the interpreter 
raises a common criticism brought against discourse analysis regarding the selection and 
interpretation of data. Being a strictly qualitative method, discourse analysis always faces the 
problem of justifying the selection of materials as research data (See Jaworski & Coupland 
1999: 36). Why certain findings and categories are attributed to the selected data is again a 
problem. As Wodak et al. emphasize, in analysing discourse, a priori categories cannot be 
imposed upon the data (1999: 30). On the contrary, the categories used in analysing the data 
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are strictly shaped by the data itself, necessitating the construction of a particular framework 
for each data set and research question (c.f. van Dijk 2000). 
In answering a criticism about the role of the analyst in shaping the data analysis, Chouliaraki 
and Fairclough note that all analysis brings the analyst's theoretical preoccupations and 
categories to bear on the discourse, and these preoccupations "determine not only what data is 
selected for analysis but also how it is perceived" (1999:7). However, by insisting on the 
impossibility of a formal analysis that excludes the theoretical preoccupations of the analyst, 
the writers are not claiming, "anything is possible". It might be the nature of the data that 
largely answers and legitimises the method and its findings, and yet, the analysis itself should 
also be able to justify the selection and examination of the structural categories. As Meyer 
rightly notes, hermeneutic interpretation urgently needs detailed documentation, and yet "the 
specifics of the hermeneutic interpretation process are not made completely transparent by 
many CDA oriented studies" (2001: 16). Hence, throughout the analysis of the case studies, 
the need to make the process as transparent as possible has been a major concern. 
3.4 Photographs and Visuals 
Even though the term discourse includes a large number of communicative practices and can 
not be limited to texts alone, CDA often focuses on language use, and neglects the visual part 
of signification, particularly when mapping out general discursive patterns rather than 
analysing specific texts (See Macdonald 2003: 4). In this research, even though the texts form 
the main source of analysis, photographs and other visuals are also considered to be an 
important part of the data and will also be analysed. Visuals are seen not as separate entities 
but as fundamental parts of news stories, enhancing the power of the dominant discourses just 
like sentence structures, lexical styles, chosen metaphors, euphemisms and other properties of 
the texts. In particular, the photographs, with their claims of presenting the real world - a 
correspondence between what the readers normally would see with the naked eye and visual 
representation - can normalize the discourses that construct versions of reality for the readers. 
In addition, the choice of layout will also increase or determine the visual impact of the 
particular news story, and along with it the discourses transmitted. These issues have been 
noted as an important part of the analysis. 
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Lastly, it has to be noted that the importance of visuals has also shaped the collection of the 
data. As layout was important for the analysis, the Internet web pages of the newspapers 
proved to be insufficient for conducting research. Though some papers have recently started 
to upload scanned versions on to the Internet6, during the time of the analysis this was not 
common practice. Therefore, most data was collected through classic archival research, 
mainly in Ataturk Library in Taksim, Istanbul, which is a modest version of the Colindale 
Library in London. After the news stories were scanned in this library, the Internet was used 
to check whether all related data was collected, and was particularly helpful in catching the 
columns, or small news items that might have been missed during research in the archives. 
3.5 Problem of Translation 
One of the major problems in textual analysis remains the language. As the data is in Turkish 
but the research in English, two alternative methods for textual analysis were possible: either 
translating the data into English and applying textual analysis methods, or doing the analysis 
in Turkish then translating the data. The latter has been adopted for this research as working 
with translated data can lead to a loss of meaning and misreading of the text. As Fairclough 
also agrees, analysis of translated texts is vulnerable to serious objections: 
"What light can analysis of the researcher's English translation of a Gorbachev speech cast upon the 
political and discursive analysis of a Soviet, and Russian-language, discursive event? In my opinion, 
discourse analysis papers should reproduce and analyse textual samples in the original language, 
despite the added difficulty for readers." (1999:186) 
Here, given the large amount of data, it was not possible to supply the news items in the 
original language. However, when they are particularly significant, words or phrases in the 
data have also been provided in their original form. 
6 As of December 2006, Hurriyet and Sabah had scanned electronic versions of the whole paper on the Internet, 
whereas Milliyet only has the front page. 
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3.6 Object of Analysis 
3.6.1 Newspapers: 
F or this research, newspapers were chosen as the medium to conduct the analysis. While the 
selected case studies also received coverage in the broadcast media, mainly on television, 
television news was not considered in the analysis. This was a deliberate choice made firstly 
on the basis of methodological concerns, particularly regarding the question of reliability, 
which would have emerged when introducing another medium to the analysis. The second 
reason was the qualitative difference between the coverage of events in newspapers and 
television. Although TV news is a main source of information in Turkey, it is only a small 
part of what popular Turkish television channels offer to their audiences 7• When they do 
broadcast news, stories are determined by ratings concerns, they are momentary and fresh, 
and they remain on the news agenda for a shorter period of time compared to print news. 
Conversely newspapers can offer more breadth and depth in their coverage, and analyses of 
events are sustained for a longer period of time, during which the journalists revisit, reflect on 
and reinterpret the events, particularly through feature stories and columns. As a result, it is 
possible to closely follow, and conduct in-depth analysis of how the discourse shifts and 
develops through the texts. 
Among national newspapers in Turkey, three papers, Hiirriyet, Milliyet and Sabah were 
chosen for the purposes of this research. Here mainstream refers not only to the circulation 
numbers of the newspapers but also to their the political affiliations, which can be described 
as being of the centre right, showing strong support for secularism, economic liberalism and 
some degree of political liberalism depending upon the subject matter. The selection 
inevitably excludes local papers, tabloids8 and newspapers that favour different political 
objectives, such as the radical left wing, ethnic, Kemalist, Islamic or strongly nationalist 
newspapers, some of which have high circulation numbers as in the case of the Islamic 
newspaper Zaman. However, considered together, the three selected papers have the majority 
circulation figures in Turkey and therefore their coverage can be taken as a good measure of 
7 The popular main channels are all commercial in Turkey. Channel D leads the audience market share with 17.1 
percent; Show TV follows with 15 percent, Star 14.3 percent and ATV 13.1 percent. These channels all belong 
to different media groups. The public channel TRT-I on the other hand has only 6.2 percent of the audience 
share (2002 figures cited in Bek 2004: 383). 
8 It is important to note that a clear-cut tabloid and broadsheet categorization does not exist in Turkey as in the 
UK. In terms of format, all national newspapers are broadsheets. However, in terms of content, a crude 
differentiation can still be made between newspapers depending on the level of populism and sensation in the 
coverage of news stories. 
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what the majority of readers receive as everyday news. As the research seeks to uncover 
dominant discourses, these newspapers fulfil the purposes of the project in terms of both their 
political positioning and their audience reach. 
It is also important to note that there have been some changes in these newspapers in terms of 
their pool of journalists. For example, in 2003, Sabah newspaper changed hands and a 
number of writers from all three newspapers have also changed their paper since they covered 
the analysed events.9 
3.6.2 Type of Data analysed: 
As has already been discussed, an important methodological choice has been to focus the 
analysis on news reporting, rather than the news reported. This has allowed consistency and 
reliability in the analysis and focus on the narration of the events and the discourses involved 
in this process, without being distracted by the events themselves. As previously mentioned, 
this has had some implications on the selection of the analysed data. As the focus is on the 
reporting itself, when interviews or comments by witnesses are included in the item, the 
analysis has been on the selection of particular quotes, or the foregrounded themes from the 
quotes, rather than the quotes themselves. In other words, if a journalist, for example Ayse 
Arman, interviewed Sureyya Ayhan, the focus was not on what Sureyya Ayhan has said but 
how Ayse Arman has reported the interview. 
Within this context, all news items on the specific case studies, regardless of their particular 
genres were included in the analysis - commentaries, headlines, news written by a certain 
reporter, news from the Turkish wire services, interviews and more. In the beginning this 
might have seemed problematic in terms of methodology. However, in spite of the 
fragmented character of the data, the aim here is not to observe differences among the genres 
through a generic analysis but rather to find a unifying pattern across the various narrations 
and news genres. Not only are such differences insignificant across the whole body of data, 
as explained in the discussion on Fairclough, but the analysed texts are also united through a 
'storytelling' news style, a tabloid narrative which can be described, in the words of Bird, as 
focusing on personal narratives about individuals, giving predominance to visual images and 
9 For example, Fatih Altayli from Hurriyet is now in Vatan newspaper. Ahmet Hakan from Sabah, on the other 
hand, has transferred to Hurriyet. 
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the sensational over analysis and rational description, and entailing a growing use of dramatic 
techniques, such as photo enhancement and re-enactments (See Bird 2000: 215). 
In terms of referencing the data, only the date and if not specified, the name of the newspaper 
are given inside the text, so as not to disrupt the flow of the discussion. However, the full 
reference details, such as the name of the journalist, the title of the news item, and where 
relevant, the particular type of news item are supplied in the footnotes below. These details 
not only provide the necessary extra information to contextualise the extracted data within its 
relevant story, but also help to distinguish different items appearing in the same paper on the 
same day. Lastly to highlight the data and set it apart from the interpretations, all the data 
analysed in the research has been supplied in italics in the text. Unless further explanation is 
provided in the footnotes, all the data that is emphasised with bold letters have also been 
emphasised in the original texts. 
3.6.3 Time span: 
The selected newspapers were analysed within the time span of 1999 to 2003, marking the 
end of a century, and the start of a new one. This specified time frame also marks the ending 
of a decade in which prominent changes had taken place in all aspects of social life in Turkey, 
with significant consequences for the press. The liberal policy of "opening up" that had 
started in the mid-eighties had brought with it a dramatic shift from a state-protected to a 
liberal economy, which was followed by considerable liberalization of the political agenda, 
privatisation of broadcast media and the emergence of news media outlets, opening up the 
country further to the currents of globalisation in the nineteen nineties. As media texts 
"constitute a sensitive barometer of socio-cultural change" (Fairclough, 1995: 52), locating 
the research at the dawn of a new century can offer the opportunity to draw conclusions about 
the changes that have taken place, as well as some answers on how to approach the emerging 
problems of identity and modernity that are likely to remain on Turkey's agenda for the 
coming decades. 
3.6.4 Selected Cases 
Three case studies have been selected for the project. In the selection of these cases one 
criterion was to find events that had received significant headline coverage in all three papers, 
and beyond the main reporting of events, the stories were taken up and further discussed by 
journalists in columns or features. However, a more important rationale for their selection is 
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that they present a good picture of the conflicting and competing discourses around nation, 
modernity and women in Turkey. The selected events themselves show clear evidence about 
how different identities struggle and compete in society for inclusion in the national and how 
negotiations are made on this ground. 
3.6.4.1 Media coverage of female suicides in Batman 
This case study focuses on the media coverage of the high rate of female suicides in Batman 
and the surrounding area, an impoverished southeast region of Turkey. It is important to note 
that most of the suicides reported by the media are of people of Kurdish origin. The media 
covered these events with more attention throughout the autumn of 2000, however, important 
follow-ups in the form of feature stories continued in 2001. 
3.6.4.2 Sfireyya Ayhan 
The second case study is about Turkey's first popular national female athlete, Sureyya Ayhan. 
After having made it to the fmal eight in Sydney Olympics in 2000, she turned into a source 
of curiosity for the media. She was first acclaimed as a national hero, then not content with 
stories about her career, media coverage shifted to her private life only to discover that she 
was having an affair with her married coach, twenty years her senior. She was criticized 
heavily until summer 2002 when she won a series of competitions, including the European 
Championships, and was announced as the best athlete of the year in the foreign sports press. 
The time span for this case study covers summer 2000 to summer 2002. 
3.6.4.3 Three weddings 
The weddings case study differs from the other two in being a composite of three case studies 
of three different weddings. The first of these is the wedding of Elif Sozen to Helmut Kohl's 
son in May 2001. This light news event received extensive front-page coverage in the press, 
praising Elif Sozen's educational and career achievements, and portraying her as a modem 
Turkish girl. The next wedding, of Elif Erbakan, involves the daughter of Necmettin 
Erbakan, the now politically banned leader of the religious right and Turkey's former PM in 
1997-1998. This white wedding, a lavishly organised event starring a veiled bride, attracted 
significant media attention. The third wedding, which took place in summer 2003 involves 
the son of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the present PM of Turkey, and his veiled bride. Media 
attention on this event was heightened by Silvio Berlusconi' s attendance at the wedding as 
one of the witnesses. 
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3.7 Framework for analysis 
It should be noted that given the large quantity of newspaper data in each case study, the data 
analysis seeks to map out the emerging pattern of conflicting and overarching discourses 
across the data, rather than presenting a microanalysis of specific texts. In each case study, 
detailed information about the methodological concerns raised by the specific content of the 
case is given at the very start. What is presented here is only a general framework, which 
changes slightly according to the specific case studies. 
The following framework was developed for the analysis: 
1. Introduction of the case study 
1.1. The setting- summary of the events & a brief description of the context within 
which the events took place 
1.2. Objectives in the selection of the case study 
1.3. Overview of the data 
1.3.1. Time frame 
1.3.2. Type of data to be analysed 
1.4. Organizing the data for analysis- methodological decisions 
2. Thematic Analysis 
2.1. Linguistic Analysis 
3. Overarching Discourses, interpretation and concluding remarks 
In the case studies of the weddings and Sureyya Ayhan, the thematic analysis also included an 
analysis of language. However, the more compact nature of the data in the Batman case study 
along with the specific narrative details made it possible to conduct the linguistic analysis 
separately. To provide a framework to guide the language analysis for all case studies, a 
flexible checklist was also planned. The aim was not to limit the study by setting a fixed 
structure or order to it, as not all linguistic means are relevant, or equally important for the 
mentioned mechanisms. The checklist that guided the linguistic analysis is as follows: 
a) General Style/ Tone of language 
• Particular choice and use of graphics/ visuals 
• Particular use and choice of headlines, headings, subheadings 
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• Particular choice and use of style- storytelling, descriptions, frequent use of ellipsis 
• Journalistic differences among the newspapers- if any 
b) Word level - choice of specific words used in the stories 
c) Sentence level- syntax 
d) Other rhetorical means - in what ways they are used, what meanings they serve 
(I.e.: implications, exaggerations, sensationalism, partial/hanging quotes, cliches, cliched 
descriptions, euphemisms, collective symbolism or 'figurativeness' in symbolism, metaphors 
in language and graphic contexts, word games, idioms, sayings, references & other sources of 
knowledge. ) 
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Chapter 4: 
Victims, Villains and Guardian Angels -Batman suicide stories 
4.1. Introduction of the case study 
4.1.1 The setting - Brief description of the context within which the suicides took place 
The following discussion examines the media coverage of the unprecedented rate of suicides 
among women in Batman. The analysis focuses on directly related news stories that appeared 
between 2000 and 2001, as the suicides reached their peak in 20001• Official records state that 
between 1995 and 2000 the total number of people reported committing suicide and attempted 
suicide in this region was 191. Seventy five percent of these were women, a figure well 
above the world average. During 2000 only twenty-two suicide attempts resulted in death 
among women living in the area of Batman. 
The setting for these stories, geographically speaking, is in the impoverished southeast region 
of Turkey, which hosts a large population of Kurdish citizens. Even though the area is mostly 
rural, dramatic levels of migration from the rural areas to the city of Batman resulted in a 
growth rate of 2325% in the city population in only 50 years, increasing the population from 
443 people in 1945 to 427,000 in 2000 (See Bagli & Sever 2003: 69). Bagli & Sever (2003) 
point out that the discovery of modest oil reserves in the region was significant in attracting 
the rural population into the cities, in the hope of achieving a higher standard of living. 
However, oil profits were not enough to prevent Batman from suffering all the hazards of 
rapid urbanization, including escalating poverty, unemployment and insufficient health and 
educational opportunities. 
The transition to urban life was also hastened due to the escalating terrorist threat in the 
region, particularly through the activities of the PKK and Hezbollah2• Both of these groups 
I Further details and statistics can be found in Deniz & Ersoz (2001), also see the article by Bagli & Sever 
(2003). 
2 PKK is a separatist Kurdish organization, Hezbollah an ultra-religious organisation operating in the Middle 
East. Both groups were strongly committed to using violence against the Turkish state in the 90's. The anned 
conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state subsided in the first few years after 2000, although recently there 
has been a sharp increase in anned combats and losses on both sides. 
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benefited from the chaotic urbanization in the city and the geographical remoteness of the 
area (Bagli & Sever, 2003: 70-71). As the armed conflict between these groups and the state 
escalated, civilians, particularly the Kurdish population, were not only caught in the cross-fIre 
but their villages were also evacuated or destroyed, forcing them to seek greater security in 
the city and thus augmenting their social and economic displacement. Even though terror in 
the region had died down by the time of this case study, the damage it has left behind is seen 
as significant and appears as a recurring theme in the discussion of suicides. 
The brief context paints an already disheartening picture in terms of living standards, yet the 
extremely patriarchal society that exists further deteriorates living conditions for women in 
particular. For the majority of the population living in the region, patriarchal oppression is a 
part of everyday life, making the issue of women's problems in the region a frequent subject 
of debate in the mainstream press3• In spite of the existing Civil Law which guarantees equal 
citizenship rights for both men and women in Turkey, women's rights and their status within 
the family and society are mostly still determined by traditions and religious rules, which 
usually work or are interpreted to work to the advantage of the patriarchal system (Ilkkaracan, 
1998). With escalating migration into the urban areas, these existing patriarchal structures 
were seen as forming a stark contrast to the urban city life and as a result focused the attention 
of the media. 
4.1.2 Objectives in the selection of the particular case study. 
The case study focuses on the meanings and interpretation of 'difference', following the 
initial set of questions selected to guide the analysis: 
• Who are the female figures in the case study? 
• In what ways are they described as different? 
• Is that difference described as a desired or an unwanted one? If the latter, what 
are the proposals to eliminate that difference? 
• In what ways is their difference significant for a particular understanding of 
modernity & national identity in Turkey? 
3 An example is the problem of 'honour killings' of women, which has been a particularly hot topic of debate in 
recent years, and in the press is mostly associated with the culture and traditions of Southeast Turkey_ 
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It is important to note that the goal of this study is not to offer causal links between suicides 
and social variables, a task which should be left to social researchers. In contrast, the object 
of analysis, namely the news stories, are themselves nothing but relentless attempts to explain 
the recurring suicides providing an ongoing debate on the perceived causes and offering 
suggestions as to how they could be prevented. However, through a discourse analysis of this 
data, the Batman case study provides a perfect context for achieving the primary research 
goal, that of observing the construction of boundaries for the desired nation, and the politics 
of inclusion and exclusion that serve this process. 
Positioned both geographically and culturally at the peripheries of Turkey, Batman is a part of 
the still mostly rural Southeast region, and as the news stories will show, challenges the 
modern/urban life the journalists see themselves as holding. Nor does the region allow for 
unproblematic inclusion within the category of Turkishness, due to its largely Kurdish 
demographic structure. Therefore, what is often being discussed in the stories is actually the 
centre's interpretation of what is going on in the "margins of modernity" (Bhabha 1990a) and 
of national identity in Turkey. From within this context we can start to understand how the 
centre, where the journalists see themselves as located, looks at the periphery, what they see 
as problematic, and what solutions they propose to bring the periphery closer to the centre. 
The oppression of women in the region, which is cited as the foremost cause of suicides, also 
introduces an extra urgency into the situation, as t4e liberation of women has always been 
regarded as the first and foremost responsibility of the modem Turkish state. 
4.1.3 Overview of the data 
4.1.3.1 Time frame 
The data, which comprised 49 items published in Hurriyet, Milliyet and Sabah, was collected 
from September 16th 2000 to December 220d 20014. These dates do not signal the first and 
last suicide occurrences during the period. Rather they roughly mark the period the suicides 
first started receiving significant media attention and when their coverage started to decline. 
The escalating suicide rates among women started to pick up the national media's interest in 
4 The only exception to this time frame remains on an article published on 16.06.200~. Titled "Hear t~is 
scream", this article formed the major news piece for the Sunday supplements of Hurnyet newspaper WIth 
coverage too extensive to ignore. Spread over three pages, this is a feature story that aims to follow up on the 
problem of high rate of female suicides, this time in a neighbouring city to Batman, Urfa, where, it is argued, ~e 
female suicide rate has highly exceeded that in Batman. The journalist had written extensively on Batman m 
2000, so this feature, in terms of narrative style is the same as the other suicide features published in 2000. 
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mid September in 2000 with reports of about 30 women who had committed suicide in the 
preceding six months. Media attention faded away towards the end of 2001, which is marked 
by an article in Sabah newspaper on 22.12.2001 announcing that according to official figures 
suicide rates had halved. After this article, short news items still appeared, but not frequently 
enough to set a different time frame for the case. However, the dimming of media interest 
does not mean that suicides have stopped. For example, Hurriyet newspaper on 30.04.2003 
informed the readers that within four months in 2003 there had been 37 suicide attempts with 
12 resulting in deaths. Therefore, the selected dates should be seen not as the start and end of 
events, but as markers of the rising and falling points of an open ended parabola showing the 
media's interest in the issue, which reached its peak in autumn 2000. 
4.1.3.2 Type of data to be analysed 
The events were covered under a variety of genres, one of which was the 14 individual 
columns included in the data. The columnists' need to show their concern about the high rate 
of suicides provides useful reference points in interpreting the results of the analysis within its 
specific context. Even though columnists from the same paper do not have to be in agreement 
about a certain issue, or comply with the editorial line of the newspaper, for this case study 
their arguments pertaining to the suicides did converge towards the overarching arguments 
found in the analysis. The language used was also not dissimilar to the language used in the 
human-interest features. 
Apart from columns, the remaining news articles appear in different forms and styles, some of 
which have an intertextual mix of genres. The theme of female suicides lends itself to human-
interest articles rather than hard news, yet there are a few news items which are more 
perishable and have impersonal language that is essentially institutional and bureaucratic even 
when by-lined. However, even the articles that come closest to the hard news genre can 
contain varying degrees of personal language. One such example is an article titled 
"Psychological tragedy in Batman" in Hurriyet newspaper (06.10.2000). Covering the press 
brief by the Directorate General of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) on the preventative measures 
the institution is taking to stop the suicides, this news item is written in the conventional news 
style, and aside from the topic, the style is no different from a hard news item reporting the 
press brief of a political party member. Milliyet's coverage (06.10.2000) of the same brief, 
s NO-bylines, 30.04.2003, 'Three more women have committed suicide in the East', Hurriyet. 
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however, has a tabloid twist focusing on the uneasiness of the religious authority in answering 
questions pertaining to sexuality. The theme already blurs the distinction between hard news 
items and human-interest stories and the title' The question that made the president of Diyanet 
sweat' adds to the less formal style. Another similar article appears in Hurriyet newspaper 
(11.08.2001), not by-lined, reporting the findings of research with the title "In Batman, it is 
hard to be a man, too" which has inside a star graphic reading "they too are in depression". 
The tone of the article is very impersonal and bureaucratic, but the topic, and the emphasis on 
the headline and layout makes it suitable for a human-interest story. 
Therefore, apart from a few items where distinctions are relatively clear, it is almost futile to 
attempt to categorize all news stories as either hard news or human interest. Some stories, on 
the other hand, have clearer genre distinctions, and whenever possible, genres have been 
highlighted in the analysis and also in the footnotes. This is the case with two interviews in 
the data -one specifically on suicides in the region and the other a more indirectly related 
item, focusing more on the educational projects developed by an NOO in the region- and one 
review of a book on Batman suicides, including a short interview with the book's writer. 
Feature stories are also clearly distinguishable from the rest. There are nine feature stories all 
written by women journalists where the journalist's own eye witness account and personal 
interpretation of the events are evident, even when supported by selections from interviews 
done with authorities, victim's families or girls living in Batman. It should be noted that 
while the data may not seem striking in terms of quantity; the feature stories with their 
human-interest appeal and significant coverage, which are large enough to be spread over 
three whole pages6, and their accompanying visuals, helped to make the case a memorable 
issue in the public sphere. 
4.1.4 Organizing the data for analysis- methodological decisions 
Without exception, all stories were analysed thematically, and the main themes of the case 
study were mapped out. How discourses around these themes reveal themselves requires 
textual analysis, which is more problematic. Having such a variety of genres, it is impossible 
6 Here I am referring to Gulden Aydin's feature titled 'Hear This Scream' covering up one whole front page of 
the weekend edition of Hurriyet on 16.06.2002, and spread over two pages in the inside with the title 'In the last 
five months, thirteen women committed suicide in Urfa'. 
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to find a selection of articles that are, in terms of language and style, representative of the 
whole case study. And yet, when we look at the total data in general, the remarkable feature 
of the Batman stories is the continuous intervention by the journalists with subjective 
remarks, self-reflexive comments and opinions, which provide an excellent opportunity to 
follow the hegemonic discourses circulating within the suicide discussions. Discourse 
researchers also note that reflexivity can effectively add to our awareness of the ideological 
locatedness and contingency of reporting, and alert us to the discursive gaps and silences that 
are otherwise hard to detect (See Macdonald, 2003: 77). Therefore observing reflexivity and 
subjectivity, and how journalists want to narrate their own account of the suicides rather than 
stating what has happened have been the main concerns throughout the linguistic analysis. 
Having thus set the focus, certain generic decisions needed to be taken in selecting the data 
for the micro levels of analysis. Linguistic analysis was steered away from items without by-
lines, or items with impersonal and bureaucratic language in the hard news style, which are 
not as heavily laden with suppositions, assumptions or biases as the features or columns are. 
This is not to say that hard news language is free of any discourses, even though as noted 
previously they are harder to identify. And yet, most of these stories will be pulled from news 
agencies in Turkey, only to be printed with slight alterations while the goal in this part of the 
analysis is to focus on the three newspapers. Therefore the preference here was to keep in the 
spotlight the journalists' comments and arguments conveyed through the articles. Again for 
this very same reason, quotes from witnesses were not analysed. Whereas the selection of 
witnesses and their words for quotation are significant in understanding the context within 
which discourses are placed, the wording or arguments provided by sources and quoted 
directly were not analysed on their own. The purpose in such a selection is to focus the 
analysis on the journalist's own input in terms of language and style, which inevitably puts 
features and columns at the foreground for analysis. 
And lastly, because of the compactness of the Batman case study in comparison to the other 
two cases, it offers a unique opportunity to follow a very distinct pattern of linguistic 
mechanisms used in almost all feature stories and columns. I have therefore expanded on 
these mechanisms in a specific section rather than highlighting them throughout the 
discussion of the themes. 
107 
4.2. Thematic analysis -themes addressed in the coverage and allocation of sub-themes 
to thematic areas 
Certain general themes emerge through the stories about the identities of the Batman women , 
their social context, their perceived needs, and aspirations. The thematic analysis focuses on 
how these general themes are discussed through the coverage of the case study, and allocates 
sub-themes to the thematic areas. These themes also address how journalists perceive of the 
specificities of living in Batman as a woman. 
4.2.1 Gender problem - being a woman in Batman 
Perhaps the most recurring theme is a concern about gender roles in the region, and how they 
make life unbearable for women. It should be noted that the Turkish equivalent for gender, 
which is "toplumsal cinsiyef', is not mentioned directly in the articles. The reason for this, in 
my opinion, is that journalists around the time did not use this term commonly, although it 
had already become established in academic circles7• However, the condition of women in 
Batman, their role in society, their rights and needs, are reported as urgent problems and 
without exception are explained as resulting from the social structure in the region. For this 
reason, I have grouped these stories under the theme of gender. 
The coverage pertaining to the gender problem is very similar in the three papers. "Loss of 
hope" and "unwillingness to live" are the most common phrases used to describe the situation 
throughout the stories. Among the problems women face, the foremost is described as the 
gridlock of patriarchy, namely the treatment of women as second-class citizens compared to 
males. Journalists describe the situation as one in which "women are regarded as 
property"(Sabah, 07.01.2001)8, and where "they are trampled on" (Hurriyet, 27.10.2000)9. 
Cases in which women who committed suicide had been previously beaten by their fathers or 
husbands are frequently cited to emphasize the bleakness of the situation, which, as described 
by one columnist, leave women with no alternatives but to "make a difficult choice between 
an authoritarian father and an authoritarian husband" (Hurriyet, 21.03.2001)10. The 
pressure on females and the extreme patriarchal structure is described as an extension of the 
7 Today this tenn appears in mainstream media more often, although it is still not a commonly used concept. 
8 ElifUrgu, feature story, 07.01.2001, 'I am neither a traveller, nor a free one' Sabah 
9 Ferai Tine, column, 27.10.2000, 'When life becomes a burden' Hurriyet 
10 Enis Berberoglu, column, 21.03.2001, 'The difficult choice facing the girl in Batman' Hurriyet 
108 
traditional structure of the society, with customs and traditions as the main obstacle to women 
achieving basic rights. The headline "Either get married or die" (Milliyet, 23.10.2000)11 is a 
good example, which sensationalizes the drama of women attempting relationships outside of 
marriage. The customs, obliging women to remain sexually pure until marriage, and allowing 
polygamy for men in marriage are shown as the main driving force behind suicides in all 
stories 12. What is more, family members and relatives, especially men, appear insensitive to 
the suicides, and unwilling to change the system: 
"In the meanwhile, I ask where the first wife was, and this disturbs him. He says "in the other 
house" and changes the subject."(Hurriyet, 30.03.2001)13 
"Metin Ok left his wife (...) whom he continuously beat up like his daughter, with his other 
children; he is now said to be preparing to remarry. "(Sabah, 21.09.2000)14 
"Nobody talks about the reasons of (her) suicide. (...) He says he had built two different 
houses for the two wives, and they got along very well. "(Hurriyet, 16.06.2002)15 
Particular attention is also paid to the families' unwillingness to talk. This is a recurring point 
of criticism particularly in the feature stories: 
"Families don't talk. Even though they cannot understand the reason for their daughter's 
suicide, they agree that silence is the best attitude. "(Hurriyet, 27.10.2000)16 
"That is all. She does not say a word more. However Nurcihan's neighbours tell a different 
story. (. . .) Nurcihan burned herself with a gallon of gas exactly a month ago. The mother, 
Makbule, says there is nothing to tell."(Sabah, 16.09.2000)17 
II no by-line, front page main headline, 23.10.2000, Milliyet 
12 The tone of such remarks is very direct. Consider for example Figen Unal Sen's article in Sabah, '~e truth 
behind the suicides' on 16.09.2000: "This was actually the "problem" that led Filiz to death. ( ... ) Losmg her 
virginity at a young age in Batman city in Southeast had led Filiz to death." 
13 Gulden Aydin, feature, 30.03.2001, 'A mother of 13 in the suicide caravan', Hurriyet 
14 Halil Beytut, human interest story, 21.09.2000, 'When she could not succeed, she ran away', Sabah 
15 Gulden Aydin, feature, 16.06.2002, 'In the last 5 months, 17 women committed suicide in Urfa' Hurriyet 
16 Gulden Aydin, feature, 27.10.2000, 'Suicide has become fate' Hurriyet 
17 Fugen Unal Sen, feature, 16.09.2000, 'The reality behind the suicides' Sabah 
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"Just like the other girls in Batman, Diyarbakir and Mus, the cause of suicide for Gulcan, 
who died at the age of only 17, was left buried under the white paint. The wall was first 
washed, and then painted white. As if it was never lived, as if it never happened, all was 
silent, nothing was spoken." (Milliyet, 19.10.2000)18 
As well as necessitating an urgent rescue mission, such depictions inadvertently imprison 
women within a terminology of rescue and helplessness, as will be further discussed in the 
linguistic analysis. As a main part of the rescue efforts, journalists stress the importance of 
education and of earning a living to improve the quality of life for women in Batman and a 
path to solving their problems. Girls who have jobs are described as happier and are widely 
presented as desirable examples. In the full-page feature story 'Suicide has become fate', 
girls who contemplated suicide before they found employment are presented as perfect 
examples of the transformation that ajob can provide: 
"16 year old Aynur has dropped plans of suicide because she can earn 200 million Turkish 
Liras per month. She is happy for looking after her family, buying her trousseau, and 
dreaming her dreams. " (Hurriyet, 27.10.2000i9 
The same theme also appears in columns: 
HWhen I ask the girls Htheir plans about the future", none of them say it is Hgetting 
married". I always hear HI want to learn" and HI want to set up my own business." 
(Hurriyet, 27.10.2000, author's emphasisio,21 
In this same column, education and earning a living are described as "the only hope for 
salvation" in the region. Another columnist chooses the title "Women and 
education"(Milliyet, 28.10.2000i2 while expressing his approval of the Ministry of 
Education's decision to take action and investigate the relationship between suicides and 
education in the region. In November 2000 and January 2001, two whole page news items, an 
18 Semra Kardesoglu, feature, 19.10.2000, 'Batman, the city where hope dies', Milliyet 
19 Gulden Aydin, feature, 27.10.2000, 'Suicide has become fate' Hurriyet 
20 Ferai Tinc, column, 27.10.2000, 'When life becomes a burden' Hurriyet, author's emphasis. 
21 Most columnists in this data favour darker fonts to provide extra emphasis in their arguments. When 
significant, I have also found it necessary to highlight some of the data in the text throughout. To avoid 
confusion I will be giving the source of the highlights in the footnotes in the case studies. 
22 Taha Akyol, column, 28.10.2000, Millliyet 
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interview and a feature story, appeared in the Sunday edition of Sabah newspaper, both 
raising awareness of the importance of education for women in the Southeast region. The 
interview headlined "It only costs 10 million TL to give a girl an education" (Sabah, 
05.11.2000i3, was conducted with a female NGO member working with the CATOM, the 
Multi-purpose Community Centres designed to improve gender parity in this part of Turkey4. 
In the January feature, again prepared by the same female journalist (Sabah, 07.01.2000i5, 
this time the coverage was about the efforts of an NGO to educate girls in the Southeast with 
the help of a sponsoring mobile communication companY6. 
The main suggestion here was that, by educating girls and offering them the opportunity to 
earn their own income, the discrepancy between the modem girls of Turkey and the girls of 
Batman would be significantly reduced with gender relations in the region reshaped. In other 
words, a career and an education are seen as the foremost vessels in bridging the gap between 
the luckier girls of the big cities and the suppressed girls in Batman. While there appears to 
be no doubt that poor education in the region is a major social problem in general, stress is 
always placed upon educating women and saving them, rather than on changing gender 
relations by educating the men. 
4.2.2 Ethnic identity & difference 
There seems to be no concrete research about the ethnic origins of the suicides. And yet, the 
articles back up the assumption that since the region hosts a dense population of Kurdish 
citizens, an overriding majority of the suicides will be Kurdish27• Five feature stories, written 
by journalists investigating the events in the region, especially emphasize the ethnic identities 
23 Elif Urgu, interview, 05.11.2000, 'It costs only 10 million TL to give a girl education', Sabah. (Back in 2000, 
10 million TL would cost probably around six or seven pounds.) 
24 CA TOM provides classes on various subjects, and skills and workspace for women where they make crafts 
that are later to be sold through the Centre. 
25 ElifUrgu, feature, 07.01.2000, 'I am not a wanderer, neither free .. .' Sabah. 
26 The title of this feature 'I am not a wanderer, neither free' is a word pun on a TV advertising campaign 
launched in 2000 by the company. The series of TV advertisements would feature an independent and free 
spirited young backpacker girl travelling all around Turkey including the eastern regions and singing th~t. she 
was free. The pay-as-you-go cards of the company would contribute to her freedom. When Batman SUICIdes 
were brought to the media's attention, many writers pointed out the sad irony of the two contrasting worlds. For 
example, in the feature entitled 'Batman, the city where hope dies' on 19.10.2000 by Semra Kardesoglu, the 
feature on the story of a girl who had just recently committed suicide ends with the following: "In the room 
where Gulcan's blood stains were cleaned, a girl with her rucksack on her back sings "I am free" on the 
television." 
27 News items which report new suicides or research conducted about the increasing rate of suicides, do not share 
the same emotive descriptions on ethnic difference. 
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of the women who committed suicide, by detailed descriptions of the language spoken in the 
households or by specific cultural particularities. In these feature stories, the suicide's 
cultural context is described as almost exotically different. In fact, efforts to illustrate this 
sympathy are sometimes overtly exaggerated, as in the feature story in Hurriyet (30.03.2001) 
28. The feature has the striking subtitle "The cats that spoke Kurdish": 
"] go on to explore the rest of the house. Inside a hut covered with plastic hang series of 
tobacco leaves. When I see the tawny cat, I walk after it and call it "psi psi" it does not look 
at me. Years ago Musa Anter's cats also had not looked at me. Anter had said: "My 
daughter, we are Kurdish, our cats are Kurdish too. How would they understand psi psi? Call 
it miri miri so that they will come to you. " ] call the tawny cat "miri miri", and it turns and 
looks at me. " 
In other features too, there is a special emphasis on ethnic identity by referring to the spoken 
language: 
"Even though she could not speak a word of Turkish, she told the truth so well with the words 
her neighbour translated, simple but heavy words each of which came as a blow on our face. " 
(Hurriyet, 27.1 0.2000i9 
"The old woman did not know Turkish. Her younger daughter Selma, goes and sits next to 
her mother who tells Filiz's [the suicide's] story in Kurdish." (Sabah, 16.09.2000)30 
In one feature story, ethnic identity is sympathetically emphasised through the cultural 
preferences of a suicide victim who would to listen to Kurdish singers, but also watched 
Turkish movies: " ... She would listen to Siwan Perver, but she would not miss the Turkish 
movies" (Milliyet, 19.1 0.2000)3 I. The writer in this case approves of, even legitimising her 
culturally specific choice of music with the subtle use of the compensatory conjunction "but". 
For the journalist, the girl was pleasingly open to two identities, and enjoyed both Turkish and 
Kurdish culture. We find the follow up on this theme in a column published in the same 
newspaper almost a week later. This column is in fact the only one that directly discusses the 
28 Gulden Aydin, feature, 30.03. 2001, 'Mother of 13 in the suicide caravan', Hurriyet, emphasis mine. 
29 Gulden Aydin, feature, 27.10.2000, 'Suicide has become fate', Hurriyet 
30 Fugen Unal Sen, feature, 16.09.2000, 'The truth behind the suicides', Sabah 
31 Semra Kardesoglu, feature, 19.10.2000, 'Batman, the city where hope dies', Milliyet, emphasis mine. 
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relationship between being Kurdish and suicides, and underlining that there is a clash of 
modem and traditional cultures in the region: the journalist argues "not being Kurdish but 
being Kurdish in a closed society is an additional problem in this clash of cultures" (Milliyet, 
25.10.2000)32. It might be useful to quote here the rest of the argument by this columnist: 
"If the multiple causes of depression, which can result in suicide, are to be briefly 
summarised, we can call it "the difficulty to socialize". Living in such a 'closed society', it is 
harder for a Kurd to overcome "the difficulty to socialize" by forming comforting 
relationships and communications." 
The columnist here makes a direct link between the suicides and the Kurdish social structure 
in the region which leads to, in his terms, a difficulty to socialise. When we consider his 
assertion alongside the description of the Kurdish girl who impressed the journalist by 
watching Turkish movies, we are pointed at a perceived difficulty, i.e. for the two different 
worlds to mix. In this regard, overcoming the barriers of living in a closed society and 
opening up to the urban/Turkish world of the journalists is seen as a painful but nevertheless 
vital task. 
Not all columnists discuss the specific ethnic identity in the region in detail. In fact, the 
Kurdish make up of the region is often not directly discussed. However, it should be noted 
that euphemistic terms like "differences in ethnic origin and religious sects", "regional 
difference" or "Southeast" are frequently used while referring to Kurdish citizens. In short, 
we can say that most news stories do allude to the ethnic partiCUlarity of the region, while in 
the feature stories there is an attempt to focus more on the exotic and folkloric elements in 
their depictions. 
4.2.3 Poverty 
Another much repeated theme throughout the stories is the economic background of the 
suicides with a clear link often made between the economic backwardness of the region and 
the suicide rate. Since the research undertaken by government institutions, such as the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and the Family Research Institution of the 
32 Taha Akyol, column, 25.10.2000, 'Batman is a symbol' Milliyet 
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Ministry, has identified economic status as one of the prominent causes of suicides, quite 
frequently news articles bring up the issue of poverty, referring to the findings of this 
research. This factor is again emphasised most heavily in feature stories and columns, and it 
allows for a dramatic human-interest angle in the coverage. Those who commit suicide are 
described as unable to stand the circumstances in which they lived. 
"She lives in that ruin, which destroys mental and physical health, is too small even for the 
minimum amount of reason. She wants a fridge, a TV. She misses things. It does not happen. 
It makes her commit suicide. " (Hurriyet, 27.10.2000)33 
The poverty of the families is conveyed through detailed depictions of the houses the 
journalists have been into. The descriptions are very visual, and narrated to create an effect of 
liveliness for the readers, hence adding to the dramatisation: 
"The house, which was transformed from a one floor shanty house into an apartment with 
threefloors" (Sabah, 16.09.2000)34 
"That night, I cannot find anything to say in that room where the smell of dung and sewer 
does not evenfor a second let a person alone" (Hurriyet, 27.10.2000)35 
Another feature goes to lengths to describe the poverty of the suicide's family: 
"According to police documents, her address is "The Opposite Neighbourhood16, the house 
next to the electric transformer". Semra's [the suicide] house does not have a legal address 
because it does not have a place in the housing development plan. There are shanty houses 
and windmills sparsely scattered in the middle of a plain. There is no public transportation. 
Semra's house is an unfinished shanty house. No outside painting, no door, no glass on the 
windows. " (Hurriyet, 16.06.2002)37 
33 Gulden Aydin, feature, 27.10.2000, 'Suicide has become fate' Hurriyet 
34 Fugen Unal Sen, feature, 16.09.2000, 'The truth behind the suicides' Sabah 
35 Ferai Tinc, column, 27.10.2000, 'When life becomes a burden', Hurriyet 
:~ In the original text, "Karsi neighbourhood." In Turkish, "kar~I" means "the opposite.". ... , 
Gulden Aydin, feature, 16.06.2002, 'In the last five moths, 17 women have commItted SUICIde m Urfa, 
Hurriyet 
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For the columnists, the picture is one of high contrast between the rural and urban parts of 
Turkey, and this economic inequality is largely found to be responsible for the "social 
outbreaks" (Hurriyet, 28.05.2001i8, which in return result in suicides. One columnist 
remarks "terror in the region has ended but the economic wreckage is devastating" (Sabah, 
07 .11.2000i9• In fact, all columns refer to poverty either directly or indirectly pointing to 
how economic change had brought about social change in an unbalanced and undesirable 
way. This is because, it is largely argued, the region cannot socially and culturally catch up 
with the technological change that is already under way. One columnist ironically mentions 
how the local education centre had to open up a course on "how to use mobile phones 
efficiently" (Sabah, 18.09.2000)40. This, for the columnists, produces "another Turkey" in 
the Southeast (Hurriyet, 25.09.2000t l , which, to the inhabitants of Istanbul's high streets is 
like "another planet" (Sabah, 18.09.2000)42. Another columnist describes the gap as the 
"e/ash of times" and asks if "Turkey had grown in a more balanced way, would the "e/ash of 
times" be so violent?" (Hurriyet, 24.1 0.2000)43 
4.2.4 Protecting moral values - the dangerous media 
For the journalists, then, the "other Turkey" clearly differs from the western cities, with its 
poor villages, traditions, and gender inequality. This difference is seen as posing the greatest 
problem, not only because it needs to be eliminated for the living standards of women to 
improve, but also as the media (particularly TV) makes women aware of their difference by 
presenting them with images of alternative life styles, making their lives even more 
unbearable. Journalists emphasise the impact of television on women's lives very clearly as 
can be seen in the subtitle "the only way out is television" (Sabah, 16.09.2000) 44: 
"In the Southeast, the only thing that brings the outside to the young girls is television. For 
this reason as soon as work is done they sit in front of the TV. In front of that TV that is taken 
out onto the terrace passes days, years, lives. Seeing lives that are so much more colourful 
than theirs, young girls become depressed." 
38 Enis Berberoglu talks especially about this social outbreak in his column 'Women are dying in Batman' on 
28.05.2001, Hurriyet 
39 Ruhat Mengi, column, 07.11.2000, 'Southeast should be declared a disaster zone' Sabah 
40 Ahmet Tan, column, 18.09.2000, 'Zeugma is there, Batman is here' Sabah 
41 Serdar Turgut, column, 25.09.2000, 'What is happening in the other Turkey' Hurriyet 
42 Ahmet Tan, column, 18.09.2000, 'Zeugma is there, Batman is here' Sabah 
43 Zeynep Atikkan, column, 24.10.2000, 'The clash of the times' Hurriyet 
44 Fugen Unal Sen, feature, 16.09.2000, 'The reason behind the suicides' Sabah 
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Again, this argument is often discussed within the context of economic inequality. A 
columnist argues, "Our society has had a serious, very heavy blow. Lives have been 
deformed"(Hurriyet, 25.09.2000)45 and explains: 
"In the other Turkey, people want to be happy, fall in love, be with beautiful women and 
handsome men, earn money, buy a car, in short, live like a human being in this short life. 
Before, when there was no television and so on and so forth, it was possible to hide the 
possibility of alternatives from them. Not anymore. " 
This awareness, in one columnist's words, IS 
actually what leads "the rebellion of the slaves ": 
"Now they see a light oozing from TV screens, 
radios, and newspapers into their worlds which are 
no longer as small as they used be, and they try to 
reach that light." (Sabah,01.10.2000t6 
Fig.1 "Bad examples", Sabah In this last quote, the journalist openly welcomes the 
way the media interlinks homes in Southeast Turkey 
with the urban city centres in the West and in doing so incites awareness in the 
"slaves/women" in spite of their spatial/local constraints.47. However, not all journalists are 
as optimistic about the revolutionary "light" emanating from the media. Most of the news 
items point to a danger: women are not only demanding more when they watch television, but 
they cannot tell the (morally) good from the bad in TV programmes, and try to follow "bad 
examples" such as those presented in celebrity shows48. This recurring argument is based on 
45 Serdar Turgut, column, 25.09.2000, 'What is happening in the other Turkey? ' Hurriyet 
46 Gulay Gokturk, column, 01.10.2000, 'The rebellion of the slaves' Sabah, emphasis mine 
47 For the journalist, by connecting the life in the East with that in the West, the traditional way of life will 
inevitably change. If we leave aside the journalist's enthusiasm about the prospect and content of such change, 
the argument on how media reshapes traditional life and identities is in fact very much reminiscent of what 
Meyrowitz (1985) argues in his seminal work, No Sense of Place. 
48 In these stories, what is seen as especially dangerous to national moral codes are Turkish celebrity 
programmes, called Televole by the Turkish pUblic. These are strongly criticised for broadcasting nationwide the 
eccentric lives of a minority, movie stars and members of the upper classes, as if their lives were the norm in the 
big cities. 
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the findings of Diyanet's (Directorate of Religious Affairs) investigations in the region, and 
the President of Diyanet' s harsh criticisms of these programmes, as well as the observations 
of other witnesses, including families, friends, local bar and security organisations. In fact, 
there seems to be agreement between the journalists and the state institutions on the 
desirability of limiting exposure of modem life for the region. 
This becomes particularly evident when journalists frequently foreground the debate on the 
negative influence TV has on women and young girls in Batman. This is the case in the full-
page feature story "Suicide has become fate" (Hurriyet, 27.l0.2000t9. On the left hand side 
of the page runs a one-column box, an interview with a police official in the Batman Security 
Office, in which he shares his observations about the causes of suicides. His very last 
comment is on the influence of television in the region; however, the box has a title in bold 
letters stating "Televole programmes should be stopped'. A similar example can be observed 
in a human-interest story in Sabah newspaper, titled "Bad Examples" (Sabah, 19.01.2001)50. 
The news reports a speech by the President of Diyanet, and the journalist's open support is 
evident: 
"The President of Diyanet has made important warnings about the images of "fake world" 
that are broadcast to millions on TV. (. . .) The devastating consequences that these images can 
lead to were again revealed by research carried out by Diyanet. ( ... ) [The President] Mehmet 
Nuri Yilmaz invited the rich and the famous to act more responsibly and made the following 
call ... " 
Six visual images accompanying the article also support the argument that television is a bad 
influence. One of these is the picture of the President of Diyanet, the second a clipping from a 
(possibly) local newspaper showing a young suicide's picture and lamenting "Again a suicide, 
again a young girl". On the top part of the news item there are three pictures, displaying girls 
drunk in nightclubs, or dancing ecstatically. Perhaps the most striking visual image on the 
page is a small illustration of two women dancing in a nightclub with the banner ''fake world' 
circling around them. 
49 Gulden Aydin, feature, 27.10.2000, 'Suicide has become fate' Hurriyet 
so Mehmet Cetingulec, human interest, 19.01.2001, 'Bad Examples' Sabah 
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In these depictions the threat that inflicts the peripheral other comes from the urban centre , 
the imagined locus of progress and modernity, and the place where journalists see themselves 
as located. Journalists are quick to disown these undesired aspects of modem life as 
belonging to an eccentric minority of the rich and the famous in the urban centres. However, 
it is not only morally dubious television content that the centre imports. Journalists were also 
interested in one of the findings of the investigation undertaken by the Institution of Family, 
which argued that girls in Batman go into relationships with public officials working in the 
region, in the hope that they will save them from their miserable lives. When the officers do 
not marry them, however, the only option left is to commit suicide51 • The only time a suicide 
story makes it to the front-page headlines is actually when Milliyet's "exclusive" article 
emphasises this causal link with the title "Either get married or die" (23.10.2000)52. Later, 
other journalists also take up this news item. In her column, the journalist Zeynep Atikkan 
(Hurriyet, 24.10.2000)53 twists around the metaphor of the 'father state' by portraying it as a 
collaborator in the suicides along with the other fathers in the region who oppress their 
daughters. The critical language is especially strong in this column: 
"When times clash ", "father state's public officers in ties" becomes only good for dirty 
flirting. He becomes the exploiter of "the times that clash". He seduces the girl in the mini 
skirt. He makes her a "whore" in the eyes of the neighbourhood. (. . .) (The father) beats her. 
Either kills her, or forces her to commit suicide. " 
We can argue that while these threats emanate from the centre, they are described as the 
deformed forms within the urban centre, which in any case the centre tries to expel, hence 
preserving the wholeness of the ideal Turkey for the reader. 
4.2.5 Terror, insecurity and instability 
The damage terror has caused in the region is another regular theme in the suicide stories, 
which again emerges as a differentiating factor between the region and the cities. Stories 
51 This fmding is supposed to be in the preliminary research conducted by the Institution. It might be interesting 
to note that the fmding was not mentioned in the three articles reporting the p~eliminary. rese~ch on 3.1 st October 
2000 published in Milliyet and Hurriyet, and the preceding research findmgs published m Hum~et on 16 
February 2001. All three are articles based on press briefs and do not have by-lines. The argument IS also not 
mentioned on the Institution's website www.aile.gov.tribatman.htm. 
52 Semra Kardesoglu front page headline, 23.10.2000, 'Either get married or die' Milliyet 
53 Zeynep Atikkan, c~lumn, 24.10.2000, 'The Clash of the Times' Hurriyet, emphasis mine. 
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usually discuss this problem by referring to the relevant fmdings of research carried out in the 
region, like that of the Diyanet, or through eyewitness accounts. There is one news article 
focusing solely on this subject, published in Sabah newspaper, titled "Depression caused by 
terror kills" (Sabah, 17.09.200oi4• The item summarises the comments by three MPs from 
Batman, each representing a leading party. Two of the MPs mention terror among the other 
causes of social distress in the region; however, with the title and subtitle employed the 
journalist prioritises terror as the main cause of suicides: 
"According to the MPs from Batman, the reality behind the increasing suicides in Batman is 
that the depression caused by years of terror is at the point of bursting." 
Other journalists point to the heavy feeling of distrust and insecurity in the region, but not 
always with the same emphasis. For example, Ferai Tinc, from Milliyet newspaper, draws 
attention to outlawed groups and their assaults, and how people living in the region were 
given false promises by these groups: 
"Black clouds gather on this city, which was famous for murders with unknown perpetrators, 
and its Hezboullah. (...) For 23 years, these lands have bred suspicion. All tales of liberation 
have ended in disappointment. No one saves anyone. Neither Hezbollah, nor the P KK. 
But now women want to save themselves." (Hurriyet, 27.1 o.2oooi5 
Here, Ferai Tinc distinguishes between the terrorist groups against whom a curfew had to be 
implemented by the state and the population who have been exploited. Distinct from these 
two she locates the women, who are no longer content with false promises and want to save 
themselves. The state, by its very absence, is detached from this chaos and only indirectly 
enters the picture as the implementer of a curfew that appears both necessary and inevitable. 
On the other hand, the state is very much a part of the apparent feeling of mistrust in Gulden 
Aydin's feature story in Hurriyet newspaper. Even though she appears to be retelling what 
was told to her by her sources, mainly using direct quotes, the angle from which she chooses 
to tell the story distinguishes her features from others. She particularly stresses in two 
consecutive features how one of the suicide victims missed the village she had left behind, 
S4 Sebnem Hosgor, human interest story, 17.09.2000, 'Depression caused by terror kills' Sabah 
ss Ferai Tine, column, 27.10.2000, 'When life becomes a burden' Hurriyet author's emphasis 
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"The state had emptied their village ten years ago. " (Hurriyet, 27.10.2000)56 
"She also wanted her village back, which was evacuated ten years ago." (Hurriyet, 
06.12.2000)57 
In another feature story, she interviews the family of a suicide (Hurriyet, 30.03.2001)58. The 
family brings up the issue of how the armed conflict between the state and the terrorist groups 
had influenced them psychologically, and she also adds her own observations: 
"(..) we set on the road On certain points, there are queues because of army controls. " 
"Oztekin family used to live in a village (..) 35 Ian further from where they now live. Armed 
conflicts, deaths, raids take place and at last in 1992 their village is burnt. Nurettin Oztekin 
[the husband]first tells of those days, then the beauty of their village. " 
"The household points towards the Heybeli Mountain which goes down to the other side of 
the river. Two years ago 16 people were killed Their skeletons were still there. They say 
Sabriye [the suicide] had witnessed this fight, and the same day saw that nightmare after 
having been forced to look at the corpses whose noses and ears had been cut, and following 
that nightmare she was no longer the same Sabriye. " 
Here Gulden Aydin paints a vivid picture of terror, and while she is careful to avoid putting 
any blame directly on the Turkish state, by the choice of memories she decides to foreground 
from her interviews, she does take a critical position against the state and presents it also as 
responsible for the insecurity in the area. This is a divergence from other stories, where 
criticism is directed more at educational, social or even political policies, but not at the 
military actions of the state. 
S6 Gulden Aydin, feature, 27.10.2000, 'Suicide has become fate' Hurriyet 
S7 Gulden Aydin, feature, 06.12.2000, 'In the seventh try, she succeeded in dying' Hurriyet 
S8 Gulden Aydin, feature, 30.03.2001, 'A mother of 13 in the suicide caravan' Hurriyet 
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In other criticisms of the state's handling of the problems in the region, focus is largely placed 
upon the discrepancy between the region and the more developed parts of Turkey. One 
columnist argues that "Clash of the times" also results in "the clash of the cultures" because 
"Turkey missed the importance of education, and whenever regional difference was brought 
up as an issue, had seen them as the fantasy of the leftists, so today two different times clash 
in her! The rules, traditions, clothes, food and hopes of the two times clash. " (Hurriyet, 
17.1 0.2000)59 
Seeing education as the only cure to bridge the gap, she asks: "Now, if Turkey had developed 
in a more balanced way, would the clash of times have been so violent?" 
Another columnist hints at the negligence of the region's problems on the part of the state. For 
the journalist, the problem is bigger and beyond the recent visibility of the female suicides. 
"The lifting of the political ban on the Southeast has now helped us to re-discover the bitter 
and old tragedies. ( . .) 1/ we think about the fire that took over the whole region, and the blood 
that was shed, we cannot tell for sure whether or not the deaths of the young girls, one after 
another, would be lost in between all that was taking place ten years ago. But even if this 
tragedy were noticed, it would probably be interpreted within the limits of a political cause 
and effect relationship. " (Hurriyet, 21.03.2001 )60 
In short, then, journalists agree that it is the duty of the state to "give hope and excitement to 
the people in the Southeast, which has been cleaned ofterror"(Sabah, 17.09.2000)61 and urge 
the state to develop policies to help people in the Southeast, to bring about a new direction 
now that the terrorist threat has been overcome. However, the degree and content of the 
criticisms varies when discussing the past policies of the state. 
4.3 Overarching arguments and the main discourse 
59 Zeynep Atikkkan, column, 17.10.2000, 'Clash of the times' Hurriyet, emphasis not mine 
60 Enis Berberoglu, column, 21.03.2001, 'The tough choice facing the girl in Batman' Hurriyet, author's 
emphasis 
61 Gungor Mengi, column, 17.09.2000, 'Come on' Sabah 
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As noticeable from the analysis of main themes emerging through the coverage of the Batman 
suicides there is no prominent divergence between the three newspapers, in terms of the 
degree of criticism they level against the state, the emphasis placed on the hardships of life for 
women in Batman, or on the picture of the Southeast painted for the readers. This is not 
unexpected given the very similar political standpoints of the newspapers within which the 
journalists work. Divergences of opinions are observable only on a more individual level 
depending on the journalist, and particularly on the role and responsibilities of the state 
regarding the negligence of the region. On this issue, the image of the state in the journalists' 
discussions varies from that of a benevolent to a malevolent father figure. 
Nevertheless, the convergence in the stories is much more apparent and striking. Certain 
journalistic preferences in coverage aside, we can see the following common arguments 
emerging through the discussion of the themes: 
• Batman is a part of the Southeast, which has suffered from terror in the past. 
• There is a clash between the cultures of Turkey and the Southeast, which is not 
easily bridgeable. 
• Social class and lack of education are major impediments to achieving freedom 
and happiness in the region. 
• The traditional structure in the region resists change and modernization. 
• Women in Batman are very much oppressed and silenced by their society, and 
therefore urgently need help. 
• Most of the women who committed suicide are Kurdish. 
• Relatives of the victims are not willing to change the social system, or investigate 
the reasons for the suicides. 
• Women in Batman often cannot differentiate between what is modem and what are 
degenerate forms of modem ways of living - they can become the victims of 
undesired patterns of modem life. 
• Women in Batman, along with other residents, have also been victims of the armed 
conflict between the state and terrorist groups. 
• It is the state's responsibility to help these people. 
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When we consider the arguments as a whole, we can find them converging towards a general 
and overarching theme that can be summarised as the notion that women in Batman in 
particular and the region as a whole are in urgent need of help from the centre in order to be 
saved. This urban centre, where journalists clearly locate themselves along with the modern 
institutions of the state and the urban dwellers, emerges here as the other of "Other Turkey". 
Put differently, where journalists are located is also where modernity exists, as opposed to the 
"other Turkey", an evident declaration of I'ipseite, where not only poverty but also gender 
inequality, oppressive traditions, unfulfilled wishes from life, ethnic differences and serious 
problems caused by armed conflicts in the region prevail. As a result, the stories narrated by 
the journalists simply present the accounts of outsiders visiting the peripheries and the other 
people who live there. In this respect, the occasional divergences among the journalists' 
criticism of certain state policies also lose their significance, as it is not the state in particular 
but the agreed image of the centre as a whole, which becomes the motor of change by 
representing the model of development for the 'Other Turkey,62. 
And yet, this Turkey is not only a model, but also a protector and guardian for the "Other" 
one. This entrusts the centre with certain responsibilities, while enhancing its superiority and 
power. In fact, there is an agreement among the journalists that whatever is going on in the 
Southeast is/should be of great concern for the centre. "Until what is going on in the Other 
Turkey is a matter of conscience for this country and people take active action, such a country 
cannot have a future" (Hurriyet, 25.09.2000)63 argues one columnist, carefully distinguishing 
between his country (Turkey) and the other country, the other Turkey. His call for urgent 
action and help is an important one, replicated in many other columns and features and 
reminds us of Spivak's criticisms of the role of intellectuals in perpetuating hegemonic 
relationships. Even though Spivak's concern in her writings is with the subaltern, and she 
takes careful effort to make it clear that it is not enough to be postcolonial or to be the 
member of an ethnic minority in order to be subaltern since "that word is reserved for the 
sheer heterogeneity of decolonised space" (1999: 310), the discussion that she develops is 
nevertheless applicable to our analysis. In her well-known article (1988b), she argues that the 
intellectuals, in representing and speaking for the oppressed, naturally take the position of the 
"Self', and they persistently form the oppressed as the "Other". Through this process the 
62 How journalists linguistically separate themselves from the "other Turkey" and incorporate themselves within 
the centre will be further analysed in the following paragraphs. 
63 Serdar Turgut, column, 25.09.2000, 'What is happening in the Other Turkey?' Hurriyet. 
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oppressed turn into what Spivak calls ''the Selfs shadow, the periphery". Such a conception 
does not only disguise the power relationship implicit in this positioning, it also locates the 
agency of change not in the oppressed, who are seen as too helpless or incapable, but in the 
intellectuals, who emerge as the saviours. 
In the suicide stories written by the intellectuals in this case study, namely the journalists, we 
can observe the formation of a similar discourse on the centre/periphery relationship in 
Turkey. As journalists clearly distinguish themselves and their lives from that of the region, 
they create a problem-free centre to represent Turkey and Turkish people, and offer it as a 
model which can be replicated, with their help, to solve the problems in the region. This 
approach not only locates the source of progress outside the Southeast, but it also further 
enhances the divide between the two regions in Turkey, and results in the construction of the 
discourse legitimising the superiority of the centre/us with regards to the periphery/them. 
The discourse defining the centre and peripheries of Turkey is apparent not only on a thematic 
level, but also more importantly, realized through discursive strategies at a language level in 
the texts. The following part of the analysis seeks to display the linguistic means through 
which this discourse is fleshed out in the texts. While exposing those means, the analysis can 
also help us reveal the intricacies of how the centre-periphery relationship is constructed 
through women -and by women- in Turkey. 
4.4 Processing the text- how the discourse was realised in the texts 
Unlike the other case studies, the Batman case offers two commonly used literary 
mechanisms that enhance the superiority of the centre in the Batman stories, which are the 
forms of narration and characterisation used by journalists to cover the events. Because I fmd 
them uniquely important in this case study, I have decided to expand on them specifically. 
The first of these is narration and the second is characterisation. 
4.4.1 Narration 
With its already emotional content, the Batman stories are written to direct the reader's 
attention to the particular problems by highlighting the dramatic set of events. In this respect, 
the headlines and titles emerge as problem oriented, rather than offering solutions, and 
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highlight the tragic dimensions of the events: "Batman, the city where hope dies" "The 
weather is not of spring but of sadness in Batman", "Hear this scream" "When life becomes a 
burden" (Milliyet, 19.10.2000; Sabah, 07.04.2001; Hurriyet, 16.06.2002; Hurriyet, 
27.10.2000)64. The subheadings are also developed to further the dramatic effect, such as 
"Could not reunite with her love" "Children and flies" "It is over now" or "The responsible 
ones" (Sabah, 16.09.2000; Milliyet, 19.10.2000; Milliyet, 23.10.2000; Sabah' 09.01.2001/5• 
The visuals accompanying the news stories, which include pictures of the suicides, their 
families and children who are left behind, are especially powerful and increase the emotional 
charge of the stories. Where possible photographs of the authorities interviewed on the matter 
are also included in the layout. Visuals are used more heavily in feature stories, some of 
which also include pictures of happier girls who, with help from NGO organizations, could 
get a job or continue their education. These girls are, in the words of the previously quoted 
journalist, "the freed slaves" (Sabah, 01.10.2000)66. Their happiness is in stark contrast to 
both the emotional and physical deprivation that can be felt through the other pictures, and 
they confirm to the readers that all can be bettered only though education and job 
opportunities. (See fig.3) 
This rich visual content usually helps to dramatise the stories further but what is more, it 
enhances the credibility of the eyewitness accounts of the features stories. And yet, even 
without the help of photographs, detailed descriptions with vivid adjectives provide the 
visuals for the story. In fact, adjectives remain as the single most powerful tool for the 
journalists in the narration of the stories. They set the mise en scene with "dusty roads" 
"sparsely scattered squatters" "broken Turkish" "short runty man" "delicious almond trees in 
pink-white blossoms"(Sabah, 16.09.2000; Hurriyet, 16.06.2002; Hurriyet, 30.03.2001; ibid.; 
Milliyet, 07.04.2001)67. In many cases, exaggerations, metaphors and personalisations also 
64 In the order of citation: Serna Kardesoglu, 19.10.2000, Milliyet; Leyla Umar, 07.04.2001 Sabah; Gulden 
Aydin, 16.06.2002, Hurriyet; Ferai Tinc, 27.10.2000, Hurriyet. 
6S In the order of citation: FUgen Unal Sen, 16.09.2000, 'The truth behind the suicides' Sabah; Semra 
Kardesoglu, 19.10.2000, 'Batman, the city where hope dies' Milliyet; Semra Kardesoglu, 23.10.2000, 'Either get 
married or die' Milliyet; Mehmet Cetingtile~, 09.01.2001, 'Bad Examples' Sabah. 
66 Gulay Gokturk, column, 01.10.2000, 'The rebellion of the slaves' Sabah, emphasis mine . 
67 In the order of citation: Fugen Unal Sen, 16.09.2000, 'The truth behind the suicides' S~bah; Gulden Ayd~, 
16.06.2002 'In the last five moths 17 women have committed suicide in Urfa' Hurnyet; Gulden Aydm, 
" . 30.03.2001, 'Mother of 13 in the suicide caravan' Hurriyet; ibid.; Leyla Umar, 07.04.2001, 'The weather IS not 
of spring but of sadness in Batman' MiIliyet. 
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accompany the graphic descriptions and add to the visual imagery provided for the readers. In 
the following extract, a columnist translates the miserable living conditions for her readers: 
"She drags life in this cold room, with her husband's other wife and God knows how many 
children, with old paintfallingfrom the walls, and black bugs scrambling to andfro under the 
mattresses on the floor, even they do not want to stay here. "(Hurriyet, 27.10.2000)68 
In this elaborate narrative style, choice of words is particularly significant: it is not the suicide 
that wants to escape - even her life needs to be dragged along in the rundown house. The 
personification of the black bugs who know better than to stay also helps the reader to 
visualize her suffering. Again, another columnist describes a derelict setting where girls not 
only die, but are "walked to their deaths" by the realities of the region: 
"Batman, where the blackness of the oil [petrol] has darkened the fates of some young girls, 
can be best told by the dusty roads, the fields of yellow grass, and silence. What tells of the 
realities that walk the girls to death?" (Sabah, 16.09.2000)69 
The metaphor of deathly silence is a common motif used throughout the narrations: 
"As soon as we step inside through a wooden door, we are greeted by silence." (Sabah, 
16.09.2000)70 
Most of the time, this heavily emotional coverage resembles the narrative style of fiction 
rather than news. Once again, this is particularly evident in columns, especially in columns 
written by female journalists, and in feature stories, all of which are written by female 
journalists, narrating the events as personal accounts of what has happened. This style of 
narration, especially in the features, places the journalists at the centre, observing a tragic 
story unfolding. In some cases, even though the journalists could not possibly have witnessed 
the last moments of the suicides, events are told as if they are eyewitness accounts: 
68 Ferai Tine, column, 27.10.2000, 'When life becomes a burden' Hurriyet 
69 Fugen Unal Sen, feature, 16.09.2000, 'The reality behind the suicides' Sabah 
70 Fugen Unal Sen, feature, 16.09.2000, 'The reality behind the suicides' Sabah 
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H (..) On the morning of March l1h, when everybody was asleep, she went into the kitchen. 
She tied the rope into a loop, put it around her neck and kicked the chair ... " (Hurriyet, 
30.03.2001)71 
"The rest happened very fast. Filiz came home, cleaned the house, and helped with the dinner. 
And then. .. " (Sabah, 16.09.2000)72 
"Fatma put the barrel across her neck, and pulled the trigger. Her head blew up." (Hurriyet, 
16.06.2002)73 
Particular descriptive tools of Turkish language can also be employed to enhance the 
fictionalisation of the stories, such as the use of the inferential past tense74• This particular 
form of past tense is often associated with fiction writing rather than fact and contributes to 
the tale telling effect. It is mainly encountered in stories or jokes, and gives the effect of 
hearsay being widely used in daily spoken and written Turkish. Exact translation of the 
inferential tense does not exist in the English language however the intended meaning is as 
follows75 : 
H(. . .) When she learned how to read and write, she would say, "this much is enough". And 
then she would go to the cotton fields to work. If, working from six in the morning till the 
darkness fell, she gathered 100 kilos; she would earn three million liras. She would take the 
money to her family. If anything were left after that, she would buy herself a skirt. " (Milliyet, 
19.10.2000)76 
H(..) Fadile would not leave any notes before she put the rope around her neck. She would 
not have known how to read or write anyway." (Hurriyet, 27.10.2000)77 
71 Gulden Aydin, feature, 30.03.2001, 'A mother of 13 in the suicide caravan' Hurriyet 
72 Fugen Unal Sen, feature 16.09.2000, 'The reality behind the suicides' Sabah 
73 Gulden Aydin, feature 16.06.2002, 'In the past five months, 17 women have committed suicide in Urfa' 
Hurriyet 
74 in Turkish: mi~'li gecmis zaman 
7S This tense can imply many other meanings, such as doubt, possibility, and uncertainty. Here it is used to 
enhance the story effect and therefore I have tried to translate it to give the same impact in English. 
76 Semra Kardesoglu, feature, 19.10.2000, 'Batman, the city where hope dies' Milliyet 
77 Gulden Aydin, feature, 27.10.2000, 'Suicide has become fate' Hurriyet 
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The effect here is significantly different to that of a sentence with regular past tense. The 
informality of the inferential tense contributes to the emotional tone and invites the readers to 
empathise with the suicides, while at the same time evoking the visual aids of the imagination 
one uses while listening to a tale. 
Another commonly applied tool to add to the dramatic effect is to use mis-constructed 
sentences. Again this is a narrative form specific to the Turkish language and is made by 
changing the word order by for example putting the verb at the start of the sentence. Even 
though it is almost impossible to translate a mis-constructed sentence, the word order would 
have sounded irregular in the same way as saying "Nefiye Kaya exactly six times had been at 
death's door and come back. Finally succeeded she in dying' CHurriyet, 16.12.2000)78, 
instead of "Nefiye Kaya had been at death's door and come back exactly six times. C ... ) She 
finally succeeded in dying." Mis-constructed sentences are a more dramatic form usually met 
in literary pieces in Turkish. They again detach the text from the conventional style used in 
news items, while also allowing the writer to shift the emphasis of the sentence as desired. In 
the above example, the mis-constructed sentence puts the stress not on the event but on the 
character and the number of times she had tried to commit suicide before. 
Frequent use of ellipses, both in features and in columns also charge these depictions with 
emotions. The readers are first invited to witness the lives of the suicides and then with the 
use of the ellipses, they are expected to think further about the events and complete the story 
in their minds, as in the case of the column quoted below: 
"According to her sister, she never had any loved ones that she wanted to be reunited witk .• " 
(Milli yet, 19.1 0.2000)79 
When used in columns, the ellipses also ask the reader to join the author and fill in the 
imagery or vision started out by herlhim: 
"A few years ago in Hakkari, in between the seeds that were beginning to sprout, I had from 
time to time witnessed gazes with no hope of future ••• The feeling of not being able to see the 
78 Gulden Aydin, feature, 06.12.2000, 'In the seventh try, she succeeded' Hurriyet 
79 Semra Kardesoglu, feature, 19.10.2000, 'Batman, the city where hope dies' Milliyet 
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light at the end the tunnel was growing through scarcity and poverty ... "(Milliyet, 
26.10.2000)80 
"Life will beat death. Maybe now, maybe in two generations ••• " (Sabah, 01.10.2000)81 
Regardless of where they are used, the ellipses introduce a feeling of interactivity in inviting 
the reader to complete the depictions or arguments initiated by the writer. It provides a shared 
platform on which the journalist and the reader can build imagery around the suicides in 
Batman. The use of punctuation, the often-exaggerated emotional style, generous use of 
metaphors, personalisation and other literary tools, combined with the already dramatic 
content almost turn the events into fiction. Given the fact that most of these literary tools are 
employed by female journalists, we could assume an effort here to approach the issue with 
female sensitivity, a declaration of solidarity with the "women out there". However, an 
inherent division already exists in this attempt, putting women in Batman in one camp, and 
the journalists, and through them, us the readers into another. This is particularly evident in 
the frequent us of the deixis 'we' throughout the stories: 
"What we are going to tell now is the story of the last one to commit suicide, Sabriye 
(jztekin's. The story of a mother of 13 children. " (Hurriyet, 30.03.2001)82 
"We sit down next to Filiz's mother Hanife Teyze. We listen to Filiz' last supper and the 19 
years of life that carried her to this end" (Sabah, 16.09.2000)83 
As discussed previously, journalists here see themselves as initially located in the centre, 
witnessing/living/commentating on the events temporarily, rather than being a part of the 
"other Turkey" where suicides are taking place. However, the readers are also carefully 
positioned through the mode of address used to narrate the stories. The deixis "we" in these 
quotes clearly distinguishes the storytellers from the story, as the journalists tell "us", the 
readers, about "them", the suicides. This not only assumes that all readers are located, in a 
geographical and more figurative sense, outside the "other Turkey" along with the journalists, 
but it can also help the readers visualize and live through the events with the storyteller, and 
80 Zeynep Oral, column, 26.10.2000, 'Deaths and Roles' Milliyet 
81 Gulay Gokturk, column, 01.10.2000, 'The rebellion of the slaves' Sabah 
82 Gulden Aydin, feature, 30.03.2001, 'A mother of 13 in the suicide caravan' Hurriyet 
83 Fugen Unal Sen, feature, 16.09.2000, 'The reality behind the suicides' Sabah 
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associate themselves with the storyteller rather than the characters in the story. The story, 
after all, is told to "us", who are naturally closer to the writer, who can complete the imagery 
that she lays out to us, and who will share her concerns about the tragedies of the region. This 
is nowhere more evident than in the following words of a female columnist: 
"We cannot just give our attention to prisons, political and economic mistakes and leave them 
to their fates, it is enough we did that /" (Sabah, 07.11.2000)84 
Through the distinct mode of address in the Batman case study, which is also apparent in the 
other two case studies, the news stories select their readers. It is important to note here that 
the discursive subject positions in the texts should not be collapsed outright with the actual 
readers of the newspapers. At the same time, readers of these columns should not just be 
dismissed as an ideal/fictitious reader either, constructed by the author, and fixed by his text 
forever. Rather this double figure of readership opens up a relationship between the readers 
in the stories and the actual readers o/the stories, which Wolfgang Iser (1974), in his analysis 
of literary texts, calls the implied readers of the texts. 
Iser uses the term 'implied reader' as a concept that incorporates "both the pre structuring of 
the potential meaning by the text, and the reader's actualisation of this potential" (1974: xii). 
The implied reader is called into existence at the moment of the actual readers' active 
engagement with the texts. The readers relate to the texts, and "slip into the role mapped out 
by the texts" for them whenever "we perform the role assigned to us by placing ourselves at 
the disposal of someone else's thoughts" (2000: 248). For Iser, this process will bring about a 
split of roles, a moment of hesitation and maybe rejection, for "on the one hand we are 
prepared to assume the role, and on the other we cannot cut ourselves from what we are" 
(ibid.). The resultant tension will call for a resolution but this will only come about by 
incorporating the new experience offered by the text, in short accepting the position asked by 
the text (ibid.: 249). This will be encouraged through the repertoire of familiar patterns and 
themes in the text, which steer the act of reading, and techniques or strategies used to set the 
familiar against the unfamiliar (1974: 288). But most important of all, Iser notes that the 
implied reader, as an active process of meaning making, will always be strictly contextual, 
84 Ruhat Mengi, column, 07.11.2000, 'The Southeast should be declared a war zone' Sabah 
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and "will vary historically from one age to another -and not to a typology of possible readers" 
(1974: xii) 
While Iser's study is about novels, it can explain the function and role of the readers in the 
news stories for the operation of dominant discourses in the society. While there is always the 
chance that the actual readers might reject these subject positions, it is more likely that readers 
will choose to identify with them. This is helped not only by the style and the mode of 
address in the text, but also because within the time frame in which the actual readers are 
reading the texts, they will already be positioned within the dominant discourses of national 
identity and modernity within Turkey 
And finally, before analysing the characterisations in the stories, it is necessary to note that all 
quotes cited in this part of the analysis come from news items written by female journalists. 
The similar subjective, self-reflexive and dramatic styles found across the three newspapers 
might actually hint at editorial expectations from these journalists to introduce that sensitivity 
in covering these stories, and approach the events with pure empathy. This is not particular to 
Turkey, many critics have voiced their concern over how market-driven dynamics of 
journalism today encourage more humanized news to increase the appeal for audiences, rather 
than traditional news journalism. As van Zoonen (1998) demonstrates, stereotypical views on 
what female journalists can and cannot do fit in perfectly with the shift in news towards 
human interest and more life-style news. This trend can lead to assigning female journalists 
"to subjects they are supposedly good at and expecting the human touch of women" in the 
newsroom (1998: 46). And yet, it would be unfair to claim that it is only editorial decisions 
that lead to the overly reflexive and emotional style in the coverage of suicides. While this 
probably had been expected on an editorial level, female journalists do come across as sincere 
in their concerns about the deaths in Batman and personally and emotionally involved with 
the stories they are covering. However, this ironically comes at the cost of making suicides a 
problem of Southeast women, something emotional, feminine, personal, happening not "here" 
but "out there". As such, it confinns the divide within Turkey, while also working to 
naturalise the superiority of the more powerful centre with regard to the weaker periphery in 
need of help, which will come in the fonn of change located initially in the centre. 
While this narrative style works to naturalise the superiority of "Turkey" with regard to the 
"other Turkey" (since the journalist/centre remains as the only one that can change the 
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narrative/women's fates), it also allocates the parts to be played by the main characters of the 
story. 
4.4.2 Characterisation - Main actors/ victims, villains & guardian angels 
Narrative style alone does not create a good story, there also needs to be a well-defmed cast of 
characters85 • As with all good stories, the Batman suicides offer dramatised personae that act 
to a narrative line. The recurring characters in the suicide stories can be grouped into villains, 
victims, and guardians who offer their help, which works to the victimization of women, 
vilification of men in the region, and securing the role of the centre as the guardians. 
The foremost victims in the stories are without doubt the women who commit suicide. As 
discussed previously in the thematic 
analysis, women in Batman are often 
discussed within the rhetoric of saving, 
as 'helpless women' to be rescued. The 
theatrical depictions of how women 
committed suicide m a state of 
hopelessness, the use of literary tools 
also confinn their victim status. The 
descriptive tone without exception 
portrays a picture of suffering. Images 
Fig.2 "Batman, the City Where Hope Dies", Milliyet 
of dying women, children crying, 
children left behind, girls forced into 
marriages, women who want to be saved, suffering women are accentuated with the metaphors 
such as slaves, young girls running towards death one after another, women beaten blue by 
their husbands and so on. These stories of tyranny also stand in sharp contrast to the status of 
the female journalists who conduct the interviews and write about the events. 
85 The importance of characters in stories has been highlighted fIrst and in most exquisite detail by Vladimir 
Propp (1968) in his book Morphology of the Folktale. Even though his work studied fairy folktales, his ~oncern 
on the functions played out by characters has been an inspiration in building up this part of the anal~sls . . l?e 
analysis here also differs from his work by the signifIcance it gives to the characters themselves, not dlsrrussmg 
them in trying to expose their functions. In Batman news stories who the acts are done by is as important as the 
act that has been done. 
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The victim status in the Batman stories firmly places women within the terminology of 
slavery and rescue. And yet, women are not only portrayed as passively suffering the 
patriarchal pressures, but also as actively trying to ''protest their lives" (Hurriyet, 
27.l0.2000)86, "determined to save themselves" (Hurriyet, 27.l0.2000)87. They are described 
as ''forever slaves" (Hurriyet, 27.10.2000)88 wanting to have a future and it is particularly for 
this reason that they must be helped. The most dramatic use of this depiction is a column 
headline by a female journalist, which describes the situation as "The rebellion of the slaves" 
and the suicides as the "martyrs of liberation" (Sabah, 01.10.2000)89. She argues that: 
Fig. 3 "Suicide bas become fate". 
Black&wbite pboto of young girls 
working in an atelier,Hurriyet, 
"Those young girls are looking for a way out of their 
lives that are turned into hell by traditions, customs, 
feudal morality and religious pressure. They now know 
that there is a world out there where to love is not 
punished by death, where men and women take part as 
equals". 
The articles define suicide as the victim-women's last 
attempts at saving themselves, which makes death and 
suicide synonymous with freedom: "The name of 
liberation in Batman lS suicide" (Milliyet, 
23.10.2000)90. Within this context, suicide resulting in 
death can be described as a tragic "success", as visible in 
headlines "When she could not succeed in dying, she 
ran away" (Sabah, 21.09.2000)91 and "In the seventh 
try, she succeeded in dying" (Hurriyet, 06.12.2000)92. 
Through this narrative, the news items not only attempt to dramatically describe the bleakness 
of the situation but also call for action to save the women, which is at times voiced urgently , 
86 Gulden Aydin, feature story, 27.10.2000, 'Suicide has become fate ' Hurriyet 
87 Ferai Tine, column, 27.10.2000, 'When life becomes a burden' Hurriyet . 
88 Semra Kardesoglu, book review & interview with author, 29.05.2001, ' While they seek freedom, they amve at 
death' Milliyet 
89 Gulay Gokturk, column, 01.10.2000, 'The rebellion of the slaves' Sabah 
90 Semra Kardesoglu feature 23.10.2000 'The name of liberation in Batman is suicide' Milliyet 
91 ' " ., S bah Halil Beytut, human interest story, 21.09.2000, 'When she could not succeed in dymg, she ran away a , 
emphasis mine 
92 Gulden Aydin, human interest feature, 06.12.2000, 'In the seventh try she succeeded' Hurriyet, emphasis mine 
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in the headlines as in "Hear This Scream" "Southeast should be declared a disaster zone" 
"Come on" (Hurriyet, 16.06.2002; Sabah, 07.11.2000; Sabah, 17.09.2000)93. Photographs are 
powerful tools in accentuating the victim imagery, and in some items pictures of young girls 
who are saved and happy are also used. When considered within the whole context of Batman 
stories, these photographs not only create a 'before and after' image for the readers, but also 
create a small myth about the saved women. (See Fig.3) However, covering the stories within 
the rhetoric of saving has further consequences. Firstly, it defines and discusses women 
within the cliche of victimization. One female journalist makes an exception as she notes the 
apparent danger in her column, and argues that thinking within the discourse of social cliches 
leads us to accept and normalize violence within the family, which further feeds suicides and 
honour killings: 
"Let alone changing stereotypical roles, we have internalised and accepted them so much that 
we keep reproducing these and setting them out as examples. As the society defines (and since 
we live in a male hegemonic society, defining from men's perspective), women are "Mother" 
"Sister" "Housewife" "Honourable woman" "The bird that makes the nest" "Angel" "One 
that needs to be protected" "Altrustic women" "Weak and helpless" and many times, we 
have elevated them to the status of "victims". (. . .) Unless we overcome these cliches, these 
stereotypes, this perspective and this discourse, I do not think we can end violence within the 
families." (Milliyet, 26.10.2000)94 
In fact, the totality of the stories does exactly what the journalist warns against, and works to 
strengthen cliches. Ironically, the journalist herself contributes to the emotion-laden 
descriptions in the rest of her column95, without which the victim character could not have 
been realized. 
Second, the victim character helps to carve more convincing villains out of husbandsIJathers 
beating up wives/daughters, authoritarian fathers/husbands, and oppressive customs and 
93 In the order of citation: Gulden Aydin, feature story, 16.06.2002, 'In the last five months 17 wome~ have 
committed suicide in Urfa' Hurriyet; Ruhat Mengi, column, 07.11.2000, 'Southeast should be declared a disaster 
zone' Sabah; Gungor Mengi, column, 17.09.2000, 'Come on' Sabah. 
94 Zeynep Oral, column, 26.10.2000, 'Deaths and Roles' Milliyet 
9S See for example the previously quoted extract from the same column: "A few years ago in Hakkari, in between 
the seeds that were beginning to sprout, I had from time to time witnessed gazes with n~ hope of future.~: The 
feeling of not being able to see the light at the end the tunnel was growing through scarcity and.p~verty... The 
journalist uses the same emotional narrative style that contributes to the stereotype of hopeless victim/woman of 
the Southeast. 
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traditions. At the same time, it should be noted that men are not described with the same 
dramatic details as the victims are. This is not only because the already powerful presence of 
the helpless victim proves any further details about the oppressors to be unnecessary, but also 
because men themselves can appear as the victims of their surroundings. In other words, here 
victimization occurs at two levels through the stories, first for women and then for men. As 
discussed previously, men are also portrayed as suffering from poverty and terror in the 
region, even though there is only one human interest story reporting the fmdings of research 
under the title "In Batman it is hard to be a man tool they, too, are in depression" (Hurriyet, 
11.08.2001)96 which clearly reflects this concern. However, columnists often do bring up the 
position of men as they discuss the situation in Batman. On such occasions, the rhetoric used 
for men is similar to that used for women, albeit less emotional. Men are described as 
"hopeless" souls "who have had a blow from life" (Hurriyet, 25.09.2000)97, and as in urgent 
need of rescue, just like women: "not only young girls and women, but also the army of 
jobless young men, sons, fathers who from morning till night stroll around in boredom should 
be considered' (Hurriyet, 27.10.2000l8• As one columnist argues, it is "the people of the 
region" including men, as well as women, that needs to be "saved from the tyranny of 
traditions" (Sabah, 07.11.2000)99. 
The categorization of first the women and then the men as the victims furthermore establishes 
the significance of the centre as a protective force. As discussed previously, the centre is 
associated with the journalists, the readers, and certainly involves the state. The state is one of 
the problematic characters in the stories, as the role played out by it can change throughout 
the stories. At times, it is described benevolently, as ''flooding into the region with its 
institutions" (Sabah, 22.12.2201)100, and as in the coverage of Diyanet, emerging as the 
ultimate defender of women's rights, even raising its voice against the moral degeneracy of 
liberal/extravagant lifestyles emanating from within the centre. In other news items, it is 
criticised for negligence, or for its military policies, which were analysed in the thematic 
analysis of terror. Nevertheless, this does not reduce the state's prominence as a solid part of 
the centre, and as a necessary mechanism that needs to be operated efficiently to prevent the 
suicides. 
96 no by-lines, 11.08.2001, 'In Batman, it is hard to be a man, too' Hurriyet, 
97 Serdar Turgut, column, 25.09.2000, 'What is happening in other Turkey' Hurriyet 
98 Ferai Tine, column, 27.10.2000, 'When life becomes a burden' Hurriyet 
99 Ruhat Mengi, column, 07.11.2000, 'The Southeast should be declared a disaster zone' Sabah . . 
100 Halil Beytut, human interest, 22.12.2001, 'The suicide rate has halved in Batman' Sabah, emphasIs mme 
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With the inclusion of men and the whole region in the victim category, the centre/periphery 
divide gains a more precise meaning in drawing national boundaries through social, 
geographical and ethnic divides between the "real Turkey", and the "other Turkey". While 
national boundaries are acted out, boundaries of modernity are also continned by associating 
the centre with modernity, education and progress, and the periphery, which lies in the east 
and is inconspicuously ethnicised, with traditions, customs, and backwardness. 
4.5 Conclusion, and more about the guardian angels 
Buried underneath all the sad stories, the Batman case study can offer the readers one or two 
rare instances, which inadvertently put a smile on the faces of critical readers. If the 
delightful anecdote about the cats who spoke Kurdish is one, the plausible complaint of one 
sociologist on the absurdity of government policies in the region is certainly another (Milliyet, 
01.11.2000)101. In an interview, the sociologist complains about how the government 
perceiving women and young people in the region as stuck in between modernity and 
traditions, implements certain modernization policies. In an attempt to ease their 
transfonnation, the government would distribute six thousand free hand radios to young girls 
in education centres, so that they could bond with popular culture. 
If we leave aside the dubious likelihood of the success of such a project, neither the 
distribution of radios nor the rationale behind it should be unfamiliar. It in fact echoes Daniel 
Lerner's observations in his book, The Passing of Traditional Society (1958), the classic 
example of modernization theory of the 1950s and 60s. In his study of modernization in the 
Middle East, in which he has no reservation about taking the West as the ultimate model of 
modernization, Lerner finds the story of the Middle East "encapsulated" within the "career" 
of the village of Balgat in Turkey (ibid.: 19). Having read the survey conducted by one of his 
investigators for his study in 1950, Lerner is fascinated by the story of this desolate village, 
which is home to a poor farming community, situated just outside of Ankara, yet with no 
roads to connect it to the capital. In the whole community, there is only one single radio, 
which is owned by the village Chief, a contented old man with no desire to experience 
anything new, and a living symbol of traditional Turkish values for Lerner. The only resident 
101 Naki Dogan, interview with Associate Prof. Yasin Aktay, 01.11.2000, 'Death is given a more aesthetic look' 
MiIJiyet 
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who seems to disrupt the emotional stillness of the village is the village's only Grocer with his 
"city-dressed ways" and his "eye at the higher places", constantly "hungering for whatever is 
different and unfamiliar" (ibid.: 25). For Lerner, the Grocer is an infidel in the village, 
someone who yearns for modern life. 
Lerner revisits Balgat in 1954, only to find it has changed drastically. A bus service regularly 
connects the villagers - who are now predominantly factory workers rather than farmers-, 
there are four impressive grocery stores instead of one. He is even more impressed as he, on 
his way out of the village "absently" counts 69 radio antennas on the roofs, confrrming his 
estimate of over 100 new radios: "And only four years ago, I counterpointed to myself, there 
was but a single battery set in the village" (ibid.: 40). Although Lerner is distressed to find 
out that the Grocer had died, he is pleased to see that the Grocer's dream survived at the end, 
and Balgat is set on the path of modernization. 
It is evident that Lerner sees modernization as a continuous and unilinear process, emanating 
from the centre to the peripheries, and fonning a neat line of categories of Traditionals, 
Transitionals and Moderns. Media - particularly the radio - plays no less part than to 
accelerate this process. Although Lerner's strong belief in a rigidly linear theory of 
modernization is academically outdated, it is very much alive in the discourses surrounding 
the Batman case study. Just as Balgat of 1950 lied in the 'Traditional' category for Lerner, so 
does the region of Batman for the journalists and for the government authorities who want to 
distribute radios in an attempt to move Batman into the 'Transitional' stage, like Balgat had 
done in just four years. 
This modernist perspective very much shapes the discourse on women in Batman and 
modernity in the news stories. The coverage separates first the women and then the whole 
population of two Turkeys, feeding into and strengthening the centre/periphery division, while 
offering ways to incorporate them into a desired and pleasant version of modernity. This 
results in problematic consequences for the definition of modernity and national identity in 
Turkey. Firstly, it makes the mistake of sharply dividing up the two regions into two 
perfectly unrealistic and monolithic entities, the centre with the modem and global popular 
culture and the periphery with all its backwardness. Through this division, the centre largely 
emerges as an unproblematic whole, offering the model to be replicated for the other Turkey, 
and also as the guarantor of that process. In fact, the whole problem is perceived as a 
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difficulty in replicating the urban centre. The stories share the wish that all problems would 
disappear if only the periphery could have been like the centre. This wish, which holds for 
the whole region, is clearly audible regarding the condition of 'other Turkey's' women in 
Batman. This outlook distracts us from critically evaluating the centre itself, and focus on the 
ways to eliminate undesired differences, which can vary from the distribution of free radios to 
more serious projects for creating work opportunities. The second consequence that follows 
from this is the denial of the region's possibility to offer alternative definitions of modernity. 
In doing so, the centre negates the autonomy of its peripheries, and its women living in the 
peripheries. 
The third consequence is very much related to this last issue and pertains to the ethnic 
difference of the region, which cannot be eradicated through modernization. It not only 
disrupts the modernity the nation claims to represent at the centre, but also the ethnic identity, 
the Turkishness of the nation. It is at this point that ethnically inscribed discourses of national 
identity become hard to disentangle from the dominant discourses of modernity: Batman will 
only be accepted into the centre if civilisationary differences are eliminated, and yet, 
sameness can never be fully achieved unless the region is culturally and ethnically the same. 
In this context, as Kirisci and Winrow also point out, the connections between assimilation 
and modernization will be inevitable (1997: 4), and this can build up further tension in the 
already problematic relationship between the region and the centre. Members of threatened 
ethnic groups can feel that their culture is under attack from the state, and may perceive the 
state as identifying itself with the interests of a majority/dominant ethnic group/nation (ibid.). 
Equating modernity with the centre and backwardness with the periphery where a major 
Kurdish population lives can only intensify the conflict and obstruct the channels for progress. 
Lastly, we have the consequences awaiting women in particular. Throughout the coverage of 
suicide stories, women in Batman become the means through which boundaries were built 
within Turkey. As mentioned in the previous chapters, this is generated through one of the 
main discourses embedded within the Kemalist modernization project, which regards women 
as the strongest signifier of the modem nation. Within this context, women in Batman 
encapsulate the unfInished part of that project, which not only the state but the whole centre, 
in all its modernized forms, is willing to complete, which in turn justifies the centre/periphery 
distinction discussed above. Of course, as has been discussed throughout the preceding 
chapters, as national boundaries are built through women, they also set certain boundaries for 
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women. Within the Turkish context, the most popular discourse seems to be the one arguing 
that women, rather than men, can be influenced by (and therefore should be protected from) 
the too liberal by-products of modernity. This argument places the need to liberate women 
through modernizing them alongside the need to protect them from the presumed threats that 
modern life can entail. We can see the same discourse emerging with regard to television 
programmes depicting liberal lives of urban men and women, which are carefully singled out 
as reflecting not the reality of modem life in the cities but only the "lives of an eccentric small 
group". As the centre, which includes the liberated women journalists of modem cities, sets 
the limits for the women in Batman, it echoes the Kemalist project, which has been carefully 
trying to control the meanings of "modem" for women since the foundation of the RepUblic. 
While it is clear that women in Batman share the restrictions, along with the emancipatory 
rhetoric of the dominant discourses of national identity and modernity in Turkey, it is also 
important to note that they are, in Spivak's (l988b) words, doubly marginalized, by 
discourses of national identity that other the region, and also by discourses of patriarchy. 
Here again it is useful to draw some parallels between Spivak's discussion of women and 
discourses of sati in India, and the suicide stories examined in this case study. Even in the 
attempts of the benevolent intellectuals to speak on behalf of the women, the women are 
spoken for, and therefore marginalized, rather than speaking out for themselves, and "one 
never encounters women's voice-consciousness" (ibid.: 297). Spivak here quickly adds that 
although "such a testimony would not be ideology-transcendent or 'fully-subjective'" it would 
have still provided a 'countersentence' (ibid.). As a result, "the figure of the woman 
disappears, not into a pristine nothingness, but into a violent shuttling which is the displaced 
figuration of the "third-world woman" caught between tradition and modernization" (ibid.: 
306). Although it can be argued that the women in the Batman case have spoken and made 
their ultimate protest through their bodies, if we are to follow Spivak again, this does not 
matter. Through the news stories the suicides' identities still remain as difference, and as long 
as they remain on the other side of difference, that speaking cannot matter much. 
"Representation has not withered away" and she remains muted inside the dominant 
discourses of representation by the centre (ibid: 313). 
As the discussion throughout has shown, it is not possible to dismiss the potential of 
postcolonial theory in exploring discourses of centre/ peripheries, and inclusion! exclusion in 
the Batman case. Postcolonial theory does not only help us, through Spivak, to examine the 
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meaning of these discourses for women in the region. The very act of deconstructing these 
discourses calls foremost for questioning the cultural authority and civilisationary superiority 
of the centre, which forms the main of both postcolonial theory and postcolonial criticism. 
However, a caveat needs to be made against the adoption of a strictly post-colonial or 
Spivakian perspective which might result in the categorisation of the case as one of internal 
colonialism. This is particularly because of the demographic structure of the region, which 
points to a large population of Kurdish origin. Kirisci and Winrow (1997) rightly argue that 
such theories of internal colonialism and relative deprivation can offer only partial 
explanations when discussing the Kurdish population living in Turkey, since factors like 
internal migration, historical, social and cultural variables should also be taken into account in 
addition to economic factors (ibid.: 17). 
And fmally, we should conclude with a few words on the actuality of what has been taking 
place in Batman, even if at the risk of slightly moving beyond the boundaries of this 
dissertation. The analysis here has attempted to show how women are an important means in 
constructing national boundaries, particularly here in ethnic terms. As with the other case 
studies that will be analysed in the next two chapters, this case study also arose from a 
challenge to the system - in fact we can call it the ultimate challenge, in the form of suicides. 
However, apart from this generalisation, this chapter cannot tell us more about the mysteries 
behind the suicides, and perhaps such information can never be fully within our grasp. As 
Henry Montherlant writes, "There is nothing more mysterious than a suicide": 
"Coo.) When I hear someone explain the reasons for one suicide or another, I always have the 
impression of being sacrilegious. Only the suicide has known them and was in a position to 
comprehend them. I do not say, 'to make them comprehensible'; they are usually multiple, 
inextricable, and beyond the reach of any other person." (Cited in Minois 1999: 323) 
While no explanation can solve all the mysteries behind all the suicides, attempts to interpret 
them will (and in fact, should) continue to understand and perhaps prevent further losses. In 
fact, this was what the journalists had sought to do all throughout their stories and columns, as 
did the government institutions, NGO's, and social researchers who went to Batman region to 
investigate the deaths. Some others were also hopefully sparked into action by this analysis. 
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And yet, at the heart of all any such interpretation and explanation process lies the very same 
and simple question: "What can I do for them?" 1 02 
One should admit that it is easier to criticise the offers that are being made, than to offer a 
better solution. This chapter has no unrealistic ambitions to offer a solution to female suicides 
in Batman, but has attempted to show them as part of a wider discourse shaping the 
boundaries of national identity in Turkey. Yet, by doing just so, it sought to prove that 
understanding the female suicides in Batman and fmding the right answers needs to go 
beyond just the woman question in Turkey. It has to take into consideration many other 
factors, and perhaps the most important of all, avoid causing the creation of discursive 
distances on cultural identity in our clumsy attempts to eradicate them. 103 
102 Spivak: (l988a: 135) notes that this question lies under all western feminist attempts of studying third world 
women. 
103 Parts of this chapter appeared in 'Victims, Villains and Guardian Angels -Batman Suicide Stories' (2004) 
Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 1(1),66-92. 
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Chapter 5: 
"She was/aster than the tractorl"- Sureyya Ayhan's story 
5.1 Introduction of the case study 
5.1.1 The setting - Summary of events and the brief description of the context 
This chapter provides an analysis of articles about the Turkish national athlete Sureyya 
Ayhan, which appeared in the Turkish mainstream press during 2001 and 2002. During these 
two years Sureyya received extensive press attention with three main storylines, the first of 
which focused on her eighth place finish in the 1500 metres at the 2001 World Athletics 
Championships. Both prior to and after the games, her promising talent was heavily covered 
in headlines and feature stories. Focusing on her humble background from a small Central 
Anatolian town, the features narrated her achievement as a remarkable story of ascent from 
village life to international competition. These stories also strongly emphasised the fact that 
she had received almost no significant financial or institutional support and that since the age 
of thirteen she had been trained in the cities of Anatolian by her coach, Yucel Kop, who had 
no experience of training international athletes or of international competition. 
The second storyline concerned Sureyya Ayhan's private life with revelations that she and her 
coach were having a relationship coming to light as she competed at the World 
Championships. Given their 22-year age gap and the fact that the coach was married with 
children, Sureyya's private life was quickly turned into a main news item. Coverage 
increased after an interview she and her coach gave to Hurriyet newspaper in autumn 2001 
where they talked openly about their relationship, provoking a heated debate on morality 
amongst newspaper columnists. Following the interview an MP even took the debate to the 
Turkish General Assembly proposing to penalize their relationship for transgressing 
professional rules of ethics, though the proposal was subsequently turned down. Morality 
aside, however, Sureyya Ayhan's insistence on keeping Yucel Kop as her coach, instead of 
working with a new and professionally more experienced trainer, was regarded by a large 
number of journalists as a reckless decision influenced by emotions and a major obstacle to 
furthering her career. 
142 
The third time stories about Sureyya Ayhan peaked was after she won the gold medal at the 
European Athletics Championships in 2002 for which she was extensively praised in front 
page headlines. In celebrating her international success, the coverage depicted Sureyya as 
someone who had succeeded against all the odds, including the social pressure placed upon 
her over her relationship. 
The exceptional coverage Sureyya Ayhan received on the front pages becomes more 
meaningful when one considers that Turkey does not have any real tradition in athletics. The 
last athlete, for example, to win a medal in international competition was a triple jumper at the 
1948 Olympics l . Thus, the context within which she rose to success also contributed to the 
press interest in her story, which was largely covered as the 'Sureyya miracle'. Lastly, it 
should also be noted that her success coincided with a difficult time for Turkey. In February 
2001, Turkey went through a deep economic crisis leading to a change of cabinet, and the 
adoption of a new IMF package to prevent the country from falling further over the economic 
preCIpIce. However, this wiped out already shaky public confidence in the coalition 
government, which was made up of the far-right Nationalist People's Party (MHP), a centre-
left Democratic Left Party (DSP), and the centre-right Motherland Party (ANAP) - a coalition 
that was already suffering from a governmental crisis. In November 2002, about two months 
after Sureyya had won the gold medal at the European Championships, early elections were 
called and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power. While there is almost no 
direct reference to the political and economic challenges of the time in the coverage of 
Sureyya Ayhan2, it is not unlikely that the dispiriting context also contributed to the extensive 
coverage her international achievements received in the newspapers. 
5.1.2 Objectives in the selection of the case study 
This case study illustrates the different demands and visions inherent in Turkish national 
identity, mainly its cultural roots, moral codes and preferred and rejected readings of 
1 Turkey finished third in the triple jwnp in 1948. Football is the most popular sport in Turkey with the national 
team having some international success, especially during the 2002 World Cup. Football is followed by the 
rising popularity of basketball, and in terms of individual sports weight lifting and wrestling is where Turkey has 
achieved success on the international stage. 
2 I have noted such a direct correlation in only one column by Hayrullah Mahmud, where he enthusi.astic~l"y 
thanks Sureyya Ayhan for making the Turkish public proud of itself in spite of the burden of economic cnsls. 
Mahmud, Hayrullah, column, 'What will Mr. Gardner say now?' 12.08.2002, Hurriyet, 
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modernity, relationship with European identity, and the degree to which class distinctions 
playa part in the secular journalists' preferred images of Turkey. One medium through which 
these get to be debated is Sureyya Ayhan's identity - providing us with an excellent case 
study to explore how femininity is circumscribed by national demands. As a result, Sureyya 
Ayhan's story offers us a twofold, tightly intertwined focus for analysis - revealing the visions 
and ambivalences inherent in Turkish national identity, while at the same time also exposing 
the interplay between gender norms and national identity in Turkey. Discussion of modernity 
weaves through both levels in the news stories - we see it being discussed indirectly through 
Sureyya's rise form her rural background to international tournaments, but more explicitly in 
comments about Sureyya's mostly unapproved of relationship. Therefore, besides the 
nationalistic sports coverage of Sureyya's successes, this is a multi-dimensional case study, 
heavily loaded with different discourses on Turkishness. As with the other case studies, 
through the different debates on who Sureyya is and how she should behave, it is possible to 
identify the fault lines that circumscribe Turkish identity. 
The guiding questions remain the same as in the other two case studies, with an added 
emphasis on sameness, as will be discussed below. 
• Who is the female character analysed in this case study? 
• In what ways is she described as different (or the same)? 
• In the case of difference, is this described as a desired or unwanted one? If the 
latter, what are the proposals to eliminate that difference? 
• In what ways is her difference (or sameness) significant for a particular 
understanding of modernity and national identity in Turkey? 
Although the questions remain basically the same for all the case studies, apart from some 
slight variations, the answers offer different discussions on discourses of inclusion/exclusion. 
This is because of the changing meaning of difference in each case study. While all three 
case studies, through their female protagonists, inform the readers about what is seen as 
divergence from national norms and standards, the content of this difference - or rather what 
is seen as different by the journalists - varies in each case study. In the Batman case the issue 
of difference surfaced through discourses on ethnicity, as well as civilisationary discourses of 
modernity. As the analysis will discuss, with Sureyya the focus is more on nationally 
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accepted norms of gender and modernity. At the same time, Sureyya Ayhan's story is also as 
much about discourses of sameness as it is about difference. Thus, what makes Sureyya's 
case particularly interesting is her representation of both sameness and difference. Compared 
with the evident otherness of women in the Batman case study, Sureyya's identity is firmly 
located within the ethnic definition of Turkishness, and she emerges strongly as the centre's 
very own daughter. Therefore, debates approving or disapproving of Sureyya's behaviour 
turn into debates about those that the centre would already accept and describe as its own 
people, those that make la memete. In doing so, the stories also reveal the biases and 
hierarchies, in terms of class and gender, which the centre holds about its people. 
5.1.3 Overview of the data 
5.1.3.1 Time frame 
The first appearance of Sureyya Ayhan's name in the newspapers coincided roughly with her 
participation in the finals of the 2000 Golden League with coverage increasing further in the 
same year as she reached the semi-finals of the Olympic Games. However, it was after her 
achievements in the Wodd Championships finals in 2001 that the coverage spread from the 
sports pages to headlines and front page stories. There are three moments in which the 
coverage climaxes, in August 2001, in November 2001, and in August 2002 and this is 
triggered by a number of key events. On August 6th the news that Sureyya Ayhan would run 
in the finals is covered as a front-page item in both Hurriyet and Sabah, and continued as a 
feature story in the inner pages. Her relationship with her coach was first mentioned in Sabah 
in the feature story titled "/ have fulfilled my promise" on 07.08.200e. However, it is 
through the same item4 that appeared in Milliyet and Hurriyet on 08.08.2001 that her 
relationship became a main news story. Hurriyet announced this as one of the three large 
news items on page four, under the headline "This love has made Sureyya run" whereas 
Milliyet announced it in a column on the front page, carried into a full feature on page 17, as 
"Sureyya runs with love". The debates regarding their relationship are reheated on November 
18th, 2001 with an interview conducted by a well-known female journalist, Ayse Arman, in 
Hurriyet, titled "My coach yearns for me". The interview received a strong reaction from a 
3 This was covered under a smaller item on the same page "Father and daughter reconciled", telling the story of 
how Sureyya Ayhan's father reacted after learning the rumours about her relationship, and how they had 
reconciled just before the competition. 
4 Dogan News Agency provides stories for both newspapers therefore the same item, written. by the s~e 
journalistls can appear in both Hurriyet and Milliyet, although often with different titles or VIsuals .. In thIS 
particular case, for example, journalists Ahmet Kaya, Nihat Duzgun and Serkan Gemici had written both Items. 
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popular male journalist in the same newspaper, Fatih Altayli, and resulted in a debate about 
gender and morality in the two journalists' columns. This time the discussion, although 
lasting more than a week, was contained mainly within the same paper. The third time the 
stories climaxed was just prior to and after the European Championships held in Munich 
11.08.2002. Sureyya Ayhan's success is covered in all three papers as front page headlines 
on 12.08.2002, it is also covered extensively in the inside pages, and continued with more 
features and front-page announcements on 13.08.2002. After that, the headlines fade out and 
coverage is returned to the sports pages. 
Even though this case focuses on these peak moments in coverage, there are also related news 
stories scattered throughout the two years, such as the news about Sureyya's first place at the 
University Olympics on 30.08.2001, or her victory in the Golden League right after the 
European Championships, on 31.08.2001, which again was announced on the front pages and 
continued into the sports pages. Yet neither the front-page announcement, nor the inside page 
stories are comparable to the coverage of her achievements in the World and European 
Championships. Because these stories do not offer new debates in terms of research 
objectives, they will be referred to where relevant but are not foregrounded in the analysis. It 
should also be noted that the coverage of Sureyya Ayhan actually extends for six years, 
continuing to this day, including the coverage of her second place in the Paris World 
Championships in 2003, her marriage to her coach in 2004 on Valentine's Day, and her 
disqualification from the Olympic Games in Athens in 2004 due to allegations of drug use. 
While all these stories hold significant news value for the journalists, in terms of the 
discourses they disseminate in their coverage, they do not diverge significantly from the time-
span chosen for this case study. 
5.1.3.2 Type of data to be analysed 
In terms of its two-year time range, and the emotional writing style observable in the feature 
stories, Sureyya Ayhan's story resembles the Batman case study. However, in terms of the 
narration of the story, Sureyya Ayhan's case differs from both Batman, and also from the 
weddings case study. This is because the stories in this case are not centred on a particular 
event but unfold through a series of different events that take place in her private and career 
life into one long narrative. Within the selected time frame for the case study, Sureyya's story 
begins with her unexpected success, covered alongside the backdrop of stories about her 
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childhood. It develops with the news about her relationship, which complicates the coverage 
of her achievements, and ends with a resolution, her final achievement and society's 
acceptance of her relationshipS. While the Batman case study, just like a storybook, tells the 
readers about the experiences of different women, Sureyya Ayhan's story resembles more of 
novella, with its happy start, obstacles on the way and then a nationally celebrated happy 
ending, against all the odds, through to a nationally agreed moment of forgiving and 
forgetting. 
The data that forms this narration includes all news stories, which can be grouped into three 
main categories: news stories on sports pages, news stories on front and inside pages 
excluding sports pages, and lastly, columns. It must be underlined that in spite of the wide 
diversity of different news genres, all items in the three newspapers converge tightly around a 
subjective and self-reflexive style in the reporting of these stories, which often contributes to 
the strongly nationalist rhetoric. The stories often convey the feeling of being about "one of 
us" discussed "amongst us", forming a strong link between the journalists and the readers. 
There are however, divergences, mainly in terms of the themes raised within certain types of 
news items. On this, there is a need to open a further parenthesis. As explained in the 
methodology chapter, this research project is interested in lifting up and examining the pattern 
of discourses about national inclusion and exclusion, rather than focusing on what Fairclough 
(1995) would call 'the media order of discourse'. At the same time, Sureyya Ayhan's case 
study offers a chance to follow how institutional journalistic practices can contribute to the 
shaping of these discourses. The ways in which the sports journalists' narrate the stories, 
presents an interesting case of the differences between journalistic styles and priorities. Even 
though sports journalists' items are mainly located in the sports pages, they have often 
contributed to the feature stories and headline news covered on the front pages, and therefore 
differences emerge across the paper, between those items covered by sports journalists and 
those covered by others. While the sports journalists often share a patriotic and personalised 
style of coverage with other journalists, they foreground Sureyya Ayhan's identity as a 
national athlete, rather than her gender identity. As a result, throughout the two years of 
coverage, sports journalists, regardless of which page they have covered the story, have 
S All news stories, as Bell (1991) explains, have a narrative structure. Howev.e~, what I am su~estin~ here is, 
different storylines that make up the data for analysis, mainly the tw~ competItIOn~ ~d her relatlOnsh~p un:old 
into one long narrative where, to follow Todorov's (1977) narratIve theory, dIstmct stages of dIsruptIon, 
complication and resolution are identifiable. 
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downplayed the 'relationship' aspect of the story, or have covered it in a more positive light6• 
Finding their different attitude to gender and their shared attitude to national rhetoric 
interesting, I have tried to identify the sports journalists throughout the analysis. However, 
this divergence in journalistic coverage is not directly pertinent to the questions of this 
research and its overall conclusions, and it is not further explored in the analysis. 
Added to this, and outside the items prepared by sports journalists, the gender of the 
journalists also appears to have shaped the coverage. This case study, in contrast to the 
Batman suicides, is without question a male dominated discussion with only 7 out of 28 
columns written by women, and 5 of these columns written by Ayse Arman during the 
aforementioned polemic she entered into with Fatih Altayli. In columns written by female 
journalists the emphasis is mainly on supporting Sureyya and her relationship, and national 
identity comes as secondary to her identity as a female athlete. It can be assumed that had the 
news been covered by sports journalists who, for professional reasons, seem to be more 
interested in Ayhan as a national athlete, or by female journalists who shared different 
concerns for covering her identity, the discussion about her relationship might not have been 
as heated. 
Apart from the items discussed, two other news items are generically different and form an 
exception. These are the two interviews conducted by Ayse Arman in Hurriyet newspaper7• 
One of these interviews is especially significant as it is held with Sureyya Ayhan and her 
coach; the other interview is with another female journalist, about the book she had recently 
written about Sureyya Ayhan and women in Turkey. Again, as along the lines developed in 
the methodology, the focus of analysis in these items will be Arman's interpretation of events 
and choice of headlines and titles, rather than the particular views submitted by the athlete, 
her coach or the journalist she interviewed. 
5.1.4 Organizing the data for analysis - methodological decisions 
6 I have come across only one small news item that does not fit this pattern: 'Oh no, my father!' published ~he 
sports pages of Sa bah newspaper on 28.07.2001. The item is written as an insider's gossip t~ sports and explams 
how Sureyya's father had stormed in on the couple during one training session. It is interestmg that ev~n th~ugh 
Sabah was the first newspaper to bring up the gossip, the newspaper strayed away from Sureyya Ayhan s pnvate 
life once her identity as a national athlete became more prominent. 
7 Ayse Arman, 18.11.2001, 'My coach yearns for me', Hurriyet; Ayse Arman, 10.03.2002,. 'Unf~~ately 
women do not get a piece of the cake', Hurriyet. As explained in the methodology chapter, thiS deCISion was 
taken to keep the analytical focus sharply on the journalistic perception in the newspapers. 
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Even though the Sureyya Ayhan case study offers generically diverse data, these do not pose 
stark linguistic differences as was the case in the Batman case study. As mentioned above all 
news items from sports news and columns to headlines, converge around an informal and 
mostly nationalistic tone of reporting. The complexity of this case study lies instead in terms 
of authorship, and the narrative structure of the actual case study. 
This case study differs from the other two with the main protagonist's involvement in the 
actual shaping of the verbal data. Unlike the two other case studies, Sureyya is not a passive 
character but actively contributes to the verbal discussion through the briefs or interviews she 
gives, commenting on the different levels of her identity: as a sportswoman, as a national 
athlete representing her country, as a daughter, or as a woman in a relationship. This enables 
the readers to observe, to some degree, Sureyya's internalisation, and active and verbal 
involvement in the production and dissemination of nationalist discourses, as evident in the 
front page headline that quotes her as rather ambitiously saying, "/ will be the idol of Turkish 
youth" (Hurriyet, 13.08.2002)8, or in the titles that comment on how she had "cried out" the 
following words: "/ carried 65 million Turkish people in my heart, and exceeded my 
goaf'(09.08.2001)9. In the one interview she gives, she again underlines her ambition to 
represent Turkey. Therefore in this case study, Sureyya Ayhan is not only talked about but 
also talks back as she communicates with the journalists. While it is fascinating to see how 
Sureyya tries to break in and contribute to the discussions, what is more interesting, and for 
our exploration of hegemonic discourses, more crucial, is how her attempts to break in are 
being interpreted, which of her words are carried onto the headlines and titles, or which 
information is emphasised or prioritised. Therefore the analysis here is also in line with the 
methodological choices made at the start and focuses on the journalistic interpretations of the 
events, rather than attempting to compare the different accounts of realities (Sureyya's and the 
journalists) by different sources. 
Another particularity of this case study is closely linked to the ways in which the data unfolds. 
The data is in the form of a long story, and the journalists live through the story just like the 
readers do, they form their opinions and rethink the events in their attempts to narrate the 
separate events into one storyline. To follow how journalists' perceptions have evolved and 
8 Mehmet Arslan (sports journalist), front-page headlines, 13.08.2002, 'I will be the idol of Turkish youth' 
Hurriyet. 
9 Sports department, 09.08.2001, feature story, 'Sureyya is the Champion of our hearts', Sabah 
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matured through the narration, the thematic analysis has largely followed the temporal 
development of the storyline. 
5.2 Thematic analysis - themes addressed in the coverage and allocation of sub-themes 
to thematic areas 
The thematic analysis follows the different debates that have emerged around Sureyya 
Ayhan's identity, and falls roughly into two interrelated parts. The first two themes explore 
the aspects of Sureyya's identity that depict her as a hero, sharing and reflecting the cultural 
roots of the Turkish nation, as well as the inherent potential of Turkish people to succeed in 
the international arena. The next two themes observe how Sureyya Ayhan's gender identity 
conflicts and/or enhances Sureyya Ayhan's role of representing the nation. 
5.2.1 National roots- "the girl in the black school uniform" 
Sureyya Ayhan's background 
is a very prominent theme in 
the coverage of her 
achievements, and also forms 
the ground on which the 
readers can create their 
perceptions about her 
identity. References to her 
ongms can be found in all 
three newspapers, but 
particularly In detail In 
Hurriyet and Sabah's 
coverage in the first week of 
August 2001. On August 7th, 
t ......... ~~'5JYah onlLiklO klZln zaferi 
ilkokuldaki bir yan$ta en onde. Siyah 
klZ, sonra Kanada Ida 
.·-._--.11'. 
Fig. 1 "Victory of the girl in the black school uniform", Hurriyet 
the day of the competition, Hurriyet published one of the most potent images of Sureyya 
Ayhan on the front-page, under the headline "The story of the miracle girf' (Hurriyet, 
07.08.2001)10. The picture shows a rural town and a group of primary school girls running in 
10 NO-bylines, on front page, 07.08.2001 'The Story of the Miracle Girl', Hurriyet 
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black school uniforms, with the audience, apparently other primary school children and their 
teachers, lined up on the side. The girl who is winning on the front is said to be Sureyya 
Ayhan, and the captions read "The victory of the girl in the black school uniform- Sureyya is 
ahead in a race in primary school. Years later the girl in the primary school uniform is 
running ahead of world famous athletes in Canada." Next to this picture is a contrasting 
picture of a smiling Ayhan today, in red and white running suit, with one hand victoriously 
raised up as a fist. With its two visuals, this news item largely dominates the front page, and 
flags up the full-page feature on Sureyya's background in the inside pages. 
The image of Sureyya in black uniform is surprisingly powerful as it is one of the ordinary 
everyday experiences of growing up that most adults in Turkey can clearly remember, and 
easily associate withll. It creates a 'witness account' for the story of how a hero is born, yet 
at the same time creates an immediate point of identification for the readers. On the same 
day, a full-page feature on Sureyya's background in Sabah newspaper (07.08.2001)12 
complements the coverage in Hurriyet. In the centre of the feature a distinct subtitle reads 
"The trials that shaped Sureyya's destiny -A star was born as she came first in the 
competitions on national Children's Day", explaining how she owed her interest in athletics 
to a race she ran and won in on Children's Day during her first year of primary school. Just 
like the black uniform, the Children's Day strongly establishes her as one of the many Turkish 
children, while at the same time distinguishing her exceptional talent. It is also important to 
notice that the binding reference points between the readers and Sureyya in the two stories is 
the national uniform and national day, hence adding to the feeling of oneness for the national 
readers. 
The images of Sureyya's childhood owe their strength to the underprivileged setting she grew 
up in; a rural Anatolian district, another very familiar memory for many Turkish readers, and 
one that forms a stark contrast to the international success of the national athlete. The full-
page feature in Hurriyet reaffirms this contrast with five further visuals (Hurriyet, 
07.08.2001)13. Three of these images tell the readers about Sureyya's background: on top, a 
repeat of the front-page primary school picture, in the middle, Sureyya's family proudly 
11 Until the start of this decade, the nonn was black uniforms, with only a few exceptions. Today, primary school 
unifonns are largely blue. . . 
12 Tayfun Bayindir (sports journalist), 07.08.2001, 'I kept my promise', Sabah. The National ChIldren's Day IS 
celebrated on the 23rd of April each year- to commemorate the opening of the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
on the same date in 1920. 
13 Serkan Gemici & Ahmet Kaya, feature, 07.08.2001, 'From gold coin to gold medal' Hurrlyet 
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posing with the trophies she won, and next to it one particularly striking picture of Sureyya's 
father pointing to the run down house in which Sureyya was boml4. These visuals, alongside 
captions "Sureyya was born in this house", and subtitles like "She did not even have the 
money to buy sports shoes" or "Sureyya's incredible journey" accentuate the 'against all odds' 
theme. It would however be wrong to assume that the news item draws a picture of total 
deprivation and poverty about Sureyya's hometown. The conveyed images and depictions 
have an almost tangible feeling of warmth and nostalgia about the rural Anatolian life, and 
particularly regarding the people who live there. On the front-page, the subtitle "To the 
finals, with collective work" conveys this feeling vividly. Here the Turkish word 'imece' is 
used to imply 'collective work', but this word is not without its warm connotations: it refers to 
the inhabitants of a village or town working together for a communal goal, or to help 
members of the community who need help, such as gathering the harvest. In this case the 
'imece' had been held to transform Sureyya into a national athlete. To emphasise this point, in 
narrating Sureyya's story, journalists constantly refer to local people who have supported her 
or who believed in her or participated in her journey. The journalists even manage to directly 
quote the long dead grandmother, providing a powerful, although impossible, eyewitness 
account of her childhood: 
" 'You will be a very good sportswoman one day. Maybe I will not live to see those years, but 
my prayers are always upon you. ' So said the grandmother and left this world a year later ... 
ifshe had lived ... she would have been proud "(Hurriyet, 07.08.2001)15 
The language chosen to describe the epic story of the national hero is nowhere more striking 
than in this over-romanticised feature published in Hurriyet. The extent to which journalists 
have themselves embraced Sureyya's experience is very much evident in the choice of past 
tense, describing her story as if witness to the events. Other options would have been to use 
the Turkish past participle tense, which adds a story-like quality to news items by distancing 
the storyteller from the actual event itself. While this tense was used much more in the 
depictions of women in Batman, it is not a popular narrative tool in the coverage of Sureyya' s 
childhood, where journalists prefer to tell her story through their own eyewitness accounts. 
14 The other two visuals include a large centre photo of Sureyya as the athlete, and a small photo on the left hand 
side, showing Sureyya sitting next to the city mayor -(me of the few people who had supported her. 
IS Serkan Gemici & Ahrnet Kaya, feature, 07.08.2001, 'From gold coin to gold medal' Hurriyet 
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Sureyya is the uncontested heroine in these stories, but journalists also point to supporting 
actors. Sureyya's father, her primary school teacher and her coach are all described as the 
guiding men who have helped her along the way. In similar coverage of Sureyya Ayhan's 
childhood, Sabah newspaper (07.08.2001)16 explains how Sureyya "would train even on her 
way to the fields to work with her family." Her father is described as Sureyya's "biggest 
supporter" who "set out a racecourse, and everyday waited next to the water fountain, timing 
and watching her daughter from the distance. " Similarly, the feature in Sabah newspaper 
(08.08.2001)17 describes how she had once ran a race against her uncle's tractor and won. 
These items create a fondness and nostalgia around the deprived childhood Sureyya has had, 
and are again referred to in the news coverage of her success in the European Championships 
of2002 (See Milliyet, 12.08.2002)18. 
In these romantic depictions, the difference of class, between the superior city life and the 
small town life from which Sureyya raised herself up, inconspicuously runs as a backdrop to 
the stories. As will be pointed out throughout the analysis, what is being conveyed, between 
the lines, to the readers is an idealization of the Anatolian Heimat, and the naivety and the 
unspoilt kindness of the Anatolian people, but all the while establishing a feeling of 'parental' 
superiority for the urban life and journalists. A wonderful example of this can be found in the 
Sabah reporter's amusement at the commotion that was taking place in Sureyya's hometown, 
Korgun, right before the World Championships. The reporter, who went Korgun to watch the 
Games on television with Sureyya's family, describes the atmosphere in detail, while using a 
language similar to what one would use when observing a much loved child: 
"Korgun was taken by a flutter. The 'bugbear', as her father calls Sureyya, is going to run, 
that is a serious matter isn't it! Fifo pastries are being prepared, critiques about the 
competitions are made. " (Sabah, 09.08.2001)19 
It also has to be noted that in these stories, the understanding of national roots is not devoid of 
ethnic meanings. It is not only Sureyya's cultural background, or where she was born, that 
wins the journalists' admiration, but also her ethnically pure Anatolian heritage. Sabah 
16 Tayfun Bayindir (sports journalist) feature 07.08.2001, 'I kept my promise', Sabah 
17 Ali Erdogan (sports journalist) feature 08.08.2001 'She was faster than the tractor' Sabah 
18 Sports department, 12.08.2002 'I have just started' Milliyet 
19 Ali Erdogan (sports journalist), 09.08.2001, 'Look how brave our bugbear is!", Sabah. ~e title i~ ~en from 
the father's words to the mother. This item appeared on a full page coverage under the mam headhne Sureyya 
is the Champion of our hearts' prepared by the sports department. 
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newspaper reports Sureyya Ayhan as the fust Turkish athlete who has got to the fmals in the 
World Championships, yet Milliyet and Hurriyet newspapers acknowledge a previous 
achievement: Ebru Kavaklioglu, originally a Russian athlete who became a Turkish citizen by 
marriage, had finished in fifth place in the 1999 World Championships (Milliyet, 07.08.2001; 
Hurriyet, 07.08.2001io. Nevertheless, Sureyya's success is reported as the fust time Turkey 
has achieved this, in the words of the Milliyet reporter, "with an athlete from its own" 
(Milliyet, 07.08.2001i1• Here, a fine line is drawn between Turkish citizenship and being 
Turkish, and this subtlety is explained to the readers in the very front-page subtitles of the 
above-analysed news story "The Story of the Miracle Girf': 
"For the first time in our history, a Turkish girl born within the borders of the Turkish 
Republic has become a source of our pride by making it to the finals of the World 
Championships." (Milliyet, 07.08.2001)22 
In a column the same day, a well-known economic journalist makes the link clearer to the 
readers: 
"Sureyya is of course not the first Turkish girl who has run in the finals of an international 
level. (. .. ) However, she (Ebru Kavaklioglu) was the product of the opportunities of education 
and growing up that another nationality gave her in other lands. Yet Sureyya is the rare 
sapling that could rise her head up in the local draught." (Hurriyet, 08.08.2001i3 
The admiration for Sureyya's authenticity can be best felt in a column by Kanat Atkaya, a 
journalist best known for his usually humorous and ironic style (Hurriyet, 08.08.2001i4• 
After considering the various pleas for which Turk to clone, he proposes Sureyya Ayhan as 
the best candidate with an unusually emotional tone that diverges sharply from the humour he 
had used in considering the other candidates. 
"Leaving everything aside, I am thinking of one person that really needs to be cloned 
Her name is Sureyya Ayhan. 
20 No-bylines, sports page, 07.08.2001 'Bravo Sureyya', Milliyet, emphasis mine; Mehmet Arslan (sports 
journalist), 07.08.2001 'She wrote history on the tracks', Hurriyet 
21 No-bylines, sports page, 07.08.2001 'Bravo Sureyya', Milliyet, emphasis mine 
22 NO-bylines, sports page, 07.08.2001 'Bravo Sureyya', Milliyet, emphasis mine 
23 Mumtaz Soysal, column, 08.08.2001, 'The Finalist', Hurriyet 
24 Kanat Atkaya, column, 08.08.2001, 'Lets clone Sureyya', Hurriyet 
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... Sureyya is 23 years old. Sureyya is the daughter of a working class man. 
Today, in newspapers there is a photograph titled "This is the house she was born in". 
Sureyya was born in a building in ruins. 
There is another picture of Sureyya. From a competition she ran in her school uniform. 
Sureyya is running meters ahead of her nearest competitor, with a laughingface. 
Sureyya is one of those athletes that win a race laughing." 
For the journalist, Sureyya's humble Anatolian background, combined with her determination 
to succeed in spite of all odds, makes her the genetically perfect Turkish candidate to clone. 
He ends his column with an openly proud nationalist stance in which there is an apparent 
division of Turkey into two camps -one that promises a progressive future and one that forms 
an obstacle to the work of those that struggle for progress. From his words, it is clear that he 
sees Sureyya and himself in that first lonely camp. 
"Sureyya is one of those that accomplish somethingfor Turkey in spite of Turkey. 
Anyhow, this nation survives thanks to those that do something for Turkey in spite of 
Turkey. 
They are the ones that really need to be cloned. 
Sureyya might not win a medal today. 
That is not important at all. 
I will wake up at 04.30 and watch her [ on television], just so that she does not feel alone. 
And I will be proud of the Sureyya, running and laughing in her black school uniform. ,,25 
5.2.2 A sense of pride- Sureyya as "the bright face of Turkey" 
What transforms Sureyya Ayhan into a national hero is undoubtedly the victories she wins for 
Turkey in the international competitions. In the two competitions where she is elevated to 
hero status, in the World Championships of 2001 and the European Championship of 2002, 
there is an unreserved nationalism and sense of pride in newspaper coverage, conveyed 
through again the mythical and epic descriptions. However, the source of pride extends 
beyond the achievements on the running tracks. Through Sureyya Ayhan Turkey proves itself 
ftrstly, to itself, the Turkish nation, and then to Europe. In other words, through Sureyya 
25 Explanation and emphasis mine. 
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Ayhan, journalists frame the discourse of the modem Turkish woman representing modem 
Turkey and place it in comparative context. In the subtitles following a headline, journalists 
argue that Sureyya Ayhan had 
"showed the whole world what gems there are in Anatolia ... Is there better proof than this to 
show what more can be achieved if the opportunities are given?" (Hurriyet, 07.08.2001)26 
However, this comparison also brings a feeling of frustration over the meagre number of 
success stories. This feeling is nowhere clearer than in the mythical description of Ayhan by a 
columnist who calls her "The Turkish girl of the wind": 
"And now Sureyya Ayhan has sent the Turkish flag with the crescent and the star up the flag-
staff·· 
She has once again written Turkey's name on the world map! She has once again made the 
Turkish public, which has been heavily suffering under economic crisis, proud to be 
Turkish ... Thank you Sureyya, for once again making us say, 'We can become someone! ' ... " 
(Hurriyet, 12.08.2002)27 
As in the above-analysed column by Kanat Atkaya, the frustration is again directed, to 
'others' who stand in the way of Turkey's progress, and there are a number of candidates to 
blame. In the above example, the others within are the politicians who have dragged the 
country into economic crisis; in another column (Hurriyet, 08.08.2001i8 they are the 
governing bodies responsible for sport in Turkey. The journalist asks why Turkey has had to 
wait since the 1948 Olympics to have an international achievement in athletics, and why so 
much money had been spent on promoting Turkey's Olympic bid when no real efforts were 
made into developing sports, when "a huge nation of seventy million people could not even 
make the leap Greece has made in athletics" (Hurriyet, 08.08.2001i9• Giving Greece as a 
reference point especially works, when we consider that historically Greece has been one of 
Turkey's most distinct external others, and falling behind its neighbour is the ultimate 
humiliation for Turkey's national pride. In 2002, with Sureyya Ayhan's second success, 
another columnist uses the same reference point: 
26 Serkan Gemici & Ahmet Kaya, 07.08.2001, 'From gold coin to gold medal', Hurriyet 
27 Mahmud, Hayrullah, 12.08.2002, 'What will Mr. Gardner say now?' Hurriyet, my emphasis 
~8 Mumtaz Soysal, column, 08.08.2001, 'Finalist', Hurriyet 
9 Mumtaz Soysal, column, 08.08.2001, 'Finalist', Hurriyet, my emphasis 
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HI observe the international athletics competitions with interest, and as best as 1 can. 
In recent years, 1 was watching Greeks showing themselves on international running tracks. 
I used to secretly envy this, and resent the fact that we are so uninterested in athletics. 
Why weren't our people competing in these tournaments? 
Why weren't our children stepping onto the podium, wearing the gold medal and making our 
national anthem play?" (Hurriyet, 14.08.2002io 
The columnists' resentment here stems from the lack of success in an area, where 'even the 
Greeks' had shown some improvement. The journalist compares Turkish athletics to a 
swamp; however, his frustration is eased by the hope Sureyya offers him for the future: 
"Now Sureyya has left this door ajar. 
And 1 believe with all my heart that there are many other Sureyya's, just like Sureyya has 
said 
Our most beautiful orchid in the swamp has blossomed, now its others' turn." (Hurriyet, 
14.08.2002)31 
In these almost revengeful lines, Sureyya does not only represent the modem, successful and 
"bright face of Turkey" (Hurriyet, 18.08.2002)32. As described in a subheading on one front-
page headline, "She is Europe's best" (Hurriyet, 12.08.2002). In the international 
competitions, Sureyya also wins for the Turkey, which has been left behind and humiliated 
for its failure to 'catch up' with the West. By proving that Turkey has now caught up and is 
on a par with European nations, Sureyya Ayhan represents the metamorphosis of Turkey, 
from swamp to an oasis where orchids blossom, and therefore avenges the past, and offers 
hope for the future. This euphoric feeling of optimism is echoed in the upper title of the front-
30 Tufan Turenc, column, 14.08.2002, 'The most beautiful orchid in the swamp has blossomed', Hurriyet, my 
emphasis 
31 Tufan Turenc, column, 14.08.2002, 'The most beautiful orchid in the swamp has blossomed' Hurriyet, my 
emphasis. As the journalist also reminds his readers, after the Sydney Olympic Games back in 2000, he had 
written a column "The orchids in the swamp" (26.08.2000 Hurriyet) where he had likened Sureyya and a few 
~ther young athletes to blossoming orchids. 
Reha Erus, 18.08.2002, 'The bright face of Turkey', Hurriyet , 
The Rome correspondent of the newspaper has pulled his title from La Stampa's coverage of Sureyya Ayhan s 
achievements in the European Championships. 
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page headlines: "Basketball, football and now athletics... We are here too." (Hurriyet, 
12.08.2002i3 
The coverage of Sureyya Ayhan's success, particularly in 2002, is full of many similar joyful 
declarations of national pride enhanced with blown up photographs of Ayhan draped in the 
Turkish flag, or holding out her medal. These references to and comparisons with Europe, 
point to the mixed feelings Turkey has about Europe. On the one hand there is the positive 
identification with Europe, in the form of emphasising the Europeanness of Turkey. On the 
other hand, Europe is positioned against Turkey, in an ever-competitive stance: little details, 
such as how the international sports commentators had not at first taken Sureyya seriously, are 
continuously reminded to the readers. One columnist describes Sureyya as the athlete whom 
"the Eurosport commentators first looked down upon her and then stood up in front of her 
with respect' (Sabah, 07.08.2001)34, and the comments of international journalists are largely 
reviewed under striking headings such as "Eurosport busted up" (Milliyet, 13.08.2002)35, "A 
message from Sureyya to EU" (Hurriyet, 13.08.2002)36, "RAJ 3 cuts into its normal broadcast 
and has its audience listen to [Turkish] national anthem" (Hurriyet, 12.08.2002)37 or the 
subtitle quoting the Italian reporter's remark when he finds out that Sureyya can't speak 
English: "We will have to learn Turkish." (Milliyet, 01.09.2002; Sabah, 01.09.2002)38 The 
fact that Sureyya beat her closest competitor Szabo in the European Championships is a 
particularly important source of pleasure in the reports and is repeatedly emphasised in 
subtitles such as "Szabo cried" (Hurriyet, 12.08.2002)39 or "Szabo accepted her defeat - '] will 
not run again'" (Sabah, 13.08.2002)40. While one reporter, intoxicated with happiness, 
describes how he put his head "onto the pillow supping this unbelievably delicious happiness" 
(Milliyet, 12.08.2002)41 hoping to relive the moment in his dreams. Another journalist 
explains in detail, and almost sadistically, the ex-World Champion's state soon after being 
beaten by Sureyya: 
33 Front-page headline, no by-lines, 12.08.2002, 'Our lion girl', Hurriyet 
34 
Hasmet Babaoglu, column, 07.08.2001, 'Our legend', Sabah 
3S Sports department, 13.08.2002, 'Eurosport busted up', Milliyet 
36 Reha Ems & Ihsan Dortkardes, 13.08.2002, 'A message from Sureyya to EU', Hurriyet 
37 Reha Ems, 12.08.2002, 'RAJ 3 cut into its nonnal broadcast and had its audience listen to (Turkish) national 
anthem', Hurriyet 
38 No-bylines, sports news, 01.09.2002, 'The new queen of the tracks', Milliyet; also as a part of news item in 
Sabah, no-bylines, sports news, 01.09.2002, 'The queen of the tracks' 
39 Mehmet Arslan (sports journalist), 12.08.2002, 'And here is my answer', Hurriyet . ' 
40 No by-lines, 13.08.2002, 'This is only the beginning', Sabah . The referenced item is a large pIcture-box m 
two-page spread news coverage under that heading. 
41 Fuat Ercan, 12.08.2002, 'J wished for the best', Milliyet 
158 
"While my eyes were searching for Ayhan, a short, blonde petit athlete got my attention. She 
was the Romanians' big athlete - the World and Olympics champion Gabriel Szabo. The 
athlete walking infront of me had put her head on the shoulder of her coach ... Tearsflooded 
from her eyes ... "(Hurriyet, 12.08.2002)42 
After contrasting Szabo's current state with her fonner glory, the journalist starts to feel pity 
for her, and attempts to comfort her in his own way: 
"/ am not writing these lines to exaggerate our athlete's success. ( .. ) I tried to comfort her by 
calling behind her back "Don't worry champion. You are a big athlete". But she made a 
disapproving head gesture. She was still crying." 
Apparently not satisfied with the conversation, the journalist goes and asks Szabo where 
Sureyya is: 
"She lifted up her right hand thumb. And only said "Good". 
Here, while Ayhan represents the winning Turkey, Szabo stands for the beaten Europe. It 
almost fulfils a fantasy: for the journalist, the tide had finally turned and he was feeling the 
pleasure of victory on a very personal level: 
"At last in the European Championships I thoroughly enjoyed the pleasure of being from the 
same country as the champion. I was so happy when my foreign colleagues heatedly 
congratulated me. We finally had a champion and we were living through this pleasure to its 
full. (...) Thank you Sureyya. " 
5.2.3 "Our flying girl" - Sureyya as the national daughter 
The coverage of Sureyya Ayhan reveals a strong sense of nationalism, but embedded in the 
nationalist rhetoric is also a sharp emphasis on nationally preferred gender roles and 
responsibilities. This is achieved through the continuous reminding of readers that Sureyya 
42M hm . 'H . t e et Arslan (sports journalist), 12.08.2002, 'And here IS my answer, umye 
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Ayhan is not only a national athlete but also "our" national daughter, who has to adhere to the 
expectations of her nation, not only in terms of her career, but, as will be discussed shortly, 
also morally. 
The role of the daughter surfaces at two overlapping levels in the stories, Sureyya is a 
daughter in her private life, but she is also attributed the role of national daughter in the news 
items. Her daughter role in her family is largely determined not through child-parent 
relationship, but through the special relationship between the father and the daughter, which 
sets limits and responsibilities to Sureyya's female identity. Journalists often quote and 
foreground her father's opinions on the competition and Sureyya Ayhan's performance, and 
he appears as the main figure behind the "Sureyya miracle." (Sabah, 07.08.2001; Hurriyet, 
07.08.2001t3 In Hurriyet's feature in 2001, he does not only appear as a role model for 
Sureyya, having run and won a medal in a high school competition, but he is also praised for 
the "surprising support' he showed for his daughter's running career - revealing the 
journalist's slight astonishment at finding such a progressive father figure in an Anatolian 
town (Hurriyet, 07.08.2001)44. In the extensive coverage following the European 
Championships in 2002, all three newspapers cover the joy in the Ayhan family, and all three 
quote the father's words about how proud he was to see his daughter "wave the Turkish flag in 
Europe" (Hurriyet, 12.08.2002; Milliyet, 12.08.2001; Sabah, 13.08.2001)45. The mother is 
quoted only in Milliyet with a brief approval that she too was proud. In another full-page 
story a picture can be seen showing the father hugging his daughter on her return to Turkey 
(Milliyet, 12.08.2002)46. 
Even though the father is the most prominent figure in these stories, in the words of the 
Hurriyet journalists, "meeting the right people" had also contributed to this miracle (Hurriyet, 
07.08.2001)47. The right people turn out to be other male characters in the long features about 
Sureyya's rise to success, such as her uncle who watches her exercise and even holds a race 
43 See features in Sabah and Hurriyet. Tayfun Bayindir, sports journalist, 07.08.2001, 'I kept my promise', 
Sabah; Serkan Gemici & Ahmet Kaya, 07.08.2001, 'From gold coin to gold medal', Hurriyet 
44 Serkan Gemici & Ahmet Kaya, 07.08.2001, 'From gold coin to gold medal' Hurriyet 
4S 'Tears of joy in her family' - this item is a part of a larger full page coverage by Mehmet Arslan (sports 
journalist), 12.08.2002, 'Here is my answer', Hurriyet; 'Her family: we are proud' as an item in ~e ~ll p~e 
coverage with no-by-lines, 12.08.2001,'The Sureyya Legend', Milliyet; Saban Ozgul's item 'Her faJ?I~y IS flymg 
with joy' as a part of a larger coverage on a two-page spread, no specific by-lines, 13.08.2001 'ThIs IS only the 
beginning', Sabah 
46 lhsan Dortkardes, 12.08.2002, 'The unknown Turk has ran from the highway', Milliyet 
47 Serkan Gemici & Ahmet Kaya, 07.08.2001, 'From gold coin to gold medal', Hurriyet 
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with her while riding the tractor, her gym teacher at school who had discovered and supported 
her training and who "had passed away without having the chance to witness Sureyya's 
worldwide success" (Hurriyet, 07.08.2001)48, her coach Yucel Kop who would never let her 
go (yet whose contributions are also highly debated in news about their relationship), the city 
mayor and the professor/journalist who sponsored her. It is striking how little women appear 
in these stories, compared to the space allocated to the 'fatherly figures'. Apart from a 
grandmother figure who foretells that she is going to be a star and dies, the only other female 
figure is the mother appearing only through some brief snapshots. It is through the Sabah 
news reporter's coverage of Sureyya Ayhan and her family during the World Championships 
in 2001 that the readers get to hear most about her. The day before the Championships we 
learn that "as Sureyya was busy running, with the money she (Sureyya's mother) has saved, 
she had put together Sureyya's dowry"(Sabah, 08.08.2001t9• In a feature the next day, the 
same journalist reports the commotion at Sureyya's home, and uses the metaphor of wedding 
while describing how women make preparations ahead of watching the Championship on 
television. 
"It looked as if Sureyya 's family was marrying off their daughter. On the one side savoury 
bread parcels and filo pastries, on the other side flat breads and pancakes were being 
prepared, potatoes were being baked for the coming guests." (Sabah, 09.08.2001 )50 
Next to the item is a small picture showing two rural women preparing the food. After 
Sureyya only finishes the race in eight place, the father is directly quoted for his comments 
whereas the mother is indirectly quoted as having linked her daughter's less than expected 
performance to her excitement. Through the news stories, we get the feeling that the father 
sees Sureyya not only as his daughter, but also as a daughter with national responsibilities; 
therefore through him, the daughter role of Sureyya in her private life blends into her identity 
as a young female athlete with national responsibilities. The mother, on the other hand, is 
seen as related to Sureyya only on a private level, through the typical mother-daughter 
relationship, which can explain why she remains in the background in the coverage. 
However, she does not disappear from the stories altogether as she also fulfils an important 
48 Serkan Gemici & Ahmet Kaya, 07.08.2001, 'From gold coin to gold medal', Hurriyet 
49 Ali Erdogan (sports journalist), 08.08.2001, 'She was faster than the tractor', Sabah 
so Ali Erdogan (sports journalist), 09.08.2001, 'Look how brave our bugbear is!" Sabah 
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role in Sureyya's life. While the men try to help Sureyya achieve a career in athletics, the 
mother secures Sureyya's gender role as a wife. 
From the daughter of a loving mother and a father, Sureyya is quickly elevated to the status of 
becoming a national daughter. This is normalized through the extensive use of deixis "we" 
and "our" in the news items such as the headlines "Sureyya is the Champion of our hearts" 
(Sabah, 09.08.2001iJ, "Our lion girf' (Hurriyet, 12.08.2002i2, which are made even more 
powerful through the dramatic use of metaphors in the subheadings: 
"She is Europe's best. She is the golden girl of Turkish athletics. She is our girl like the wind, 
she is our girl with the gold medal, our girl who has written her name in history. She is 
Sureyya Ayhan." (ibid.) 
If Sureyya is the nation's daughter, she is first and foremost a daughter figure in front of the 
nation's founder Ataturk or as his name already suggests, 'the father of the Turks'. The 
emphasis on Ataturk in the coverage will only be intelligible when one considers that in 
dominant discourses of nationalism, every progress and achievement in Turkey is linked to 
Ataturk's reforms in the early years of the republic. In this context, Sureyya Ayhan emerges 
Fig. 2 Putting flowers onto Ataturk's mausoleum, 
Hurryet & Milliyet. 
as someone three times indebted to the 
national leader, once for being a member 
of the nation that had been saved by the 
leader, once again for being a woman 
who historically had been emancipated 
by the leader, and lastly as an athlete. As 
with other aspects of modem life in 
Turkey, the development of sport is also 
largely attributed to Ataturk's support 
and encouragement in this field. Not 
only do his words on sport often decorate 
gyms and sports halls in Turkey, but the 
19th of May, which he had proclaimed as Youth and Sports Day in the early years of the 
Republic, is still being commemorated as a national holiday. Therefore, it is only to be 
51 Sports department, full page coverage headline, 09.08.2001 , Sabah 
52 No by-lines, front-page headline, 12.08.2002, Hurriyet 
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expected that Sureyya will feel indebted to Ataturk, and voice her undying respect and 
faithfulness by his grave. 
The admiration for the leader, or 'the cult of Ataturk', as Navaro-Yashin (2002) calls it53, can 
be clearly observed in the news items with attractive visuals reporting Sureyya Ayhan's visits 
to Ataturk's mausoleum54• Two of these items are half-page long headline stories in Sabah's 
sports pages, and stress the importance of the ultimate father figure. In these stories, Ataturk 
emerges as no less than a God-like figure. Following the 2001 World Championships, Sabah 
reporters had put a captivating picture of Ayhan outside in front of the mausoleum, with a 
solemn face and both hands open towards the skies as if praying (Sabah, 17.08.2001 )55. The 
headline reads "She made a promise to Ata", using the short form of Ataturk, which means 
the father. From the subheadings the readers learn that Sureyya has promised the father that 
she will bring back medals from the 2003 Paris World Championships and 2004 Olympic 
Games in Athens. The second headline that appeared in the sports pages of Sabah in 2002 
and again dominated half the page is basically a repetition of the previous year's storyline 
(Sabah, 14.08.2002i6• This time however, the headline is more personalised through the use 
of the first person "/ promise you, my Ata". 
In this one Sureyya is pictured as putting flowers on the national leader's tomb, while helped 
by the soldiers guarding the mausoleum. This is again a powerful image, also used by 
Milliyet and Hurriyet positioned as the centrepiece on their pages. In Sabah, accompanying 
this picture is another photograph of Sureyya outside the mausoleum. The visual design of 
the headlines again exaggerate the nationalist feel through the use of special fonts that colour 
the already bold letters in red, against a backdrop of a pattern of the crescent and the star from 
the Turkish flag. The colour gets darker towards the end of the headline and finally the word 
s~avaro-Yashin (2002) finds that the image of Ataturk after the 1990's has changed from being an emblem for 
the sovereignty of the state and turned into a fetishlike national father figure. Calling it ''the cult of Ataturk" she 
argues that the public participated in this new Ataturkism loaded with "magical, ritualesque, and mystical 
dimensions", turning someone who is supposed to represent secularism into a figure who is worshipped. The 
trips to the mausoleum, she fmds similar to "visits to a saint's tomb". See particularly the chapter on 'The Cult of 
Ataturk', p.l88-203. 
54 It should be noted that mausoleum visits are not extraordinary stories in Turkish newspapers - indeed, they are 
common, and expected events by journalists. Yet, their commonality, or in Billig's (1995) terms, "banality", 
makes them so much more powerful. While Ataturk's mausoleum is open to public, it has now ~ecom~ ~ 
tradition for visiting foreign members of state, political figures, nationally famous figures to esp~cI~ll~ VISit 
Ataturk's mausoleum and write in the open guest-book. If the visitors are well-known figures, therr VISits and 
what they have written into the guest-book becomes a favoured news item for the press. 
:: AI~ Erdogan, sports pages, 17.08.2001, 'She promised Ata', Sabah 
All Erdogan, sports pages, 14.08.2002, 'I promise you Ata', Sabah 
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Ata, which is at the end, is coloured in a black-red, emphasising the prominence of the 
ultimate father. These visuals strengthen the already powerful emotional charge of the news 
item, which creates a powerful 'oneness' between the journalists, readers and Sureyya. 
Through the use of the first person in reporting her promise, simultaneity of experience is 
created for the journalists and the readers alike as they witness Sureyya making her pledge in 
front of the whole nation. What she promises here is not just a gold medal, but also the 
fulfilment of the founder's dream of modem Turkey. In this context, the use of the first 
person can also be seen as turning Sureyya's words into the national readers' very own pledge 
to the founder, for furthering his project. The deliberate choice of reporting through the first 
person is not limited to Sabah's coverage but is also observable in Hurriyet's reporting of 
Sureyya Ayhan's words written in the mausoleum's guest book. Alongside a picture of 
Sureyya laying flowers, Sureyya is seen as talking on behalf of the nation: 
"My Ata, we as the Turkish youth are signing successes in the road you have paved." 
(Hurriyet, 14.08.2002)57, 58 
5.2.4 'The national athlete who destroyed a family' 
Because of her relationship with her coach, On 6alaYI Sureyya's image in the media oscillates back 
and forth between the ideal national daughter 
AntrenorU ile ask yasayan J 
Almanya'daki tedaviSln( tal figure and the rebellious/loose daughter 
on giJnlGk sOrede sevgllisi ' disobeying her father. As mentioned 
Fig.3 "Pre-honeymoon is from the government", 
Hurriyet & Milliyet. 
previously while describing the data, all three 
newspapers have covered the relationship 
early on in August, with varying degrees of 
emphasis. In particular, the news stories that 
appeared in Hurriyet and Milliyet early on in 
August exploited the tabloid storyline, and 
made direct links between Sureyya' s career 
S7 S ' H . t erdar Uluer, sports pages, 14.08.2002 'The big lottery for Sureyya urnye . . h . 
58 Th . .. . ti II ' d . "My Ata / bow Wit respect m e same news was covered m Mllhyet and Sabah With the 0 owmg wor s , . 
. . . d h dfi the Turkish nation and remam your presence, and promise to continue my life on the roa you ave pave or 1 , • , 
faithful to the ideals you have left " Necmi Kepcetutan, sports pages, 14.08.2002, 'Szabo fell mto the trap 
Milliyet; Ali Erdogan, sports pages, 14.08.2002, ' I promise you Ata', Sabah. 
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performance and her private life with titles such as "Sureyya runs with Love" "This love has 
made Sureyya run" (Milliyet, 08.08.2001; Hurriyet, 08.08.2001)59. These stories also infonn 
the readers about the how Sureyya's relationship with her coach damaged her relationship 
with her the father. In the following months, news coverage of the relationship focused on 
Yucel Kops' ending of his marriage with titles such as "The national athlete ruined afamily", 
"Here is the photograph that destroyed a family" (Milliyet, 11.11.2001; Hurriyet, 
11.11.2001)60. These items are accompanied by a photograph of Sureyya Ayhan smiling, 
lying on her coach's lap in shorts and a t-shirt, while the two embrace each other, along with 
the picture of the sad wife. 
While it might not be too unsurprising to find media interest in the national athlete's private 
life, the coverage here extends beyond the simple news value of the relationship. Having 
declared Sureyya as a national daughter, journalists, almost all of who are male, take over the 
paternal role in the national parenting and attempt to bring her into line. One news story even 
criticises the state, for being too soft on her and not assuming fatherly authority. This item, 
written by the same journalists for both Milliyet and Hurriyet (22.12.2001)61, appeared with 
the headline "The pre-honeymoon isfrom the government", followed by the subheading: 
"National Athlete Sureyya Ayhan, who is having an affair with her coach, has completed her 
medical treatment in Germany. With the request of the sports organisation, her lover was 
also with her during the ten days". 
For the journalist, the illicit relationship between Sureyya and her coach also make their work 
relationship no longer acceptable and turned every trip into a pre-honeymoon paid for by the 
state. Both papers have accompanying visuals - Hurriyet has the picture of the couple 
embracing each other, Milliyet has a photograph of Sureyya Ayhan, in her uniform, and with 
what can be interpreted as thankful smile. Again both stories share a striking second news 
item embedded into the first, with the subtitle "Any other institution would have shown her 
the door." The item argues that the sports minister even "admitted that they have had double 
S9 Ahmet Kaya, Nihat Duzgun, Serkan Gemici, 08.08.2001, 'Sureyya runs with love', Milliyet; Ahmet Kaya, 
~ihat Duzgun, Serkan Gemici, 08.08.2001, 'This love has made Sure~a ~', .Hurriyet. 
Ahmet Kaya, 11.11.2001, 'The national athlete destroyed a famIly', MIlhyet; DHA (Dogan News Agency) 
!rI1.2001, 'Here is the photograph that destroyed a family', Hurriyet,. . . 
Murat Agca, 22.12.2001, 'The pre-honeymoon is from the government, Humyet and MIlhyet 
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standards for Sureyya Ayhan. ,,62 Sureyya might have had her accomplishments, but she is 
still a daughter who needs to follow the rules just like all women do. 
Despite the extensive coverage of "the affair" in similar news stories, what I fmd more 
interesting than the tabloid coverage is the discussion that took place among the columnists on 
Sureyya Ayhan's relationship. In this discussion, three different camps emerge: some 
journalists criticise Sureyya's relationship on moral grounds, some (feminists) argue that the 
moralist line reflects the double standards of patriarchal Turkish society, while others regard 
Sureyya's relationship as a threat because it jeopardizes her future achievements in the 
international arena. 
5.2.4.1 The moralist 
Fatih Altayli, who had one of the most popular columns in Hurriyet, can be seen as 
representing the moralist camp. While he has strong opinions about Sureyya Ayhan's 
relationship with her coach, it should be noted that his criticisms are ignited not by the initial 
stories about the relationship but by an interview Ayse Arman conducted in the weekend 
edition of his newspaper (Hurriyet, 18.Nov.2001)63. In this interview, spread over a whole 
page, plus half a page of extras in Ayse Arman's own weekend column, Sureyya is quoted as 
saying "My coach yearns for me". While the headline is the journalist' choice, throughout the 
interview readers meet a young woman standing fully behind her relationship, without any 
apologies. The visuals also accentuate this image: in the centrepiece visuals she is posed not 
in her usual tracksuits in national red and white colours, but in a sharp black trouser suit, and 
one small photograph shows her standing next to Yucel Kop. On the opposite half page, the 
columnists reflect on her interview, under a very striking series of photo shoots of again the 
same 'dressed up' Sureyya Ayhan, smiling, laughing teasingly, and in the last one sticking her 
tongue out. After the publication of the interview, what can only be called a battle of words 
between the two journalists broke out. Fatih Altayli made the first attack by focusing on 
Ayhan's words when she told Arman that her coach had a major role in her success as he had 
been supporting her since she started training with him at the age of 13, and that Yucel Kop 
was "her coach, her lover, her brother, her best friend, her father", all at once, underlining 
the strength of their relationship. The day after the interview, Altayli read this as an affair that 
62 E h . 
63 mp aslS mine. 
Ayse Arman, interview, I8.Nov.200I, 'My coach yearns for me', Hurriyet 
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started between an adult male and a girl at the age of 13, and asked his column "Would you let 
your child do sports when there are such coaches around?" (Hurriyet, 20.11.2001)64 
"This relationship started when Sureyya was 13. 
Can you see what is happening? ( .. ) 
They put a small, very young girl, or rather, a child, into the hands of a man. 
He is a coach, so he should train her. However, the man does more than training "the 
child ,,65. ( . .) 
It is obvious that Sureyya 's mind is a bit confused. Or someone has confused it. " 
In Altayli's words, not only Yucel Kop turns into a much hated child abuser, but Altayli 
himself takes over the fatherly role for the rest of the readers as he asks: 
"The fact that this is told so much out in the open, in front of everyone is a big blow to sports. 
( ... ) 
If you were a father, would you comfortably let your daughter go to sports trainings? Even if 
her coach was old enough to be her father?" 
In his columns Altayli addresses his readers directly, and asks them to identify with his 
position, which he offers as the only nationally accepted position. Morality, in these lines, is 
not a private matter; it is also a national matter. To support his argument, Altayli calls upon 
the well-known words of the nation's father as his reference point66: 
"Ataturk liked sportsmen who are intelligent, agile and of good moral character. 
The Directorate General of Youth and Sports used to write this on all sports halls. 
ObViously they forgot to put it on where Yucel Kop and Sureyya Ayhan were training." 
In his column, Altayli's initial reaction was to the couple, not to Arman who "could not have 
known the disgrace". For Altayli, Arman was just a journalist doing her job and "The one 
who reports about the situation cannot be the one who is trampling on the moral values." 
64 Fatih Altayli, column, 20.11.2001, 'Would you let your child do sports when there are such coaches around?' 
Hurriyet 
65 Ath ' U or s emphasis. 
66 "I like sportsmen who are intelligent, agile and of good moral character" 
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(Hurriyet, 21.11.2001 )67 However, as Arman responded in her own column fully supporting 
the relationship, the debate got sharper and eventually the discussion about Ayhan's private 
life became an open debate over modernity and national values. For Altayli, Ayse Arman, by 
attacking him was trying to "make her own moral perspective and values the dominant one" 
(Hurriyet, 23.11.2001)68. Directly addressing the readers, Altayli again appealed to the 
nationally accepted moral norms that all Turkish fathers would behold and protect: 
"If you like, think of it this way. 
"You have a daughter. You take her to a teacher when she is 13, for him to educate her. And 
after a while, you learn about the love affair that your little daughter, who has not come of 
age, is having with her teacher. 
How would you feel? 
I do not know about Ayse Arman but I would not feel too well. " 
It is interesting to follow how the debate about morality suddenly turns into a debate over 
modernity in these columns, as Altayli accuses Arman of having a faulty vision of what 
modernity is: 
"Ayse Arman defends her column in the name of modernity. And she uses this argument for 
whatever she does. And while she is doing this, she uses the fact that her mother is German as 
a reference point. Maybe Arman does not know this but if the relationship between Sureyya 
Ayhan and Yucel Kop had taken place in Germany, according to German laws Yucel Kop 
would have been taken to court for abusing someone that had come to him for education." 
(Hurriyet, 26.11.2001 )69 
This is one of the strongest attacks Altayli launches on his colleague. As he reminds the 
readers about Arman's non-Turkish 'origins', he questions the applicability of her values to 
Turkish society (Hurriyet, 01.12.2001)70. In an almost racist tone, Altayli brings up Arman's 
67 Fatih Altayli, column, 21.11.2001, 'A very stupid situation' Hurriyet 
68 Fatih Altayli, column, 23.11.2001 'Ayse Arman has made what s 'private', public' Hurriyet 
:9 Fatih Altayli, column, 26.11.2001, 'The Oriental Fox, Ms Ayse' Hurriyet 
o Altayli, of course, is not the only one who questions ''modernity''. In his column in Hurriyet on 01.12.2001, 
titled 'A tragic case' Bulent Bog criticises the relationship along the same lines: "A relationship such as the one 
between Sureyya and Yucel Kop used to be something unacceptable for Turkish people. However, un~er the 
blanket of 'keeping up with the times' today people can take in a lot of things. For somebody t? say / am a 
coach' and take the responsibility of a /3 year old girl, for the relationship to turn into a love affair even though 
one of them is already married, has become perfectly normal." 
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half-German background, and warns the readers against her efforts to inflict upon the society 
her own moral values, which for him do not really portray the real meaning of modernity 
anyway. Here it is not really the West that poses the risk, rather it is the misinterpretation of 
what Western modernity is. For Altayli, it is clear that Arman is a living example of over-
westernisation. In this context, just like Kop, Arman with her attempts to challenge the 
existing moral norms and her unacceptable perception of modernity also tum into a threat to 
the nation (Hurriyet, November 2001 fl. 
5.2.4.2 The modernist 
Arman's arguments are not unpredictable: she rejects the moral grounds on which Altayli 
criticises the couple, fmding them conservative at the least. While she underlines that she 
does not intend to challenge all cultural values, she has objections to what defines Turkish 
family tradition and what needs to be preserved from the existing moral norms: 
"But my intention is not to deny the institution of marriage, nor the family. (oo.J Then let me 
askyou: 
On the 2 r t of November, there was a news item in Hurriyet about how a father killed his 
daughter for not being a virgin, and at the end, it turned out that she indeed was a virgin. Is 
this the Turkishfamily tradition? 
If it is, I have no more to say. 
But just note that this is no different than Taliban's logic." (Hurriyet, 25.11.2001)72 
If for Fatih Altayli the danger awaiting the nation was in over westernisation, for Arman the 
real danger is traditionalism. While both journalists voice their desire for a modem Turkey, 
each see the requirements of that modernity with respect to gender and morality differently, 
and therefore blame each other for trying to impose hislher set of values upon society. To 
support her interpretations of modernness, Ayse Arman, just like Fatih Altayli uses Ataturk as 
her ultimate reference point: 
71 AltayIi retained his strongly critical stance about the relationship between Ayhan and Kop not only in these 
four columns he wrote in November 2001 but also in the column titled "Should success change the 
understanding of morality?" which he wrote' after the European Championship in 13.08.2002. Arguing that 
Sureyya's victory has not changed his moral perspective, since "success is not related to morality." 
72 Ayse Annan, column, 25.11.2001 'Human beings do not have contracts', Hurriyet 
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"How can Altayli look at this as "Ataturk used to like sportsmen who are intelligent, young, 
agile and of good moral character"? 
How can he present relationships that do not fit into the morality he formulated in his mind as 
a piece ofrag? 
Dear friends, even Ataturk would revolt at this! 
This is not fair. One does not have the right to call someone else immoral, judging from his 
own perspective. " (Hurriyet, 21.11.2001)73 
Ayse Arman's mode of address is also direct in her columns, positioning the readers as her 
friends as she complains about Altayli. In fact, on two occasions she published readers' 
comments only, which largely support her in her polemic with Altayli. Arman defended her 
case in the four other columns she wrote on this issue in 2001 and 2002, after the European 
Championship (Hurriyet, 17.11.2001; Hurriyet, 26.11.2001; Hurriyet, 30.11.2001; Hurriyet, 
14.11.2002)74,75. However, in these liberating columns there also is an evident elitism that 
puts a distance between Arman's already-liberated self, and the rural girl Sureyya, in need of 
support to complete her liberation. This is particularly evident in the very first column Arman 
wrote on the issue alongside her interview. Titled "Should Sureyya Ayhan stay in Antep?" her 
column discusses whether or not Sureyya should do as advised, leave the southeastern 
Anatolian city of Antep, come to Istanbul and start training with a new, more experienced 
team: 
"Then I saw them together. 
I saw the electricity between them, the communication, the warmth, the love. 
Then I started thinking. 
Why are we so obsessed with progress? 
Why do people always have to go forward, higher, further? 
They are so beautiful where they are. They are so untouched 
Yes, their world is little, but will they be happier when it gets bigger? 
73 Ayse Arman, column, 21.11.2001 'I make a complaint about Fatih Altaly, to his wife Hande', Hurriyet 
74 Ayse Arman, column, 17.11.2001 'Everybody says I love you' (original title is in English.), Hurriyet; 
Ayse Arman, column, 26.11.2001 'Uniting in one in goals and in destiny', Hurriyet; Ayse Annan, column, 
30.11.2001, 'What do sports professionals say about Sureyya', Hurriyet; Ayse Annan, column,14.11.2002 
'Forgive us Sureyya', Hurriyet 
75 There are at least two other columns by other journalists that also criticise the patriarchal standards of 
morality, which work to women's disadvantage: Ece Temelkuran, column, 12.08.2001, 'It is allowable for Sukru 
Bey, but forbidden for Sureyya!' Milliyet; Gungor Uras, column, 13.04.2002, 'We (I mean men) both love and 
beat women', Milliyet 
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Can there be something better than what they are living? 
I do not know." (Hurriyet, 18.11.2001)76 
There is an almost patronising feel to these lines. As Ayse Arman paints a romantic picture of 
Sureyya with her coach, she also draws a clear line between the girl from the small town , 
content with her little world, and her modem, urban self who is one of those with a bigger 
world, an obsession with progress and a desire to go ''forward, higher, further". By 
attempting to protect Sureyya, and by placing her in an imaginary pastoral town setting, 
Arman also manages to place her outside the world of progress. 
5.2.4.3 The pragmatist 
The third group can be represented by Hincal Vluc, a popular writer in Sabah, who has a half-
page daily section, as well as the occasional sports column he writes for the sports pages. 
Vluc clearly states his position from the beginning: he sees the relationship as a threat to 
Sureyya's career, and to her further national victories. For the journalist, Sureyya's private 
life is her own business: 
"If Sureyya is in love with her coach, if, just to be nearer to him, she chose Gaziantep 
University, if she can take two hours of commuting time back and forth, just to work with him, 
this is her choice." (Sabah, 18.08.2001)77 
However, Vluc also makes it clear that this is a waste of Sureyya's potential: 
"As a worldwide talent, instead of competing on the world stage with thousands of pounds in 
her pocket, win medals in Olympic Games, in World Championships, have her name written 
in history, become a hero, and in order to do this, train with the best coaches of the world, if 
instead of doing these things, just for the sake of her relaiionship she chooses to train with her 
humble coach in, let's say not in running tracks in L.A. but in the upland meadows of 
Erzurum, this is her choice, and one of the biggest sacrifices done in the name of love. Maybe 
this is a love story that needs to be written ... " 
MA . 
17 ~se Annan, column, 18.11.200 I, 'Should Sureyya Ayhan stay at Antep?', Humyet 
Hmcal Uluc, column, 18.08.2001, 'A star cannot be born', Sabah 
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Using a sarcastic style, Vluc makes a comparison between Sureyya who chooses her love 
, 
trains in Anatolian cities such as "in the upland meadows of Erzurum" and her "humble 
coach", and the Sureyya who chooses her career and opportunities that await her, such as 
"thousands of pounds in her pocket", fame of "becoming a hero" and "training in LA". This 
is an elitist depiction of the urban centre and its modem athlete vis a vis the small Anatolian 
town and its Sureyya. The comparison makes it evident for the readers which path Sureyya 
should be choosing and the opportunities she will be missing in her career and life in general 
if she does not move to the urban centre where the journalist is already positioned. However, 
what is at stake here is much more than an athlete's career. What Sureyya will be sacrificing 
is also the nation's newly found international success in athletics. Therefore, for Vluc, 
Turkey's success is conditional upon Sureyya's cooperation, whether or not she follows the 
journalist's advice: 
"For the first time in our history we will live through the happiness and pride of having a 
winner at the Olympics, a World Champion, a record breaker. 
Sureyya is talented enough to do all these ... 
Only if. .. " (Sabah, 26.09.2002)78 
That conditional clause "if' determines national progress and Vluc sees it as his responsibility 
to direct the athlete towards the right choices. In doing so he sharply criticises the 
modernist/feminist camp for missing the point and protesting about the news coverage of 
Sureyya's private life. Vluc contends that if Sureyya stays in Antep with her humble coach, 
national success is under threat. Therefore Vluc raises his protests once again after her 
European Championship victory: 
"Who is Sureyya Ayhan's coach? .. What is his career, his education? .. What are the facilities 
he has access to?.. To train an athlete, who has beaten an Olympics Champion, requires a 
real team play, starting with psychologists... Weight training requires specialists, the way she 
eats requires specialists... And much more... Does this team exist in Turkey, particularly in 
the Anatolian cities and towns?" (Sabah, 15.08.2002)79 
78 H· h' . meal Dlue, column, 26.09.2002, 'Sureyya Ayhan!.. Till where?', Sabah, emp aslS mme . 
79 Hineal Dlue, column, 15.08.2002, 'The Sureyya Ayhan incident and our media', Sabah, my emphasiS 
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The Anatolian town is agaIn a recumng Image in these lines. However, instead of 
romanticising it as Ayse Arman does, Vluc focuses on its deficiencies, its not having caught 
up with the global standards - which the urban centre clearly has. The Anatolian city should 
wait and follow the lead of the urban cities of modem Turkey, and give up its grip on 
Sureyya. For the journalist, Sureyya is no longer an ordinary athlete but national property, 
which he and his readers hold the ownership of, and this property needs to be put to good use. 
In this context, in return for representing the nation, individuality has to be sacrificed: 
"We will continue own and see to Sureyya and if necessary, in spite of Sureyya. Because 
today Sureyya is a national asset. No one should ever forget that. " 
5.3 Overarching discourses and concluding remarks 
The dominant discourse throughout the stories is an evident nationalism, which is reflected 
through the sports coverage. This is not a phenomenon unique to the Turkish context - how 
nationalism works through the medium of sports is a much-discussed area. If nationhood is 
built through the imagination, then sporting events become one of the major channels that 
feed into that communal imagination and strengthen our bonds of belonging. Blain et. al 
rightly suggests that "due in part to the universality of sporting activity, sport has been an 
important cultural arena through which collective identities have been articulated" (Blain et 
al., 1993: 12). Media plays no small role in the process of "coalitional identification through 
sports" (Mac Clancy, 1996: 6). In particular, international competitions and games seem to be 
an area where the media continuously and openly arouse national sentiments, flagging up 
nationalist identity through such strong rhetoric that it would have appalled us elsewhere. In 
fact, many scholars have pointed out that the reporting of national sporting events in almost 
all contexts echo the language of warfare, with international games more and more starting to 
be perceived as "substitute wars" (Blain et aI., 1993: 77; see also Billig, 1995). As Elias 
notes, sports continue to constitute an area of social activity in which overt emotional 
engagement remains publicly acceptable in ways that would have been unthinkable in other 
contexts (cited in Q'Donnel, 1994: 354). When it comes to supporting one's country in the 
field of play, fervent nationalism turns into a natural and even expected feeling. Without our 
realizing, these events transcend the sports field, quietly carrying nationalist discourses into 
our everyday lives, and generating social and cultural meanings far beyond the world of sport. 
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Given this context, the key role sports people play in symbolising and strengthening national 
belonging becomes more significant. In reporting sports events, the media continuously 
identify us, the readers, with the national team or, as in our case study, national sports hero. 
As Hobsbawm has pointed out through the mass media coverage of international contests 
, 
'sportsmen representing their nation or state' became 'primary expressions of their imagined 
communities' (cited in Alabarcas et aI., 2001: 548). That is why the lives of sports people 
have become a major point of interest for both the people and the communities that they 
represent. Therefore, in some respects, this case study does not present unusual findings. The 
use of epic, almost mythological language interwoven with jingoism, or the constant 
references to the athlete with the deixis "our" are also commonly found in other national 
contexts. The news value Ayhan's private life holds for journalists is also not surprising. 
However, the ways in which her identity, her career and the choices she makes are discussed, 
and how journalists position themselves with respect to her, reveals aspects of nationalism 
that are unique to the Turkish context. Through her story, three location points emerge that 
are fundamental to the positioning of Turkish national identity: Turkey's relationship with 
Europe, Turkey's relationship with its past, and Turkey's stance regarding women's morality. 
Firstly, through the reporting of Sureyya Ayhan's European Championship, Turkey's 
ambivalent relationship to Europe vividly surfaces. As Sureyya is turned into the symbol of 
Turkey's struggle against Europe's presumptions, her victories become a testimony to 
Turkey's ability to keep up with and be a part of successful Europe. By being transformed 
into the national daughter figure, Sureyya gets Turkey accepted by its European counterparts, 
and fulfils the role set out for modem Turkish women from early on in the RepUblic. 
However, the coverage also reveals a deep resentment that paradoxically 'others' Europe at 
the same time as Turkey tries to secure acceptance and inclusion in Europe. The resentment 
arises from the perceived initial gap with Europe, and is most clear in the news coverage 
about 'foreign athletes' with whom Turkish athletes have always had to catch up. 
At the same, Sureyya also serves as a reminder of overcoming a troubled past. Narrations of 
Sureyya Ayhan's childhood are a key mechanism in building up the readers' identification 
with the national athlete, as they play upon the shared social memories about the Turkish 
homeland, such as the barren lands, the poor but genuine Anatolian people, and their inherent 
wisdom and belief in progress. If identity is a "question of memory, and memories of 'home' 
in particular" (Morley & Robins, 1995: 91), then the memories evoked by the journalists 
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about Sureyya Ayhan's hometown confmn Turkish national identity most powerfully. In 
fact, Sureyya's Anatolian hometown in Cankiri, a neighbouring city to Ankara, gives the 
perfect description of the Turkish heimat8o• It must be noted that Anatolia is a powerful 
signifier in Turkish national imagination, most importantly because Kemal Ataturk organised 
and led the war of independence from Anatolian cities. After the war, the capital of the New 
Republic was set not in Istanbul, the imperial capital, but in what was then a small Anatolian 
town, Ankara. Therefore just like the position of women, the transformation of the deprived 
Anatolian town became one of the symbols of the modernization project. We can say that 
Sureyya's rise from the Anatolian town and her success in international arena actually play 
upon the historically embedded feelings of national progress, and turn her into an even better 
candidate for representing national identity. 
This is very much evident in the detailed depictions of Sureyya's childhood, in which the 
rural Anatolian town emerges as a fondly remembered and over-romanticised place. The way 
her story was covered in the papers strengthened the feeling of nostalgia, through the use of 
exaggerations, metaphors, inverted syntax and narrative style, which all add a touch of fairy-
tale quality to Sureyya's story. The powerful images accompanied by anecdotes told by her 
relatives - such as the quoting of Sureyya's long dead grandmother - work to convince the 
readers of the credibility of the "incredible" story of a hero "which is much better than the 
ones told in the movies" (Hurriyet, 07.08.2001)81. However, as the journalists continuously 
remind the readers, that fondness arises only from having moved on to a better, more modem 
place, the urban centre with further opportunities for national progress. It can be said that the 
poor little Anatolian town will best be remembered only once left behind, and national 
aspirations have become closer to fulfilment. Even though the image of Anantolia evokes 
fond national memories, it is not a place that one should to return to, or where the athlete 
should remain. In other words what is evoked is nostalgia for a place that should remain in 
the past, and nobody really wants to revisit today. 
In pointing to the gap that Sureyya needs to jump, journalists already position themselves 
within a Turkey, which is urban, Kemalist, and in league with European standards of progress 
- very much in line with the identity attributed to 'white Turks' discussed in the second 
80 , d fin' . Here, I am using Heimat not as a Gennan-specific concept, but more in a general sense. Rathzel s e It !On 
here is useful in explaining Heimat as a concept that" lies between the home in which one lives and the country" 
~d expressing "a prime symbol of the nation" (1994:84). 
See the coverage in Hurriyet, 07.08.2001, 'From gold coin to gold medal' 
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chapter. We can argue that while the barren rural village has always been an important image 
in Turkish modernization, the way it is re-considered in terms of class difference, and 
compared with the globally recognizable patterns of life - such as psychologists, nutritionists, 
training sessions in LA, terms associated with the life style of the urban city dweller - belong 
to the context of the nineties and the present decade. The troublesome image of the past is left 
behind through a necessary leap - whether or not Sureyya will make that move is a recurring 
debate throughout the coverage. Here, the gap between the town and the city that the athlete 
is expected to jump stands for the very same move that Turkey has been trying to make 
towards Europe. 
In this, the discourses that narrate Sureyya's story intercept those that we saw in the Batman 
case study. At the outset the Anatolian towns and cities journalists talk about seem very 
different to the peripheries of Batman, which were imagined as a part of 'another Turkey' 
outside the journalists' vision of the modem Turkish core. However, while the two cases 
differ in their ethnically inscribed discourses about Turkishness, they share the same 
modernization discourse that expects modernity to move in a unilinear line, from the urban 
centre to the rural peripheries. The much-loved Anatolian towns are, just like Batman, still 
located outside the journalists' centre, and outside its modem life, and progress. While they 
certainly offer some excellent potential, as proven by the 'Sureyya miracle', they still have to 
wait until they are modem enough to be trusted with national assets like Sureyya. 
Lastly, another contradiction emerges when Sureyya is not only asked to move to the urban 
centre, but also to take with her what needs to be preserved from her cultural roots - most 
importantly moral values. Through her, the readers witness the classic debate about the 
"limits of modernity", which mainly refer to the moral boundaries for women. The data 
presented shows clear evidence that the moral discourses that see women as a signifier of 
male honour - in this case, national honour- are far from extinct and they continue to define 
the binaries of 'Western culture' versus 'authentically Turkish' through women's bodies. 
Sureyya is simultaneously criticised for not being modem enough, in her insistence to train in 
the Anatolian city with her coach, and also for not conforming with Turkish cultural norms by 
having a relationship outside of marriage. Like most women in the post-colonial context, and 
as Chaterjee (1989) had argued, Sureyya has the difficult task of modernizing through 
acquiring the cultural refinements of the West, without jeopardizing the national culture by 
'over-westernising'. The delicate balance Sureyya, as the nation's daughter, is asked to strike 
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here is also the balance that the journalists envision for the modem nation's identity vis-a-vis 
the West. The debates that follow, such as the above-discussed polemic between Fatih Altayli 
and Ayse Arman, are actually debates about where that perfect point of balance lies for 
Turkey today. 
Having stressed the still important stronghold of discourses on gender and morality, we 
should also note that when compared to the supremacy of nationalism in the coverage, and the 
accompanying discourses about the need for Turkey's modernization, gender discourses are 
more open to debate. The very fact that Sureyya's moral values became an issue of debate 
marks a relative flexibility about the codes and conduct of Turkish moral values, particularly 
when national victories are at stake. Following her European Championship in 2002, there is 
an evident softening of news coverage in all three papers on this issue82• The titles "My love 
gave me strength" (Milliyet, 13.08.2002)83, "1 will not talk about my private life" (Sabah, 
13.08.2002)84 or "She did not cave in, she remained strong - She had told Ayse Arman that he 
was her "everything"" (Hurriyet, 12.08.2002)85 point at the possibility of acceptance of 
rebellious daughters, and the questioning of the nationalness of moral values and norms. 
With the victory in the Europe, it seems, wrongs are largely forgiven and hostilities are 
forgotten. 
Nevertheless, the possibility of change does not mean that gender and moral norms will be 
radically rewritten in any foreseeable future. After all Sureyya did get married to her coach 
on Valentine's Day in 2004, not only to the relief of the expectant writers, readers, and 
government authorities, but according to the news coverage, also to Sureyya herself. "It feels 
like a big burden has left my shoulders" (Milliyet, 17.02.2004)86 she was quoted as saying 
shortly after the wedding, showing the nation her conformity to the gender norms. 
82 The only exception is again by Fatih Altayli who insists on his position in the aftennath of Sureyya's 
European Championship. (Fatih Altayli, 13.08.2002, 'Should success change my moral values?' Hurriyet.) 
83 Sports department, 13.08.2002, 'I have just started', Milliyet 
84 No by-lines, 13 .08.2002, 'This is only the beginning', Sabah 
85 Mehmet Arslan, 12.08.2002, 'And here is my answer', Hurriyet 
86 Front-page item with picture of the bride and groom, no-bylines, 17.02.2004, 'Sureyya has become a bride', 
Milliyet. Unfortunately, Sureyya's story, beyond this case study, does not have a happy ending. After one other 
gold medal in Europe and a silver medal in the World Championships in 2003, apart fro~ ~any other gold 
medals in European League events during the year, the news that she would not be competIng m Athens 2004 
was a big blow for the Turkish media. With allegations of doping usage, the media fury direct~d at her coach 
(now also her legal husband) was much worse than in 2001. He was vehemently accused of natIOnal treachery 
and of standing in the way of Sureyya's/nation's progress. See for example Hincal Vluc, 08.08.~004 'He 
finished Sureyya with his own hands' Sabah; Emin Colasan, 10.08.2004 'The multi-dimensional dIsgrace of 
Sureyya' Hurriyet 
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Chapter 6: 
'Everybody loves a bride?' 
White Weddings and Political Meanings in Turkey 
6.1 Introduction of the case study 
6.1.1 The setting - Summary of events and the brief description of the context 
This case study examines the news coverage of three weddings, each of which included a 
significant political actor as the father of the bride or groom and therefore received extensive 
front page reporting in mainstream newspapers. 
The first of these weddings was that of Elif Sozen to Helmut Kohl's son on 26th May 2001. 
During his tenure as German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl had been very vocal in his opposition 
to Turkey's inclusion in the EU. News of the couple's planned wedding was therefore 
received with direct irony in the press. In the stories published in the build up to the wedding, 
Kohl's speeches or acts were often quoted as evident signs that the former German Chancellor 
had finally changed his attitude towards Turkey with the help of his son's Turkish bride. The 
wedding itself, set in the five star Kempinsky hotel in the historical Ciragan Palace by the 
Bosphorus, was covered in exquisite detail, both during the preparations and following the 
wedding day. What also received exceptional coverage were the religious ceremonies that 
preceded the official ceremony, the traditional Islamic marriage and the Church wedding prior 
to the official signing of the papers on the wedding day!. Pictures of Elif Sozen taken inside 
the Church and in the Palace accompanied front page headlines that focused on how the 
marriage vows were exchanged three times, through one secular and two religious 
I To avoid confusion later in the analysis, it is necessary to make some clarifications. In Turkey, in order to get 
married, couples have to sign official papers in front of witnesses and a marriage registrar. Depe~ding on the 
couples' financial means or preferences, this can take place either in the registry office, or the registrar ~~ be 
called to the venue where the wedding reception will take place. If they wish, couples can also have the rel~g~ous 
Islamic marriage, which requires the presence of witnesses and a religious authority. However, rehgl~us 
~arriages are privately organised, they are not legally recognized and they do not grant the couple any mantal 
nghts. 
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ceremomes, with the Islamic marriage, though not confrrmed, forming one of the major 
storylines. 
The second wedding also took place in Ciragan Palace, only about a month after Elif Sozen' s. 
The bride, again named Elif, was a young woman who covered her hair and was from a 
prominent Islamist family. She was the daughter of Necmettin Erbakan, the founder of the 
political Islamist movement in Turkey and a former prime minister, who came to power in 
1997 leading the coalition government with his Welfare Pa.rtY. Erbakan served for only a 
short term until the government collapsed under pressure from the military in 1997. In 1998 
both Erbakan and his party were banned by the Constitutional Coure for violating the 
principles of secularism and for being a threat to the democratic regime in Turkey.4 Given 
Erbakan's strong Islamist stand, and his daughter's veiled looks, the press was particularly 
keen on the details of the wedding ceremony, which took place on June 17th• News coverage 
started months in advance and became headline news during the week of the wedding, 
particularly focusing on the special white wedding dress that would cover the bride's hair, as 
well as the choice of the extravagant venue. When the wedding photos were made public, 
many journalists ironically criticised the wedding for not reflecting Islamist traditions and 
values, which Erbakan had so long stood for in Turkish politics. Comparisons were also 
made with Elif Sozen's wedding, especially after photographs revealed that Elif Erbakan had 
walked down the aisle with her father to be given away, just like Elif Sozen had done in her 
church wedding - a common sight in the Christian tradition but not in Turkish weddings. 
Many other details of the wedding, from the choice of music to the dresses of the guests, were 
2 Refah Partisi (RP) 
3 The Constitutional Court was formed by the 1961 constitution following the military coup of 1960. It was 
founded as a part of the attempt to give the judiciary considerable powers in the exercise of sovereignty, as it has 
the power to control the constitutional validity of statutes passed by Parliament. It was an attempt by the military 
to avoid any abuse of power by the Parliament and counterbalance political institutions, and still plays an 
important part in the political system in Turkey. As Kalaycioglu (2005: 137) notes, 18 political parties h~ve 
been banned by the Constitutional Court in the last two decades, however parties with religious fundamentahst, 
Kurdish ethnic nationalist Marxist-Leninist credentials have been much more at risk of suffering from a legal , 
ban than others. Further information on the Constitutional Court can be obtained from the official government 
~ebsite http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/court.htm .. .. 
Before he lead the coalition government in 1996, Erbakan was known for hIS staunchly antI-Western pOSItIon, 
including opposition to Turkey's membership of the EU, arguing it would result in the assimilation o.f T~key's 
Islamic/cultural identity. After becoming the prime minister he followed a more moderate line, al?eIt sull pro-
Islamist. By Feb 1997, the government received an ultimatum from the National Security CounCIl t? re~ffirm 
the secular nature of the state, and under increasing pressure Erbakan resigned in mid: 1997 resultmg m the 
~ollapse of the coalition government, a process which is termed as the post-modem coup m Turkey. So?n after, 
m January 1998, the constitutional court ruled that the party had violated the principles of seculansm and 
outlawed it, imposing a political ban on Erbakan, along with some other leading names in his party. 
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covered in minute detail, turning what was seen as a Western-style wedding organized by an 
Islamist political leader into a major news story. 
To frame the political context more accurately it is important to note that at the time of these 
two weddings the Democratic Left party5, which is strongly secularist and pro-EO, led the 
ruling coalition in Turkey. On the Islamic front deputies who were not subject to the political 
ban imposed by the closure of the Welfare Party in 1997, joined forces to form the Virtue 
party with Erbakan becoming the party's 'behind the scenes' leader6• The party participated 
in the 1999 elections and entered the parliament with approximately 15% of the national vote. 
Although from the very start the Virtue Party showed a concerted effort to reform its identity, 
promoting itself as pro-democratic and pro-EO, its future was no different to the party it 
succeeded. Following the elections, a female MP, Merve Kavakci insisted on wearing her 
veil while taking the parliamentary oath, causing the Democratic Left Party to object on the 
grounds that it violated both the Constitution and the Standing Orders of the Turkish General 
Assembly. This event, and the following debates on what the veil symbolised, whether it was 
a sign of modernity or an open threat to secular Turkey, also triggered what was to be the end 
of the Virtue Party. Following a complaint from the Public Prosecutor in 2000, the 
Constitutional Court eventually closed down the Virtue Party in June 2001 for being a 
continuation of the Welfare Party, breaching the principle of secularism. This event took 
place only five days after Erbakan's daughter's wedding, and it confrrmed the already sharp 
divide between the secularists and the Islamists, as well as foregrounding the role women 
played in representing the modem nation. 
By the time of the third wedding, however, the political picture had changed dramatically. 
The debates on the meaning of modernity and the role of religion in Turkey had split the 
members of the Virtue Party into two new parties. The 'traditionalists' formed the pro-
Erbakan Felicity party7 and the 'renewalists' led by Tayyip Erdogan formed the Justice and 
Development party8. Following the elections in 2002, the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP)9 came to power, winning the majority of the votes, and soon after its leader, Tayyip 
s 
Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP) 
6 Fazilet Partisi (FP) 
: Saaddet Partisi (SP) 
9 Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) ..' . 
Both Erdogan and leading names of the AKP had in the past close links WIth the Islamts.t partIes lead by 
Erbakan. Erdogan himself became active in politics first in the now defunct National S~lvatlOn Party (MSP), 
which re-formed under the name Welfare Party following the coup in 1980. Later, WIth the success of the 
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Erdogan, started serving as the Prime Minister of Turkey. This was a major shock for the 
secularist circles in Turkey, especially when Erdogan himself had been sent to prison and 
banned from politics for inciting rebellious feelings against the secular principles of the 
Republic in a speech he gave in 1997. Given the Islamist roots of the Party's leadership, 
including those of Erdogan himself, the success of his party was alarming news for the 
secularists who did not trust the AKP with negotiations over Turkey's entry into the EO. In 
spite of the expectations, Erdogan was careful to sever any ties with the party's pro-Erbakan 
background, consistently stating that the party did not represent an Islamist movement but 
rather a "conservative democrat" stance. Furthermore, as soon as the Party came to power, it 
launched a staunchly dedicated campaign for Turkey's membership into the EO, which 
diverged from the discourse about the EU as the 'Western Club' which had been strongly 
advocated by Erbakan and supported by his followers only a couple of years before. The 
attempts of the AKP, especially in its first year, to show that the party was loyal to the aims 
and goals of the Republic, in return led to mixed reactions from the secularists ranging from 
hesitant trust to outright rejection of the Party and the new Prime Minister. The wedding of 
Erdogan's son to the veiled Reyyan Mutluer10 took place within this context. 
Newspapers covered the build up to the wedding by focusing on a range of stories from the 
couple's youth to the arranged nature of the marriage and the bride's 'covered' wedding dress. 
However, two issues received particularly large coverage, one being the choice of the 
wedding venue. On the one hand the wedding was a comparatively a low profile occasion 
with only a civil ceremony and no dinner reception. On the other, though, it was held at a 
conference centre in front of an estimated 9000 guests most of whom were Erdogan' s 
supporters. It can be said that of the three weddings, Reyyan Mutluer's remains the most 
plain and formal, even though it was a major event and had the largest guest list when 
compared to the other two weddings. It had the least ballroom glamour. For the journalists, 
this wedding also had the added attraction of Silvio Berlusconi attending as one of the 
witnesses. Berlusconi was reported to have come for the wedding on the request of Tayyip 
Welfare Party in local elections in 1994 he became the Mayor of Greater Istanbul as well as the president of the 
?reater Istanbul Metropolitan Council. 'He served until he was tried and convicted of inflictin~ religious ~atred 
m a public speech he made in an east-Anatolian province to protest the ban of Welfare Party ~ 1997, whl~e he 
was still the Mayor of Greater City of Istanbul. He was sent to prison and also barred from pUb~lC office untIl the 
AKP came to power in 2002 and amended the constitution to uplift his ban. Again, see Kalaycloglu (2005: 163) 
for further details. 
When the AKP came into power in November 2002, for the first time in 15 years one party held absolute 
~ajority in Turkey. 
Erdogan's bride, as well as his daughters, and his wife are all veiled. 
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Erdoganll , and said to have addressed the Prime Minister as his 'friend' throughout the 
ceremony. Following this, the news stories on the wedding gave a mixed reaction to the 
'modernness' of the actors and the wedding itself. 
6.1.2 Objectives in the selection of the case study 
Like the other two case studies, the analysis of the three weddings also explores the question 
of difference, attempting to understand the desired boundaries for the nation through women. 
Here, the question of difference concentrates on the representation of modernity and its most 
prominent signifier for the journalists, Europeanness. 
As so often is the case in wedding stories, the data here positions the brides at the centre of 
attention, but unlike other wedding stories, these brides, through their or their husbands' 
families, are also accredited with representative power and therefore turn into the focal points 
for discussing Turkey's position vis-a.-vis a modem Europe. 12 The storylines try to find an 
answer as to whether the actors in these weddings are "modem" enough to qualify for 
inclusion within the category of a "European" Turkey. To put it more simply, there is one 
very simple concern underlying all three storylines: does this wedding bring Turkey closer to 
or away from Europe and the EU? In this regard, the three brides and their weddings are 
assessed according to a set of factors, such as family and educational background, careers, 
hobbies and achievements, the bridal dress worn at the wedding, or the venue, all of which are 
examined in detail to measure their proximity to the conduct of the ideal Turkish citizen. 
In doing so, this case study deals with both internal and external others. While Elif Sozen is 
described, similar to Sureyya Ayhan, as the nation's daughter, Elif Erbakan and to a large 
extent also Elif Sozen appear as the brides that the journalists hesitate to call their own. 
However, the coverage of the weddings does not only try to situate and fix the identity of the 
Islamists, and the role of religion, but also to define Europe, and Turkey's relationship to 
Europe. The inconsistencies that arise in this process are valuable in revealing the 
ambivalences inherent in Turkish national identity today. As the analysis will show, fixed 
11 During the time of the wedding, Berlusconi was not only the Italian Prime Minist~r, but. as Italy had ~e 
rotating presidency in EU, Berlusconi also held an important position within the EU. GIven thIS and the AKP s 
dedication to take Turkey into the EU his attendance at the wedding was also symbolically important. 12 ' . th 0 dO °d I However, unlike the Sureyya Ayhan case, this is not a representative power emanatmg from e In IV! ua 
identity of the brides, nor is such a representative position eagerly owned by them as Sureyya had ~?neo It IS the 
families, or specifically, the father figures, that turn the brides into representatives of their commumtleso 
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criteria for approval and criticism do not exist for the brides. The same wedding venue can be 
a source of praise for Elif Sozen, and a reason for sarcasm for Elif Erbakan; just as a veiled 
wedding gown can be described as a ridiculous imitation of the West for Elif Erbakan, but 
might lose its novelty in the case of Reyyan Mutluer. Following these inconsistencies we can 
easily layout the discourses on national identity. Moreover, by comparing the coverage of 
the fIrst two weddings that share the same time frame as the third wedding, we can also 
examine whether the changing political context under the AKP government resulted also in 
changes in value judgements about modernity and national identity in Turkey. 
Indeed, the wedding case study helps us sweep through these debates in a rapidly changing 
political context within a very short period of time. During the two years that the data spans, 
the political scene changed dramatically in Turkey. The closing down of the Felicity Party, 
the splitting of the Islamist politicians into renewalist and traditionalist camps, the election of 
the renewalist AKP to power with the 2002 elections, and the staunchly pro-EO campaign it 
pursued particularly in the first two years of its tenure, all contribute to the discursive 
framework that unfolds through the data. These developments resulted in a more heated 
debate among the Islamists and secularists themselves as to who is secular and who is Islamist 
and who should be praised or criticised according to which criteria, making the Kemalist 
dichotomies of Islamistlsecularist more problematic. Even though the focus of the analysis in 
this research is the journalists' impressions of the events rather than the events taking place, it 
is impossible to ignore this context, within which both the weddings and the journalists 
covering them are situated. F or this reason alone, the case study contributes invaluable data 
to witness the different claims to what identity and modernity entails in Turkey, as the 
political tables turn in this period. 
As for the objectives that lead the study, the same initial set of questions as with the previous 
two cases will be used to guide the analysis. However, because the weddings case contains a 
large bulk of data that includes three mini cases, these questions are supported by a subset of 
questions to anchor the analysis and explore the specifics of the wedding case in more depth: 
• Who are the brides in the case study? 
• In what ways are they described as different (or same)? 
• In the case of difference, is this described as a desired or an unwanted one? If the 
latter, what are the proposals to eliminate that difference? 
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• In what ways is their difference significant for a particular understanding of 
modernity & national identity in Turkey? 
o What is the meaning of being modern in these stories? In what respects 
do the stories and the brides differ from one another? What are the 
signifiers and criteria for being modern for each bride? 
o How are the concerns about 'becoming European' and 'joining the EU' 
revealed through the reporting of these? 
o Where do the journalists place religion within this context? 
o Where do the journalists position themselves? 
o Can we observe a change throughout the cases? 
• 
• 
• 
In the journalists' coverage? 
In the shifting discourses on being modern and being Turkish? 
If so, how can we interpret this change? 
6.1.3 Overview of the data 
6.1.3.1 Time Frame 
The initial data includes all related news items that appeared between 2000 and 2003, and 
concentrates around the week of the weddings. As a general rule coverage of the weddings 
peaks right before they take place or on the day of the event itself, when plans are announced, 
as well as right after the weddings when photographs are available. Coverage then peters out 
soon after the weddings take place. 
Following this pattern, news about Elif Sozen's engagement appears in news pages as early as 
18th December, 2000, but is limited in the days following the engagement (between 18th and 
23 rd of December) and is not followed up until 6th May 2001 when the wedding plans for the 
26th of May are revealed. The detailed coverage of the wedding dies away after the 30th 
May.13 News stories announcing Elif Erbakan's engagement also appear as early as 5th 
January 2001, and although there are several news stories between then and the wedding in 
• 
May, the most extensive coverage appears around the time of the wedding on the 17
th
, and 
dies away after the wedding day on the 20th June. 
13 Following the death of Helmut Kohl's wife on 05.07.2001, Elif once again appears in the headlines, this time 
as the responsible and supportive Turkish bride pulling the grieving family together. The coverag~ here su~ports 
the findings of the initial data regarding the wedding, but given its different theme, it was not mcluded m the 
analysis. 
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For the third wedding, news stories are more limited in their timeframe. There are a few 
possible reasons. Firstly, the marriage was strictly arranged, as we learn from the reporting; 
second there was a short time span between the actual marriage and the announcement of the 
marriage; and lastly the two families strived to keep the news regarding the wedding as 
private as possible. The coverage about the engagement starts appearing on the 11th July, 
about a month before the wedding, which took place on the 10th August. In spite of these 
restrictions, this wedding was given the largest coverage, with the bulk of the items appearing 
between the 7th and the 13th August. The stories die away soon after this, so the 14th can be 
taken as the end date for this case study. 
6.1.3.2 Type of Data to be analysed 
In terms of news genre, all three wedding stories can be topically categorised as soft news 
items, or human-interest stories. They are largely covered as headline news because of their 
expected interest to the public due to the involvement of well-known father figures, with 
varying degrees of tabloid elements in the language. Most headlines reflect a very strong 
tabloid style reminiscent of celebrity news, as revealed in headlines such as "Kohl's 
grandchild is on the way", "She had seen that she was getting married in her dream", "A 
watch/or the groom from his uncle Silvio". However, there are also news items which report 
the events from a more bureaucratic perspective, most of which are found in the reporting of 
the prime minister's son's wedding. 
In terms of style and language used, further distinctions emerge between the coverage of the 
three weddings. The patriotic style in the coverage of Elif Sozen's wedding and the sharp 
sarcasm accompanying Elif Erbakan's wedding contrast with the relatively more objective 
headlines found in the news stories about Reyyan Mutluer's wedding. This is also observable 
in the selection of visuals. The photographs from Elif Sozen's wedding, showing the couple 
kissing on the lips, or pictures of Elif Erbakan walking into the venue in her father's arms, and 
the captions accompanying these photographs have a strongly tabloid feel, compared with the 
visuals from Reyyan Mutluer's wedding. In other words, Reyyan Mutluer's wedding lacks 
the 'gossip' factor: it is more concentrated on not the storylines building up to the wedding 
but rather on the reporting of the event itself. This might be due not only to the different style 
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of this wedding, as explained in the previous sections, but also because of respect for a prime 
minister. 
Although Reyyan Mutluer's wedding might lack the gossip factor, it certainly is the object of 
attention for the columnists. In total, there were 34 columns written solely or partially on the 
selected weddings. Two of these were on Elif Sozen's wedding, seven on Elif Erbakan's 
wedding and a record number of twenty five columns discussing Reyyan Mutluer's wedding, 
reflecting the columnists' value judgements regarding the significance of each event. Reyyan 
Mutluer's wedding, in fact, is distinguished from the other two by its relatively less intrusive 
coverage, which can mostly be attributed to the limited time, the unwillingness of both sides 
to speak about it, the silence of the couple who are said to have met shortly prior to the 
wedding, and the style of the wedding itself. These have not, however, affected the 
newsworthiness of the event, as Reyyan Mutluer's wedding received the most extensive 
coverage in all three papers. As Hurriyet pointed out, the news of the wedding received a 
record level of coverage compared with all Turkish newspapers. 14 
The heavy coverage is not surprising given the families involved. The fact that the last 
wedding is the Prime Minister's son's wedding, in front of thousands of guests, including 
Berlusconi as the witness, puts the young couple in a significant position in tenns of 
representing the Turkish public and young Turkish people in particular. Given that both the 
bride and the groom were dressed in an Islamist style, the bride having the veil and the groom 
wearing a shirt with banded collar and no ties, even the pictures from the wedding turns their 
representation into an 'interesting', if not 'problematic', story for the journalists. These 
factors can explain the extensive coverage of this wedding in the columns, even though all 
three marriages have dominated the headline news and the front pages of all three papers. 
6.1.4 Organizing the data for analysis - methodological decisions 
The case study of the weddings differs from the Batman and the Sureyya Ayhan case studies 
in that it is made up of three different cases, and therefore requires an adaptation of the 
14 Answering a reader's criticism about why the Hurriyet newspaper had devoted so much space to suc.h a 
'frivolous event', journalist Dogan Satmis argued "News stories about the Prime Minister's son hav.e re~elVed 
extensive coverage not only in Hurriyet, but also in other newspapers as well. In a recent news. article, It was 
announced that the amount of news about the wedding had reached a record level." Dogan Satnlls, 01.09.2003, 
'Readers Letters' Hurriyet 
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general methodological framework developed for this research. Applying the preferred 
template, all news items were analysed thematically, and the main themes of the case study 
were mapped out, to arrive at overarching discourses. However, given the existence of three 
different weddings, and their different contexts, it was necessary to contextuaiize the themes 
within each wedding separately. The textual analysis exposing the specific linguistic tools 
was undertaken alongside the unfolding themes, and varied in each wedding. For example, 
and as has been previously mentioned, Reyyan Mutluer's wedding with the prime minister's 
son neither got the sharply sarcastic headlines that Elif Erbakan received, nor the jingoistic 
news coverage of Elif Sozen's wedding. At the same time, most columnists did not see Elif 
Sozen's wedding as a worthy event, whereas each of the other two weddings was the 'meal of 
the day' for the columnists, which has an important bearing on the analysis. Treating the 
analysis as one big case study throughout would have meant compromising some of the data, 
especially the linguistic details, in an attempt to level them out in line with the common 
themes. Conducting the analysis as three separate studies allowed me to focus on these 
differences, and how they enhanced the unfolding discourses. Parallels or comparisons 
between the three weddings were then discussed in the conclusion sections of each analysis. 
The second methodological concern regards the type of data. As discussed previously, in 
terms of genre, in all three papers the coverage converges around columns and soft-news 
items, even though the language and style used in the news items have varying degrees of 
tabloidization. Therefore, in terms of the variety of genres, the weddings case is not a very 
complex case study. However, the data is far from being un-problematic, particularly when it 
comes to documenting the news stories. Whereas it was relatively easy to follow the 
coverage of individual journalists from the by-lines in the Batman case study, and reasonably 
so for the Sureyya Ayhan case, this is not the case for the weddings. Various journalists 
followed the events at various times, and for the coverage of the wedding day in particular, 
the stories are the outcome of collaborative work, rather than being produced by one or two 
journalists. This collaboration can either take the form of journalists writing their relevant 
news items under one larger headline news story, with specific by-lines for each or most of 
the pieces, or putting together the whole page as a team, without any specific by-lines for the 
individual items. The latter is particularly the case for the day-after stories of the weddings, 
where a long list of journalists working on the news are given in the form of a banner at the 
bottom of the page. Milliyet newspaper on 11.08.2003 offers a good example on this, where 
Reyyan Mutluer's wedding is covered with a striking picture of the couple in the middle of 
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the first page, while in the inside pages, coverage is on two consecutive pages, both with full 
page spreads. The team covering this wedding included nine journalists' and four 
photographers. While in such news the number of journalists working on the event is striking 
in terms of pointing to editorial decisions about the newsworthiness of the event, it proves to 
be cumbersome in referencing and documenting. To overcome this problem, and for practical 
purposes, I have decided to reference the by-lines of these items in the form of et aL, citing 
the first journalists' name rather than all ten or eleven. These large spreads were then treated 
as one big news story, but with their own sub-stories, and when important further information 
was provided regarding the space covered by the sub-stories in the spread. 
6.2 "We gave away a bride to the Chancellor"- Elif Sozen's wedding 
6.2.1 Thematic analysis -themes addressed in the coverage and allocation of sub-themes 
to thematic areas 
The thematic analysis follows how the news stories, through their coverage of Elif Sozen's 
wedding and her persona, reveal concerns and ambitions regarding Turkey's identity. Among 
the three brides, Elif Sozen emerges as the most approved of bride by the journalists, for 
being a modem Turkish woman who has made the former German Chancellor shed his biases 
about Turkey's Europeanness. The first three themes in the analysis explore how, through 
Elif Sozen's marriage, Turkey'S identity is played out with respect to Europe's perceived 
identity. The last theme looks at the journalists' concern regarding the role religion plays in 
Turkey's identity vis-a.-vis Europe. 
6.2.1.1 The importance of the CV - Acceptance 
News stories introduce Elif Sozen to the readers as a strong, well-bred and talented Turkish 
woman. Unlike the coverage in Sureyya Ayhan's story, news here does not offer any first 
hand information in the form of direct quotes from Elif Sozen or her family. Despite this, 
there is an abundance of news stories offering information on the bride. In these stories Elif 
Sozen's upper middle class family background is frequently highlighted15, as well as her 
achievements in her education and career. In particular her high school, Robert College, a 
15 For example Sabah introduces her as the "( ... ) the daughter of the General Director of the Kalekalip 
Machinery and Molds Inc.( ... )" no-bylines, 18.12.2000, 'We gave away a bride to the Chancellor'. 
188 
well-established and American-sponsored private high school in Turkey, is an important 
reference point for the journalists in locating her on the social map of Turkey. From the very 
first stories about her engagement to the later news stories on her wedding, her high school is 
repeatedly mentioned even when this information sounds out of place and irrelevant, as in the 
following example: 
"The bridal gown of Elif Sozen, who is about to tie the knot in her eleven year long 
relationship with Peter Kohl, and who is a graduate of Robert College, is being designed by 
the famous fashion stylist Yildirim Mayruk" (Hurriyet, 06.05.2001)16 
Arguably because of the prestige of the school in Turkey, and probably also due to the lack of 
first hand information, news coverage freezes the 32-year-old bride in her high school years. 
Her high school yearbook seems to be the only source of information and is frequently quoted 
to inform the readers that she is ''passionate about nature, literature and especially poetry" 
(Hurriyet, 06.05.2001)17, which helps to construct the image of Elif Sozen as the romantic 
bride. A picture of a very young Elif Sozen, apparently from that same yearbook, showing 
her in an elegant white dress, accompanies her feminine description in the newspapers and 
remains as the only visual image of the bride until the wedding. 
In addition to the emphasis on her school, Elif Sozen's other academic and professional 
achievements are repeatedly foregrounded, which help to compare Elif with Peter Kohl and 
stress her equal position to the groom: 
"Elif and Peter, who met while studying at MIT, in Boston, work as brokers in the British 
finance organization J.P. Morgan. Peter is a specialist in corporate mergers, and just like his 
bride-to-be, he can speak six languages." (Sabah, 06.05.2001)18 
Here, the journalists' praise is twofold. Elif Sozen is not only a qualified woman but through 
her qualifications she has won the love and respect of the Kohl family, which is headed by the 
former Chancellor of Germany, who had adamantly resisted Turkey's accession into the EU. 
Before the wedding, Hurriyet and Sabah both give substantial space to their report on the 
16 N b h· . o y-lines, 06.05.2001, 'The Wedding of the Year' Sabah, emp aslS mme. 
17 Ayla Ozean, 23.12.2000, 'The bride with the poet's sprit' Sabah 
18 Ayla Ozean, 23.12.2000, 'The bride with the poet's sprit' Sabah 
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interview done by the German Bild newspaper with the mother of Peter Kohl in which she 
praises his Turkish bride. The front-page title "Our bride is very clever" in Sabah newspaper 
clearly stresses how Elif is fully accepted in the Kohl family, and the news item quotes Mrs. 
Kohl's description of Elif who attended "the top prestigious schools, after which she started 
her career as a financial consultant to the Russian government. She is now the Assistant 
Director of J.P. Morgan" (Sabah, 23.05.2001)19. Hurriyet also reports the same interview 
from the front page, which reads "Mother Kohl praised her Turkish bride" (Hurriyet, 
23.05.2001io. On the inside, the same news takes the headlines with more than haIfa page of 
coverage reading "Our Turkish bride is very cute and clever" and "My bride is the one and 
only". With these lines, directly reported in the first person, Peter Kohl's mother not only 
reaffirms Elif s qualifications for the Turkish readers, but also expresses the Kohl family's 
admiration of their Turkish bride. 
Such a focus should not be discarded as a tabloid concern. From the very start, news stories 
make it clear that the meaning of this marriage extends beyond an ordinary union of families, 
let alone a couple. This is evident from the very first news headline announcing the couple's 
engagement where journalists position themselves and their readers as the members of the 
Turkish nation. Here, the nation is envisioned as a family, giving away to Kohl who is still 
referred to as 'the Chancellor', their bride: 
"We gave away a bride to the Chancellor" (Sabah, 18.12.2000/1. 
As Elif becomes the nation's bride, her marriage to Peter Kohl becomes a symbol of the 
changing relationship between Turkey and the Kohl family, and beyond that, between Turkey 
and Europe. News stories foregrounding the best from Elif Sozen's past not only put Elif on 
equal grounds with, if not higher than the Kohls, but also prove that she is as European as 
Kohl himself, who used to be deeply against Turkey's inclusion in the EU. Her academic and 
career achievements are shown as proof of this, as well as key to the "praise" received by the 
Kohl family. In this regard, the Turkish bride's entrance into the Kohl family turns into a 
19 no by-lines, 23.05.2001, 'Our bride is very clever' on the front page, on the inside: 'Our bride Elifis very cute 
and clever' Sabah . . 
20 no by-lines, 23.05.2001, 'Mother Kohl praised her Turkish bride' on the front-page, on the inside 'My bnde IS 
one and only' Hurriyet 
21 b h' . 
no y-lines, 18.12.2000, 'We gave a bride to the Chancellor' Sabah, emp aslS mme 
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metaphor for Turkey's acceptance as a modem, European nation state, and more specifically, 
Turkey's acceptance into the ED. 
In spite of the news about Elif Sozen's acceptance by the Kohl family, the coverage 
throughout is dominated by a feeling of resentment, if not outright frustration. This is because 
the very terms of acceptance imply a superior side agreeing that the other, which had 
previously been rejected as being inferior, is now equal. Therefore journalists received the 
news about Elif Sozen's 'admission' to the Kohl family with bitterness, rather than with pride 
and joy. On hearing Helmut Kohl's statement that they gladly accepted Elif and her family, 
one columnist expresses her annoyance in the following words: 
"And also, what was Mr. Kohl supposed to do but accept? His son is, as it is apparent, madly 
in love with our girl. On top of all, our girl is also educated; she is in no respect less than his 
giant son who is his look-alike, only 20 cm. taller. What is this superiority complex?" (Sabah, 
29.05.2001i2 
Here the journalist, clearly positioning herself and her readers as the family of the bride, is 
enraged to think about the possibility that Kohl might not have found her nation's daughter 
suitable enough for his son. For the journalist this is just another case of Europe's unfounded 
superiority complex. By referring to the groom as a 'tall, giant Kohl look-alike', the 
journalist attempts to tum the other side's feeling of superiority into inferiority. 
6.2.1.2 Bringing up the past - Repentance 
Given its symbolic associations, Elif Sozen's 'acceptance' is a reminder of the Turkey that 
has once been rejected by Kohl. Within this context, present acceptance becomes not enough 
to compensate for the humiliation caused by Kohl's rejection in the past. To erase the 
superiority of the West, and to readjust the power balance in favour of Turkey, the other side 
needs to be humiliated as well - just as the above quoted journalist had attempted to do. This 
is done through continuous comparisons between the past and the present, using a highly 
sarcastic tone of voice. It might be that Kohl's "son's love has made him forget the past" 
22 Rub . . 
at Mengi, column, 29.05.2001, 'Everybody needs justice' Sabah, emphasls mme 
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(Milliyet, 26.05.2001i3, but journalists are keen to continuously remind Kohl and aff'mn their 
readers that Turkey has not forgotten. 
This is nowhere more apparent than in the front-page headlines of Milliyet newspaper on the 
day of the wedding, proclaiming that "Kohl has made peace with MehmetcilC,24 (Milliyet, 
26.05.2001i5• Covering half the front page, the news story focuses on a small, but quite 
nationalist note on the wedding invitations. The note requests the guests not to send any 
flowers to the wedding but instead to make donations to the Mehmetcik Foundation, a Charity 
set by the Turkish armed forces to help war veterans and the families of those who have lost 
their lives in war. This forms quite an irony for the journalist, who recalls right below the 
headline, Kohl's adamant objection to Turkey's inclusion to the EU, his policies against the 
Turkish Diaspora and his opposition to the selling of weaponry to the Turkish army. In 
addition, an extra item on the right side of the headline states in large fonts that "During his 
tenure, he refused to sell weapons to Turkey. However, his son's wedding invitations say 
'Donate to the Mehmetcik Foundation ' ... " Beside the pictures of Kohl and the invitation, 
there is also a picture of Elif pointing to the bride's role in the sudden change in Kohl's 
attitude. In the 'detailed news story' in the inside pages, half a page is devoted to an extended 
version of the same story under the highly ironic headline "Something strange is happening to 
Kohf' (Milliyet, 26.05.2001i6• The journalist covering the story is clearly not convinced by 
this sudden change and regards Kohl's attitude with suspicion, and then gives his reasons for 
doing so: 
"Even though the wedding is regarded as "the kinship of Turkey and Germany", the/act that 
Kohl was not on very good terms with Turkey remains fresh in memories. In the European 
summit in 1997, he had asked Turkey "What have you got to do with Europe when your 
religion and your culture are different?" and at the Luxemburg summit in 1998, he had been 
against Turkey's membership of the EU" 
Here the reporting of Kohl's words helps to enhance Kohl's representative role for Germany 
and for the Europeans who share his opinion. From the informal tone of address in the 
question, it is arguable that the quote is as direct as it claims to be. The particular way in 
: Metin, Pervin, 26.05.2001, 'Kohl has made peace with Mehmetcik' Mi~liyet 
Mehmetcik is a general name used to refer to any enlisted Turkish soldier. 
2S Metin, Pervin, 26.05.2001, 'Kohl has made peace with Mehmetcik' Milliyet 
26 Metin Pervin, 26.05.2001, 'Something strange is happening to Kohl' Milliyet 
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which his words have been put together not only adds an exaggerated tone of aggression to 
Kohl's opinions, but also personalizes the feud between him and Turkey. Since a personal 
offence calls for a personal defence, the news item, also as apparent in the subheading "He 
was against our membership of the EU - A struggle to erase the pasf', serves as a reminder of 
what had happened, presenting the readers with further evidence and asking them to take it 
personally and not forget the past. In doing so, the coverage reflects a deep cynicism about 
seeing Europe as the friendly partner. 
The day after the wedding, Hurriyet newspaper also had a front-page headline focusing on the 
contrast between the past and the present. The tone 
was, however, more forgiving than the sharp sarcasm 
of Milliyet newspaper. Under a striking title "The 
fine confessions that arrived with the wedding" 
(Hurriyet, 27.05.2001)27, the heading reads: 
"In his son 's wedding, Helmut Kohl, who followed 
policies against Turkey during his Chancellorship 
said, '1 had been biased against the Turks. What 
politicians could not do, Elif succeeded in doing '. " 
Fig.1 Elif Sozen and her father walking 
into the Church 
In this context Elif Sozen emerges as the Turkish girl 
who broUght Kohl down on his knees. Her role in Kohl's repentance is further reinforced 
with the two subheadings, "1 had been unfair" and "Elif's success", followed by a slightly 
extended version of the heading. In the inside pages, there is a two-page coverage of the 
wedding, and the second largest news piece of the spread has the title "My bride Elif's 
success". On the same day, Milliyet newspaper on its front page calls attention to Kohl ' s 
apologetic comment in the wedding under the subheading "Kohl confessed his sins" (Milliyet, 
27.05.2001i8, repeating the same title again in its coverage of the wedding in the inside 
pages. Again on the same day, Sabah newspaper uses the very same title inside an eye 
catching star illustration in its coverage (Sabah, 27.05.2001)29. 
27 Nilgun Karatas et.al, 27.05.2001, 'My bride Elif s success' Hurriyet 
28 Orner Erbil et.al, 27.05.2001, 'A wedding with three times ' I do's' Milliyet 
29 YusufDemir et. a1. 27.05.2001 , 'Three times: 1 do, 1 do, 1 do' Sabah 
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The phrase "confession of sins" is powerful, not only in identifying Kohl as the Christian 
other, but also positioning Turkey as the superior side from whom Kohl asks for forgiveness. 
Having Kohl 'confess' fulfils the desire to shift power towards the Turkish side. However, 
confessions may not be seen as enough repentance for some journalists. The previously 
quoted columnist, Ruhat Mengi openly admits that she does not yet feel satisfied: 
"And shall I tell you something, Uncle Kohl said those words "I was unfair to the Turks, I was 
prejudiced" a little too quietly. In between us ... as if confessing to a priest .. 
He should go and say it right in the heart of Europe so that everyone can hear. Of course, 
they voice their enmities in the loudest tone, and confessions in the lowesL. Whatever you 
say, I am still angry!" (Sabah, 29.05.2001)30 
There is a high degree of cynicism in these lines, as the journalist clearly suspects the 
sincerity of this 'too quiet' confession. Moreover, Europe's hostility towards Turkey is not 
limited to the past and to Kohl only. Here the guilt extends from Kohl to 'them', i.e. other 
European states and their leaders, who have been and still are, united in their loud opposition 
to Turkey. For this reason, it is not enough for Kohl to quietly repent; by demanding Kohl to 
confess audibly and "right in the heart of Europe" the journalist desires to see both Kohl and 
Europe defeated. Within this rhetoric of repentance and confessions, Europe clearly emerges 
not as a locus of positive identification, but as an 'other' in the form of an aggressor who has 
been trying to exclude Turkey. 
6.2.1.3 Compliance - having it the Turkish way 
Among the three weddings, the Kohl wedding offers a surprising emphasis on religion and 
traditions, as the journalists are especially keen on watching how the events unfold with 
regard to Turkish customs. Hurriyet newspaper, before the engagement took place, informed 
its readers that Helmut Kohl had come to Turkey to ask Kemal Sozen, the bride's father, for 
pennission to marry his son to Elif Sozen, emphasising that "Kemal Sozen is known for his 
conservatism" (Milliyet, 18.12.2000i1• The next day, following the engagement, the 
language used to describe what happened assures the readers that things took place in the 
accustomed Turkish way, such as the news item titled "We gave away a bride to the 
:~ Ruhat Mengi, column, 29.05.2001, 'Everybody needs justice' Sabah 
no-bylines, 18.12.2000, 'Kohl visits the in-laws' MilIiyet 
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Chancellor" (Sabah, 18.12.2000i2• Here, the verb "give" implies that Helmut Kohl asked for 
permission from Elifs father, as it is the custom for the father of the would-be-groom to visit 
the would-be-bride's family and ask for permission for his son to marry the girl. As discussed 
in the previous sections, since the families stand metaphorically for the two nations, pressing 
for Turkish customs becomes significant in exerting Turkey's authority in its relationship with 
Europe. The following lines leave no doubt that events proceeded in the accustomed way: 
H(. . .) and then Helmut Kohl went to the house of the Sozen family. Asking there for Elif 
Sozen's hand for his son Peter, who has been deeply in love with her for the past eleven years, 
Helmut Kohl got a positive answer. With a little ceremony among the family, the bride's 
family has agreed to give away their daughter into marriage. " 
The coverage of the engagement stresses the difference between the two cultures, while 
emphasising Helmut Kohl's compliance with Turkish customs. In fact, all three papers 
address Kohl and Elif Sozen's father as 'dunur', the informal way the in-laws of the bride and 
the groom address each other in Turkey, as accustomed in Turkish traditions33. Milliyet 
newspaper sees Kohl's visit to Elif Sozen's parents' home and her father's work in Canakkale 
as further evidence that the " .. former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl complied with 
Turkish traditions in his visits" (Milliyet, 18.12.2000i4. Readers are told in detail about 
Kohl's visit, such as the fact that the Kohl and Sozen families went to Canakkale to visit the 
factory Mr. Sozen is the manager of, in a helicopter provided by Mr. Sozen's boss. These 
details help to paint a prestigious picture of the Sozen family. However, perhaps the most 
interesting piece of information comes from Sabah reporters who write that "Helmut Kohl 
first went to the Gallipoli Cemetery for Turkish Soldiers" (Sabah, 18.12.2000)35, adding a 
nationalistic touch to Kohl's visit, which the readers would presume to be pre-planned by his 
Turkish host. 
These events, in fact, have symbolic significance in reassuring the readers that even though 
the bride is marrying the German groom, her cultural identity is still protected and will not be 
lost through the marriage. As will be further discussed in the next section, retaining Turkish 
32 no-bylines, 18.12.2000, 'We gave a bride to the Chancellor' Sabah, emphasis mine . 
33 Metin Akpinar, 17.12.2000, 'Tomorrow Kohl will ask Elifs family if his son can marry her' H~yet; no-
bylines, 18.12.2000, 'Kohl visits the in-laws' Milliyet; no-bylines, 18.12.2000, 'We gave a bnde to the 
Chancellor' Sabah 
34 
35 no-bylines, 18.12.2000, 'Kohl visits the in-laws' Milliyet 
nO-bylines, 18.12.2000, 'We gave a bride to the Chancellor' Sabah, 
195 
values and customs in the face of Western ones becomes particularly important as the day of 
the wedding, which is announced to involve a church ceremony, approaches: 
"In December, Kohl (...) visited Elifs house and asked for permission for his son to marry 
Elif, and in line with Turkish customs, the families agreed on the marriage." (Sabah, 
06.05.2001i6 
There are, however, still two contradictions that need to be resolved in order to convince the 
readers that the marriage will not endanger Elifs Turkishness. One is the fact that her 
fiancee, no matter what, is German. The Turkish public needs to be assured about the 
groom's intentions. Stories that describe Peter Kohl as "an amazing friend of the Turkish 
people, and acts like an ambassador in advertising Turkey abroad" (Hurriyet, 17.12.2000)37 
as well as someone who knows "six languages and through their relationship learned Turkish 
from Eli!' (Hurriyet, 17.12.2000i8 work to serve this purpose. In May, when covering the 
wedding ceremony at Ciragan, all three papers excitedly report that the groom had said, "I do" 
in Turkish after which "the whole party had burst into big applause" (Milliyet, 27.05.2001i9. 
Again reporting the wedding, Hurriyet journalists noted that it "got everyone's attention how 
the groom, in line with Turkish customs, kissed the hands of Elifs father and witness after the 
wedding papers had been signed" (Hurriyet, 27.05.2001)40. In addition to his willingness to 
follow Turkish customs, the groom is also reported to "know and has read a lot about Islam" 
(Sabah,29.05.2001)41. Moreover, reporters also hint that he offers potential for conversion, 
as made clear in the striking caption title "Elif can put Peter on the right trac/(' (Sabah, 
28.05.2001)42. Quoting an imam who says he has known Elif since her childhood, the caption 
reports that "Eli/, just like her family, is a very strong believer" and repeats the title once 
again for stronger emphasis, "she will definitely put Peter on the right trac/('. 
These depictions assure the readers that Elif is not compromising her identity by marrying 
Peter Kohl. Unlike his father or other Europeans who were so unfair to the Turks, the groom 
is portrayed as 'a good European' who is already half Turkish. However, this does not solve 
36 nO-bylines, 06.05.2001, 'The Wedding of the Year' Sabah . 
37 Metin Akpinar, 17.12.2000, 'Tomorrow Kohl will ask Elifs family ifhis son can marry her' H~yet 
:: Metin Akpinar, 17.12.2000, 'Tomorrow Kohl will ask Elifs family ifhis son can m~ her' Hurnyet 
40 ~er Erbil et.al., 27.05.2001, 'A wedding with three 'Ido's~ Milliyet, fr?nt-page headlme 
41 Ndgun Karatas, et.al., 27.05.2001, 'First St. Antuan, then Crragan' Humyet . 'd 
Nebahat Koc, 29.05.2001, front page summary news 'There was no Islamic marriage', followed on the IDS1 e 
'No Islamic marriage' Sabah 
42 Ahmet Ozay, 28.05.2001, 'A Grandson is on the way for Kohl' Sabah 
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the second problem: what to make of the church ceremony that took place on the wedding 
day. Even though the wedding in the Ciragan Palace was described as prepared 'in the 
Turkish style' (Sabah, 18.05.2001)43, where the menu, even including the wine, was 
completely Turkish, where classical Turkish music was played and where the groom complied 
with Turkish customs, for many these were not enough to compensate for the Christian form 
of the wedding that took place in the church, nor for the photographs of Elif walking into the 
church in her father's arms. To counterbalance the situation, it is necessary to assert the 
nation's own religious identity - yet the problem remains regarding what form of Islam is 
compatible with Turkish national identity. 
6.2.1.4 Confusion - But what is the Turkish way? 
Rumours and predictions about the wedding intensified in the news coverage around the time 
of the marriage. Among these, the most talked about issue was whether or not the couple 
were going to have an Islamic marriage. On May 6th, both Sabah and Hurriyet newspapers 
announced on their front pages that an Islamic marriage would in fact take place alongside the 
church wedding. Sabah newspaper chose the title "Islamic marriage for the groom Kohf' 
(Sabah, 06.05.2001)44 informing readers that two religious ceremonies would be he~d on the 
day: "After the Islamic marriage, there will be a ceremony at St. Antoine Church". Similarly, 
Hurriyet had the front page title "A marriage with both the Imam and the Priesf' (Hurriyet, 
06.05.2001)45. The day after the marriage, when news of the wedding dominated the front 
pages of all three dailies, the emphasis was again on the existence of the three weddings. 
Milliyet and Sabah used the similar headlines of "A marriage with three 'I do's " (Milliyet, 
27.05.2001)46 and "Three times: I do, I do, I do " (Sabah, 27.05.2001)47. On the inside pages, 
all three papers again extensively covered the issue, displaying pictures from the church 
ceremony but also remarking that the Islamic marriage came prior to the Christian one. 
Quite contradictorily, there seems to be no official confirmation that the Islamic marriage did 
in fact take place, and careful readers would notice the questionable reliability of the news 
stories about the Islamic wedding, as the wedding's coverage included different versions of 
: Nebahat Koc, 18.05.2001, 'Kohl is in Cesme until the wedding' Sabah 
45 no-b~lines, 06.05.2001, 'Islamic marriage for the groom Kohl' Sabah, ~ont-page ~ummary 
46 Kubday Keskin, 06.05.2001, 'A marriage with both the Imam and the Priest' Humyet, ~ont page summary 
47 Orner Erbil (et.al) 27.05.2001, 'A marriage with three 'I do's' Milliyet, front-page hea~lme 
YusufDemir (et.al) 27.05.2001, 'Three times: I do, I do, I do' Sabah, front-page headlme 
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when or how it actually took place. According to Milliyet newspaper, the Islamic marriage 
had taken place in a room at the Ciragan Palace, Hurriyet newspaper claimed that there had 
been an Islamic marriage in the bride's house two days prior to the wedding, while Sabah 
newspaper mentioned that such a marriage had taken place prior to the Christian one, but gave 
no further details. This implies that the journalists did not have clear information about the 
matter, and relied on rumours and vague remarks such as those by Hannolere Kohl that the 
wedding would conform to both Islamic and Catholic traditions (Sabah, 23.05.2001; Hurriyet, 
23.05.2001)48. Indeed, the journalists' insistence on bringing it to the foreground can be 
interpreted as a desire to make up for the Church wedding, for which the civil ceremony in the 
Ciragan Palace would not compensate. 
Yet, religion is not easily accommodated within the secular identity of Turkishness, especially 
when it has been seen in Turkish dominant discourses of modernization as a potential threat to 
the secular principles of the Turkish Republic. The idea of Islamic marriage itself contradicts 
the initial efforts of the Republic to replace it with a civil marriage as a part of its 
modernization project in its early years. While Islamic marriage is still a very common 
practice in Turkey and is not illegal as long as it succeeds the civil one, adopting it publicly 
under the critical gazes of the Europeans who would be watching is quite another matter. In 
this context, religion is perceived as a problem; on the one hand it is necessary to 
counterbalance the religious identity of the other side, and hence the journalist's eagerness to 
cover it. On the other, it presents a contradiction to the efforts to become modem. It is a no-
win situation. This explains the indecisiveness of the journalists on how to cover the 
situation. A subheading in Sabah newspaper makes an effort to highlight that the Islamic 
marriage did take place, while at the same time carefully not including it as a part of Turkish 
customs: 
"Following the Islamic marriage, the couple, Elif Sozen and Peter Kohl, said 'I do ' according 
to Christian traditions in St. Antoine's, and in line with Turkish traditions in the Ciragan 
Palace." (Sabah, 27.05.2001)49 
48 No by-lines, 23.05.2001, 'Our bride is very clever' on the front page, on the inside: 'Our bride Elif is v.ery cute 
and clever' Sabah. Also see Hurriyet on 23.05.2001 with the front page headline 'Mother Kohl praised her 
Turkish bride' continued on the inside as 'My bride is one and only' 
49 YusufDemir (et.al) 27.05.2001, 'Three times: I do, I do, I do' Sabah, front-page headline 
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The same concern is also evident in the Hurriyet newspaper, which, unlike its previous 
headline of May 6th, chose not to mention the number of marriages on its front-page headlines 
(Hurriyet, 27.05.2001)50. Instead, it had a short news summary titled in German "Einmal ist 
keinmaf', meaning only once does not count. The news story is covered extensively in the 
inside pages and on a separate page from the wedding coverage, and reminds the readers that 
it is actually illegal to have the Islamic marriage prior to the legal signing of the papers. 
However, the story adds that this mischief can be ignored as a one-off mistake. In the rest of 
the wedding coverage taking up a further two-page spread, a related news item titled "First St. 
Antoine's, then Ciragan" argues that "before the couple had the legal signing of the papers, 
they have followed both Islamic and Christian traditions", subtly drawing a line between what 
can be called Islamic and what can be Turkish. 
Once the wedding is over, the idea of having an Islamic marriage is more openly questioned 
and rejected by the journalists. Two days after the wedding, Hurriyet comes up with a new 
topic of debate which it frames as a ''public discussion" titled "Can a Muslim woman marry a 
Christian man?" (Hurriyet, 28.05.2001)51. The article asks whether there can be an Islamic 
marriage between Peter Kohl and his Muslim bride, and then questions the whole concept of 
the Islamic marriage. The article gives extensive space to directly quoted arguments from 
various religious authorities. The subheading "There is no such thing as Islamic marriage" 
puts particular emphasis on the arguments of one official, according to whom Islamic 
marriage is just a custom not a religious requirement, and what it intends to do is already 
fulfilled by the civil ceremony. 
Sabah newspaper also resorts to first hand information from religious authorities in a similar 
story. The item appears on the front page with the title "There was no Islamic marriage" 
(Sabah, 29.05.2001)52 and under a photograph of the newly wed couple. On the photo, inside 
a star illustration it writes "The new debate on the wedding of the year" and under it another 
title reads "The shocking declaration from the Associate Professor". The front-page item 
infonns readers that certain prayers were read to sanction the couple's marriage, without the 
rituals of the traditional Islamic ceremony. There is also detailed information on the religious 
so Nilgun Karatas (et.al) 27.05.2001, 'The fine confessions that came with the wedding' Hurriyet, front page 
headline 
:~ Ayhan Can, 28.05.2001, 'Can a Muslim woman marry a Christian man?' Hurriyet . 'd 
Nebahat Koc, 29.05.2001, 'There was no Islamic marriage', front page summary news, followed on the mSI e 
as 'No Islamic marriage' Sabah 
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authority present at this ceremony. He is introduced as an associate professor in theology 
who had "written 22 books on law in Islam", as well as being the bride's religion teacher from 
Robert College and a close friend of her father. The item also quotes the scholar's argument 
that there is in fact no such obligation to have a religious marriage in Islam. The story is 
picked up in the inside pages where it appears as a main news item covering half a page and 
titled "No Islamic marriage". The article is based on the interview with the same scholar 
where he argues that what is seen as 'Islamic marriage' by the public is only tradition and is 
not compulsory having lost its function with the civil marriage. His arguments are also 
backed up through an interview with another professor, who assures the readers that Islamic 
marriage is not a must. The news item, while emphasising that the groom "had read and 
knows a lot about Islam" also highlights that "Elif's hair was not covered" and that she was 
wearing a low cut shirt while the prayers were being read in the Islamic ceremony. Elifs 
unveiled attire is also the subheading of the same item. 
In both stories, the strong emphasis on religion serves to mark Turkey's difference from the 
West. At the same time, the news coverage also helps to depict the Islamic practices followed 
by the bride's family as fully compatible with their European identity, and with the secular 
norms and values of the Republic. In the stories, the bride's side emerges as a Turkish family 
that has remained loyal to its cultural distinctiveness and has not compromised its religious 
identity, without being traditional or backward. The religious authorities that are chosen to 
offer support to this picture come from academic circles, and are not too far away from the 
secular social circle ofElifSozen and her family. 
It is important to note that newspapers do not overtly advocate this interpretation of religion to 
their readers who might still find it controversial that Islamic marriage is nothing more than a 
tradition that can be left behind. Instead, news stories chose to present the issue as a ''public 
discussion", "a new debate", or as in Sabah's coverage "a shocking revelation" which got 
"people confused'. And yet, the very choice of this issue for coverage in the newspaper, the 
extensive space it is allocated in the news pages, the selection of witnesses, and the framing of 
it as a major discussion in the public sphere when only based on a few interviews conducted 
by the journalist, reflects a desire to re-read the prerequisites of religion and reinterpret it not 
as an obstacle to, but as compatible with a desired notion of Turkishness. In this regard, Elif 
Sozen and her religious practices provide a progressive example for the readers. 
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6.2.2 Overarching Discourses and concluding remarks 
The coverage of Elif Sozen' s wedding is dominated by an overriding discourse of nationalism 
and unapologetic praise for the national self. As Ozkirimli and Yumul have found in their 
study on Turkish dailies, the positive evaluation of the national self is often accompanied by 
open or hidden messages about the inferiority of others (2000: 797). In the case of Elif 
Sozen's wedding, there is not a hidden but continuous and overt attempt to describe the 
European other, represented mainly through Helmut Kohl's persona, as the inferior side. This 
becomes most evident in the front-page headlines, predominantly written in a sarcastic style, 
and quite often ridiculing the former Chancellor's attempts at repairing his strained 
relationship with the Turks. 
This attempt to position Europe as the inferior side also points to existing anxiety about 
Europe. Throughout the coverage of the wedding, Europe is present as the initially powerful 
other, posing a continuous threat to the aspirations and self-perception of Turkish people by 
the possibility of rejecting them and excluding them from Europe. The wedding and 
particularly Helmut Kohl's changed attitude presents the chance to not only show the readers 
the turning of the tables in terms of power relationships, and but also to teach Europe a lesson. 
In other words, Elif Sozen's wedding provides the opportunity to symbolically normalize the 
relation of power between Europe and Turkey, and to overcome the threat of exclusion. 
All this, however, does not eliminate the existing desire to be accepted by Europe. In this 
context, the desire for inclusion, frustration and anxiety from the possibility of exclusion 
result in a continuous and what can only be regarded as an exasperating comparison between 
Turkey and Europe. At this point, the coverage of Elif Sozen's wedding intersects Sureyya 
Ayhan's story: both point to, beneath the declaration of superiority, a heavy feeling of 
ressentiment, which Greenfeld defines as a psychological state resulting from "suppressed 
feelings of envy and hatred (existential envy) and the impossibility of satisfying these 
feelings" (1992: 15). This does not undermine the significance of the nationalistic rhetoric 
that shows up unapologetically in the headlines, but the overt nationalism should be read as a 
camouflage for this resentment. The linguistic tools that enhance a positive presentation of 
the self and negative presentation of the other, such as in the form of sharp sarcasm and 
cynicism, help to reinforce the feeling of national superiority in order to compensate for the 
frustration. 
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At the same time, the threat from the European other is double-edged: it is not only exclusion 
that threatens the envisioned national identity. Inclusion, or more precisely, becoming 
"European" is also problematic, for it poses the risk of cultural assimilation. This is again a 
shared concern with the case study on Sureyya Ayhan. With Sureyya Ayhan, the significance 
of protecting the cultural distinctiveness of the nation surfaces in the debates about over-
Westernisation, and the emerging risk to national norms on gender and morality. With Elif 
Sozen's wedding, the unfolding discussion is concerned with preserving the authentic culture 
through customs and traditions, and not compromising these through marriage with the 
Euopean other. The news stories on how the two families followed Turkish customs during 
the couple's engagement provide a good example of this concern. However, the meaning of 
authentic culture becomes a contested issue once Europe presents religion as a part of its 
cultural identity, through the Church wedding, and Turkey has to meet it by asserting its 
Muslim identity through an Islamic marriage. At this point, whether Elif did or did not have 
an Islamic marriage becomes important because Elif, in becoming the nation's daughter, not 
only represents the nation's cultural authenticity, but also its modernity and secular lifestyle. 
It is at this point that the coverage reveals the contradictory relationship between Islam, 
secularism and national identity. 
The inconsistencies that arise regarding the place of religion in national culture can be found 
embedded in Turkey's modernization project and its secularist policies. Today secularism is a 
hegemonic public discourse in contemporary Turkey and forms the "state's preferred 
narrative about itself' (Navaro-Yashin 2002: 6-7). However, its definition is far from being 
self-explanatory or clear; neither does it mean that religion and state are exogenous 
categories. As discussed briefly in the second chapter, from the first formative years of the 
RepUblic, secularisation was seen as "a necessary, if not sufficient" (Arat 2001: 35) condition 
of Westernisation and formed the backbone of Kemalist modernization reforms. Zurcher 
(cited in Gole 1998: 57-58) groups the radical changes introduced by the secularisation 
process under three headings: firstly, institutional changes were followed to secularise the 
state, its education and law, such as the abolition of the caliphate, secularisation of the 
educational system and the adoption of the civil code. Second, changes were undertaken to 
. ·1·· h as the replace religious symbols by European symbols of European CIVI IsatlOn, suc 
replacing of the Arabic script with Latin alphabet, or the adoption of a new, Western-style 
dress code. Lastly were the attempts to secularise everyday social life and popular religion, 
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such as the banning of religious shrines and dervish orders. What is striking about all these 
changes is that they show the Kemalist state elite's attempts to constrain religion, rather than 
refusing or eliminating it. As Davison (2003) points out, this is because from the very 
beginning the state, let alone rejecting religion, sought to maintain it as a constitutive part of 
the nation's identity and its cultural distinctiveness vis-A-vis the West. 
This did not imply a wholehearted acceptance of Islam with all its meanings however, but 
rather crafting a version of it that was carefully supported through state institutions, ensuring 
the "proper relationship between nationalism, national solidarity, and Islam" (ibid.: 339). In 
this relationship, the desired version of religion would not have certain forms of Islamic 
control and expression which were seen as wrong and "rejected as superstitious, fanatical, 
reactionary, and obscurantist" (ibid.: 341). This understanding, which aimed to shape "the 
content of belief and norm" (ibid.: 341) and "privatise Islam" (Arat 2001: 43) was - and still 
is - sustained through state institutions and cultural policies. The continued instruction of 
religion in national primary and intermediate schools, state-sponsored religious education and 
training, and the practices of the Directorate of Religious Affairs which oversees all religious 
matters, from the monitoring of mosques to the determining of texts to be read in mosques 
across the country in Friday sermons, help to maintain this understanding. 
As Davison argues, while this state-sponsored understanding of Islam might be at odds with 
the understanding found amongst other people at large, "it still is an understanding of Islam" 
(ibid.). For this reason, he argues that the series of hybrid and alternative arrangements in the 
politics of secularisation that lie at the heart of the Turkish modernization process can hardly 
be examined within the analytical category of secularism. Neither can the Turkish state be 
studied as a secular one in the sense that the state is free from religion (ibid.; c.f. Navaro-
Yashin 2002). But if we leave the debate over the analytical usefulness of the concept aside, 
what we see here is a powerful discourse in Turkey about secularism that excludes Islamic 
identity from defInitions of modernity, but at the same time accepts it as a constitutive part of 
national identity. Although it might be hybrid, ambiguous or ambivalent, this discourse 
serves two very important functions: it not only helps to define and control religion, but also, 
it uses that constrained version, to resist and negotiate with Europe. In other words, Turkish 
secularism, while legitimising the claims of the Europeanness of the Turkish nation, also 
limits its Europeanisation. 
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The coverage ofElif Sozen's Islamic marriage fits this framework. What the journalists do in 
their reporting is to reinstate religion's part in the nation's identity and use it to distinguish the 
nation from Europe. Elif Sozen's wedding allows Europeanisation, but one that is ultimately 
limited by the nation's cultural distinctiveness, including its religious identity. At the same 
time the news stories also appropriate the expression of religion to make sure it is in line with 
the desired version of Islam. The interviews with religious authorities, all of them state 
approved officials, the continued storyline on Islamic marriage, and the framing of the 
discussion as a 'public debate' all work towards achieving this goal. 
6.3 "Neither Islamic, nor Turkish, or Western ... " 
- The wedding of Elif Erbakan 
6.3.1 Thematic analysis - themes addressed in the coverage and allocation of sub-themes 
to thematic areas 
Of these three weddings covered by the newspapers readers received most information about 
Elif Erbakan's. Though journalists conducted no direct interviews with her, readers gained an 
insight into her relationship with her fiancee, and had the chance to familiarize themselves 
with her in a number of photographs published prior to the wedding itself. However despite 
her visibility, of all three brides Elif Erbakan was treated least favourably by the journalists, 
mainly because she was the daughter of the Islamist politician Necmetting Erbakan. My 
thematic analysis in the first four sections examines the reasons for the journalists' criticism 
of the bride and of the wedding itself. The last section examines the coverage by certain 
columnists that diverges from the hegemonic reading and offers an alternative interpretation 
of the wedding. 
6.3.1.1 Introducing the happy couple - Elif Erbakan and her fiancee 
Unlike Elif Sozen, Elif Erbakan' s qualifications are not a prominent theme in the news stories 
prior to the wedding. Rather, the groom's achievements and the couple's relationship are 
foregrounded in the coverage during the early months of their engagement. The first news 
about the couple appears in the newspapers as early as January, when Elif Erbakan's fiancee, 
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Mehmet Altinoz, is described as "the centre of attention for the press" (Sabah, 13.03.2001)53. 
With their emphasis on the groom, these stories reflect the journalists' curiosity about who is 
marrying the religious leader's daughter. Particularly Sabah's coverage in its three stories 
(Sabah, 05.01.2001; Sabah, 06.01.2001; Sabah, 07.03.2001)54 highlights the groom's 
educational background and that he is a "university graduate". In particular, the news item 
places an exaggerated emphasis on the groom's qualifications: 
"( ... ) 27 year old Mehmet Altinoz is the son of one of the best known families in Bursa. (..) 
like all other members of his family, Mehmet Altinoz is also in the furniture business. Altinoz, 
who has a degree in business administration, also had two years of language education in 
the UK. The groom-to-be, who can speak English and Italian, took over the Altinoz 
furniture business in Bursa after finishing his degree." (Sabah, 07.03.2001)55 
Such a detailed introduction of the groom contrasts with the brief description of Elif Erbakan 
in the following paragraph of the same news item, which reads simply "Erbakan's Bilkent 
University graduate daughter". Another news item offers slightly more detail, describing her 
as "Elif Erbakan, who is responsible for the Women's Commission (of the party) in 
Istanbul, was born in 1974, and is a graduate of Bilkent University." The explanatory clause 
foregrounds her political activities rather than her education. Except for a passing quote from 
the groom in Milliyet newspaper, which reveals that "Elif is an interior architect" (Milliyet, 
26.05.2001)56, ElifErbakan's education is hardly ever emphasised throughout this case study. 
This is in sharp contrast to the coverage of Elif Sozen analyzed earlier. 
Instead, the journalists show sustained interest in Elif Erbakan's fiancee. A month before the 
wedding, Sabah newspaper portrayed the groom in great detail in a boxed news item titled 
"The groom feels sure of himself when it comes to swimming" (Sabah, 03.05.2001 i7. I fmd 
this item particularly successful in arousing the curiosity of the readers about the groom, 
especially as swimming is regarded as a Western sport in Turkey, and an indicator of 
Westernness. Pictures of young people, especially women, wearing swimwear and proving to 
53 Nebahat Koc, 13.03.2001, 'I love Elif Sabah, emphasis mine . 
54 Nebahat Koc, 05.01.2001, 'A new Groom for Erbakan' Sabah; Nebahat Koc, 06.01.70~1, 'APpare~Yd ~If 
Erbakan got engaged during her holy visit (Umre)' Sabah; Yavuz Ozgunay, 07.03.2001, EhfErbakan e e 
foom from his photograph' Sabah . . 5: Yavuz Ozgunay, 07.03.2001, 'ElifErbakan liked ~he groo~ fr~~ his photograph' Sabah, emphasiS mme. 
Erdogan Pacin 26.05.2001 'She drew her own bndal dress Mtlhyet 
57 ' • . ' ,. 'Our honeymoon Nebahat Koc, 03.05.2001 'The groom is very sure of himself when It comes to swtmmmg m 
is in Venice' Sabah 
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the world the modernness of the new nation have an important place in the iconography of the 
Republic. A good example of this is a meaningful advertisement campaign for a swim wear 
company that launched in 1997, the same year Erbakan was forced to step down as Prime 
Minister. Showing Ataturk in his swimsuit by the beach, and with the title 'We missed the 
sun', the campaign was a big success and a favourite among the secularists. 58 Given this 
context, the groom's hobby can be seen to contradict the lifestyle of the religious family he is 
marrying into. The remaining news story again mentions his "well-known family" alongside 
references to his educational background including the languages he speaks and "his business 
administration degree from the Open University". Furthermore, more personal details are 
supplied, such as his membership to foreign business clubs, his passion for sports, interest in 
reading, and that his favourite stations on the radio are the ones that play ''foreign music". All 
these contribute to his image as a young and active businessman with a Western lifestyle. 
This item is part of a large news report on the same page, based on an interview with the 
groom with the headline "Our honeymoon will be in Venice" (Sabah, 03.05.2001)59. The 
accompanying titles above and below the headline are again based on the groom's words: 
"The groom Altinoz reveals his wedding plans: Elif and I are going to get married with 
Hungarian Gypsy music playing as our wedding tune" 
"Elif will wear a covered dress but without a veil. We chose its fabric together in Bursa." 
"[the groom] likes to surprise Elif, mostly by bringing her Orchids" 
As well as information on the groom's relationship with the bride, the journalist reporting the 
interview also puts special emphasis on the groom's relationship with Elifs father. The 
caption under the groom's picture highlights in bold capital letters that he "gets along very 
well with his father-in-law" followed by a short paragraph about how he "insistently" 
mentions his love for Erbakan. 
58 More recently devout Islamist women and men's 'covered' swimsuits - full-body for women covering from 
head to ankle, ~d long shorts for men and both made out of special non-clingy fabric- and their se~~gated 
beaches in Turkey have been seriously challenging the establishment's ownership of this leisure a~tl.vlty. Not 
surp " I '" . b 't f d'a cun'osity if not ndlcule for nsmg y, Islamlst swtmmmg and beach practIces have een an I em 0 me I , 
~ainstream papers. 
Nebahat Koc, 03.05.2001 'Our honeymoon is in Venice' Sabah 
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In this, and in other news items, Erbakan's identity continues to shape the journalists 
expectations of and the reactions towards the groom and the bride. In the coverage preceding 
the wedding Erbakan is often referred to as "The politically prohibited leader of the banned 
Welfare Party" (Hurriyet, 05.01.2001; Sabah, 06.01.2001; Sabah, 03.05.2001; Sabah, 
13.03.2001; Sabah, 19.04.2001; Milliyet, 25.05.2001; Milliyet, 26.05.2001; Milliyet, 
17.06.2001; Sabah, 03.05.2001)60 in the very first paragraphs, reminding the readers not of his 
former position as the Prime Minister but his political ideology, which was a threat to the 
modem aspirations of the state and therefore had to be banned. Following this, Elif Erbakan' s 
identity is defined through her father, often as "the daughter of the politically prohibited 
leader o/the banned Welfare Party" (Hurriyet,05.01.2001). Within this framework, it is no 
coincidence that the journalists were more interested in the groom than the bride. The 
groom's hobby of swimming, his musical tastes or his business memberships seem almost too 
Western and out of place compared to the journalists expectation of the Islamist lifestyle. 
6.3.1.2 Romance Muslim Style - Elif Erbakan's relationship with her fiancee 
All wedding stories, by default, raise expectations about romance, as well as curiosity about 
the nature of the relationship. The news stories about Elif Erbakan' s wedding also share this 
interest. However, in this instance the coverage is highly sarcastic, reflecting the journalists' 
incredulity in imagining a romantic relationship for the Islamist leader's daughter. As noted 
in the previous section, Mehmet Altinoz emerges as the dominant figure in the relationship, 
adhering to western ideals of romance, surprising his bride by buying her orchids, and by 
"declaring" his love for Elif Erbakan, which finds its way into the tabloid headline "/ love 
Elif' (Sabah, 13.03.2001)61. This article, based on a short interview with the groom, describes 
him as "travelling back and forth" between the two different cities where the couple live, and 
more than once quotes him as having commented on how much they love to go out to dinner, 
as highlighted by the subheading "Romantic dinners alone". While such details could be 
regarded as common content for most tabloid stories, the newsworthiness of articles such as 
"Our honeymoon will be in Venice" or "1 love Elif' emerges from their juxtaposition with 
Islamist tastes. Even when there is no direct sarcasm in these earlier stories about the couple, 
60 See for examples 05.01.2001 Hurriyet; 06.01.2001 Sabah and 03.05.2001 Sabah; 13.03.2001 Sabah; 
lt04.2001 Sabah; 25.05.2001 Milliyet; 26.05.2001 Milliyet; 17.06.2001 Milliyet; 02.06.2001 Sabah. 
Nebahat Koc, 13.03.2001 'I love Elif, Sabah 
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the Turkish secular reader targeted by the journalists can easily pick up the irony that is 
produced by bringing together the stereotypical signifiers of Western romance and Islam. 
In one of the first articles about the couple, Sabah (06.01.2001)62 reveals a good example of 
this attitude. The headline for the news item explains to the readers how the decision to marry 
was taken during her pilgrimage to Mecca: "Apparently Elif Erbakan got engaged during her 
holy trip,,63. The following spot also notes 'It was revealed that Necmettin Erbakan's 
younger daughter Elif Erbakan got engaged to the furniture store owner Mehmet Altinoz 
during her holy trip'. The insinuation that arises with the word choice "apparently" and "it 
was revealed that" points to the seemingly odd combination of pilgrimage and romance, 
while calling into question the romantic nature of such an engagement. 
How the couple initially met is an issue of major interest for the journalists, as apparent from 
its repeated coverage in all three papers. According to the titles of an item in Sabah, Elif had 
"liked the groom from his photograph" (Sabah, 07.03.2001)64. The story notes that the couple 
were shown each other's photographs by their elders, pointing to the arranged, but flexible, 
nature of their marriage. If the journalists covered such information with a subtle tongue in 
cheek attitude, they were openly amused by the case of another story of how the couple had 
met that was revealed shortly after the wedding. All three papers ran the story on the same 
day (Hurriyet, 20.06.2001, Milliyet, 20.06.2001, Sabah, 20.06.2001)65, having picked it up 
from another story published in the pro-Erbakan and pro-Islamist newspaper, Milli Gazete. It 
is a major story in all three papers covering a quarter of a page with Milliyet also running a 
summary of the story on its front-page. According to the story, an elderly friend who knew 
both families first brought up the issue of marriage. Following this, Elif prays and then goes 
to sleep in the hope of receiving divine guidance in her dreams about the matter and is told 
that the family friend promises to meet her on the holy pilgrimage. Later Elif and her future 
husband end up flying on the same plane on their way to the pilgrimage and the families 
officially agree on the engagement. 
62 Nebahat Koc, 06.01.2001 'Apparently Elif Erbakan got engaged during her holy trip' Sabah. The insuniating 
conjunction "megerse" is translated as "apparently" here. 
63 E h· . mp aslsmme. 
: Yavuz Ozgunay, 07.03.2001, 'ElifErbakan liked the groom from his photograph'. Sabah, , 
no by-lines, 20.06.2001, 'Elif dreamt of her own marriage' Hurriyet; Orner ErbIl, 20.06.2001, In her ~eam, 
she saw she would get married!' Milliyet· Nebahat Koc & Huseyin Ozalp, 20.06.2001 'The steps to matn~ony 
, . ·11· . t·tl d 'The promise of 
were taken on the way to the pilgrimage' Sabah. The front-page summary m MI Iyet IS I e 
marriage came with the dream', again by Orner Erbil. 
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The story was covered with much amusement. News headlines on the inside pages of both 
papers announced that she "had dreamt of her own marriage", with the Milliyet journalist 
stressing his incredulity with an exclamation mark, while Hurriyet created the same feeling by 
the use of the inferential past tense. Both news items, covering almost a quarter of the page, 
have a box explaining the custom of praying to see the groom-to-be in one's dream, assuming 
that most readers would not know about it. The language used throughout the story is openly 
sarcastic, which is particularly evident in the use of punctuation marks: 
"Milli Gazete, which is known for its affiliation to Erbakan, saved the whole of the back cover 
of yesterday's edition to the renowned (/) wedding ceremony. 
But with one difference; startingfrom how the couple had met ... " (Hurriyet, 20.06.2001)66 
" (. . .) the way the couple met is very interesting. Milli Gazete reported the story of the 
meeting, which is much better than old Anatolian legends, under the title "The Story of the 
Matrimony" (..)" (Milliyet, 20.06.2001)67 
The rest of the story, both narrating the 'meeting' in a style that mimics fairy tales, is quite 
similar in both papers. The apparent similarity between the wording and the coverage 
suggests that both newspapers could have used the same journalist. However, the coverage is 
not different in Sabah either. Under a picture of a Saudi Arabian Airlines aeroplane, the 
caption reads "See you in Mecca", while a subheading reads, "They met on the Jumbo [jet]" 
(Sabah, 20.06.2001)68. 
This story is powerful in not only satirising the Erbakan family, but the Islamists as a whole 
through the Islamist newspaper. The use of sarcasm is evident albeit in varying degrees 
across different storylines and newspapers in the reporting on the couple's relationship. This 
can be seen as an indication of the unwillingness to see romance, which is portrayed as a 
Western construct, as compatible with the life of the Islamist leader, regarding them as 
exclusive categories. The same attitude also emerges with respect to the dress, and other 
wedding details. 
: no bY-lines, 20.06.2001, 'Elif dreamt of her own marriage' Hurriyet 
68 Orner Erbil, 20.06.2001, 'Elif dreamt of her own marriage!' Milliyet 
Nebahat Koc & Huseyin Ozaip, 20.06.2001 'The steps to matrimony were taken on the way to the 
pilgrimage', Sabah 
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6.3.1.3 The white dress with a twist - with or without the veil? 
Elif Erbakan' s wedding dress forms a main theme of the coverage. Since she wears the veil 
in everyday life, the news that she will be wearing a bridal gown without the Islamist veil 
sparked considerable media interest about her dress. 
Apart from one article (Sabah, 19.04.2001)69 all news items which specifically mention the 
bridal dress prior to and after the wedding inform the readers about the lack of the Islamist 
veil. Milliyet and Sabah newspapers specifically emphasise that this was the groom's 
decision. One news article in Milliyet focuses solely on this issue. On the front page, in a 
short teaser titled "A wedding dress without the veilfor Hodja's Elif' (Milliyet, 25.05.2001)70, 
the article draws out the contrast between the political leader who advocated the wearing of 
the veil and his daughter who refused to wear it at her wedding. The same article also reports 
that Erbakan gave in to the demands of the groom: 
"( ... ) when the groom pushed for a wedding gown without the veil, Erbakan agreed on a 
bridal veil or a cap that would cover his daughter's hair.,,71 
In the inside pages, the story, headlined "The Groom wants a bridal dress without the 
[Islamist] veif' (Milliyet, 25.05.2001)72 mentions the groom's role six times, even though 
there is no direct or indirect quote from him supporting this. In the subheading, the repeated 
comment that "The groom wants a dress without the veif' is highlighted in bold red colours 
for added significance. The language in the article describes a "crisis" within the family, 
where the parents had to be "convinced". The conflict is said to have been resolved when 
"the dress was prepared according to the wishes of the groom" who "got what he wanted'. In 
the end "Erbakan's family could not say anything" and "Erbakan accepted'. 
The next day, the same paper had another much shorter article called "She [Elif Erbakan] 
designed her wedding dress" based on comments made by the groom. Even though there is 
the subheading "She asked the groom's opinion", the news indicates that the groom might not 
have been solely responsible for choosing the veil: 
~: Ibrahim Oge, 19.04.2001, 'They went shopping for the dress' Sabah. . ., . 
71 No by-lines, 25.05.2001, 'A wedding dress without the veil for Hodja's Ehf Mtlhyet, front-page tItle 
emphasis mine 
72 Yildiz Yazicioglu, 25.05.2001, 'The Groom wants a bridal dress without the veil' Milliyet 
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"Ms. Elif is an interior architect. She designed her wedding gown. She asked for my opinion 
as well. ( . .) As far as 1 know, the dress will not show her hair. Only her face will show." 
(Milliyet, 26.05.2001)73 
It might have been the case that the groom had felt the need to speak, to give another 
interpretation of what happened, even though Milliyet was reluctant about letting go of their 
own story, and emphasised the groom's role in deciding about the headdress in another news 
article prior to the wedding (Milliyet, 17.06.2001)74. What really took place is not the concern 
of this research. Indeed, from the existing data it is impossible to make reliable assertions. 
However, the emphasis on the dress without the veil, combined with hints about the groom's 
role, help to portray the un-veiled dress as Erbakan's inability to apply the social order he 
politically stood up for in his own home. A very troubled-looking photograph of Erbakan 
rolling his eyes and with one hand on his head above the caption "Erbakan accepted," 
confirms this image (Milliyet, 25.05.2001f5• 
While the coverage in Hurriyet and Sabah does not foreground the groom's role in the 
decision over the dress, there is still a persistent emphasis on the dress as evident in news 
headlines and subheadings. The day after the wedding, Sabah reported that "Elif Erbakan did 
not want a dress with the veil, she preferred to cover her hair with a cap" (18.06.2001) and 
Hurriyet reported that Elif Erbakan had 'a dress which she had designed and had a special 
veil covering her hair rather than the Islamic one' (18.06.2001)76. What seems to have been 
neglected in these stories is the fact that the decision had still been on a form of veil. The 
novelty for the journalists might have been in the style of the veil, yet even this seems 
unconvincing. A photograph taken at the wedding of Erbakan's oldest daughter and 
published on two consecutive days also shows the bride wearing a white dress with a covering 
of her hair through what resembles a cap, rather than the Islamist veil tightly tied around the 
neck. Therefore, the conflict about the 'un-veiled wedding dress that still covers the hair' can 
be related to the journalists' perception of the veil. The veil here is not seen as a garment that 
changes with fashion and style and therefore is adaptable, but as a covering that stays the 
same. In doing so, the news stories fix not only the form but also the meaning of the veil as 
~: Erd~gan Pac in, 26.05.2001 'She designed her own bridal dress' Milliyet 
75 A~h Oktener, 17.06.2001 'The banned wedding' Milliyet . ., .. 
76 YIIdiz Yazicioglu, 25.05.2001, 'The Groom wants a bridal dress without the Isl~lc veIl Mtlhyet 
Muharrem Aydin et. al. 18.06.2001 'A palace wedding to Hodja's daughter' Hurnyet 
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an anti-modem, and anti-Western garment which is incompatible with the Western wedding 
dress. 
6.3.1.4 A real white wedding - criticising the event 
As the wedding drew near, criticism similar to, but stronger than that about the wedding dress 
appeared regarding the wedding venue, the choice of music and the style of the invitations _ 
all of which were regarded as 'too Western' for the Islamist leader. Sabah announced the 
preparations for the wedding in a front-page headline as "From Erbakan Hodja to his 
daughter: A High Society wedding" (Sabah, 02.06.2001)77 which continued on a full-page on 
the inside. This deliberate choice of addressing Erbakan as the 'Hodja' helps to caricaturise a 
traditional man in an extravagant and posh setting, described as "one of the most luxurious 
hotels in the world' on the front page. Around the date of the wedding news coverage in all 
three papers frequently refers to Erbakan in this form. 
In general, coverage of the wedding draws attention to changes in Erbakan's actions and 
beliefs. Journalists are keen on providing evidence from the past to compare it with any 
differences in his attitude in the present. For example, in his front-page coverage a journalist 
from Sabah explains that although the venue for the wedding of Erbakan's oldest daughter 
was also a five star hotel, the preparations for Elif Erbakan's wedding are remarkably 
different. In the full-page coverage78 inside, Elif Erbakan's wedding is described as a "real 
Western wedding,,79, not comparable to that of her sister. 
"While Erbakan had married off his older daughter with readings from the Kur' an, he 
westernised himself for Eli/,8o 
"However, Erbakan is going to perform a first and have a completely 'Western' wedding for 
Eli!,81 
: Huseyin Ozalp, 'From Erbakan Hodja to his daughter: A High Society wedding' 02.06.2001 Sabah 
79 The story inside is titled 'A High Society Wedding for Elif 
8 Emphasis mine. 
°E h' . 8 mp aslS mme. 
I Emphasis mine. 
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Further details are provided to fully convince the readers of the westernness of the impending 
wedding. The date is "not the 'Holy Friday' but Sunday" 82, and the wedding venue is "the 
high society's favourite, the Ciragan Palace". The subheadings emphasise that the dress is 
"without the Islamic veil" and "Romanian gypsy music" is chosen for the wedding. A picture 
of the invitation is also provided, pointing out that "no religious motifs have been used" in the 
invitation but the "& sign from English was used in between the names of the bride and the 
groom", interpreting this as yet another sign of the western look of the wedding. All these 
details, which are reported to "have surprised everyone", are termed as "Hodja's revolutions". 
Fig.2 "The much talked photograph", Erbakan bringing his daughter 
to the weddin2 venue, Milliyet 
Similar themes also 
appear on Milliyet's news 
story on the day of the 
wedding. An item with 
the title "First the prayers 
then the gypsy music" 
appears on the front page, 
informing readers that 
Elif s sister had religious 
hymns at her wedding 
(Milliyet, 17.06.2001)83. 
The story receives half-
page coverage on the 
inside. The wedding day coverage also highlights similar contradictions for journalists, 
foremost of which is the "dress dichotomy" (Sabah, 18.06.2001; Hurriyet, 18.06.2001; 
Milliyet, 18.06.2001)84 accompanied by pictures of veiled guests as well as guests in 
fashionable cocktail dresses. While these news items repeatedly cite examples highlighting 
the Westernness of the wedding, what the journalists actually emphasise is the hybrid form of 
the wedding that will never be completely Western. As Sabah's headline notes, what results 
IS a: 
82 Friday is a holy day in Islam. 
83 Asli Oktener, 'First the prayers then the gypsy music' . , 
84 Ali Ozluer et. ai, 18.06.2001, 'The dress dichotomy' Sabah. Also see Muharrem Aydm et.al, 18.06.2001 , ': 
palace wedding for Hodja's daughter' Hurriyet; Emine Turker et. al. 18.06.2001 , 'Erbakan was late for hIS 
daughter's wedding too' Milliyet 
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" ( ... ) synthesis of Islamic traditions and European celebrations. As the fireworks went off, 
red roses were scattered to symbolise love; while prayers were being said, non-alcoholic 
tropical cocktails were sipped." (Sabah, 20.06.2001)85 
For the secular journalists, this is not a desired synthesis but a contradiction in itself. The 
perceived absurdity of the situation is powerfully conveyed through the choice of 
contradictory images such as the sipping of tropical cocktails, blowing of fireworks, scattering 
of red roses and chanting of prayers all described as if taking place at the same time. A 
columnist from Milliyet is more direct in her judgement. For her, this is a "distastefuf' and 
"odd-looking" picture which is "neither Islamist, nor Turkish, and not Western either" 
(Milliyet, 21.06.2001)86. She finds the hybrid form of the wedding so absurd, so incredulous 
that she caricaturises it in detail in her column. For the columnist, far from being a sign of 
Islamist modernization, the wedding is "a freakishness" caused by bad "imitation". 
This column is not the only item in which the wedding is framed as 'Western imitation'. Two 
days after the wedding the front-page headline of Milliyet read as "The much talked 
photograph" (Milliyet, 19.06.2001)87 revealing a secretly taken picture from the wedding of 
Elif walking into the venue in her father's arms. The large captions for the picture inform the 
readers that the scene is just like the ''famous Hollywood movie, Father of the Bride!" Again 
on the front page, under a subheading "This is not in the traditions", a well-known professor 
of religion is quoted as complaining that this is a disgrace and that in Islam there is no such 
custom. The short summary on the front page emphasises the fact that the wedding caused a 
stir in Islamist circles. 
The coverage continued on a full page inside the paper with the headline "This picture looks 
very familiar" (Milliyet, 19.06.2001)88 sharpening its level of sarcasm. The two photographs 
showing Erbakan walking his daughter down the aisle have the caption titles "American style 
wedding" and "Flowers on the jackef'. The rose pinned to Erbakan's jacket is circled in one 
photograph, and a small picture next to it shows Kohl at his son's wedding, again with 
flowers on his jacket. According to the heading under the headline people responded to the 
85 Nebahat Koc & Huseyin Ozalp, 20.06.2001, 'Six thousand red roses for Elif Sabah, continued coverage from 
the front page 
86 Berrin Cankanat, column, 21.06.2001, 'Odd-looking' Milliyet 
87 Emine Turker, 19.06.2001, 'The much talked photograph', front page headline, Milliyet 
88 Emine Turker, 19.06.2001, "This picture looks very familiar" Milliyet. Provincial edition of the paper has a 
different headline that is more direct in its sarcasm "You, imitator Hodja". 
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wedding by arguing that "Hodja carried out Christian traditions". In a separate column 
under the title "This is against Islam", there are six short interpretations of the wedding from 
various opinion leaders who all but one, an MP from the Virtue Party, denounce the wedding. 
The spot highlights two of the opinions: "As opposed to some who argue that 'There is no 
such wedding in Islam' there are also others who say 'when Hodja does it, it can become our 
tradition "'. 
This news story is particularly powerful as it places the mental image about Erbakan, and 
what he represents next to Christianity. It is important to note that Erbakan is not compared 
with Elif Sozen's father, or satirised for imitating the previous wedding. Instead, he is 
directly compared to Helmut Kohl, and criticised for mimicking Christian traditions. In the 
coverage Erbakan appears as no friendlier than the Christian Kohl. At the same time, this 
story and others appearing in all three papers also seriously undermine Erbakan's credibility 
as the leader of Islamist politics, who is known to have worked to "establish 'just order' on 
the basis of his Sunni Islamic 'image of good society'" throughout his political career 
(Kalaycioglu, 2005: 156). The headlines in Hurriyet and Sabah "A palace wedding for 
Hodja's daughter" (18.06.2001) and "Six thousand red rosesfor Elif' (20.06.2001) reflect this 
attitude89• This criticism is most poignant in a column titled "This is the wedding of the 'just 
order' " by Bekir Coskun: 
"I have looked at the photos of our respectable Muslim brother Erbakan bringing his 
daughter in his arms ... 
We wish them happiness ... 
But then, what about the "You evil imitators of the West"?. 
Wasn't it with such words that enmity towards Ataturk has escalated .. That Mustafa Kemal 
was declared a "heretic" just because he looked up to Western civilisation and did away with 
S'I. .'? "an a . ... 
(...) After turning naive people against the founder of this Republic with words like "These 
are Western imitators, we want Shari 'a " ... After causing young girls to protest on the streets, 
making them enemies of the secular regime, what is this wedding?" (Hurriyet, 20.06.2001)90 
8~uharrem Aydin et. al. 18.06.2001 'A palace wedding to Hodja's daughter' Hurriyet; Nebahat Koc & Huseyin 
Ozalp, 20.06.2001, 'Six thousand red roses for Elif Sabah . . 
90 Bekir Coskun, column, 20.06.2001, 'This is the wedding of the just system' Hurriyet, emphasIS mme. 
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In his lines, Coskun firmly positions himself together with Ataturk and his secularist readers 
who are included in his depiction of the 'we' against Erbakan, who emerges as a clear threat 
to the Republic and to the society whose religious feelings he has exploited. The journalist 
here makes a careful distinction between Erbakan and his party, and the nai've believers, the 
young girls, "all our sincerely religious Muslim brothers who voted for these,,91. This is also a 
distinction between the preferred and undesired versions of Islam, and the good Muslims from 
the bad. The good Muslims for the columnist form the masses of the society who are, like all 
masses, prone to manipulation. 
As for himself, Coskun sees himself not as against religion but, on the contrary, as a brother 
who has interpreted his religion in the right way. Calling out to his readers, Coskun argues 
that the wedding "concerns US,,92, as it is evidence revealing how "naive people have been 
deceived .. And a society has been broken into pieces." In doing so, Coskun, and through his 
column his readers, emerge as the bastion of Ataturk's values and beliefs, a protector of 
national unity and a guide for the Muslim masses who might have lost their way. 
Coskun's column sharply voices the concerns felt through the wedding coverage. In one 
news story included in Sabah's wedding coverage, readers learn about one naIve Muslim who 
has lost her way. Under the title "Her sister-in-law has also covered her hair" (Sabah, 
20.06.2001)93 readers are told that the groom's sister has started veiling "through the advice 
of Elif Erbakan". The following lines only work to enhance the feeling of threat for the 
secular readers: 
"Nurdan Altinoz, who had two years of graduate education and continued her education for 
another year in the States, had never covered her hair, nor dressed in a way that was more 
covered than normal, until the engagement. After the engagement, major changes were 
observed in Nuran Altinoz, and she started covering her hair." 
The item offers the case of a young woman, highly educated - let alone one of the masses -
who fell victim to the Islamists. The story could have served as a justification for Bekir 
91 E h' . mp aslsmme. 
92 My emphasis . , 
93 Nebahat Koc & Huseyin Ozalp 20.06.2001, 'Her sister-in-law has also covered her harr Sabah 
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Coskun's column. Here real Muslims are not inherently bad but naive, and in much need of 
the secularist intellectuals' guidance. 
6.3.1.5 Reading the wedding differently - the event as a sign of change 
Despite the general coverage, there are a few journalists who welcomed the wedding as a sign 
of change, or rather, as evidence of modernization. For Erdal Bilaller from Hurriyet, the 
wedding is a conscious effort on Erbakan's part (Sabah, 19.06.2001)94. The columnist argues 
that as the Virtue Party is waiting to be closed down by court order and renewalists within the 
party are preparing to break free, Erbakan is getting ready for a ''fundamental change (I)": 
"Why not? 
(Maybe) Erbakan Hodja also realized that it is time to change and explain and show this 
change to the public? And he proved it by even marrying his daughter in a wedding with 
gypsy music playing in the background .. " 
Billaller's tone is suspicious, yet not overtly pessimistic about the possibility that Erbakan 
"might have" changed, moved closer to the centre to appeal to a larger political base. In other 
words, the wedding is a sign of the compromise Erbakan is willingly making. On the other 
hand Can Dundar, writing for Milliyet newspaper, locates change elsewhere, seeing it as 
emanating from the tension between "the Western lives of our children and A la Turca lives of 
our ancestors" (Sabah, 21.06.2001)95. He argues that Erbakan probably would have preferred 
another kind of wedding for his daughter, however he did not have much choice: 
"( ... ) life drags a leader, whose political career had been devoted to lamenting the Western 
Club, towards the wedding table of the Western Club with his daughter in his arms, and a red 
rose on his jacket' 
Laughing off the claims that the wedding did not conform to Islamic traditions, he sees the 
much criticized wedding as yet another inevitable outcome of modernization, where traditions 
are destined to change: 
94 Erdal Bilallar, column, 19.06.2001, 'The new keeper of the Hodja's (treasures)' Sabah 
95 Can Dundar, column, 21.06.2001, 'The groom is ours, the bride is ours' Sabah 
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"We are running towards modernity, shedding on our way all the traditions that we have been 
keeping for centuries. In this run, some traditions change, some disappear, some remain the 
same. " 
Here change is not matter of choice but an inevitable, affecting both the secularists and the 
Islamists. Furthermore, Dundar does not see hybridisation as limited to the Islamists. F or the 
journalist, the weddings of the "secularist' families are no different: 
"They start with the Islamic marriage, continue with the civil ceremony and the La 
Comparsita. When the first show is over, and alcohol loosens up the minds, there is a return 
to the "roots"; jackets end up being tied around the waists, folk dance starts, ( .. J and the 
bride gets showered down with money,,96 
Dundar's column is evidently more welcoming than many other news items towards the 
notion of hybridities, which he sees as a part of Turkey's experience of modernity. 
Nevertheless, he still envisions this process as producing one irresistible experience, towards 
which all groups in society, secularist or Islamist, are pulled into, transforming them all the 
same, and dragging them towards an inescapably more Westernisedlmodernised model. 
In this context, I find the interpretation offered by Taha Akyol, another columnist from 
Milliyet newspaper, more radical (Milliyet, 20.06.2001)97. Having been invited to the 
wedding, Akyol sees a contradiction in the conservatism of the criticisms directed at Erbakan: 
"Since Erbakan is a fundamentalist, even if you attack him with the most 'traditionalist' 
·11 b . .,J d . ,,,98 arguments, you WI e conSluere as progressIve. 
This paradox is caused by an "iron cage of rules that do not permit individual choices", which 
may belong to either secular or religious authorities, yet all reflecting the same authoritarian 
mentality. Hence, Akyol finds the secularists also responsible for what had been in a 
previously analysed column coined as "the society broken into pieces". For the journalist, 
what is happening with the Islamists is a totally different hybrid formation which Erbakan 
96 Author's emphasis 
97 Taha Akyol, column, 20.06.2001, 'Erbakan's daughter's wedding' Milliyet. 
98 Author's emphasis. 
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himself could not have foreseen twenty years ago. In another column (Milliyet, 22.06.2001) 
he regards the emerging hybridities as "the colours of life,,99, or rather as a sign of "multiple 
modernities", as opposed to black and white categories that "equate a particular modern life 
style with 'modernity"'. In doing so, Taha Akyol' s column draws attention to the possibility 
of different interpretations of modem life existing side by side. 
The only other journalist, who is openly critical of the secularist attitude, is a columnist Hadi 
Uluengin, from Hurriyet. Voicing his support for Taha Akyol's arguments, the journalist 
criticises the two polarized alternatives, which limit and forces people to choose between the 
veil and modernity (Hurriyet, 21.06.2001)100. Finding this same attitude responsible for the 
unsolved problem about the ban on wearing the veil in universities, he asks: 
"What do we want, gentleman, let's now talk about this frankly! 
Do we prefer our girls to be educated, or remain ignorant? 
Either covered or not, that does not change the vital importance of this question! 
(. . .) Authority, instead of forcing the girls to uncover their hair, open your eyes!" 
Here Uluengin retains a highly patriarchal form of address, gendering the decision makers as 
men who need to decide on how they ''prefer'' their women to live. In spite of this, he 
remains along with Akyol, one of the two journalists who attempt to distance themselves from 
what they call 'the authority' of the secularists. 
6.3.2 Overarching discourses and the concluding remarks 
With a few exceptions, the coverage ofElifErbakan's wedding remains largely faithful to the 
Republican discourses of modernity and secularism, and replicates the binaries of 'religious 
versus secularist' created by those discourses. These discourses are also apparent in Elif 
Sozen's wedding, however, the way they unfold with respect to the two brides differ 
strikingly. In the case of the first wedding, Elif Sozen was portrayed as the nation's daughter 
representing her nation-family. In the case of Elif Erbakan, she appears as the bride that 
represents, largely through her father, the Islamist community that poses a direct threat to the 
nation's modem identity and its secular ways of life. It is important to remember that at the 
99 Taha Akyol, column, 22.06.2001, 'Modernization?' Milliyet . . 
100 Hadi Ulengin, column, 21.06.2001, 'Covered hair or uncovered eyes?' Hurriyet, emphasIS mme. 
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time of the wedding, the 'reality' of this threat was also officially confirmed through the 
Constitutional Court's decision to close down Erbakan's two parties101 and ban him from 
politics. The negative coverage and criticisms of Elif Erbakan's wedding indirectly give 
support to this decision. 
But beyond this apparent 'othering', the extensive coverage of the wedding is less concerned 
with the threat represented by Elif Erbakan's family, than it is with the perceived 
inconsistency of the wedding with the Islamist identity. This is reflected in the particular 
attention journalists pay to the minute details in the coverage, from the groom's hobby of 
swimming to the red roses decorating the wedding tables, or the couple's plans of having a 
romantic honeymoon in Venice. Throughout these stories, the Erbakans are seen as 
selectively using the habits, tastes, lifestyles and cultural preferences that have been 
associated with the secular elite and their de-Islamisation in the Turkish modernization 
discourse (Gulalp 2003, c.f. Kandiyoti 1997). According to this discourse, as people urbanize 
and move up the class ladder, they are expected to shed their Islamic traditions on the way 
and their cultural practices will evolve toward a Western lifestyle (Gulalp 2003: 390). Such a 
unilinear vision of modernization reproduces the dichotomies of the secular that is modem, 
Western and urban, versus the religious, that is traditional, local and rural. In this discourse, 
religiously defined identities remain external to Westernisation and modernization102• 
In contrast, Elif Erbakan's relationship and her white wedding disrupt these dichotomies by 
merging Islamic patterns and values, with what are seen as Western consumption practices 
and lifestyles. In doing so, the wedding also re-appropriates the meanings of modernness and 
Islamism in Turkey. In other words, the wedding resists and challenges both the secular 
journalists' defInition of the Islamists, as well as their monopoly over the meaning of modem. 
The coverage that results in retaliation can be seen as journalists' attempts to re-enact those 
dichotomies that distinguish the modem secular from the traditional religious, and convince 
the readers of the incompatibility of the two lifestyles. This is largely achieved through the 
sharply satirical and sarcastic language used in the narration of the events, which portrays the 
merging of Islamic and Western practices as no more than laughable oddities, such as the 
101 The Virtue Party was closed shortly after the wedding. . . 
102 I should once again reiterate that modernization and Westernization are interchangeable concepts m Turkish 
modernization discourse. (See also Gulalp 2003:388) 
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exaggerated coverage of the 'romantic meeting' of the couple on their way to the pilgrimage. 
The Islamist white wedding, in this context, is written off as a "bad imitation", an unsightly 
hybridity that has tried but failed to replicate the Western model. This has important 
consequences: firstly, it discredits Erbakan's political leadership - and through him Islamist 
politics in general - for being unfaithful to his own political agenda and harbouring a secret 
desire for the West. This is particularly evident in the news stories that criticise the way he 
brought his daughter into the venue, or the way, just like Helmut Kohl, he pinned a red rose 
on his pocket. Second, in seeing the wedding as a hybrid of different traditions, and by 
equating that hybridity with poor imitation, even "freakishness", the journalists maintain the 
hegemonic imaginary about modernity as purely de-Islamised. Following from this, we can 
infer that in the secularist journalists' discourse, appropriations of modernity will always 
suffer from not being modem enough, and appropriations of religion will always result in a 
negation of the authenticity of religion. 
However, such a rejection reveals a highly paradoxical attitude: hybrid forms that were 
regarded as 'normal' or even desirable with Elif Sozen's wedding are criticised as 'anomalies' 
in Elif Erbakan's wedding. By too easily scorning Elif Erbakan's wedding for being a poor 
imitation, journalists also ignore the hybrid character of both the Turkish modernization 
project itself, and Turkish secularism, which clearly surfaced through the analysis of the 
previous wedding. 
6.4 "The veiled Diana"- Reyyan Mutluer's wedding 
6.4.1 Thematic analysis - themes addressed in the coverage and allocation of sub-themes 
to thematic areas 
On the face of it Reyyan Mutluer seems like any other Islamist bride who covers her hair 
while wearing a white wedding dress. In her case, however, the meaning of the veil has a 
particular resonance because she is marrying the Prime Minister's son. This posits the bride 
and the whole wedding with an exceptional representative power. However, it is this 
representation that becomes problematic for the journalists who try to defme who is being 
represented through the bride, in order to position themselves, their readers and the wedding 
guests with respect to it. The themes in the analysis reflect the journalists' attempts to 
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distinguish themselves from the bride, while acknowledging her status as the Prime Minister's 
daughter-in-law. 
6.4.1.1 The arranged little bride 
As noted previously, in relative terms to the other two weddings, Erdogan's son's wedding 
provides the reader with the least amount of information about the bride and the groom, their 
personalities or preferences. This might be due to the short time span within which the 
journalists found out about the engagement and the wedding plans, and their inability to 
access the couple or the two families for further information103• The fIrst items that appeared 
on the wedding underline the arranged nature of the marriage, such as Milliyet's story titled 
"Arranged style from Erdogan" (Milliyet, 11.07.2003)104. The news item is more about the 
parents rather than the couple who are to be married, as evident from the opening sentences: 
"AKP leader and PM Erdogan is in a wedding flutter. Erdogan is planning to marry his 
youngest son Necmettin Bilal to engineer Orhan Uzuner's daughter Reyyan Uzuner in the 
next month." 
The opening sentence from Sabah's story similarly mentions that, "The Bride that Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan wants for his younger son Bilal is the daughter of an 
engineer father and a lawyer mother" (Sabah, 12.07.2003)105. Such details not only position 
Erdogan as the focus of the stories from the very start, but also help to locate the bride, 
through her parents, as middle or upper middle class urban Islamists in the social map of 
Turkey. These items also underline the Islamist character of the approaching wedding - the 
'arranged' nature of the wedding informs the readers that this is not an ordinary love story 
between two young people who have met and fallen in love. 
Apart from her parents' socio-economic status, the readers do not learn much about the bride, 
who is reported to be "uneasy with the media attention" (Hurriyet, 06.08.2003)106. She is 
presented as a "little girf' or "her father's treasure" who would be driven to school by her 
103 Of course, given the groom's father, there might also have been a concern about the degree of 'acceptable' 
tabloidization in the coverage. With the groom being the Prime Minister's son and the very young age of the 
bride the private lives of the young couple might have deliberately not been questioned further. 
104 no by-lines, 11.07.2003, 'Arranged style from Erdogan' Milliyet 
lOS Ibrahim Gok, 10.07.2003, 'The flurry about the second bride at Erdogans' Sabah 
106 Asim Gone, 06.08.2003, 'Ms. Bride's home is under siege' Hurriyet 
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father every morning, and "treated with tender care" (Hurriyet, 05.08.2003)107. Through her 
teacher's comments, readers also learn that she has not yet completed her high school 
education but is planning to pick it up when she moves to the States where the groom is doing 
his masters degree (Hurriyet, 05.08.2003; Milliyet, 09.08.2003)108. In these stories Reyyan 
Mutluer appears as a 'child-bride' and all three papers particularly emphasise the bride's 
109 Whil th d .. f young age. e e eplctlOn 0 Reyyan Mutluer as the little bride raises questions as to 
the eligibility of the bride for marriage, the concern about her age is nowhere more evident 
than in Milliyet's coverage a few days before the wedding (09.08.2003)1l0. In Milliyet's 
story, covered on the front-page under the title "Little Reyyan can get married", Milliyet 
journalists reveal a copy of the court decision that approved Reyyan's marriage. Inside, one 
full-page is devoted to covering the wedding, and the headline follows up the front-page item: 
"And here is the permission for 'Little Reyyan's marriage". The scanned image of the court's 
decision is provided on the page and the coverage itself implies that this is not a 'normal' 
marriage as it requires the state's permission. Furthermore, the story also repeatedly notes 
that in order to get approval, witnesses told the court that the couple had been engaged for a 
year, which is reported as highly dubious, since the couple had only recently announced their 
engagement. Ece Temelkuran, a female columnist for the same newspaper finds this no less 
than a serious crime, committed not only by a specific 'community' but also by the secularists 
and even the state who have permitted it to happen: 
"In fact, girls as young as 'Ms.' Reyyan can only flirt. However, since 'flirting' is not 
approved of in that community, they quickly married off the two kids. A court judge decided 
that 'She is capable of carrying the responsibilities of marriage'. How could a judge know 
this? And why should a judge know this? Should everybody remain silent just because the 
groom is a good chance for her? Two children will, in one night, become husband and wife· 
Two children, just as it is preferred, will get married 'without seeing too much' and a divine 
door will be locked onto them. May they recover soon!' (Milliyet, 11.08.2003)111 
107 Senol Coskuner, 05.08.2003, 'Flurry in the bride's house' Hurriyet ..... 
108 Senol Coskuner, 05.08.2003, 'Flurry in the bride's house' Hurriyet; the same mformatlon IS also gI~e~ m the 
court decision quoted by Sukran Cakmak, 09.08.2003, 'And here is the 'Little Reyyan's permISSIon for 
marriage' Milliyet . 
109 According to Turkish laws men and women need to be older than sixteen to get mamed, but cannot get 
married without their parents' permission and the approval of the court until they are eighteen. 
110 No by-lines, 09.08.2003, 'Little Reyhan can get married', front page summary news, Milli~et . 
III Ece Temelkuran, column, 11.08.2003, 'Wedding in between philosophy' Milliyet, emphasIs mme 
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What is portrayed here is a young bride who is not free to decide on the life she wants to lead 
and instead follows through the life path drawn for her by her community. This is a 
community that is outside the journalist's own, where ' flirting ' and ' seeing too much' are not 
approved of. Not finding this other life fair, the journalist feels obliged to speak up against all 
those that remain silent and watch the child bride get married. For the journalist, the child 
bride is a victim of her community, whom nobody wants to rescue. 
The arranged nature of the marriage and the age of the bride help to distinguish the two 
communities where the journalists and the prime minister's family are located. But more 
importantly, they become proof of the lack of modernity in the 
Islamist community, and question the modernness of the Prime 
Minister. Derya Sazak, a columnist for Milliyet 
newspaper, fmds a contradiction in the Islamist claims about 
modernness and questions the genuineness of Erdogan' s efforts 
for EU membership: 
"In the EU candidate Turkey, while the Prime Minister argues 
for a liberal conservatism that is open to the West, he is 
marrying his son through an 'arranged marriage ', and the 17-
year-old 'veiled' bride is leaving her education and 
surrendering to tradition." (Milliyet, 11.08.2003)112 
Strikingly, journalists are more divided over the ' right 
Fig.3 "The veiled Diana",. ,. 
Milliyet interpretatIOn' of Reyyan Mutluer s weddmg than they were 
with ElifErbakan's wedding. Consequently, not all journalists agree with the victimisation of 
the bride, or see the young couple as surrendering to their parents' demands. Ayse Arman, a 
columnist for Hurriyet, draws a highly romanticised picture of the couple, describing her 
impression of the groom as "a fine boy, studying at Harvard. Well behaved and well 
educated" and the girl as "very beautiful and cute. And tasteful. And ready to play the 
marriage game" (Hurriyet, 12.08.2003)113. While her choice of words also complies with the 
112 Derya Sazak, column, 11.08.2003, 'The Wedding', Milliyet, emphasis mine . ' 
113 Ayse Annan, 12.08. 2003, 'Emine Erdogan will watch over the marriage like an eagle', Humyet, emphasiS 
mine. 
224 
image of the 'child-bride', she also expresses the initial surprise she had in seeing the couple 
for the first time at the wedding: 
There was something tangible between those kids. (. . .) The girl's eyes smiled continuously. 
They seemed as if they could not care less about the criticisms about being arranged, 
backward, young etc. etc. (. .. J They looked at each other lovingly. " 
Another journalist, who does not agree with the passive image of the young couple, is Can 
Dundar, who chooses the title "The veiled Diana" for his column (Milliyet, 09.08.2003)1l4. 
Calling the wedding one where" "Modern Turkey" asks "traditional Turkey" for a dance", 
Dundar maintains the argument he had voiced on Erbakan's daUghter's wedding (Sabah, 
21.06.2001)115. For Dundar, young people are the source of change through which hybrid 
patterns that involve the old and the new are formed. What he sees is the localization of the 
modem, as signified through the Turkish version of Princess Diana. In his version of events 
young people are far from surrendering passively: 
"Covered young people emerge, who agree to the arranged marriage, but disagree with their 
parents who tell them to "wait another year"; and go to the "West", to the States to continue 
their education. .. " 
Here, the journalist implies that it is Reyyan Mutluer who has chosen not to wait but to get 
married and leave for the States where she plans to continue her education. She emerges 
among the young people as actively producing a new life, a "Westernised lifestyle which is 
peculiar to Turkey" where young people from different groups, Islamist or secular, mix, 
match and blend different lifestyles. In doing so, the journalist argues, young people create a 
new experience of modernity, which Dundar calls "the new face of Turkey". 
6.4.1.2 Descending into the maddening crowd - when secularists and Islamists meet 
Most J' oumalists are however not as keen about the 'new face of Turkey' as Dundar is. Even , , 
for those who are not as critical about the meaning of the wedding, the differences between 
the two communities are undeniably clear. However, unlike Elif Erbakan's wedding, the 
114 Can Dundar, column, 09.08.2003, 'The veiled Diana', Milliyet, author's emphasis 
lIS See Can Dundar, column, 21.06.2001, 'The groom is ours, the bride is ours', Sabah 
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focus is no longer on the 'surprising adaptations' visible in Islamists' lifestyles or the 
consumption patterns of the Islamists. Neither is the veiled wedding dress the centre of 
attention and portrayed as an anomaly. This time, the coverage highlights the nervous 
encounters between the two worlds which the wedding brings out. 
One of the early instances where the theme of the 'meeting of the two worlds' clearly surfaces 
is an interesting and light story about coincidence. On the day of the wedding, and in the 
same conference centre where the wedding was due to take place, the 5th World Philosophy 
Conference was also being held with famous academics such as Jurgen Habermas attending. 
All three papers found the coincidence ironic, calling it a "'philosophical' wedding" 
(Hurriyet, 10.08.2003)116, and using a tongue-in-cheek attitude in informing the readers 
"Philosophy with the morning prayer, wedding with the afternoon one" (Milliyet, 
09.08.2003)117. However, the most striking headline on this emerges the day after the 
wedding, when the Sabah newspaper's front-page headline announces that President Sezer 
had attended the opening of the Philosophy Conference in the morning, but did not stay for 
the wedding in the afternoon (Sabah, 11.08.2003)118. The headline, "He did not stay for the 
wedding", is followed by the heading "President Sezer opened the philosophy conference in 
the same building, and left without waiting for the Prime Minister's son's wedding". In terms 
of visuals, the page is dominated by a very sulky picture of Sezer on the left, with the caption 
title "He prefers philosophy" and the smiling bride receiving her marriage certificate from 
Berlusconi on the right with the optimistic title quoted from Erdogan's words "May we wish 
the same happiness for Turkey". Such a tension between Sezer who ultimately represents the 
secular state, and Erdogan who represents the AKP government, would not surprise the 
Turkish readers. Since the start of Erdogan's tenure, Sezer famously vetoed many 
government bills, which were interpreted as tension between the secular Republic and the 
Islamist government. The news item re-emphasises already existing tensions in its headlines 
and pictures. At the same time, it should be noted that the language used in Sabah's coverage 
does not support Sezer's choice: 
"Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan had also invited President Ahmet Necdet Sezer" 
116 Tamer Yuksel 10.08.2003, 'High security alert for the 'philosophical wedding", Hurriyet 
117 Sukran Ozcabnak, 09.08.2003, 'And here is the permission for 'Little Reyyan's' marriage', Sabah 
118 No-bylines, front-page headline, 11.08.2003, 'He did not stay for the wedding', Sabah. 
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"He did not attend even though he was invited: Even though he had been in the conference 
centre that same day, he did not attend the wedding in which three prime ministers were 
present. Sezer left without waiting for the wedding after opening the Philosophy Conference 
. h ,,119 In anot er room. 
The insistent stress on the invitation that Sezer had received, the repeated use of the negative 
conjunction even though, the contrasting titles accompanying the two visuals and details such 
as the presence of three prime ministers all point out that it was not polite of a President to act 
as such. Mehmet Barlas, a columnist in Sabah newspaper also reiterates this opinion with a 
long title for his column: "Sezer should have gone to Erdogans' wedding" (12.08.2003)120: 
"Maybe, as an individual, he does not want to be seen in a veiled community. 
Maybe he got angry at the fact that a 17-year-old girl left her school, took on the veil and 
married through arranged marriage. 
But these are the realities of the country he is presiding over. " 
Although Mehmet Barlas finds Sezer's attitude inappropriate, he also implies that Sezer has 
plenty of reasons to disapprove of this marriage. Barlas is ready to accept these as a part of 
Turkey'S reality, yet carefully detaches himself from those realities, which he calls "Iocaf'. 
Barlas' argument is very much loyal to the ideal of modernization and believes that through 
the merging of the 'local'- which we can read as the 'un-modem' or 'traditional'- with the 
modern, he attempts to elevate the local to the standards of the developed world. He is sure 
that his readers (also implying President Sezer as well) are all after the same goal: 
"Aren't we all after fusing these local realities with the realities of the developed world?" 
Despite Barlas' calls for further merging between the two realities, no matter how unpleasant 
a task this might be for the secularists, President Sezer is not alone in his unwillingness to 
enter the other world. Most journalists fmd it at best uncomfortable to join a crowd with 
which they don't fmd themselves sharing much in common. Ilker Sarier, a journalist writing 
in Sabah, offers a good example of this in his column titled: "The analysis of the wedding" 
119 M h' yemp aslS. 
120 Mehmet Barlas, column, 12.08.2003, 'Sezer should have gone to Erdogans' wedding', Sabah 
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(Sabah, 13.08.2003)121. In his lines he criticises the media for exaggerating a crowded but 
very simple wedding into an "amazing" ceremony and blames some of his colleagues for 
being too keen to receive an invitation 122. He then remarks that: 
"1 was not sent an invitation. Even if I had received one, 1 most probably would not have 
gone. 
Because 1 would have been heavily bored 
1 don't like formal gatherings. ( ... J 
And besides, there is also this atmosphere of H conservatism" that is played out so obstinately, 
to be honest, it is all a bit unnerving. ,,123 
Journalists who attended the wedding also share the same discomfort about being in alien 
territories, where people do not have a similar lifestyle, education and social class as 
themselves. Again in Sabah, Ahmet Hakan expresses this feeling candidly in his column 
when he makes the distinction between the white Turks and Erdogan's followers (Sabah, 
11.08.2003)124. As discussed in more detail in the second chapter on Turkey, this expression 
refers to the elite, urban, middle or upper class, well-educated and secular population of 
Turkey. In his column, Ahmet Hakan not openly labels himself as 'a white Turk', even 
though his column implies that he would not mind it, but he makes it clear that Erdogan's 
guests do not belong to this category. The journalist "cannot believe his eyes" when he finds 
the unusual crowd, "the contingency AKP leans on", gathering in an affluent neighbourhood 
which he describes as one of Istanbul's white Turk populated residencies: 
"What do I see? A crowd of conservative common citizens who normally do not visit this 
neighbourhood surrounding the area! People looking at shop windows, passing time in the 
cafes until the wedding hour arrives .. " 
The scene reminds the journalist of the conquest celebrations that used to be held in the past, 
to celebrate the conquest of Istanbul by the Ottomans. He argues that in these celebrations, to 
enact the conquest itself, people would march from the outskirts of Istanbul to the city centre. 
121 Uker Sarier, column, 13.08.2003, 'The analysis of the wedding' Sabah . . 
122 Similarly, Emin Colasan, a prominent columnist in Hurriyet, criticises a colleague who had VOIced. hIS 
resentment for not receiving an invitation with sharp sarcasm and mockery in his column on 10.08.2003 tItled 
'Parazites in our press history'. 
123 E h' . mp aslsmme. 
124 Ahmet Hakan, 11.08.2003, 'A wedding that resembles conquest celebrations', Sabah 
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Here, we can point to two issues surfacing in the journalist's ironic and imaginative depiction. 
Firstly, in comparing 'the conservative masses surrounding the neighbourhood' to ' the 
Ottomans conquering the city from the Byzantine Empire', the journalist reiterates the 
modem-westernltraditional-religious distinction, if albeit in a very imaginative way. At the 
same time, in the metaphors of 'conquest' or 'masses surrounding an area' there is a powerful 
warning about power changing hands from what he calls the 'white Turks' to the masses. The 
elitist stance of the secular intellectual whom he represents, and the uneasiness felt about the 
high numbers of "others" is acutely felt in the following lines: 
"Even though the host was the Prime Minister, this was not a wedding that would be highly 
esteemed by the white Turks .. I am sure that any white Turk, who had to be at the wedding, 
looked/or ways to reach Lutji Kirdar [the conference centre] without being seen by anyone." 
The journalist describes how he leaves the wedding venue 
without queuing up to congratulate the couple and the parents, 
and walks up to a shopping arcade at the heart of the 
neighbourhood. There, away from the "maddening crowd", 
he sips his coffee in a cafe, which he describes as "the home 
of peace and quiet on Sundays" 125. Through the contrast 
between the welcoming calmness of the cafe (clearly a 
familiar spot for the journalist) and the maddening crowd (the 
trespassers in this neighbourhood) it becomes apparent that 
the natural habitat of the journalist lies in a part of Turkey far 
away from Erdogan's guests, in a location which is more 
fantasized than geographical, and whose original residents the 
journalist calls the white Turks. 
Fig.4 Mr. Press, Hurriyet. 
Even though the analysis here concerns news items, a cartoon 
that appeared on the front page of Hurriyet on the day of the wedding presents a wonderful 
piece of data, by making fun of the alienation the journalists feel towards this other world. 
The cartoon shows its main character, Mr. Press, a self-seeking journalist who knows 
perfectly how to exploit situations to his own advantage, and his wife. As Mr. Press is getting 
125 E h· . mp .aslS mme 
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ready for the wedding, his wife, in an absurd combination of very low cut summer dress and a 
colourful headscarf tells him resentfully "Press, I can 't believe you made me wear the veil for 
Necmettin BUal 's wedding ... " to which Press replies "Come on, just for a couple of hours, you 
can surely manage that ... " (Hurriyet, 10.08.2003)126 
Although Mr. Press and his wife are fictional and exaggerated characters, the cartoon is not 
too detached from reality. In fact, the awkwardness of Mr.Press' wife is clearly echoed in 
Ayse Arman's column in Hurriyet. After attending the wedding ceremony, Annan not only 
wrote about her impressions in a full page article (Hurriyet, 11 .08.2003)127, but also expressed 
her feelings about the wedding separately in her column (Hurriyet, 12.08.2003)128. In the 
column, Arman provides the readers with a sincere account of her feelings; starting from the 
time she started to get ready for the wedding: 
"There is no apparent reason. I feel like I am going to the wedding of "the children of 
another world". I pick the least revealing black dress from the hanger." 
F or Annan, the dress she is going to wear to the 
wedding gains a particular significance as a bearer 
of her identity in the alien world she is about to 
enter. She then quotes a conversation with her 
partner about whether the dress she has chosen is 
suitable for the event, and confesses that she does 
not "have such conversations" or concerns about 
'the propriety of her dress' when she is going to 
places that belong to "her world',129: 
Fig.S Ayse Arman with her black dress 
and two veiled girls at the wedding, 
Hurrivet. 
"1 only have one goal there, to look chic. (. . .) But in 
here, there is another issue: I am going into a 
crowd that I don't know, whose attitudes, reactions I cannot calculate. I obviously do not 
want to compromise my character, but 1 want to adapt and to be approved of as welr l3o. 
126 Latif Demirci, front-page cartoon, 10.08.2003, 'The wedding of the year from Mr. Press '. 
127 Ayse Annan, 11.08.2003, 'The abundance of colours in the veils", Hurriyet . ' ,, ' 
128 Ayse Annan, column, 12.08.2003, 'Emine Erdogan will watch over the mamage like an eagle , Hurnyet 
129 E h' . mp aslS mme 
130 E h' . mp . aSls mme. 
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In this, she finds a strange irony, and points out that "it is usually the veiled girls who feel 
nervous when going somewhere". However, at this wedding she feels uneasy because she is 
. "th ° 0ly" 131 I· I now ill e minOTl . t IS C ear that Arman feels that her identity is under threat as she 
prepares for the wedding. But she is certainly more relaxed by the end of the wedding, as she 
discovers that the other world is not as hostile as she feared: 
"Nobody treats me with an attitude that says, "He is not your PM You are different. " (..) I 
feel like we can start communicating. And this makes me happy." 
6.4.1.4 The obvious danger that nobody sees 
Despite the psychological challenge of entering 'the other side', Ayse Arman seems to find 
condolence in the fact that her minority status is only for the wedding, and once it is over, it 
will be the veiled girls who will again feel uneasy when going somewhere in her world. 
However, for Necati Dogru, a columnist writing for the newspaper Sabah, the wedding is not 
simply a one-off experience, but a major revolution that will overturn the existing balance of 
power in Turkey. In short, it is something much more serious: 
"Bilal's green wedding was a declaration of power by a public that used to feel suppressed, 
exploited, backward, ignorant, alone, deprived, and that embraced Tayyip Erdogan as their 
leader, and that live mostly in shanty-towns. (..) It is the celebration of the Anatolian 
revolution." (Sabah, 12.08.2003)132 
Here, Dogru picks up the same concern about the masses that Ahmet Hakan had depicted in 
his portrayal of the maddening crowd, but for him, the threat is far more serious and real. The 
journalist argues that the masses, who were looked down upon (by the secularists) in the past 
are now the new rulers. They had even managed to do a wedding "with a veiled bride, tightly 
covered followers, female party members covered in black chadors, male members sporting 
Islamic beards, with water served as alcohol" in "a location where the owners of the 
established system, Istanbul's elite, the heads of the big capital's big holdings dwell." 
Dogru's choice of metaphors to express his impression of the wedding reflects an open fear 
131 E h· . mp aSlS mme. 
132 Necati Dogru, column, 12.08.2003, 'A white, bloodless revolution', Sabah 
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about what he calls the 'white, bloodless revolution' of the belittled masses. In using the term 
'revolution', the journalist implies the election of the AKP government. The wedding is 
simply a 'celebration' of this 'Anatolian revolution', which overthrew the white Turk 
establishment. Dogru admits that he does not know what will follow next, but expresses his 
wish that Tayyip Erdogan would "give in to the system in spite of his contingency" 1 33 , and 
swap the fearful masses for the support of the secularists. 
The metaphor of revolution reveals not only a fear about the loss of power, but also the fear 
that the very foundation of the Republic is in peril. This is a hidden danger, well disguised 
under democracy. Some journalists hinted at such a risk by paying particular attention to the 
middle name of the groom, which is Necmettin, the first name of former Prime Minister 
Erbakan. For Guneri Civaoglu, a prominent columnist in Milliyet newspaper, this name is a 
reminder of Erdogan' s past: when Tayyip Erdogan's son was born, he looked up to Necmettin 
Erbakan as his leader and out of adoration, or as a political investment, gave his son 
Erbakan's name. Civaoglu argues that "Children are responsible for the life they lead and the 
things they will do" (Hurriyet, 09.08.2003)134 but hopes "his [Bilal's] life, his mind and his 
fate does not resemble his namesake Erbakan". What Civaoglu hopes will not happen is 
certainly a dormant threat for Ahmet Hakan writing in Sabah newspaper: 
"I am holding the wedding invitation in my hands. Inside it is written the expression "Our 
children Reyyan and Bilal", but on the cover, the names of the young people appear as 
follows: "Reyyan and N. Bilal". Now, in that letter "N" hides a "Necmettin " .. A hidden, 
concealed Necmettin." (Sabah, 10.08.2003)135 
Here the name Necmettin, an enemy of the Republic who was warded off only a couple of 
years ago with the closing of his parties returns under the disguise of the AKP government. It 
is this same danger that leads Yalcin Bayer, a journalist from Hurriyet, to choose the self-
explanatory title "Anxiety about the future of the Republic" for his column (Hurriyet, 
13.08.2003)136. Bayer starts his piece by announcing an Ataturkist declaration published over 
eight pages in a magazine, calling the nation to come together and save the future of the 
RepUblic against all impending threats. He does not mention the wedding in this part of his 
133 M h· yemp asiS. 
134 Guneri Civaoglu, column, 09.08.2003, 'The Wedding' Hurriyet 
I3S Ahrnet Hakan, column, 10.08.2003, 'About the Wedding' Sabah . . 
136 Yalcin Bayer, column, 13.08.2003, 'Anxiety about the future of the Republic' Hurriyet, emphasiS mme 
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column. The second section has the subheading "The Erbakan and Erdogan tradition", and 
draws a parallel between the two leaders, resembling them to two historical Middle Eastern 
rulers with different political strategies - the pharaoh versus the populist king. In line with 
these strategies, he argues, Erbakan and Erdogan chose different wedding venues - Ciragan 
versus the conference centre- for their children. The journalist suggests that both leaders 
should be assessed on the outcomes of their different strategies, not on their common Islamist 
heritage. However, the title of his column, the resemblance of the two leaders to no other 
than a Middle Eastern monarch, and the generous space allocated to the Ataturkist call of the 
magazine, all ask the readers not to wait, to be vigilant, and to protect the Republic. 
In this context the veil emerges as a symbol of the failure the Republican modernization 
project. Unlike the common attitude at the time of Erbakan's daughter's wedding, in their 
coverage of Reyyan Mutluer's wedding journalists do not see the veil simply as a marker of 
tradition. On the contrary, they are well aware of the contemporary political and social 
meanings it carries, and agree that it signifies new life patterns, and even admit that the veiled 
students in universities raised the visibility of covered women in the public sphere (Milliyet, 
11.08.2003)137. Yet, this new phenomenon is seen as going against the grain of Republican 
modernization, and journalists cannot understand why women insist on wearing the veil in 
order to take part in the public sphere. As journalist Derya Sazak argues in his column: 
"if this community did not refuse the earnings of the Republic, they could take their place in 
public life 'without veiling themselves '. While the mothers of today 's AKP MPs were not 
veiled in the 1930s and 40s, their wives and daughters today prefer 'the veil '." 
As Sazak nostalgically remembers the modem but modest women of the Republican era, he 
also warns his readers that "This trend cannot be considered outside the context of 
'Islamization of the public!' 138" 
The warning bells about the hidden agenda revealed by the wedding are more audible in 
Tufan Turenc's column entitled "This is not the picture of happiness that I want to see" 
137 Derya Sazak, column, 11.08.2003, 'The Wedding', Milliyet. Here, the writer particularly refers to and quotes 
Nilufer Gole's edited book on 'Hybrid Patterns', which argue that the veil signifies n~w life patt:ms where the 
veil should be read as an attempt at reconciling belief with modem urban life, whIch causes Its own set of 
contradictions. 
138 M h· yemp asiS. 
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(Hurriyet, 13.08.2003)139. The journalist openly refuses to see the wedding as a happy 
merging of the government and the nation and argues "The picture of happiness desired by 
modern people, and that which Tayyip Erdogan and his friends want to create are totally 
opposed to one another." For Turenc, the wedding shows the plain difference between the 
two different visions of Turkey, one that has veiled women, and one that does not. His mode 
of address is very direct and clear: 
"From our colleagues who watched the wedding, we learned that 80% of the guests (..) were 
veiled. 
It is a significant contradiction for a Prime Minister, who claims he is trying all he can to put 
Turkey into the EU, to be proud of such a picture. 
It is because of this difference in culture and perception that a large number of people in 
Europe do not want to include Turkey." 
For Turenc, the picture of Turkey created under Tayyip Erdogan's government is a big threat 
to Turkey's ultimate goal, being accepted as "European". It also questions the credibility of 
his government's efforts to get Turkey into the EU. But perhaps, the journalist's anxiety is 
perhaps best captured in his description of a photograph from the wedding: 
"A bearded man. He is going to the wedding in loose, baggy, creased trousers, and a white 
shirt. 
A step behind, he is followed by four women in black chadors. 
( . .) It is not possible to tell if one is his wife and the other three are his daughters, or if all 
four are his wives. 
Because only the eyes of the women are visible. " 
The powerful picture he chooses to share with his readers also speaks for the feeling of threat 
felt by other secularist journalists. It is a picture not of progression but regression under the 
AKP government. "This should not have been the point reached in the 80 year struggle for 
modernization in the Turkish Republic" argues the journalist. For the journalist, the AKP 
139 Tufan Turenc, column, 13.08.2003, 'This is not the picture of happiness I want to see', Hurriyet 
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turns back the clock to a time when Turkey is still struggling to make the jump into the 
European future. 
6.4.1.5 What difference does Berlusconi make? 
One more interesting theme running through the wedding coverage relates to the remarks 
made about Silvio Berlusconi's presence at the wedding as the groom's witness. From the 
day Berlusconi's attendance was announced, there was remarkable media interest in the issue. 
At the time Berlusconi was not only the Italian Prime Minister, but as Italy held the rotating 
presidency of the EU he also held an important position within the EU.140 Given his position 
and the symbolic significance of his attendance, it is not surprising that Berlusconi was turned 
into the celebrity of the event. 
Prior to the wedding all three papers announced his attendance on their front pages, with 
ironic comments about the 'friendship' of the two Prime Ministers. The day before the 
wedding, Hurriyet's title on the front page was "Will Berlusconi sing at the wedding?" 
(Hurriyet, 09.08.2003) 141, followed by half page coverage on his singing exploits at a previous 
wedding he had attended, noting that ''people are curious to see if he will pick up the 
microphone in Erdogan's wedding as well." (Sabah, 09.08.2003)142 Again on the same day 
Sabah's front page announced Berlusconi's wedding gift with the title 'And this is from your 
Uncle Silvio', accompanied by pictures of Berlusconi being embraced by Erdogan and the 
picture of a gold watch. The headline to the half a page of coverage inside reads "The groom 
gets a watch from his Uncle Silvio", with a tongue-in-cheek attitude about the friendship 
between Erdogan and Berlusconi. Following the wedding all three papers again had pictures 
of him on the front page this time while giving the wedding certificate to the bride. 
And yet, it is in the columns that journalists discuss the symbolic significance of Berlusconi' s 
attendance. Overall, it would be fair to say that Berlusconi is not the most reputable European 
leader in the journalists' opinion. There is not a single columnist who is impressed by him, 
140 Although the Albanian Prime Minster was also present at the wedding as one of the witnesses, there was no 
such coverage about his attendance. 
141 No by-lines, 09.08.2003, 'Will Berlusconi sing in the wedding?' Hurriyet, front page summary ne~s ,.. 
142 Foreign news department, 09.08.2003, 'Will he sing again?', Sabah, part of larger news Item SIlVIO 
Berlusconi is being the wedding witness' on the same page. 
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his role in the EU is regarded as "nothing to be exaggerated' (Milliyet, 09.08.2003)143 and 
they don't hesitate to remind their readers about his poor reputation and the charges of fraud 
brought against him, even when they might find his attendance a "very elegant, (. . .) simpatico 
gesture" (Sabah, 14.08.2003)144. There are two female columnists, Ece Temelkuran and 
Meral Tamer, who do not hesitate to use sharply critical language, describing him as 
"dishonourable" and "up to his neck infraud' (Milliyet, 11.08.2003; Milliyet, 10.08.2003)145. 
However, journalists are also generally pleased to see Tayyip Erdogan's choice of a European 
leader as his "best par' (Sabah, 10.08.2003; Sabah, 14.08.2003)146 and his son's witness. One 
journalist interprets his attendance as Erdogan's "very clear answer to those who wonder 
where the AKP is facing relative to Erbakan's tenure" (Milliyet, 10.08.2003)147. In these 
lines, Berlusconi's attendance expresses the hope - albeit faint - that Erdogan might have 
been deterred from Erbakan's Islamism and embraced the national goal. 
This comparison between the AKP and Erbakan is a recurring remark in many columns. On 
this, Guneri Civaoglu from Milliyet asks "Would it have been better if the witness were a 
mullah from Iran, a Gulf Region Emirate, or Kaddafl instead of Berlusconi?" (Milliyet, 
09.08.2003)148 Such associations are not coincidental. As Navaro-Yashin (2002: 49) notes, 
the Turkish nation has been constructed as regionally and culturally different from the Arab 
world, and regional affinity with the Arabs has been seen as an obstacle to Turkey's 
westernisation. With the Erbakan government, there was a radical attempt to change this 
regionalist stand, unite Turkey with its "Muslim brethren" and make new alliances with the 
Muslim world (ibid.: 50). Here, the chosen examples, and the particular emphasis on Kaddafi 
are to remind the readers about Erbakan's deliberate choice of the Arab World for his first 
visits abroad as Prime Minister. Although the items imply that Erdogan is a better alternative, 
it is significant in that in the secular journalists' imaginary, Erdogan is expected to put his 
143 Guneri Civaoglu, column, 09.08.2003, 'The wedding', Milliyet 
144 Servet Yildirim, 14.08.2003, 'The friendship of the PMs', Sabah 
145 There are two female journalists both from Milliyet who before the wedding criticise Berlusconi ~ery strongly 
and see no good in his attendance. Ece Temelkuran notes that "Berlusconi, who is announced as dls~onourable 
because he has committed fraud, is the guest of honour at the wedding' while Meral Tamer th~ such a 
questionable man cannot bring any fortune to the young couple and thus should not be ~ade the WItness.. She 
makes a wish: "You never know what may happen between now and then. Maybe he deCides not t~ ~ome In the 
last minute (. . .)." Ece Temelkuran, column, 11.08.2003, 'Wedding in between philo~ophy', .~llhyet; Meral 
Tamer 10.08.2003 'There can be no fortune about Berlusconi's (witnessing of) the weddmg', Mllhyet. 
146 Se~ Ahmet Hak~, column, 10.08.2003, 'About the Wedding', Sabah; and Servet Yildirim, 14.08.2003, 'The 
friendShip of the PMs', Sabah for an emphasis on this theme. . 
147 Meral Tamer, column, 10.08.2003, 'There can be no fortune about Berlusconi's (witnessing of) the weddmg', 
Milliyet. 
148 Guneri Civaoglu, column, 09.08.2003, 'The wedding', Milliyet, author's emphasis 
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allegiances with the Islamic World, rather than with Europe. The previously quoted Sabah 
journalist Ahmet Hakan also mentions that "There are no visitors coming from neither Arab 
countries, nor countries such as Malaysia, or Indonesia" (Sabah, 10.08.2003)149. Ajournalist 
writing a column for Sabah from Washington chooses the subheading 'Thank God Berlusconi 
is coming instead of another friend and brother from the 'Muslim leaders"', not forgetting to 
mention that Erdogan's invitation is received with smiles in the foreign circles that are 
'watching over Turkey' (Sabah, 11.08.2003)150. 
It is this Western gaze, constantly keeping an eye on Turkey, trying to decide on its 
Europeanness, that worries the columnist Guneri Civaoglu. He argues that given Berlusconi' s 
celebrity status in Europe, his visit to Istanbul to attend the wedding of the Prime Minister's 
son will gain wide coverage in the European media. For the journalist this "is a great 
propaganda opportunity for Turkey. It is a rare chance in terms of tourism advertisement." 
(Milliyet, 09.08.2003)151 However, along with the optimism, the writer notes that he is "still 
fretting with worry" about the possibility that all this might be ruined with "scenes that 
Turkey does not deserve, and is not Turkey's reality". It is evident that Civaoglu thinks it is 
the wrong crowd that, unfortunately, will represent Turkey to the Western world in this 
unique PR opportunity. His column is also a warning note to that 'wrong crowd', asking 
them to behave: 
"Of course Turkey has Islamic customs. There is nothing to say against that. But these 
should not be exaggerated, exploited Ataturk's secular Turkey should reflect these local 
colours with this wedding Hwithout overdoing" them. ,,152 
6.4.2 Overarching discourses and concluding remarks 
As with Erbakan's daughter's wedding, news coverage of Reyyan Mutluer's wedding also 
converges around a powerful othering of the Islamists, and reiterates the hegemonic 
imaginary of modem Turkey. However, if the coverage of the two weddings shares 
RepUblican discourses of modernization and secularism, it also differs in the ways in which 
journalists voice those discourses, and how they perceive themselves with respect to the 
149 Ahmet Hakan, column, 10.08.2003, 'About the wedding' Sabah 
150 AsH Aydintasbas, 11.08.2003, 'The Wedding' Sabah 
151 Guneri Civaoglu, column, 09.08.2003, 'The wedding', Milliyet, author's emphasis 
152 Author's emphasis. 
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'Islamist other'. Again, as with the wedding of Erbakan's daughter, the political context 
within which these discussions take place is important. Unlike the first wedding, when 
Islamist politics had been curbed by the closing down of the two Islamist parties, at the time 
of Reyyan Mutluer's wedding the ruling government party in Turkey was one that had 
splintered from those previously closed Islamist groups. The tone of coverage, ranging from 
uneasiness to moral panic and to a more aggressive call to arms to protect the secular 
Republic, reflects journalists' reactions to this context. 
This context also determines the striking difference between the journalists' perception of the 
two brides. Whereas Elif Erbakan does not pose any confusion over whom she represents, in 
the case of Reyyan Mutluer, it is a more problematic issue. The journalists do not accept her 
representation, like they had voluntarily done so in the case of Elif Sozen' s wedding. 
However, they cannot ignore her position as the Prime Minister's daughter-in-law either. 
Berlusconi's presence at the wedding complicates the issue further, not only because of the 
Western gaze he introduces to the wedding, but also because his presence alights fears about 
the possibility that Europe sees the young bride as representative of "Turkey's reality". 
Given the problem of representation, the discussion in the coverage heavily centres upon the 
question of gender, much more intensively than had been the case with Elif Erbakan. This is 
not surprising given the fact that gender has formed the touchstone of change throughout the 
different stages of the secularisation process in Turkey, with the removal of the veil as its 
most symbolic sign (Gole 1998: 58). For the journalists, the veiled child-bride who leaves her 
school because of her arranged marriage - and who largely appears as a victim "surrendering 
to tradition" (Milliyet, 11.08.2003)153 - clearly stands for the undoing of the modernization 
efforts of the Republic. In doing so, the Islamists are seen as reversing the progress made in 
modernization, with Turkey still trying to catch up with Europe. The previously discussed 
depiction by a Hurriyet journalist of a bearded wedding guest with four women walking 
behind him in black chadors with only their eyes visible, best captures this secularist 
imaginary (Hurriyet, 13.08.2003)154. 
If sarcasm and satire were the significant narrative tools that supported the secularist 
discourse of Erbakan's wedding, then in Reyyan Mutluer's wedding the secularist imaginary 
IS3 Derya Sazak, column, 11.08.2003, 'The Wedding', Milliyet . 
IS4 Tufan Turenc, column, 13.08.2003, 'This is not the picture of happiness I want to see', Humyet 
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is transmitted most vividly through the particular choice of adjectives and metaphors. These 
strongly associate the Islamists with the concepts of tradition, locality and masses. 
Examples are apparent in the depiction of the wedding guests as "Ottoman conquerors" 
(Sabah, 11.08.2003)155, "an obstinately conservative crowd' (Sabah, 13.08.2003)156, " 
covered in blaek chadors, male members sporting Islamic beards" (Sabah, 12.08.2003)157, 
"Anatolian" (Sabah, 12.08.2003)158, "loeaf' (Milliyet, 09.08.2003, Sabah, 12.08.2003)159, "a 
maddening crowd' (Sabah, 11.08.2003)160, or as people "that live mostly in shanty-towns 
(Sabah, 12.08.2003)161. At the same time Erdogan himself is portrayed as resembling an 
ancient "Middle Eastern monarch" (Hurriyet, 13.08.2003)162 and journalists are pleasantly 
surprised to have Berlusconi attend as a guest when, they were expecting "Muslim leaders" 
(Sabah, 11.08.2003)163 "mullahs, Gulf Region Emirates, K~ddafi" (Milliyet, 09.08.2003)164, 
and "visitors from Arab countries, or Malaysia or Indonesia" (Sabah, 10.08.2003)165. All of 
these are strong signifiers of the Muslim world, the opposite of Europe, and one of the 
important 'other's of national imagination. 
These metaphors express, to borrow the title from one column, "anxieties about the future of 
the republic" (Hurriyet, 13.08.2003)166. The coverage of Reyyan Mutluer's wedding, 
particularly in the columns, is highly different from the caricaturing of Islamists as "wannabe-
moderns" that dominated the coverage of Elif Erbakan's wedding. With Reyyan Mutluer's 
wedding, there is not so much an attempt to disregard the credibility of Islamists. Here the 
'other' is accepted as an alive and functioning reality of Turkey, but situated nowhere close to 
the imagined realm of the journalists. On the contrary, it is felt as an acute threat to the 
journalists' world. While some feel this more at an individual level, as in Ayse Arman's 
concerns about wearing her little black dress to the wedding (Hurriyet, 12.08.2003)167, for 
others it is the secular homeland of the journalists that is under attack. Again the use of 
155 Ahmet Hakan, 11.08.2003, 'A wedding that resembles conquest celebrations', Sabah 
156 Ilker Sarier, column, 13.08.2003, 'The analysis of the wedding' Sabah 
157 Necati Dogru, column, 12.08.2003, 'A white, bloodless revolution', Sabah 
158 Necati Dogru, column, 12.08.2003, 'A white, bloodless revolution', Sabah 
159 Guneri Civaoglu, column, 09.08.2003, 'The wedding', Milliyet; Mehmet Barlas, column, 12.08.2003, 'Sezer 
should have gone to Erdogans' wedding', Sabah 
160 Ahmet Hakan, 11.08.2003, 'A wedding that resembles conquest celebrations', Sabah 
161 Necati Dogru, column, 12.08.2003, 'A white, bloodless revolution', Sabah 
162 Yalcin Bayer column 13.08.2003 'Anxiety about the future of the Republic' Hurriyet 
163 " , 
AsH Aydintasbas, 11.08.2003, 'The Wedding' Sabah 
164 Guneri Civaoglu, column, 09.08.2003, 'The wedding', Milliyet 
165 Ahmet Hakan, column, 10.08.2003, 'About the wedding' Sabah 
166 bl' 'H . t Yalcin Bayer column 13.08.2003, 'Anxiety about the future of the Repu IC umye 
167 " •• I 'H . Ayse Arman, column, 12.08.2003, 'Emine Erdogan will watch over the mamage like an eag e, umyet 
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metaphors of "revolution" (Sabah, 12.08.2003)168, "conquest" (Sabah, 11.08.2003)169 and 
"Islamization of the public" (Milliyet, 11.08.2003)170 accentuate this conceptualisation. 
However, the threat here is not only to the secular foundations of the Republic, but also to the 
nation's goal of ever being accepted by Europe. 
It is this goal that unites the coverage of the three weddings. In all three weddings, Europe is 
imagined as external to Turkey, and as the ultimate source of modernity that Turkey needs to 
catch up with. With this, all three weddings become performances to test whether the nation 
has caught up with Europe, or whether it still lags behind. 
However, because that catching up is measured through similarity with Europe, it also 
involves a threat to the nationalist aspirations of 'being different'. What is needed is to 
reiterate sameness with Europe, while at the same time maintaining difference. To borrow 
from Bhabha's much cited formulation of mimicry, what is needed is to maintain "difference 
that is almost the same, but not quite" (1994: 86).171 For Bhabha the necessary ambivalence 
that emerges with the desire for the same-but-different, ruptures the authority of the discourse 
resulting in a continuous "slippage, excess and difference" that resists the West (ibid.). 
Similarly, in the desire to be Western-but-Turkish, the meaning of the West and Western 
modernity are appropriated, which attempt to prevent total Westernization. In this context, 
religion forms the secularists' touchstone which if used sparingly - or as in the words of one 
columnist, "without overdoing' it (Milliyet, 09.08.2003)172- might provide the desired 
difference from Europe by appropriating Western modernity without hampering the ongoing 
efforts to catch up with Europe. However, this inherent 'in-betweenness' of Turkish 
modernization is never brought up, mentioned or discussed when criticising the 'laughable 
hybridity' of other modernities as we saw in the case of ElifErbakan's wedding. 
In the next and concluding section I will further expand on the above-discussed anxieties 
about catching up and maintaining difference by borrowing insights from postcolonial theory. 
168 Necati Dogru, column, 12.08.2003, 'A white, bloodless revolution', Sabah 
169 Ahmet Hakan, 11.08.2003, 'A wedding that resembles conquest celebrations', Sabah 
170 Derya Sazak, column, 11.08.2003, 'The Wedding', Milliyet. 
I7l Author's emphasis. Although Bhabha discusses mimicry in the context of colonization, .and partic.u~arly to 
explain the colonizer's construction of the colonized/Other, his concept can be translated mto explammg the 
o~eration of the modernization discourse in non-Western contexts (c.f. Ahiska 2003: 374). 
1 Guneri Civaoglu, column, 09.08.2003, 'The wedding', Milliyet, author's emphasis 
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Conclusion: 
'Tracing the boundaries' 
In the first chapter, I set out a theoretical framework which showed how discourses of 
the 'nation' are never clear-cut, consistent and unambiguous, though they always 
present themselves as such. They are never singular or homogenous in their messages 
but offer "a cluster of ideas", an assemblage of various sub-discourses that mould our 
imagination about nationhood (Suny 2001). As a result, all nationalisms and national 
imaginations are "haunted by" ambivalences and contradictions (Bhabha 1990a), and 
the national identities that result are "beset with tensions and ambiguities, exclusions 
and inclusions" (Pierson 2000: 43). 
The same holds for the hegemonic imagination of nationhood in Turkey, which was 
the object of this research. As discussed in chapter two, this imagination merges two 
main sub-discourses: firstly, an ethno-nationalism, which envisions national identity 
in ethnic terms, and secondly the discourse of modernization, which defines the 
authentic source of modernity as Europe. It is because of this partiCUlar assemblage 
that the ambivalences that haunt Turkishness surface most vividly in discussions 
about Europe. In this, Turkishness is imagined as already holding an intrinsic 
capacity to be modem like Europe, but has not yet fulfilled its potential. This 
particular imagining, shaped by the state elite during the formative years of the 
Republic, is not the only narrative of the nation in Turkey today and has been 
subjected to growing criticism both academically and from a number of social groups. 
Nevertheless, it is still a functioning discourse that continues to inform other 
nationalist varieties in Turkey as their root nationalism, and has a stronghold in the 
mainstream media particularly with its neoliberal version (Bora 2003). It also unites 
the three case studies despite their wide differences in topic. 
Following from this, the data reveals a chronic fixation with 'Europe', and a 
continuous appraisal of Turkey's position vis-a-vis the West, fuelled by the ambition 
241 
of becoming modernlEuropean, and the awareness of not having yet fulfilled its 
potential. The very fact that the case studies received headline coverage in the 
mainstream press confirms the importance of the "imagined Western gaze" in Turkish 
national identity (Ahiska 2003: 365). The tragic suicides in the Batman region 
became a fashionable media story in Turkey only after their publication in a foreign 
newspaper, triggering the debate amongst journalists as to why the Southeast region 
had not kept up with the progress of the Western region. Similarly, the name of the 
athlete Sureyya Ayhan was pretty much unheard of, except to those who read the 
sports pages in detail, until one day Turkey woke to the headlines that a girl from an 
Anatolian town had made it to the finals of the World Championships. As for the 
news coverage of the three brides, the debate focused almost exclusively on whether 
or not the brides could successfully represent the modem Turkey to Europe. 
The central importance of Europe in the national imagination also reveals a set of 
anxieties about the desired national identity. Although these anxieties might be 
shaped by the specific dynamics of the Turkish context, they are hardly unique. With 
other non-Western and post-colonial nations, Turkey also shares the perception of 
modernity "as an ideal to be achieved, as a source of aspiration, as an expectation" 
rather than a nation-specific experience (Gole 2000: 40), and along with this 
perception, many of its concerns. First of these is the imagined delay in becoming 
modem, and the anxiety about making the necessary jump to catch up with the West 
(c.f. Ahiska 2003). This anxiety runs through all the case studies, and is particularly 
evident in the narration of Sureyya Ayhan's life story, becoming a defining element in 
the national imagination. Gole (2000) has argued that this feeling of delay results 
from a conceptualisation of modernity as unfolding in a linear and sequential time 
from the Western centre into the peripheries. If modernity has already happened in 
the West, then the non-West is doomed to be late, to lag behind, and be 'backward', 
resulting in what Johannes Fabian has called the "denial of coevalness" (Fabian cited 
in Gole 2000: 47). Similarly referring to Fabian, Chakrabarty (2000) criticises this 
denial in his deconstruction of historicism - the assumption that a certain amount of 
time elapses in the very process of development. Because his discussion about the 
post-colonial experience offers a valuable framework to understand the Turkish case, 
I will elaborate on his thesis here shortly and later in the discussion. 
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In his book Provincializing Europe, Chakrabarty argues that the ideology of 
historicism, i.e. that modernity originates 'first in Europe and then elsewhere', 
enabled Europe's domination of the world by equating the difference in historical 
time as cultural distance (ibid.: 7). This assumption relegates the non-Western to the 
waiting rooms; where national modernities are regarded as incomplete and partial, 
having to do some 'preparatory work' until they become fully modem. In an attempt 
to abolish the waiting rooms they have been placed in, the nationalist elite can resort 
to the argument that the nation "has had it from the beginning of history", (ibid.: 10)-
which offers us an insight into understanding Turkish nationalism's stress on the 
inherent potential of the Turkish people to be modem. This is the core argument in 
the work of Ziya Gokalp as discussed in chapter two. Despite this, the nationalist 
elite can never erase the hold of European historicism from the national imagination. 
Being modem always remains as a potential and the imaginary waiting rooms are 
never abolished, resulting in a continuous anxiety to minimize the waiting period by 
urgently making the necessary jump into the modem future, or more specifically in 
the Turkish case, into the EU. This feeling is nowhere clearer than in Sureyya 
Ayhan's story, which allows the nation to imagine itself as having made the desired 
leap from the small Anatolian town to the European Championships. 
The second recurring concern throughout the case studies is the problem of preserving 
the nation's cultural authenticity while becoming modem and European. If no 
modernity resides outside Europe, how will the nation become European, but also 
keep its cultural distinctiveness and prevent itself from becoming a mere copy? This 
is a main preoccupation in postcolonial nationalisms, which struggle to keep their 
nations' uniqueness from the West, while defining themselves as modem and on a par 
with the Western world (Chatterjee 1996). It has been equally important in the 
development of Turkish nationalism, and is still a defining concern as evident in a 
number of accounts throughout the data, particularly in the news coverage of Elif 
Sozen's marriage to Helmut Kohl's son, which continuously reassures the readers that 
Turkish cultural identity has not been compromised. 
These anxieties result in a paradoxical attitude in Turkey that resents and 'others' 
Europe, at the same time as it desires acceptance from and inclusion in Europe. The 
frustration resulting from this is apparent in the coverage of Sureyya Ayhan's 
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victories, which are reported to have made her European rival "cry", and Eurosport 
commentators "stand up in front of her with respect". It is also visible in the coverage 
of Elif Sozen's marriage, which reflected a strong wish to see Europe bowing to 
Turkish terms. 
This frustration is channelled towards those factors that are seen as obstacles to 
forming a less problematic identification with Europe. The Batman case study 
presents a lucid example of this. The backwardness and feudalism in the "other" 
undeveloped Turkey is reported as holding back the developed, European Turkey in 
which the journalists see themselves as located. This, however, disguises the 
inconspicuous ethnicization of backwardness and the labelling of the region as the 
'other' - after all, Batman seems to be a region where even the cats speak another 
language. The argument that backwardness emanates from another Turkey also 
serves a dual purpose. Not confronting ethnicity directly makes the discomforting 
obstacle less paradoxical to deal with in terms of national identity, while at the same 
time protecting and enhancing the supremacy of the national identity at the centre -
the desired la memete. To sustain this, Kemalist discourses on gender are employed: 
the otherlKurdish women are to be saved and re-incorporated into the national, but 
this requires firstly the acceptance of the superiority of the Turkish centre. In this 
process, the modernization discourse inherent in Turkish nationalism supports and 
justifies its ethno-nationalist claims. 
The case study of the three weddings shows that the role accorded to religion in 
Turkish national identity is more ambiguous, and hence the terms of its negotiation 
are more difficult. While Turkish secularism never excludes religion from Turkish 
identity (and as Elif Sozen's wedding shows, uses it as a source of cultural 
distinctiveness vis-a-vis Europe when needed) it makes sharp social and class 
distinctions along the binaries of secular/modem versus religiouslbackward. 
Consequently, protests are raised when the Islamists challenge these boundaries 
between themselves and the secularists by reinterpreting the meaning of Europe and 
modernity, and positioning themselves within, not outside, Europe. The dissenting 
comments about Elif Erbakan's lavish white wedding or Reyyan Mutluer's civil 
ceremony with Berlusconi attending reveal this attitude. The open challenges which 
the veiled white weddings direct towards the Kemalistlsecular classes' monopoly over 
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representing modernity, Europeanness and the associated life styles, blur the 
boundaries between the two classes and also question the Kemalist assumption that as 
people move up the class ladder, they will become Westernised and cast off their 
religious attachments (Gulalp 2003). Moreover, unlike the Batman case study, the 
internal other this time can no longer be easily excluded to the geographical 
peripheries, but has an undeniable visual presence at the centre. The debates, in 
general, can be seen as an attempt to re-erect the boundaries and secure the identity 
claims of secular classes with women forming the site of the struggle. 
Dreaming of a 'whiter' Turkey 
In spite of the ambiguities that infect the national boundaries, the analysed stories 
insistently voice fantasies of an ideal Turkey where challenges or threats to national 
identity have been expelled or eliminated, and the desired level of progress has 
nationally been achieved. Since this cannot be acquired in reality, in all three case 
studies, journalists carefully distance themselves from the sources of their anxieties, 
which they locate in another community. The result is a Turkey imagined as divided 
into sections, if not geographical regions, such as the outskirts of urban towns, the 
Southeast, or the Anatolian villages, and with distinct populations that occupy these 
territories like the Islamists, the Kurdish population or the local townspeople and 
peasants. Such a vision disguises larger problems by restricting the debates to a 
particular locality, as was the case with the Batman suicides; presents transgressions 
as anomalies, as was the case in Elif Erbakan's wedding and Reyyan Mutluer's 
marriage; or when in line with national aspirations, portrays them as miracles as in 
Sureyya's story. The ideal enclave is reached by cutting off from the 'other Turkeys', 
or as one journalist referring to Sureyya had rightly put it, by arriving at a Turkey that 
one can be proud of "in spite of Turkey" 1. 
At the same time, this ideal community, purified from problems is also more than a 
mere fantasy - openly or in between the lines, journalists describe themselves as 
belonging to a 'whiter' Turkey, an identification which came up explicitly in the 
discussion of Reyyan Mutluer's wedding, but can be traced throughout the data. In 
1 Kanat Atkaya, column, 08.08.2001, 'Let's clone Sureyya', Hurriyet. 
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fact, this rhetoric is surprisingly strong in all three case studies. The elitist enclave 
favoured blatantly or implicitly in the news coverage strongly upholds an ethnic bias 
in constructing Turkish identity. While this is most strikingly observed in the Batman 
case, through the geographical location of the backwardness, the clash of cultures and 
the Kurdish other in the Southeast (thus leaving the Turkey where journalists are 
located free from such problems of difference), the ethnic undertones of nationalism 
are equally strong in the news stories supporting the "Anatolian miracle" of Sureyya 
Ayhan, or in praising the bride who will give Helmut Kohl "Turkish grandchildren". 
If we are to see these depictions as part and parcel of the modem and civilised Turkey 
in which the journalists prefer to locate themselves, then nationalism naturally 
becomes a welcome discourse in this universe. In this ideal community, there is also 
full support for Kemalist secularism. As mentioned previously, journalists are quite 
clear when it comes to the rejection of the Islamists, even though the justification of 
this expulsion and the positioning of religion in the construction of identity are much 
more ambiguous. Even when some writers advocate open dialogue with the Islamists, 
they do so by carefully disassociating themselves from this group, and locating 
themselves outside the mental landscape of the Turkey that the Islamists occupy. 
Intertwined with the ethnic and secularist preferences, and supporting these, is an 
unapologetic class bias. The inadequacy in economic status is seen as one of the 
major causes of cultural clashes between communities occupying the different 
Turkeys. In this context, class distinction becomes not about financial means, but 
about how those financial assets, combined with civilisationary progress, help the 
secular journalists easily blend in with the Western world (Bora 2003). Class bias 
frequently surfaces to justify national preferences, such as in the ostracizing of 
Sureyya Ayhan's coach; in the pity felt for the poverty stricken Kurdish women; 
through the discussion of the journalist's 'little black dress' that feels out of place in 
front of Erdogan's veiled guests; or with the unbearably 'kitsch' wedding of 
Erbakan's daughter. In doing so, the news stories align the ideal Turkey with the 
refmed tastes and looks of the journalists, and its internal others and dissenting voices 
with the other Turkeys that hinder the level of progress achieved by the former. 
If anything such a "harmonious heimat" (Rathzel 1994), ignores the ambiguities that 
are inherent in its very own depiction - the ambivalences and negotiations that exist in 
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the very idea of nationhood envisioned by the journalists. Furthermore, it creates a 
no-win situation - locating the other Turkeys in rural hinterlands, or at the outskirts of 
modem urban life, already sets the balance of power against those that are seen as 
occupying the outskirts of the ideal Turkey. 
Here, I want to return to Chakrabarty's discussion, which I find noteworthy in 
illuminating two issues. Firstly, he draws our attention to the politics of historicism 
taking place not only between Europe and the non-West, but also within the non-
Western nations. He accurately points out that different non-Western nationalisms 
produce "local versions of the same narrative, replacing "Europe" by some locally 
constructed centre" (ibid.: 7) We can say that this doubles the effect of historicism: at 
the same time as the nation anxiously waits for its much deserved leap out of its own 
waiting room, by demanding a certain path of progress from those that lie outside the 
established centre, journalists locate the nation's peripheries in the nation's waiting 
rooms, rejecting alternative experiences as potential contributors to modernity, and 
moreover, rejecting coevalness with its own peripheries. By trapping itself in a 
vicious circle, the centre also makes it impossible for it to leave the room that it waits 
ill. 
However, as well as delineating the repressive character of modernity, Chakrabarty 
also directs our attention to the ongoing challenges and interruptions to modernity. 
This he does through a positive re-reading of Marx. Chakrabarty uses Marx's 
historical understanding of capital and his argument that capital initially posits a 
particular past as its 'necessary precondition' -which Chakrabarty calls History 1. By 
setting those preconditions, capital denies other alternative pasts and narratives of 
itself. It sees those pasts as its antecedents but not antecedents established by itself, 
and therefore not as constitutive of its own life-process -Chakrabarty calls this 
rejected past History 2 (ibid.: 63). Here, Chakrabarty observes two processes that 
take place side by side: firstly, global capitalism tries to repress difference and reduce 
all histories to its own. As a result, it becomes constitutive of historical difference 
(ibid.: 70). At the same time, History 1 can never be fully totalising. This is because 
capital's singular history, its universality, its 'totalising thrusts', is constantly 
interrupted and deferred by the alternative narratives of History 2 (ibid.: 66). But this 
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relationship need not be limited to the narrative of capital only, History 2 can just as 
well disrupt other narratives, most importantly, the narrative of modernity. 
Throughout his book, Chakrabarty repeats insistently that by 'provincialising Europe' 
he does not aim to reject the values of European modernity altogether - rather it is the 
singular history that he attempts to deconstruct. What Chakrabarty is more interested 
in is the translation of those 'diverse life-worlds and conceptual horizons about being 
human into the categories of Enlightenment thOUght' (ibid.: 71). Such a perspective 
also allows Chakrabarty to read what historicism has often labelled as modernity's 
'lack', 'failure' or 'inadequacy' as 'plenitude' and 'creativity' (ibid.: 34). 
Here, Chakrabarty is not alone in his argument. Other writers in the Alternative 
Modernities school have stressed the need to accept that modernity results in multiple 
and incomplete trials in the national site, which, for Goankar, should be seen as 
"creative adaptations of modernity" (2001: 18). Similarly, Gole has argued that 
modernity in non-Western contexts should be approached "neither in symmetrical 
terms, nor in terms of deficiency and contrast with the West, but rather in its "extra" 
character" (2000: 50). Labelling the non-Western modernity as "extra" not only 
expresses the modernist aspirations of the non-West, the "fetish of modernity" but 
also "conveys the sense of the uncommon as extraordinary, open to surprises, hence 
worth knowing" (ibid.). In short, it gives an "opportunity for awareness and new 
ways of seeing" (ibid.). 
These arguments can help us reconsider the Turkish case. In discussing the Turkish 
experience, a good starting point is to re-construct the meaning of - and expectations 
from - modernity within Turkishness, and see the hybridities and the paradoxes that 
become more pronounced at the peripheries, not as anomalies, but as a part of 
Turkey's engagement with modernity. Both the Turkish modernization project, which 
has often been assessed on the basis of its success in copying the Western modet2, and 
the further hybridisations outside the centre constitute what Chakrabarty wants to 
discuss as plenitudes of modernity. Denying the hybridity of what the journalists see 
2 Remembering Daniel Lerner's observations, which I briefly discussed in Chapter 4 ~hould suffice. 
See also Ahiska's (2003) argument on academic scholarship's evaluation of the TurkIsh case as a copy 
of the Western model. 
248 
as 'margins' also denies the hybrid modernity that the centre has crafted since the 
formative years of the Republic. The uncomfortable asks to be negotiated by its 
acceptance within the national boundaries. 
It is also worthwhile to note an objection that is raised about the usefulness of this 
paradigm by Meltem Ahiska (2003). Ahiska argues that the alternative modernities 
framework "does not really address the problem of the worn-out but still alive 
representations of modernity", neither do the hybridities and heterogeneities of the 
identities erase the historical markers of East versus West that are still present in the 
hegemonic imaginary (ibid.: 362). She continues: "the limiting and the totalising 
imaginary may not be at all congruent with the efforts of "creative adaptations" of 
modernity practiced by heterogeneous groups in society". (ibid.) Here, I do agree 
with most of what Ahiska argues. However, I find the above outlined arguments 
helpful not only in understanding the experiences that run counter to the Turkish 
hegemonic imagination, such as 'Islamist modernities', but also in studying the 
ambivalent discourses of the hegemonic imagination in Turket. If we are to start 
first by deconstructing Turkish imaginary, we should start by accepting Turkish 
national modernity as composed of multiple, and not necessarily consistent discourses 
about modernity. From that starting point we can then begin to discuss the 
"modernity at the margins" (Bhabha, 1990). 
Lastly, a caveat: although the meaning of modernity is essential to national identity in 
Turkey, both for the hegemonic imagination and for the more resistant forms, it does 
not hold all the answers to solving the problems of belonging in Turkey. What I 
found in the data analysis more recalcitrant to deconstruction than the secularist 
discourses of modernity are the discourses about ethnicity. Turkishness as an ethnic 
belonging is the one discourse that remained unquestioned by journalists in all three 
cases. But this not only takes place through the overtly nationalist headlines that we 
see in the coverage of Sureyya Ayhan's victories, or Elif Sozen's wedding. It also 
emerges through the gaps and silences in the Batman case study. As Foucault 
3 Ahiska acknowledges the hybrid character of the Turkish modernizatio~ ~roject, but she. does not 
explain why this cannot be considered as an alternative itself. In my opmlOn, she to~ qUIC~y and 
unconvincingly writes off the alternative modernities paradigm, especially when her mam. theSIS about 
the displacement of the present in Turkish hegemonic imagination can be traced straIght back to 
Chakrabarty's discussion. 
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reminds us, silences, "things one declines to say, or is forbidden to name, the 
discretion that is required by different speakers" are "an integral part of the strategies 
that underlie and permeate discourses" (1998: 27; c.f. Macherey 19784). In the 
coverage of the suicides, the violent experience of the State-Kurdish conflict is only 
alluded to by the journalists, it is barely mentioned, yet it is never discussed or 
interrogated. Without this silence, the story could not have been covered as a problem 
of (or rather, a lack of) modernity. This is something that cannot be completely 
resolved without transcending the ethnic basis of nationalism. For Turkey, as well as 
for many other nation-states, as long as national identity is centred on ethnic 
belonging, exclusion of' other' ethnicities is inevitable. 
Finally, as just mentioned, I would like to pick up on what is left silent and remains 
untold when discussing the role of women in the case studies. As all the case studies 
have revealed, the discussions about modernity and national identity take place 
through representations of women, with the continuous comparison of "our" women 
to the women of the 'other' Turkeys. However, these debates do not give voice to the 
women who themselves have caused the debate. Instead, women appear in different 
subject positions throughout the data. With the Batman case study or the veiled 
brides, they are seen as too helpless, incapable or brainwashed to speak the right 
words themselves. In particular the debates about modernity, and in Turkish national 
modernization discourse in general, women are often imagined as passive receivers of 
modernity. Alternatively they emerge as representatives of the nation, in which case 
the importance of the national symbol stifles any individual demands or possibility of 
identity, which can be said to be true in the cases of both Sureyya Ayhan and Elif 
So zen. Within the boundaries of these roles, other subject positions follow: such as 
the 'national daughter', the 'urban journalists', the 'Kurdish women', the' Anatolian 
woman', the 'adulteress', the 'Islamist'. But outside these pre-described roles women 
cannot speak directly to us in these stories. As the news stories refuse to give them 
voice, women turn into what Macherey (1978) calls the structuring absences in the 
texts. 
4 Although Macherey and Foucault have both pointed to the significance of gaps, it has to be ~oted that 
their approaches and theoretical perspectives are very different. In oppos.ition to.Foucault's d.ls~ourses, 
Macherey works from within a Marxist paradigm and seeks to reveal the IdeologIes that remam m the 
literary texts' absences. Spivak (l988b), not surprisingly, also uses Macherey's work. 
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Undoubtedly women, through whom the ideal Turkishness is constantly played out, 
will be the first to benefit from any attempts to deconstruct the nation and reconstruct 
it on a more inclusive basis. An open dialogue on the meaning of modernity and 
national belonging can only give more voice to women who have for so long 
represented national boundaries, helping to relax the tight link between discourses of 
gender and national identity. 
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